

CHAPTERS IN
WESTERN
CIVILIZATION



VOLUME I

CHAPTERS IN

Western Civilization

SELECTED AND EDITED BY THE
CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION STAFF OF
COLUMBIA COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Volume I SECOND EDITION

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION



THE READINGS in this book have been selected and prepared in order to help clarify for the student the background of contemporary institutions and ideas. At Columbia College they are designed to accompany the study of basic source materials in the course "Contemporary Civilization." The first year of this course centers attention on the two-volume source book *Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West*.

The choice of the "Chapters" represents no claim to completeness. The editors are fully aware of the fact that significant phases of the growth of Western civilization are omitted. Their first thought has necessarily been the needs of Columbia College students, and they have preferred to limit the size of the book rather than to include material of dubious value so far as these needs are concerned.

At the same time it is hoped that the book will serve the needs of other readers and of other courses. Each of the two volumes is self-sufficient and may be used, for one purpose or another, with or without source readings.

Of the eleven chapters in this first volume, six are articles specially written by men who either are or have been associated with Columbia University. The other five have been drawn from various publications. Of the six specially written chapters, three have been prepared for this volume; the other three were originally prepared for the Contemporary Civilization Manual which the present publication supplants, and have been revised by their authors or by the editors.

With so diverse a representation of writers, perfect harmony and unity of interpretation are not to be expected. But in matters of such great complexity as those here dealt with, a certain variety of approach is highly desirable. For the student it helps to develop a sense of perspective which makes the body of fact more meaningful. Inevitable, also, in a book of this character is a slight

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

amount of repetition, both factual and thematic. We have preferred to profit from the pedagogical value of such repetition rather than to edit individual contributions to the point of mangling.

We wish to thank Morroe Berger, Henry F. Graff, Idus L. Murphree, and Fritz R. Stern for their assistance in reading proof; and the publishers mentioned in the table of acknowledgments for their kind permission to use material appearing under their imprint.

Editorial Committee

JOSEPH L. BLAU

JUSTUS BUCHLER, *Chairman*

GEORGE T. MATTHEWS

Columbia University

June, 1948

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION



BOTH VOLUMES of "Chapters," and particularly the second, have been enlarged in size, greatly amplified in scope, and greatly augmented in the quality of their materials. Additions and substitutions have been made. As in the previous (1948) edition various chapters have been specially written, and the remaining majority are from publications by men outstanding in their fields.

For the benefit of courses which may wish to use "Chapters" in conjunction with a book of source readings, the chapter titles now parallel those in *Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West*. It will be readily apparent, however, that the new "Chapters" can independently serve a variety of other needs. They present a political and economic history of Europe from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century. Interpolated with this history—and, for purposes of a general education program, of far greater moment—are thematic expositions of the intellectual realms that have concerned the occidental mind. Within the limits of available material and the aims of the book, the Committee believes reasonable completeness to have been achieved in this edition. This does not signify systematic and integrated "coverage." Owing to the diversity of sources drawn upon, the reader will discover overlapping, omissions, and divergencies in emphasis and points of view. Perhaps, however, this is to be desired, for it is a quality which civilization itself appears to exhibit.

We are grateful to Eleanor W. Blau and Nora Louise Magid for editorial services and to Susan H. Bowen, Anita S. Gelber, and Marilyn S. Reichler for assistance in reading proof. We also wish to thank the publishers listed in the table of acknowledgments for their kind permission to reprint copyrighted material. The large extent of our debt to Dean Lawrence H. Chamberlain of Columbia College, to Justus Buchler, Chairman of Columbia's

Contemporary Civilization Program, and to John Kotselas of Columbia University Press is recorded in the Preface to the *Source Book* which is the companion to this volume. Until the end of 1952 George T. Matthews was chairman of the Committee, and the other members gratefully acknowledge his invaluable services.

Editorial Committee

JOSEPH L. BLAU

RALPH H. BOWEN

PETER J. GAY

SIDNEY GELBER

GEORGE T. MATTHEWS

RICHARD M. MORSE, *Chairman*

STEPHEN W. ROUSSEAS

Columbia University

February, 1954

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CHAPTERS IN
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CIVILIZATION



VOLUME I

Chapter I

THE MEDIEVAL HERITAGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, POLITY



THE EARLY MEDIEVAL ECONOMY

THE DYNAMIC qualities of contemporary society are obvious from the most superficial examination. Changes in social structure are taking place everywhere. War has been the great catalytic agent which has speeded up the social changes to a point where they can be studied with the naked eye. The average citizen is acquiring a sense of history without a determined study of history. But in spite of the apparently rapid evolution or revolution that goes on about us there are fundamental institutions in our society that change, or have changed, but slowly. The Catholic Church is still with us, a surprising amount of medieval and Roman law is still actively in use, we still prove the congruence of triangles in the fashion of Euclid, and the parliamentary system, a heritage of the Middle Ages, is still used over half the world.

It is the presumption of this book that the complex nature of our Western society can be better understood if we realize something of its development and can examine the earlier institutions from which those in contemporary society have emerged. It is also presumed that the embryonic period of Western society is the Middle Ages (from about 500 A.D. to 1500 A.D.), when the people of Europe first settled down in a more or less permanent fashion in the European area and took up the fruits of classical antiquity and the Near Eastern cultures, mixing them into a civilization that conformed to their own backgrounds and capabilities.

The study of the medieval institutions important to contemporary society will be facilitated by the adoption in these chapters of a somewhat artificial division of man's activities: economic, political, religious, and intellectual. It is to be remembered, of course, that all man's activities are thoroughly interrelated despite the facility with which historians make such divisions for the

This chapter, designed especially for the present volume, has been revised from its form in the first edition and is by Marshall Clagett.

purpose of study and exposition. In addition to this over-all division we shall use another convenient division, namely, the separation of man's activities from his thoughts about those activities, in short, the distinction between practice and theory.

In order to examine most aspects of medieval life and institutions, we must start with some reference to antiquity, and particularly to the period just preceding the Middle Ages, that is, the period of the Roman Empire. The Mediterranean area under the Roman Empire constituted a political and economic unit. The Germanic peoples and other barbarians in Europe and elsewhere were on the periphery of that unit, yet attached economically thereto. By the third century A.D. the Empire was beginning to be extensively barbarized. The slow infiltration of barbarians increased to a virtual occupation of the West in the fifth and sixth centuries. During this same period the political administration of the Empire was divided, and it was the western division that succumbed before barbarian inroads. Barbarian kingdoms began to grow up within the area of the western half of the Empire. While the fiction of political unity with the East was often respectfully maintained by the barbarian kings, for all practical purposes the new kingdoms were working out their futures independently of imperial ties. Their future polity and economy were to be a fusion of Germanic and Roman institutions. This fusion took place among the Visigoths in Spain (before they fell to the incoming Arabs in the eighth century), the Ostrogoths and Lombards in Italy, the Franks in France, and other peoples elsewhere in the West. Historical evidence seems to show that even though the political unity of the Mediterranean was shattered (the attempt of Justinian in the sixth century to restore the West to the political control of the Empire proved only partially successful), there remained considerable economic unity until the rise of the Arabs in the seventh century, or, if we are to believe recent German historians, right through to the acceleration of commerce and trade in the eleventh century. At any rate, with the rise of the strong Carolingian house in France in the eighth century, the political center of gravity began to shift northward. We shall shortly see what role the Carolingians played in the formation of feudalism.

There is a great deal of discussion and disagreement as to the conditions of the economy of the early Middle Ages. According to an older view, the barbarian infiltration, invasion, and occupation of the western half of the Roman Empire produced a great catastrophe in the economy of the West. One economic historian of considerable stature thus epitomizes this view: "Humanity has seldom known miseries so great as those of this period." He goes

on to say that Roman institutions either passed away or were greatly modified by the Germanic invaders, that a considerable portion of the land changed hands, that workers were uprooted, that Germanic village and rural organization tended to displace the Roman villa communities. This "catastrophic" view is rarely held today. Research into the origins of medieval institutions has tended to support the opposite view that there was, on the whole, a surprising continuity of economic institutions from the late Roman Empire to early medieval kingdoms. For example, the basic rural or manorial system so characteristic of the Middle Ages owes much to the Roman organization of rural estates, and is, in fact, its direct heir. Furthermore, forms of land tenures, the cities, and certain municipal organizations and institutions continued to exist under the Merovingian and other Germanic kings in the sixth and seventh centuries. It appears to be little more than a fable that the barbarians shunned the cities and sought rural areas, as the older view taught us, for the greatest of the Roman cities continued their existence during the occupation, even if their population did fall off. Marseilles, Nîmes, Bordeaux—even Paris and Orléans—appear to have been flourishing centers and to have had merchant populations during the sixth century. On the whole, there was a sense among the Germans of falling heir to, or rather becoming a part of, the Empire; and, where able, the Germanic peoples tried to preserve important institutions and customs.

Intimately bound up with the question of the survival of Roman institutions is a second question as to whether or not the barbarian kingdoms adopted or sank into a natural or domestic economy, that is, an economy essentially closed, with local trade only, with exchange taking place by barter in kind (produce) rather than money. The answer is difficult, but it seems increasingly clear that the economic unity of the Mediterranean was preserved after the barbarian invasions and the formation of their kingdoms in the West. Some of the western cities, particularly Marseilles, were still doing business with the wealthier and more highly cultured cities of the East (especially with Constantinople and the cities of the Syrian and Asia Minor coasts), as well as with ports in Africa, Egypt, Spain, and Italy. The foreign merchants at Marseilles are mentioned in contemporary accounts. We know of markets, cities, and towns near-by which received the products funneled into Gaul by this, her greatest port. Of considerable support to the theory of economic continuity is the fact that the Merovingian kings continued the coinage of gold. Gaul naturally continued under the Franks and others to be an agricultural area as it had under the Empire. But there is rather good evidence that the agricultural society of Gaul under the Merovingians of the sixth and seventh

centuries was still a part of the money economy of the Mediterranean. No doubt in many areas the villas were organized on a basis approaching self-sufficiency. One further observation should be made. Even where a local, domanial economy prevailed, little exchange was by barter. Money remained the medium of exchange. There simply was not much circulating in those areas.

We have been speaking up to this point of the immediate period of transition from the late Empire, explaining the activity in Gaul under the Merovingians. A still further question is raised as we come down to the time of the Carolingian kings in the eighth and ninth centuries. Was the money economy which still existed in Merovingian Gaul transformed more completely into a self-sufficient economy, the so-called closed or domestic economy? The answer can tentatively be put in the affirmative. Key to the economic transformation, in the opinion of one historian, was the rise of Islam in the seventh century and her spreading over the eastern and southern Mediterranean world. Islam changed the Mediterranean from a Roman lake into a sea of perils, dominated by Moslem raiders. Thus the economic unity of the Mediterranean was ruptured, and Gaul was transformed from a partially maritime land into an inland area. The Franks and other Germanic kingdoms sank into a relatively complete domestic and closed economy. Vills and manors became self-sufficient. Urban industry languished, and money exchange was reduced to a minimum. Evidence of this new state of affairs is revealed in documents that picture domestic self-sufficient estates, particularly the *Capitulare de Villis*. Additional evidence is found in the change from gold coinage to silver, the frittering away of minting rights to a rising feudalism, and the drift of minor trading activity to the north. It should be pointed out that certain German historians have adduced somewhat contradictory evidence designed to show that the economic unity of the Mediterranean was never really shattered and that Germanic kingdoms did not go completely into a domestic economy, trade and money exchange continuing throughout the Carolingian period. But even granting the existence of more trade than was formerly thought, there is no question that western Europe (with the possible exception of Italy) in the early Middle Ages (through the tenth century) was largely agricultural. Cities were small, and manorial economy did obtain over a considerable area. Trade was meager.

It was during the early Middle Ages that the essential agricultural unit, the manor, took form. Although the manor differed in detail from century to century and country to country, it was the predominant form of agricultural organization throughout the entire Middle Ages, even after the rise of

trade and the decline of feudalism had amended the unfree status of many of its laborers. The manor continued in one form in France until the French Revolution and in eastern Europe down to the twentieth century.

As we shall show in the section on feudalism, feudal society rested on fiefs composed of manors. The lord of the manors enjoyed complete control and use of the manor. It was his benefit from the feudal exchange. We shall also very carefully distinguish the feudal relationships that existed between noble and noble, that is, between lord and vassal, and the relationship between each noble as a lord of the manor, as fiefholder, and the personnel of varying degrees of freedom (particularly the serfs) who worked and maintained his manor. This distinction cannot be repeated too often.

The lord, or fiefholder, held the manor or several manors organized into a great estate. Ordinarily the land of the manor was divided into three classes: demesne land (the lord's land cultivated by the tenants immediately for the lord's support); tenant land (land cultivated by the various tenants of the manor); and common land (meadows, forests, and the rest). The tenant land was divided into strips, so that the farm of each tenant was not a compact unit but a collection of strips. The demesne land of the lord likewise might be a series of strips mixed in with the strips of his tenants. The tenants were serfs, partial serfs, or others with varying degrees of personal freedom. They were bound to the soil, as were their descendants. They owed the lord fixed returns in labor and in produce, but they had the customary assurance of retaining their holdings from one generation to the next and the fruits of the holdings after they had satisfied the customary obligations to the lord in money and in kind. If they were serfs, they came under the complete jurisdiction of the lord and had to answer to his courts alone. If they had some personal freedom, they might come under higher courts for certain criminal jurisdiction, but for most cases they were under the manorial court. Tenants most often lived in villages within the confines of the manor or at least the estate. Sometimes they were domiciled on their holdings rather than in villages. Since the manor always had some degree of self-sufficiency, the lord maintained workshops for various types of artisan work, from smithing to hewing and weaving. Such, then, is an ideal and abbreviated description of a manor. We can now investigate its origins.

Most important of the background institutions for the study of the manor was the Roman estate. Large estates existed in Gaul from Celtic through Roman times. But it is under the Empire that we see the developing features of organization and forms of tenure that point directly toward the medieval manor. The original element of the land organization in the Roman Empire

was the *fundus* or estate. Several other terms are used as synonymous. Most popular of these terms were *villa* (originally, the home on the estate) and *curtis* (originally, the court or center of the estate). *Fundus* remained the legal term in late antiquity. Particular *fundi* with characteristic names can be traced through changing ownership from late antiquity to Carolingian times, when they emerge as manors. Different types of villages or settlements existed on the Roman estates in late antiquity, but even then some of the villages consisted exclusively of tenants of the *fundi*. These remind us of the later medieval villages on the manor.

Roman agriculture in the late republic and under the early Empire had been worked in large estates mostly by slaves. But by the second century A.D. the supply of slaves appears to have diminished, and free tenants were employed. They were known as *coloni*. By the time of Constantine (fourth century) these free tenants and their descendants after them had been bound to the soil by law; they could not legally leave the land they were working. At the same time the number of *coloni* increased, and on many estates the individual lots worked by the *coloni* became smaller. Although not free to move, *coloni* were not yet serfs. During the late Empire (fourth through sixth centuries) the number of *coloni* bound to the soil increased by the practices of "commendation" and *precarium*, or "precarious tenure," whereby small landowners might commend themselves and their land to a wealthy noble of the senatorial classes. Then their land would become a part of his estate and they would receive it back, sometimes in precarious tenure and later in tenure with specified terms of rental or service. Commendation may have been made to obtain protection, or a loan, or to avoid heavy taxation. As one historian has put it, commendation spread like a huge net over the whole social body.

The later division between demesne (lord's) land and the tenant's land was also foreshadowed in the division that existed on the late Roman estates. Part of the land was worked directly by the owner under a manager and ordinarily by slaves who had no rights under the law. Often in order to obtain better services the slaves might be given small pieces of land, to which they tended to become bound, and thus they came to resemble the freer tenants. A step above the slaves was a class of former slaves who had been freed (*affranchi*). Politically freer than the slaves, they had some rights of property, but their former owner or patron could fix their duties, and he shared with their descendants in such goods as they acquired and were passing on (a similar procedure became customary under the manorial system). The majority of the tenants were free *coloni* who cultivated the remainder of the estate. The *colonus* was a freeman before the law. He could marry, transmit possessions,

and take his master to court. But his freedom was restricted by his being bound to the soil he worked. By the fifth century a three-year stay bound the *colonus* to the land.

While it was the Roman estate with its slaves and *coloni* bound to the soil that provided the immediate institution out of which the manor grew, it is important to realize that a system of private landholding was by no means foreign to the Germans, who from at least the time of Tacitus were dividing the land among the freemen according to rank and authority. So a system of large estates was probably not foreign to the Germans when they occupied the West. They readily accommodated themselves to the organization of the *fundi*, while retaining and satisfying their distinctions of rank. If the free village community was characteristic of German society upon their entrance into the Empire, during the Merovingian and Carolingian periods it was rapidly transformed into the manorial village of inhabitants of varying degrees of freedom. And if the Germans had a system of working the land in common (which is doubtful), it disappeared in the period of German-Roman fusion. Possibly the only survival of such a great system was the sharing of common pastureage and woodage.

A study of Merovingian and Carolingian documents reveals the formation or taking over of estates by the lay nobility and the Church. At the same time there was an increasing tendency for the freemen to lose some elements of their personal freedom as they lost their land and became tied to the soil. Even so, there were still a great many agricultural freemen during the early Carolingian period, but their numbers were declining. Contrasting with the decline of the freeman was the tendency toward the amelioration of the lot of slaves by binding them to the soil as serfs.

The manorial system, then, was the outcome of the adaptation by the Germans of the late Roman estate organization to their own social institutions.

We can now turn to a more detailed picture of manorial organization, recognizing at the outset that a great variety of detail will be glossed over in an effort to present a typical manorial organization. At the apex of the manorial organization was the lord, a noble, who held the manor as a fief or as part of a fief from some other noble. He was the equivalent in some respects of the old Roman master or owner (*dominus*). He was ordinarily domiciled on the manor in a castle or a château, or in the case of Church holdings, in an abbey, cathedral, or church. When the lord's holdings were vast, he perhaps did not live in the manor but was represented by a resident steward or manager. Except for the lord and his family and any knights he might have as retainers, the remaining people were servile and quasi-servile, with an occasional peasant

freeman who, although a tenant of the manor, had retained his freedom.

Laboring classes on the manor can be broadly classified into domestic serfs and tenants. The domestic serfs worked in the lord's residence or in the workshops, the farm buildings, and the stables. The tenants worked the fields. In over-all charge was the *seneschal* or *steward* (other synonyms: *villicus*, *major*, *maire*), chosen ordinarily from the confidential domestic servants of the lord's castle called *ministeriales*. The office of *seneschal* gradually became hereditary, as the holdings of the tenants did. At times the *ministeriales* group assumed some importance when attached to the king or a great duke. In Germany they were given great favor by the Emperor and became the basis of a new nobility.

It is not important for this account to describe the various shades of tenure and personal freedom of the tenants implied in the host of different terms used in medieval documents: *laeti* (semifree men), *coloni* (another form ranging from free to semifree), *villani* (both free and unfree men; see text below). But we should have some basic idea of the distinctions between slaves and serfs on the one hand and serfs and freemen on the other. Slavery decreased considerably in the Middle Ages, but it still existed, and, as in antiquity, the status of the slave was still marked by the complete lack of personality before the law. The slave was property or chattel. The serf, however, though he was restricted, in most cases could legally own minor personal property. Furthermore, he had the customary right to enjoy the fruits of his holding over and above what he owed to the lord. At least some of his time was his own, and ordinarily his customary rights were enforced in a manorial court. Thus the serf did have personality before some law—if not before the law of the land, at least before customary manorial law. Nevertheless, there were extensive restrictions on his time and on his right to marriage (he could not marry outside of the manor without the lord's approval).

As to the difficult question of what distinguishes a freeman from a serf, different communities gave different answers. Some areas would label a man a serf if he was obligated to do any labor for the lord; others, if he did more than a specified minimum of labor; and still others, if he were subject to unspecified or noncustomary labor. Thus in all of these cases the fact that he paid a certain percentage or amount of his produce to the lord would not make a serf of the tenant; what marked him as a serf was rather that he owed the lord some conditions of labor. It is questionable as to how trustworthy was the opinion of one jurist that villainage (serfdom) was a "condition of men who do not know in the evening what work and how much they have to perform the next morning." The terminology used on occasion adds to the difficulty.

For example, in England the term *villain* (*villanus*) meant serf; in France it was used for both freemen and serfs, so that the former were known as "free villains" and the latter "servile villains."

The freemen in theory retained their personality before the law, and hence if there was ducal or royal law they could expect justice under it even against the lord. For the most part, freemen could not abandon their tenure without authorization; they were tied to the soil as the serfs were (some of the villains, however, such as those of Castile, had the right to change their domicile). Freemen could, however, come and go from their manor as they willed, while the serf could not leave without permission. Freemen were also, at least in theory, exempt from arbitrary taxation by the lord, from restriction on marriage, and from certain of the other obligations we shall presently describe.

In considering the types of obligations and services owed by serfs and other tenants to the lord, we must avoid the error of thinking that *all* of them were enforced on the average serf. Customary duties varied greatly in different areas, both as to kind and number. Furthermore, against the onerous obligations we should counterbalance the benefits to the serf: assurance of the holding to him; the guaranty to his heirs that they would hold the same land; and some protection of law and order that might otherwise have been completely lacking. But it is probably sound to conclude that these benefits do not really effect a balance.

As manorial tenures evolved, certain set duties and obligations became associated with given holdings of land. The tendency was for the personal status of the tenant to follow the status of his land. For example, if servile obligations were attached to a freeman's acceptance of land, there was a tendency in the succeeding generations for his descendants to lose their personal freedom and become serfs.

In general we can divide the obligations owed by the serf to the lord into two main classes: labor services and payments (in kind or in money). So far as labor was concerned, the principal obligation of the serf was "week work," a fixed number of days each week in which he must work for the lord on his demesne land or in his farm buildings or workshops. This varied considerably from area to area, but two or three days a week can be considered an average. The amount of week work required of the individual serf was ordinarily carefully fixed by custom, custom that was often committed to writing. In addition to week work, the serf could be expected to do extra work known as "boon work"—seasonal work like plowing, sowing, reaping. Different kinds of boon work carried different obligations on the part of the lord (or occasionally the tenant) to provide food during the time of the work. As before,

custom acted to standardize the amount and condition of boon work owed. Other types of forced labor, such as roadbuilding, ditchdigging, and the like, were known as *corvées* (a word also used more generally for any kind of forced labor).

The types of payments owed by the serf varied greatly. They were paid in kind most often, but also in money, depending on the particular time and area under consideration. The serf paid an annual head tax, ordinarily quite small (a few *denarii*, or pennies), as an indication of his servile subjection. In addition, he payed a *taille*, or forced exaction by the lord, the amount of which varied considerably. At first arbitrary, this tax came to be fixed with custom. The serf also was obliged to pay a tithe to the Church. There were, in addition, a number of occasional customary payments, such as *heriot*, a kind of inheritance tax, paid by the son of a tenant when he took over the holding from his deceased father; "banalities," that is, payments for the use of the lord's ovens, mills, wine press; and other minor payments. These payments were servile payments and are not to be confused with regular rents. There were always some freemen holding land for regular rent payments.

We have already in a rudimentary way said something about the over-all organization of the manor, but a few further details are necessary for a clearer picture. The cultivable land of the manor was divided into demesne land (literally, land of the *dominus* or lord) and the tenant land. The lord's land could be either a separate plot of land or mixed in among the tenant holdings. The tenant land was divided up into strips. The strips varied in size, but were often the amount a man could plow in one day (called variously the *acre*, *journée*, *morgen*—about 160 square rods). Strips were grouped together in "cultures" of parallel strips, and these cultures tended to follow the natural lay of the land; hence in rolling land the whole field might present a patchwork effect. The holding of the individual villain, then, was made up of a series of separate strips in different cultures. In this way, if the fertility of the land varied greatly, all would share in the good as well as the bad parts. So varied were the sizes of the holdings that it seems foolhardy to venture an estimate, but most authors suggest that the average holding was the *virgate* or *yardland* of thirty acres.

As characteristic of medieval agriculture as the division of holdings was the over-all division of the fields known as the open-field system, whereby a holding of land was divided up into two, three, four, or five fields. The division into three fields was the most common. In this system, one field might be planted with wheat or rye, the second field with barley, oats, or peas, and the third field left unplanted, or lying fallow. Then the next year one of the first

two fields would be left fallow, and the crops in the other two fields varied according to the dictates of experience in the given area, one for crops of spring planting and the other for crops of autumn planting. In all of the open-field systems one of the fields was kept fallow. The three-field system was followed widely in England, northern and central France, much of Germany, and in parts of northern Europe. A two-field system was common in southern France and Alsace, while four- and five-field systems were employed in the upper Rhine valley and Westphalia. Closed fields were used in parts of western France and in Brittany. Occasional usage of a "field grass" system has been noted. This system involved the cultivating of poor soil for one or two years and then permitting it to return to grass for several years.

The average return from the land in the Middle Ages was considerably smaller than at the present time. It has been estimated that the increase on the average has been ten- to twentyfold. One historian has judged the average yield in England in the Middle Ages at from six to eight bushels of grain for each bushel sown.

In addition to the economic aspects of manorial organization, there were, of course, political and social aspects. This is particularly worthy of note when we consider the fact that the best guesses at population in the Middle Ages put some nine-tenths of the population in agricultural pursuits. The manor formed the only political unit for the serf. Its court rendered him justice under the customs of the manor, customs that were set down in custumals (in Germany, *Weistuemer*).

In addition to being a political unit for the serf, the manor was often the parish for everyone living there. Quite often the lord selected the candidate for the parish priesthood, and almost invariably he invested him with the temporal things of his office.

Thus the manor tended to be one closely knit social and economic unit. Originating essentially in the late-Roman landed estate, and including Germanic additions, the manor, as we have seen, comprised a rural, agricultural organization in which the lord maintained according to custom and tradition the division of his land into hereditary holdings with attached obligations of varying degrees of servitude. The tenants on the manor thus ranged from the free renter at the one extreme to the basest unfree serf (or on rare occasions to the slave) at the other extreme. We shall see in the next section the effect that revival in trade was to have on this agricultural organization.

REVIVAL OF TRADE; URBAN ORIGINS; AGRICULTURAL COLONIZATION

The continuous historical development of European civilization is nowhere better illustrated than in the rise of a money economy dominated by a middle class of merchants and industrialists. This continuity is apparent from the initial acceleration of trade in the eleventh and twelfth centuries through the increased use of capitalistic commercial techniques in the high and late Middle Ages to the employment of similar techniques in the commerce and industry of modern times. The investigation of the causes for the "revival" (or acceleration) of trade in the eleventh and particularly the twelfth century is difficult and elusive, and it is almost impossible to separate cause from effect. But the following factors appear important: (1) Internal conditions in Europe seem to have undergone enough improvement at the end of the tenth and throughout the eleventh century to cause an increase in the population through a lowering of the death rate. The Northmen had been absorbed and were adding much to the organization and efficiency of Normandy in France and then of England after the Conquest. (2) With the rising population and expansionist activities of the Normans we witness a more general phenomenon, the expansion of Europe. We should not underestimate the religious motive in this expansion. Ever-increasing pilgrimages were transformed into battles for the faith, crusades. The reconquest of Spain from the Arabs was begun. The Normans moved into the Mediterranean, taking lower Italy and particularly Sicily, which had been under Islamic control. Above all, at the end of the eleventh century, Europe undertook the First Crusade, an event that proved to be of great importance in stimulating a rising trade. Everywhere the cross went, the merchant accompanied it. (3) Receiving the major brunt of this expansion were the Arabs. Long since torn politically, the Arabs felt first the recrudescence of Byzantine power under the Macedonian dynasty (867-1025). Now in the West in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Islamic fleets lost control of the seas, as well as their principal island possessions, before the aggressiveness of the fleets of Pisa and Genoa and later of the Normans. Of great significance, then, for revived trade was the termination of Moslem control of the western Mediterranean and particularly the Tyrrhenian Sea, which had been virtually a Moslem lake. (4) Control of the seas meant that the goods of the East that passed through Constantinople and the Arab commercial centers in the Levant would pass freely and in greater quantities to Europe. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Eastern goods for the revival of commerce. Spices and luxury goods were not the only commodities of the Eastern trade; the cargoes included such important items as cotton, indigo, and the

alum crystals used as mordants in the fixing of colors in textiles. (5) The actual revival of European trade came under the external stimulus of trade with the East. Two routes had been maintained through the period of Europe's relatively dormant and local economy in the ninth and tenth centuries. The city of Venice, protecting herself from Carolingian and later German control, had looked toward Constantinople and acknowledged the eastern emperor during this period. Other cities, such as Amalfi and Trani, had done the same. Thus Venice and the cities in Italy under Byzantine control continued to trade with that great and prosperous center, Constantinople. When the revival of trade started, Venice quickly leaped into a commanding lead in commercial activities, securing at that time a monopoly of the trade with Constantinople. Thus in the south Venice, and soon afterwards Genoa and Pisa, became the points of external stimulus to the reviving European economy. Trade with the East also impinged on Europe in the North. The Scandinavians had established themselves in Russia in the ninth century, and in the course of the next two centuries built up an extensive overland trade with the Baltic and North Sea areas of Europe. The most important northern terminus of this trade in Europe was Flanders. Flanders had built up textile production even during the period of relatively little money economy. Her harbors faced invitingly northward for the Scandinavian traders. She began to provide the northern points of stimulus to Europe's economy, just as Venice, Genoa, and Pisa did in the South, but she was more the producer than the carrier. (6) At the same time a professional class of merchants, Europe's first middle class, began to multiply; as the revival of trade spread from the external points inland, great fairs sprang up. Urban areas revived, and the new class of inhabitants gained privileges and liberties. The great commercial cities of Europe began to take form. (7) Finally, the reviving trade and the increasing population stimulated and in turn were stimulated by an increase of agricultural production. This was manifested in the twelfth century by an extensive clearing of the land, or deforestation, and by the spread of agricultural colonization.

We have indicated that there were some trade contacts, particularly with Venice in the South and Flanders in the North, which were to prove most fruitful for the trade revival. They were by no means the only points of contact with the trade lines that radiated out from Constantinople, the great center and *entrepôt* (warehouse) for all kinds of goods. Trading with Constantinople were Bulgarians, Armenians, Russians, Arabs, Italians, and many others. In addition, there are evidences of some internal trading in parts of Europe in the tenth and eleventh centuries in Rhenish cities and other German towns. For example, an eleventh-century document says of Bremen that

"merchants of many lands frequented Bremen with their wares." Similarly, we read about the German city Goslar that "merchants of foreign nations brought to this place their accustomed wares." German and French merchants were also passing back and forth from the Continent to England, for London statutes of the early twelfth century reveal duties paid by merchants from Normandy and other parts of France, from Flanders, and from Germany. Numerous early medieval documents refer to foreign merchants in various parts of Europe, particularly to Syrians (early references), Jews, Anglo-Saxons, and Frisians.

We have particularly stressed the activity of Venice and, later in the eleventh century, of Genoa and Pisa, for surely these three cities dominated the early stages of the revival of trade in the South. Dating back to the fifth and sixth centuries, Venice by her very position on the lagoons and marshes seemed to require trade for survival. During the lean years of the ninth and tenth centuries she maintained a flourishing trade with Constantinople. Taking wheat and wine from Italy, wood from Dalmatia, salt from the lagoons, and slaves from among the Slavic peoples on the Adriatic coast, she brought back the spices and precious stones of the East and the manufactured fabrics of Byzantium. Venice even traded freely with the Islamic peoples after the ninth century. In the beginning of the eleventh century her fleets cleared the Adriatic Sea of pirates and took many strategic points on the opposite coast. A contemporary chronicler calls her "rich in money" and "rich in men," and he adds that "no people in the world are more valorous in naval warfare, more skillful in the art of guiding ships on the sea."

By the eleventh century Venice had outdistanced her early Italian rivals, such as Amalfi, Bari, and Trani, which had likewise maintained their political and economic connections with Constantinople. She dominated the trade of many of the coastal and inland cities of Italy: Pavia, Ravenna, Cesena, and others. She was also aided by a lack of scruples in regard to trade with the infidel. Her ships were occasionally at Aleppo, Damascus, Palermo, and other Arabic centers.

Although Venice had outdistanced her early rivals, she now encountered new ones in the eleventh century. Her greatest competitors were the resurgent cities of Pisa and Genoa. It was the maritime activity of these two cities that did much to break the Islamic domination of the western Mediterranean. They joined together to attack the island of Sardinia held by the Moslems (1015-16). The Pisans attacked Palermo. Both fleets raided the African coast, which was held by the Arabs, and were able to gain commercial privileges there.

The fleets of all three Italian cities grew enormously in the course of the eleventh century. The Venetian fleet in the second half of the century so surpassed that of Byzantium that the merchants of the small republic of the lagoons "obtained in 1082 from the (Byzantine) emperor Alexis Comenus . . . privileges which made them masters of import and export commerce in the whole Greek Empire."

When the Crusades came, the Italian cities were ready to exploit them. In return for bringing reinforcements to the Crusaders at Antioch in 1097, the Genoese gained the right of founding there a commercial colony or factory (*fondaco*) with special trading privileges. This was followed by many such colonies in Eastern ports and commercial cities. The Italian fleets did not at first carry great loads of troops but mainly supplies. In the Second Crusade (1147) Italian ships were used to a certain extent in troop transport, and they were used even more extensively for that purpose in the Third Crusade (from 1189). In the succeeding Crusades ships became the only vehicle of troop transport. The significance of the Crusades to the revival of trade has been succinctly stated by Henri Pirenne:

Thus the one lasting and essential result of the crusades was to give the Italian towns, and in a less degree, those of Provence [Southern France] and Catalonia, the mastery of the Mediterranean. Though they did not succeed in wresting the holy places from Islam, and though no more than a few places on the coast of Asia Minor and in the islands remained of their early conquests, at least they enabled Western Europe not only to monopolize the whole trade from the Bosphorus and Syria to the Straits of Gibraltar, but to develop there an economic and strictly capitalistic activity which was gradually to communicate itself to all the lands north of the Alps.

From the principal points of contact with Europe, commerce spread inland. In the twelfth century cities such as Lucca began to manufacture silk and fabrics with the raw materials brought from overseas. Cities behind each of the three main Italian cities began to prosper, and soon goods from them went across the Alps into Germany and France.

We have already indicated that the activity of the Italian cities in the South had its counterpart on a smaller scale in the North, in the North Sea and Baltic areas, and particularly in Flanders. Stimulated by the trading activity of the Scandinavians, the Flemish area deserves special notice because it had maintained an export industry in colored cloth during the period when most of Europe possessed a relatively domestic economy. In the twelfth century weaving spread throughout Flanders and the neighboring towns of Brabant. Unlike the Italians, the Flemish (except for certain periods) left the carrying

trade to outsiders, first to the Scandinavians, then to the Germans and many others.

We shall turn to the expansion of trade again in the next section. Before doing so, we must mention the effect of the trade revival on the growth of cities and on the spread of agricultural colonization. Regardless of the interesting variations observed in the early constitutions of medieval cities, it is universally accepted that the important stimulus to town growth was the increasing trade. To this we can add the closely related factors of population increase, increase in surplus goods resulting from the agricultural expansion, and the development of corporative ideas. But everywhere it was the new class, the middle class or third estate, that made the city.

As we examine the origins of towns, we should keep in mind above all that the growth of towns was not a local phenomenon or even a national one, but a European phenomenon. We can thus avoid the difficulties that so many historians have fallen into by stressing only local conditions in explaining the origin of a particular town and thereby missing the over-all importance of the general revival of trade.

Theories that call for the continuous development of towns from Roman municipalities must be abandoned for the most part. It is quite true that many of the newly stimulated cities grew up on sites of older Roman cities, and there undoubtedly was continuity of life in a number of Italian cities. But the significant point is that in the twelfth century the population of the older cities increased greatly under the stimulus of the revival of trade. Even more impossible as an adequate explanation of town growth was the theory that towns grew out of early "free German villages." Then, too, the fact that a number of towns grew up in the areas of the seats of bishoprics has stimulated a theory that stresses the activity of diocesan administration in the origin of towns. But here again the important point to notice is the quickening effect of commercial activities.

From this discussion it is clear that the nuclei for different cities had been differently formed but that their further growth was fostered by the changing economy of Europe. One theory of the way in which a great many of the towns originated has been rather widely accepted by historians, the so-called *faubourg* theory. Groups of wandering merchants began to settle in fortified castles or *bourgs* in order to conduct business in safety. As the number of merchants multiplied, there was no longer room for them inside the *bourgs*. Consequently, they built up a new *bourg* in an area outside of or adjacent to the older one. These new settlements were spoken of as "outside *burgs*" (French,

faubourg; Latin, *forisburgus*) or "ports." This theory has the great merit of stressing the mercantile influence on town growth. It explains the use of the terms *burger*, *bourgeois*, *poorters*, *portmen* for the new class of town inhabitants. These new towns soon overshadowed the original castles or bourgs alongside of which they had grown up, and they attracted industrial personnel as well as merchants. For example, the weavers spread everywhere among the Flemish towns. Centralizing their activity in towns, the nascent industrialists were thus able to facilitate the sale of their products among the people concentrated in or around the bourg and also to participate more directly in any export trade handled by the merchants.

A contemporary work describing the origin of Bruges has given us striking confirmation of the *faubourg* origin of a city. Initially, the author tells us, Count Baldwin had built a castle (after 962):

After this castle was built, certain traders began to flock to the place in front of the gate to the bridge of the castle, that is, merchants, tavern keepers, then other outsiders (*hosptarii*) drifted in for the sake of food and shelter of those who might have business transactions with the count, who often came there. Houses and inns were erected for their accommodation, since there was not room for them within the château. These habitations increased so rapidly that soon a large ville came into being which is called Brugghe by the people from the word for bridge.

Regardless of particular origins, and whether or not the *faubourg* theory can be applied everywhere in Europe, the municipalities all over the Continent had certain features in common: trade, burghers, and some form of town government in which the middle class shared.

The new town governments were formed and based on freedoms and privileges frequently outlined in charters secured from a noble or the king. Different sets of privileges were obtained by different towns in the eleventh and twelfth centuries according to the sort of charter granted. Privileges can be generally classified into two groups: elementary and advanced. The elementary privileges included the personal freedom to come and go freely, to engage in trade, and to marry at will; a burgher's free tenure of land and goods with permission to alienate them as he saw fit; restrictions on the lord's powers of arbitrary taxation, his demand for military service and forced labor (*corvée*); the right to be tried in a local court; and so on. The advanced privileges were largely those of self-government: the town was given the right to choose its own magistrates; to administer its own justice; to collect tolls; to control its walls, gates, bridges, streets, and public works; and, finally, to impose taxes.

One of the privileges which was particularly pursued by the towns was the right to administer justice and thus to use the commercial and maritime law which had grown up outside of feudal and customary law. Maritime law had its source in old Roman sea law, modified by certain maritime codes formed in the Byzantine Empire. These latter codes were adopted by Italian cities such as Trani, Amalfi, and Venice, all of which had early commercial relations with Byzantium. From Italy the maritime codes spread to France, Spain, and northern Europe. Among the most often copied of the maritime codes was that of Oléron, a small island town off the coast of France, whose code was known as the "Rolls of Oléron." When the German and other Baltic cities came into prominence, new versions of the maritime law, such as the "Town Laws of Wisby" and the "Law of Lübeck," rivaled the older codes in popularity. Commercial law, growing up at fairs and markets and in the cities, also had its immediate origins in Europe in the commercial codes adopted in the Italian cities. Many a city had its code, called "Consuls of the Merchants." These served as models for other European codes. It has been pointed out with some justice that maritime and commercial law, which had gained considerable uniformity throughout Europe, was the first law to achieve the status of international law.

The gain of privileges and charters by the new cities was not always by peaceful means. Commune revolts are reported from many parts of Europe. A demand for communal privileges was probably at the bottom of a rising in Milan against the archbishop who controlled the town. At any rate, "consuls" or "magistrates" elected by the commune appear in the town shortly thereafter. Similar municipal offices arose in many towns throughout Italy, from where they spread to southern France. In northern France and Flanders, too, there were popular risings which brought about the organization of bourgeois governments. In Cambrai in 1077 the merchants led the people in a revolt against the bishop, took possession of the town gates, and proclaimed a commune. Similar revolts took place in St. Quentin, Beauvais, Laon, and elsewhere.

Corporations or guilds of merchants were often associated with the formation of the early municipal governments. (We shall study guild organization in some detail in the next section.) We realize now that in some towns merchant guilds were organized before craft guilds (organizations of craftsmen) and were therefore more powerful, at least at an early date. Examples of the intimate connection of merchant guilds with the formation of municipal governments appear in Flanders particularly. Merchants living in the *portus* or *faubourg* joined together in guilds or "hanses," electing deans or "counts

of the hances" who acted as supervisors. By these organizations the merchants were then able to secure from the lord the desired municipal privileges.

In general, municipal privileges appear to have grown up in the eleventh century and then received confirmation by charters in the twelfth. The charter of Lorris of 1155, granting freedom from the *taille*, freedom from military service, and freedom of movement, is a good example of a charter granting elementary privileges. On the other hand, the charter of St. Omer of 1127 is an excellent example of one granting advanced privileges, including the election of magistrates, judgment by local magistrates, other judicial privileges, and a host of personal freedoms. The charter of Rouen, resembling that of St. Omer, served as a model for more than five hundred towns. Similar charters were granted in other parts of Europe. Although there was some hostility on the part of the nobles toward granting charters, most of them seem to have supported the movement. The grants were made less distasteful to the lords by the fact that they were often able to sell the charters. In addition, most of them recognized the benefit of having a prosperous city within their territory.

At the same time that the population was growing, that trade was beginning to accelerate, that urban areas were taking form and gaining liberties, the agricultural basis of society was undergoing important changes. The principal changes were in two directions: (1) an increase in the amount of land in production through agricultural colonization; (2) changes in the manorial estate, including commutations of payments from kind to money, lightening of servile burdens, growing emancipation of the serfs, and formation of new lease tenures.

We can single out the remarkable work of agricultural colonization of the Cistercians, one of the new monastic orders of the twelfth century (see Chapter III, page 86). Their activities were extensive from the forests of France, the Low Countries, and England to the forests, swamps, and frontier areas of Germany. The Cistercians were continually receiving grants of wooded or swampy land, and hence their initial labor was one of clearing and draining the lands to be cultivated. The conservation techniques used by the Cistercians in reclaiming the land were enlightened. It was their practice not to denude a forest completely but to leave some trees standing. The Cistercians were master drainers and the swampland in the Low Countries and Germany which they reclaimed is extensive. Using the services of lay brothers (*conversi*), the Cistercians laid out the reclaimed land in granges. These granges of about 500 to 700 acres resemble modern farms by the fact of their having been cultivated in single blocks rather than strips. They were on occasion rented out but were ordinarily worked by the lay brothers under the direction of a monk. Some-

times outside agricultural labor was employed in place of the lay brothers. Grain farming and milling, grape culture and wine making, and stock raising were among the activities of these energetic monks.

A second type of colonization was that undertaken by the *hôtes* or "guests." They received this name from the fact that they were originally strangers or guests on the domain who had been given some vacant or waste land to cultivate. Their original status before becoming *hôtes* was usually forgotten, and they were quite often granted freedom or some quasi-free status. Frequently the colonists or *hôtes* were freed from paying arbitrary *tailles*, or at least these taxes were reduced and carefully defined. And in many cases they escaped the *heriot* or servile inheritance tax and the restrictions against free marriage. The *corvées* (forced labor) in their case were either suppressed or lightened, and they were given definition. The *hôtes* were welcomed by the lord, for if he had some marsh or wasteland that could be cleared and put into useful production and would thereby receive some rent or other dues from what had been useless land, so much the better.

The colonists tended to organize into villages that little resembled the manorial villages. These "new vills" were formed all over Europe. Much of the diked and reclaimed land in the Low Countries was given to *hôtes* for cultivation in return for simple rents. In Spain, land taken from the Moors was colonized in the same way, and the colonists were grouped into villages of the "new vill" type. These new vills often received charters that remind us of the town charters. The village charters gave to the colonists special privileges, such as freedom from some of the customary taxes, from military service, *corvées*, and other burdensome obligations.

Sometimes the work of colonization was organized and directed by clearance contractors, who were called in some areas *locatores*. The *locator* divided up the land among the immigrants or colonists. Under such an arrangement the colonist usually lived on the land rent free for a given period, so that he might get his land into cultivation before the rents started. It was not always easy for the contractor to attract colonizers to the frontier regions, particularly to Germany's dangerous northeast frontier. Part of the success in colonizing this region can be ascribed to advertising or "come on" campaigns. One contemporary account tells us that Adolph of Holstein, one of the foremost German colonizers, sent messengers into "all the regions round about, even to Flanders and Holland," proclaiming "that all who were in want of land might come with their families and receive the best soil, a spacious country, rich in crops, abounding with fish and flesh and exceeding good pasture."

No doubt, the sight of the grim reality disappointed many a colonist, particularly if he recalled the propaganda of Adolph: "Be the first to come into this delectable land, and cultivate it, and have a share of its products." We are reminded of similar activities on the American frontier in the nineteenth century.

By means of the increased agricultural colonization, a large part of the wooded and less fertile land in western Europe was put into cultivation. The amount of land in the Low Countries that was diked and reclaimed from the sea is equally impressive. Through this increase of arable land, and to a lesser extent through improved agricultural techniques, agricultural production was raised sufficiently to sustain the expanding population of the cities and to support the growing trade. The rising money economy in turn reacted on the organization of the manor. Lords required money for the purchase of luxury and other goods, and peasants were receiving money for the sale of surplus produce. The result was a pronounced trend toward the commutation of payments in kind into payments in money. In addition, the lords, in an effort to keep the peasants from running off to the cities or new colonial areas where they would be free, tended to free the serfs. A number of the charters of emancipation are perfectly frank as to the utilitarian motives inspiring them. The emancipated serf might still retain onerous *corvées* and other obligations and payments, but at least he gained freedom in several respects, including freedom before the law and before the king's courts and freedom of marriage.

As the money economy grew, the classic manor which we have described in a preceding section began to break up. In many cases demesne lands disintegrated from the encroachments of energetic stewards, bailiffs, or other agents; but more often the lord leased his demesne land out to tenants to raise his money income. We have seen that the woodlands and wastelands were coming under increased cultivation. Not only were the demesne land and woodlands altered, but there is evidence of considerable change in the size of individual holdings in the tenant lands, caused in part by the movement of the peasants to the towns.

Particularly important was the new system of lease holdings that became evident in the high and late Middle Ages. These new forms continued down into modern times. Ordinarily it was the demesne land which was put out in fixed-term leases. These leases were of two general types. The first was a fixed-term lease for a fixed money rent. It was called in France *le fermage*. This system appeared in certain parts of Italy in the twelfth century and in northern

France, the Low Countries, Catalonia, and elsewhere in the thirteenth century. The other form of fixed-lease tenure was based on a lease for a fixed share in the produce of the holding. In *métayage*, a common form of this type of lease holding, the shares of tenant and landlord were fixed ordinarily at 50 percent of the harvest for each.

By the end of the Middle Ages the progress in accepting the new lease holdings was uneven in the different countries. Equally uneven was the progress of emancipation. Serfdom was still present in various areas in western Europe, and there was even a strong reaction toward increased serfdom in parts of eastern Europe.

In the last part of this section we have gone beyond the trade and industrial developments in the high and late Middle Ages to describe the effects on agriculture of the expanding economy. We must now return to an examination of the ever-growing money economy and its manifestations in the expansion of commerce and industry.

EXPANSION OF TRADE; INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION; EARLY ELEMENTS OF CAPITALISM

Much can be learned of the expansion of trade in the high and late Middle Ages by tracing the multiplication of commercial routes by land and sea. The early international trade between the East and the West, which we have seen was one of the chief factors in the revival or acceleration of commerce, was a Mediterranean trade joining Venice, Amalfi, Bari, and other "Byzantine" Italian cities with Constantinople. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries the trade map of the Mediterranean had developed into a crisscross of routes from the Italian cities of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice (and to a lesser extent from the French and Spanish cities on the Mediterranean) to Constantinople and various ports lining the coasts of Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and North Africa. The Roman-Christian West was commercially tied with the Greek-Christian East on the one hand and the Mohammedan world on the other.

At the same time in the North, the North and the Baltic seas were providing interconnecting trade routes between Russia, Poland, and Scandinavia, and England, France, Flanders, and Brabant. By the thirteenth century the North German cities (later to be known as the Hanse cities or Hanseatic League) had already begun to compete for the carrying trade on those seas with the Scandinavians and others. They were beginning to assume in the North the role that the Italian cities had assumed earlier in the South. It has been sug-

gested previously that this northern area was connected with the eastern Mediterranean by an overland route through Russia.

In Western Europe the North and South met above all in the fairs of Champagne, where goods were bought, ordered, exchanged, and where the first international money exchange on a large scale in Europe took place (this excludes the earlier activity in the Italian cities). These fairs were international in character and were held on neutral ground in the county of Champagne. The natural way from Italy to England passed through Champagne. The traffic from the Mediterranean up the Rhone came upon Champagne. It is little wonder, then, that *products of all kinds and merchants of all nations met on the fertile Champagne plain.*

The fairs of Champagne, being the international meeting ground of the North and South, were on a larger scale than most other European fairs, but it should be realized that there were numerous other fairs of great importance during the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. The most important in England were at Northampton, St. Ives, Boston, Winchester, and, later, Stourbridge. Similarly there were noteworthy fairs in Flanders at Bruges, Ypres, Lille, and Thorout.

Fairs were ordinarily established by law or charter. Such charters extended special privileges to an attending merchant. He was, for example, protected by a special peace; he was under the "safe conduct" of the territorial prince in whose land the fair was being held. In addition to exempting him from various kinds of tolls, the fair law guaranteed his freedom from prosecution for debts and crimes committed outside of the fair. Of similar importance was the suspension or modification of the prohibition of usury (lending money for gain, that is, at interest).

Fairs must be distinguished from markets. The latter were local in character and ordinarily served the needs of a small area only. They were held weekly or at other frequent intervals. The fairs, however, were seasonal in character. Those of Champagne were six in number, held consecutively through the course of the year at four towns rather insignificant in size: Lagny and Bar each had one fair, while Troyes and Provins had two.

A fixed order of sales became customary for the Champagne fairs. There were eight days of preliminary activity: unpacking and setting up booths, materials, and the like. Then followed periods set apart for special commodities. For a ten- or twelve-day period cloth goods were sold. Other periods were devoted, for instance, to the sale of hides and furs, things sold by weight and measure, horses and other animals. The fair was closed by a period of

money transactions, when the money-changers and merchants straightened out their financial arrangements. It was during this period that the fairs contributed to the rise of credit forms and documents. This type of activity assisted in standardizing weights and measures. The administration of the fairs came into the hands of officials who were known throughout Europe by different names, which can usually be translated as "guards of the fair," and courts for administering commercial and other law were established.

The Champagne fairs remained as the most important link between the North and the South from the middle of the twelfth up to the early or middle part of the fourteenth century. By that time the fairs were on the decline for a number of reasons. Champagne, having passed to the French crown, was no longer neutral ground. France and England were beginning their devastating Hundred Years War. Italy and Germany, as well as Italy and the Low Countries, were expanding their direct trade. Immediate or direct trade between nations was beginning to render trade at intermediate fairs unnecessary and to some extent obsolete. The commercial areas of towns, with their foreign settlements or colonies, were providing "permanent fairs" for the merchants. Evidence of the decline can be found in the increasing number of foreign merchants appearing in the various countries. Italians are found in Flanders and in England. Germans traveled into Italy, Flanders, England, and, in fact, throughout the Baltic area. As the result of these various factors the fairs declined so markedly that the toll receipts in certain cases dropped from 8,380 pounds in 1296 to 1,152 pounds in 1340-41.

The decline was hastened by use of the all-sea route through Gibraltar to the Low Countries and England. The Genoese had sailed through the Straits and into the Bay of Biscay in the last quarter of the thirteenth century and Venice by 1317 had inaugurated her celebrated Flanders Fleet. This latter achievement had been made possible by the use of a new kind of vessel, "the great galley." Carrying a crew ranging up to 200, the great galley might be as long as 150 feet. She carried both oars and sails. The oars might be arranged in two or three banks. The regular service of the Flanders Fleet cut further into the volume of trade transacted at the Champagne fairs.

With the decline of the overland route through Champagne, other overland routes flourished. Above all, the Rhine became an important waterway for commercial traffic from Italy to Flanders. The principal route into Germany from Italy went to Basel, then, following the Rhine, to Strasbourg, Speyer, Worms, Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne, and Utrecht. From Utrecht routes spread out to England or anywhere in the North Sea. Another route went from Cologne to Aix-la-Chapelle, Liége, Brussels, and Bruges. Still another route

went out from Cologne to Hamburg. Eastern Germany and Austria were also connected with Italy by a direct route across the Alps.

The Alpine passes continued throughout the Middle Ages to be the key to economic and political movements connecting the rest of Europe, particularly Germany, with Italy. The Mount-Cenis Pass bore some of the traffic to France (Lyon). The Great St. Bernard Pass was used for traffic into Switzerland and France, especially in the early Middle Ages. In the thirteenth century the St. Gotthard Pass, the most direct route from Milan to Basel and the Rhine Valley, was opened. The first iron suspension bridge of which we have record was thrown across its advances at this time by some unknown engineer. Of the eastern passes, the Brenner and the Septimer were most frequently used.

During the high and the late Middle Ages the city-states of Venice and Genoa dominated the Mediterranean, Pisa dropping by the wayside as the result of her defeats at the hands of the Genoese, who destroyed her harbor in 1290. Both Genoa and Venice held wide possessions in foreign cities, especially in the East. Other seaports on the Mediterranean coast of Italy, France, and Spain were second-rate in comparison with these two giants of the sea. Florence was at first primarily an industrial city, producing silk and woolen cloths for export. Her goods were handled by Genoa, Ancona, and Venice. But from the early fifteenth century Florence gained control of Pisa and began to be important in the international carrying trade. Milan, of course, was an inland city. With an excellent location before the St. Gotthard Pass she played an important part in the European trade, but she was not engaged directly in the Eastern trade. Certain cities were of significance in bartering and money exchange, above all Florence and in addition Lucca, Siena, Rome, and the other great commercial cities already noted.

Of increasing importance, second only to the Italian cities in the South, were the German cities in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries German merchants from Cologne and other French cities were trading in London. They were very active at the Champagne fairs. As the fairs declined, they came in increasing numbers directly to Italy. Venice became a permanent mart for them. But Venice so controlled the Adriatic waters that the Germans did not venture any competition for the Eastern trade. In fact, they were strictly regulated and supervised while staying in Venice in the *Fondaco dei Tedeschi* (House of the Germans).

The most remarkable manifestation of expanding German trade was the league of cities known as the Hanseatic League. Although similar leagues preceding the Hanseatic League were not uncommon in a Holy Roman Empire rather loosely organized, the Hanseatic was easily the most important

league of cities to have an economic basis. Its beginnings are obscure. The cities most prominent in the league were situated in some manner to take advantage of the expanding commerce—Hamburg on the Elbe, Stettin on the Oder, Danzig on the Vistula were staple ports (monopoly shipping points) where the sea trade and the river trade joined. Also important was Lübeck on the Baltic. The inland cities on the whole played less significant roles, except when they were well situated on rivers or where land and river routes met, as, for example, Cologne on the Rhine, Magdeburg on the Elbe, Frankfort on the Oder, and Breslau. Bremen, Rostock, Stralsund, and Wismar complete this listing of important Hanse cities. Actually, the number of member cities in the League was continually changing.

The preliminary efforts forming the background to the League are sought by some historians in the attempts by German cities to secure common trading rights and privileges in foreign cities, for example, the common efforts of Lübeck and Hamburg in Bruges (1252). Also important were agreements made by the North German towns to follow one maritime code, such as the "Law of Lübeck."

During the fourteenth century the Hanseatic League as a formal organization came into existence. Some seventy to eighty towns composed the membership of the League at its height. It gained trading privileges for its members in various foreign areas. Though its political ties were loose, it was able to take military action when necessary. After a decisive victory against Denmark, it gained a free hand in commercial matters in the Baltic (1370), and not long afterwards was recognized by the Holy Roman Emperor. Henceforth, the Hanseatic League became a European power to reckon with. It held its prominent position until the sixteenth century, when trade began to shift to the Atlantic and by-pass both the Baltic and Mediterranean areas.

The League had a flag and diplomatic representatives abroad, and it concluded commercial treaties with foreign powers. Representatives of the member cities met together, usually in the great guild hall at Lübeck:

They provided for the protection of merchants and their merchandise at sea and on the roads, and for the improvement of rivers and harbors; they established common weights, measures and coinage; they arranged for the settlement of disputes among merchants at home and abroad; they secured new privileges and opened up new lines of trade; they drew up a *Seebuch* or almanac showing the harbors, light-houses, buoys and other indications useful to navigators from Riga to Lisbon. (E. P. Cheyney.)

The League was able to obtain "factories" or *kontoren* in other cities. These were commercial colonies or settlements within the cities where the mer-

chants could reside pretty much under their own law. The League had four important factories, in London, Bruges, Novgorod, and Bergen. The factory in London, named the Steelyard, had as many as 300 inhabitants and its own aldermen and councilors. Here there were also warehouses and other buildings to increase the efficiency of the League's commercial activities.

The expansion of trade which has been described to this point had its counterpart in an increase of industrial activity. The rise of urban areas was accompanied by the breakdown of manorial or domanial industry, which had not been organized for surplus production but rather for local consumption. But even during the period when the domanial economy was at its height, certain places, as we have said earlier, continued producing surplus goods. The looms of Flanders continued to make cloth for trade purposes even when trade was at a low ebb elsewhere. It is true that there were always certain domains producing for wider consumption: the brewers of St. Paul's Cathedral were producing annually about 67,800 gallons of ale even before the great urban centers had arisen.

After the passing of domanial industry, or at least after its significance dwindled, the towns became the industrial areas. In fact, the commercial and industrial economy of the high and late Middle Ages centered in the towns. Some idea of the relative activity of different towns could be obtained if accurate figures of town sizes in the Middle Ages were available. But aside from occasional tax and census rolls, we are at a loss for a precise picture of the size of urban concentration. The early exaggerations of nineteenth-century historians have been replaced by more modest estimates. A moderately active commercial town might have from 8,000 to 10,000 inhabitants—in 1440 Frankfurt had 8,719 and Basel about 8,000. Few towns exceeded 20,000: in the fifteenth century Strasbourg, Nuremberg, Ulm had about this number, and the great Hanse town Lübeck had only about 25,000. Cologne also appears to have had over 20,000, perhaps 30,000, but certainly not the 100,000 that earlier historians estimated. The fantastic figure of 200,000 for Ypres in one document has been countered with a reliable census that shows only 10,736 people in 1412! London has been estimated at about 35,000–40,000. The population of Florence has been estimated as growing from about 45,000 in 1280 to about 90,000 in 1339. Venice was probably over 100,000, and Paris in the fourteenth century certainly had gone beyond 100,000, perhaps as high as 200,000.

The industry that flourished in most municipal areas in the Middle Ages can be described as a craft or handicraft industry. The unit was the small shop or home of the master with one or two wageworkers (journeymen), and one or more apprentices. The number of crafts multiplied considerably from the

eleventh to the fourteenth century as specialization increased. By the fourteenth century some 157 crafts are listed in a Parisian tax roll, and a number of towns had as many as 40 to 50 crafts.

With the rise of industrial activity, craftsmen began to organize in guilds. In many instances the craft guilds came at a later date than the merchant guilds (or guild merchants). We have already mentioned how in Flanders particularly the merchant guilds were formed before the city achieved its municipal organization and, in fact, were instrumental in helping to secure the municipal charter. The broader merchant guilds were composed of the principal businessmen in town and were careful to control trade within the town. They particularly regulated and controlled the import of foodstuffs and other wares. Among these general regulations of the municipal governments or guild merchants were prohibitions of the practices known as forestalling (intercepting and buying goods before they reached the market), engrossing (cornering the market), and regrating (buying with the object of selling again at a profit).

Although formed later than the merchant guilds in many areas, the craft guilds spread everywhere and attained great power by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The craft guild was essentially the same from country to country whether it was called the *métier* in France, the *arte* in Italy, *Zunft* in Germany, *gild* in England, or any one of another dozen names. Its origins are obscure. Not much connection between late-Roman *collegia* (corporative associations in certain crafts) and the medieval craft guild can be found (except possibly in certain areas in Italy). Nor has any connection been established between craft guilds and old Germanic associations. The theory of the manorial origin of guilds has little evidence to confirm it.

Currently accepted theory sees the origin of the guild in (1) a voluntary association of craftsmen, supplemented by (2) the support and prescription of public authority. This, then, suggests that craftsmen, in imitation of merchant guilds and/or Church associations, began to form craft associations. Thereupon, to make the administration and government of the city easier, public authorities encouraged such associations. In Flanders particularly there is evidence that city authorities, who wished to control the pricing and quality of industrial products, encouraged and enjoined the formation of the crafts into guilds.

By the middle of the twelfth century craft guilds had been organized in many of the new towns, as illustrated by the weavers at Mayence (1106), the fishmongers at Worms (1128), the shoemakers at Würzburg (1149), the tanners at Rouen (early twelfth century), and a number of others.

The basic objectives of the craft guild were the common gain of its members and the protection of the consumer, no doubt in that order, since the monopoly practice of the guilds in many cases did the consumer more harm than a few regulations with regard to the quality of the products benefited him. These two objectives—the gain of the members and the protection of the consumer—have been correlated neatly by one historian with the two major factors bringing about the organization of guilds. Voluntary association lay at the root of the guild's objective of benefiting its members, and direction and control by public authority acted to keep the public interest before the guild. As Pirenne has stated, "In its essentials the medieval craft may be defined as an industrial corporation enjoying the monopoly of practising a particular profession, in accordance with regulations sanctioned by public authority."

Regulations covered every phase of the guild member's activities. Above all, they established the monopoly of the town's market for the guild members, forbidding anyone to practice the given trade in the city or any foreigner to import the same product, except under certain restrictions. Thus a rigid protective system was created against local and foreign competition. The regulations tended at first to assert the equality of the members of the guild, but in the late Middle Ages a few wealthy men began to control the guilds just as the wealthy patricians tended to gain control of the municipal governments. In the interest of maintaining their monopoly, the guilds fixed prices, wages, and hours; set the number of workers; specified the kind of tools in the shops; and so on. It would appear, however, that the canonical doctrine of just price had some influence in restraining the guilds from setting prices which were too high.

A number of regulations served to assure the quality of the work and thus protect the consumer: the careful inspection of finished products by guild inspectors, the establishment of high standards of workmanship, the punishment of members who turned out poor products, the forbidding of night work to keep up the quality of production.

A word must be said about guild organization. The guild was an organization of "masters," that is, skilled craftsmen. Before becoming a "master," a workman would ordinarily have been an apprentice and a journeyman. An apprentice was, of course, a young novice taken into the shop and home of the master with the aim of learning the trade. He was given board but received no salary (or only a small one) and, in fact, often paid a fee of apprenticeship to the master. The time of apprenticeship varied considerably—from two to eight years (or longer), depending on the difficulty of the profession, the supply and demand of the masters, and other factors. Often a contract

(indenture) would be signed with the apprentice's parents, fixing the number of years and other conditions of apprenticeship.

Upon completion of the apprenticeship, the apprentice became a journeyman (from the French, *journée*, "day") or a "companion." Trained in the art, he was able to work as a wage earner. The only thing to distinguish him from the master was the means and opportunity to become a guild member. Quite often he traveled about to gain valuable experience in different masters' shops.

In the early stages of guild development, a journeyman would be accepted as a master without excessive requirements. But as the guilds came under the control of an increasingly patriarchial group of wealthy guildsmen, they tended to become closed corporations, and various more difficult requirements for entrance into the mastership were established. The entrance fee was made excessive, or the candidate was required to produce an expensive "masterpiece" (hence, the origin of that word) in order to qualify. In addition, the applicant had to be of legitimate birth and free.

As the mastership became more exclusive, there was a tendency on the part of the journeyman to remain a wage earner. Much discontent developed among journeymen, who banded together and created riots and strikes. But these preliminary efforts at cooperative action scarcely resembled trade or industrial union activity today.

We have been describing till this point the rather typical handicraft, small shop, industrial organization. But there also existed a more capitalistic type of organization in which employer and labor were divided. The employer (capitalist) gave to the worker the material to be worked up into cloth, or some other product, which the employer then sold as export goods. It mattered not that both employer and worker were organized into guilds in this arrangement. The worker still occupied a dependent position. Most large export industries were organized in this manner, particularly the cloth industries. Although the members involved in these large export industries were much more numerous than in the small crafts, the workers were not concentrated in large factories but still worked in their homes or small shops, sometimes owning their own tools and sometimes renting them. Because the material was supplied or "put out" to the workers in their own shops and homes, this system has been called the "putting-out" system.

There remains but to trace some of the elements of capitalism which were developing in the high and late Middle Ages and which were to grow into the commercial capitalism of early modern times. In the first place, in the high and late Middle Ages business ethics were undergoing a change toward the acceptance of the profit motive so fundamental to capitalism. Earlier

medieval business ethics emphasized the doctrine of "just price" and the prohibition of usury.

The doctrine of just price held that nothing should be sold for more than its real worth. The real worth was determined by the absolute cost of production plus a proper fraction of a living wage for all those who worked on the product. This doctrine was Judaic or Christian in origin rather than Roman. One Roman lawyer had held that it was all right for a man to buy cheaply and sell dearly, and for each man to try "to overreach the other"; another limited such blanket approval by saying that if an article had been sold for less than one-half of its value the seller could recover. But the customary medieval doctrine opposed the Roman law in this case. Aquinas supported the doctrine of just price on the basis of the Golden Rule.

Much more controversial was the prohibition of usury. It was extremely difficult to rationalize the direct Biblical prohibition of lending money for gain. In the third Lateran Council (1179) it was affirmed that "usurers shall not be admitted to Communion," while in 1311 Pope Clement V declared all secular legislation in favor of usury null and void. The prohibition of usury was also being enforced on occasion in secular courts even after the introduction of Roman law. But, as one writer has suggested, the prohibition had about the same success in preventing loans for interest as the Volstead Act had in prohibiting the sale of liquor in the United States. We shall shortly see how extensive were the credit operations of the medieval merchants.

In the face of the rising trade the jurists began to interpret usury more leniently. If the lender faced a possible loss, then interest could not be usurious—that is, risk of capital was involved, so interest was justifiable. As a matter of fact, during the whole period there were numerous practical devices for hiding usury. For example, interest rates were often concealed in promissory notes: a man would promise to pay much more than he had actually borrowed, being careful to falsify upward the original amount of the loan. By the end of the Middle Ages the capitalistic spirit was definitely on the rise, and interest taking had become quite acceptable. The term "usury" was beginning to be applied, as it is today, to loans at excessive rates of interest.

In addition to the rise of a capitalistic spirit, certain other signs of the growth of capitalism are evident in the Middle Ages. At the root of the nascent capitalism was the increasing coinage, circulation, and accumulation of money. In the early Middle Ages, Charlemagne, we recall, coined the silver *denarius*, or penny. With the breakup of his empire the rights of coinage were feudalized. Manorial economy reached its height; monetary circulation was at its lowest point. But during this period some gold coinage from Byzantium was circu-

lating in Italy. In addition, gold coins were in evidence in Moslem Spain.

With the revival of trade, monetary circulation increased, and coinage began to be standardized more and more at the fairs. At the same time, increased mining activity helped to get specie in circulation. The silver mines discovered in the Freiburg region were a major source. In addition, a few other new mines were opened between 900 and 1300. But there probably was not much increase in the annual production of coinage metal from about 1300 until the mid-fifteenth century.

Toward the end of the twelfth and into the thirteenth century there were numerous reforms in silver currency, in Venice, in England, and particularly in France. In France two new coins which were struck just after the middle of the thirteenth century were spread all over Europe by their use at the Champagne fairs. It was also in the thirteenth century that gold currency was revived in Europe. Frederick II in 1231 introduced a gold *augustal* which scarcely circulated beyond southern Italy. The gold florin of Florence (1254) led to the reintroduction of gold coinage in Europe; it was followed by the minting of similar coins in a number of other countries.

With the increase of money in circulation, some merchants or commercial capitalists began to build up large fortunes, or accumulations of capital. Not only private capitalists and bankers, but kings and the Church built up great amounts of capital. As the capitalistic spirit was growing and large fortunes were accumulating, a number of techniques that were to become a part of commercial capitalism were also being developed. In the first place, there was a growth of private loan operations by merchants who became at the same time financiers and bankers. These operations had their origins, at least in part, in the extensive money-exchanging activity that went on at the fairs. The forms of the loans were numerous and merged into forms of partnership. The straight loan with or without concealed interest was very common. Popular also was the loan in the form of a sale of a rent. In return for the loan the lender received a rent for a specified time.

There were, in addition, a number of partnership loans: a partnership for a limited time would be formed in order that the lender could legally recover his money with profit. There were numerous kinds of partnerships, of which we shall mention only one, the *commenda* or *accommodatio*, in which one partner put up the money and the other did the work (such as organizing and directing a commercial voyage), the former usually receiving three-fourths of the profit and the active partner the other fourth. The *commenda* was obviously a form of investment activity for a merchant with sufficient capital. But there were also opportunities for small investors on a kind of

joint-stock basis in Genoese and Hanseatic shipping enterprises. Records show shares (*loca*) being sold in ventures to as many as fifty investors, each expecting a fraction of the profit proportional to his investment.

Of considerable importance in the commercial activities of the medieval fairs and urban markets was the growth of several kinds of credit documents, such as the bill of exchange (a promise to pay at a later date in another currency for goods received and valued in a given currency) and the letter of fair (a promise to pay at the end of the fair or beginning of the next fair for goods received on account). Much of this credit activity started with the money-changers at the fairs.

It was, at least in part, out of the money-exchanging activity of the money-changers and the mercantile activity of Italian merchants that private banking arose. The enormous wealth of Florentine banking houses of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries made them bankers to kings and popes, and such activities were duplicated on smaller scales in a number of other Italian cities. About 1400 the first deposit and public banks emerged in Italy and Spain.

Thus by the fifteenth century many of the elements of the early modern capitalism were flourishing in the vigorous money economy of the Middle Ages. We have seen that this money economy created urban communities, industrial organizations within these communities, and at the same time important capitalistic commercial techniques and, furthermore, that it had transformed the servile manorial tenures into some form of free or semifree holdings.

FEUDALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF LAW

Having discussed the economic base of medieval society, we are now prepared to discuss the changing form of its polity, and particularly the political role of feudalism and law. The initial difficulty in discussing feudalism lies in the limitations of the term. Some historians tend to apply it to the political and economic structure of society in Europe from about 900 to 1300. However, it has become customary among other historians to limit feudalism to the *political* and *military* associations of noble with noble, leaving the *economic* substructure to be described as manorialism. We have adopted the latter convention, recognizing at the same time that it was the income-producing *fief* (land holding) which was at the core of the feudal relationship, that it was the predominantly agricultural nature of European society that made possible political feudalism, and that the political feudal structure implied a definite system of land tenure.

A further difficulty in treating feudalism lies in the selection of typical char-

acteristics. After we have said that feudalism constitutes a personal relationship between noble and noble, one that involves military obligations on the part of the vassal and the grant of a fief on the part of the lord, we do well to ask just which of the further details may be called typical. When we attempt to generalize on these details, we find a bewildering array of variations as we pass from country to country and century to century. We shall circumvent this difficulty, limiting our description in the main to French feudalism of about the eleventh century.

It will be worth while to keep in mind the broad outline of feudalism as we investigate its origins. It was essentially a political and military system that held together the landholding or noble classes. Both lord and vassal were nobles. This relationship is not to be confused with the relationship on the manor between the lord of the manor and the serfs or laborers with varying degrees of freedom who worked the land. This manorial relationship of lord to serf we have already considered. We are primarily concerned here with the feudal relationship of lord and vassal. The relationship between noble and noble, between vassal and lord, ranges from the dukes and counts, holding duchies and counties from the king, to the humble knight, holding one or two manors. This relationship was a bond established by the homage and fealty sworn by a vassal to a lord who accepted this pledge. The lord received services, mainly military, from the vassal. The vassal received the usufruct (profits or fruits of the use) of a fief which he held as a result of the feudal bond and which he could pass on to his eldest son, providing the latter renewed the feudal relationship with the lord. As the land was infeudated (divided up into feudal holdings), so, to a certain degree, was public sovereignty. Thus such prerogatives of public administration as justice, defense, and even minting became prerogatives of private administration. They were in most cases limited to the higher nobles of the feudal system, but even the lower feudal nobility exercised certain minor judicial prerogatives.

The origins of medieval feudalism are usually found in Roman and Germanic institutions that were flourishing at the time the barbarian kingdoms in the West were forming. The first of these involved "patronage" (*patrocinium*) and "commendation" (*commendatio*). Patronage was the old, tried Roman custom of attaching oneself as a client to a wealthy or influential patron. The patron gained a faithful, dependent following; the client, influential support. In late antiquity this custom merged into "commendation." In those troubled times it became customary to "commend" one's self or one's self and land to a more powerful neighbor in return for assurance of protection or support.

The nature of commendation is aptly shown by a Frankish formula of the seventh century:

To the magnificent Lord ——, I, ——. Since it is known familiarly to all how little I have whence to feed and clothe myself, I have therefore petitioned your Piety, and your good will has permitted me to hand myself over or commend myself to your guardianship, which I have thereupon done; that is to say, in this way, that you should aid and succor me as well with food as with clothing, according as I shall be able to serve you and deserve it.

And so long as I shall live I ought to provide service and honor to you, suitably to my free condition; and I shall not during my lifetime have the ability to withdraw from your power or guardianship. . . . Wherefore it is proper that if either of us shall wish to withdraw himself from these agreements, he shall pay — shillings to his companion, and this agreement shall remain unbroken.

Another of the important background institutions of Roman origin was the "precarious tenure" (*precarium*). Originally, as the name implies, it was a form of tenure without written contract in which the landlord could revoke the land any time he so pleased. Often no rent was paid. In later times the land involved came to be that which the tenant had originally commended to the landlord, who in turn granted it in precarious tenure to its former owner. Precarious tenure changed into tenures with specified times and conditions of payments. As the conditions were specified, particularly when the tenant was to receive usufruct of the land for life or for, say, two generations, the *precarium* became known as a "benefice." The identification of the *precarium* with the benefice is consistently made in Frankish documents. One Frankish formula illustrates how land originally granted to a monastery was recovered as a benefice. Following a description of the land and all of its appurtenances, the abbot goes on to say:

But afterwards, at your request, it has seemed proper to us to cede to you the same possessions to be held for usufruct; and you will not neglect to pay henceforth annually the due *censum*, to wit, ——. And if God should give you a son by your legal wife, he shall have the same possessions for the days of his life only, and shall not presume to neglect the above-named payment; and similarly your sons which you are seen to have at present shall do for the days of their life; after the death of whom all the possessions above named shall revert to us and our successors perpetually.

Still another, somewhat different, type of institution of great importance for the origin of feudalism was the Germanic *comitatus* (German, *Gefolge*, "following"). This consisted in a personal military relationship between a chief and warriors. The followers were bound to the chief by an oath of allegiance. The chief was expected to furnish the warriors their "war-horse and

deadly and victorious spear" (as Tacitus tells us in his classic description of the *comitatus*). In addition, for faithful and brave service, the followers could expect to receive a share of any booty. The *comitatus* was still in full use among the Franks, Visigoths, Lombards, and others at the time of the invasions. Thus the connection of the *comitatus* with the military relationships which we speak of as vassalage can be definitely traced; and it is Carolingian vassalage that forms one of the most important elements of early feudalism. Most historians omit discussion of a somewhat similar relationship that arose in the Roman Empire in late antiquity, the so-called *bucellarii*. These were private mounted cavalry. Personally bound to their leader by an oath, they were equipped by him and provided with a horse. They even received land from him, just as was the case later in the Carolingian vassalage. However, no direct relationship between the two institutions has been shown.

One remaining institution, important later in the rise of feudalism, consisted in the granting of "immunities" from king's officials in a given territory or vill. By these grants the recipients enjoyed virtually private sovereignty in the designated areas. This is well illustrated by a formula used among the Franks for granting vills:

Wherefore, by this our present command, we have decreed forever that the person aforesaid should have the above mentioned vill, in its entirety, with the lands, houses, buildings, villeins, slaves, vineyards, woods, fields, meadows, pastures, waters or watercourses, gristmills, additions, appurtenances, including any class of men who are subjected to our treasury who dwell there; in entire immunity and without the entrance of any one of the [king's] judges for the purpose of exacting fines for any kind of case. He shall have, hold, and possess it in proprietary right and without expecting the entrance of any of our judges. . . .

We can pass over the interesting and hotly disputed question as to when the essential elements of the feudal relations became widespread and merely observe that under Charlemagne (ruled alone from 771-814) and his immediate predecessors vassals or military figures personally sworn to the king much in the fashion of the old *comitatus* were being granted *benefices in return for their military service*. These benefices were granted from crown land and were to assure to the king a numerous, active, and contented cavalry. Thus the combination of Carolingian vassalage and the benefice produced the characteristic military relationship of feudalism. But it was not until the breakup of Charlemagne's empire under his successors in the ninth century that the remaining characteristics of feudalism outlined above became widespread. The benefice granted for military service came to be known as the fief (*feos* in the vernacular, and *feodum* or *feudum* in Latin). The fiefs were recognized

as hereditary, that is, the right to hold the fief became hereditary. Primogeniture (succession to the fief by the eldest son) grew to be customary in some areas. With the collapse of central authority and the great pressure brought on by the incursions of the Northmen, "immunities" or "franchises"—and thus the prerogatives of public sovereignty—were granted to and/or seized by the feudal nobility. These included many important public rights: administering justice, collecting taxes, coining money, exploiting the forests, raising military forces, establishing and regulating markets, and so on.

In examining in greater detail the elements of feudalism, we can profitably begin with a study of the ceremonies of personal relationship that characterized the feudal bond. The bond was tied in the ceremony of homage (*homagium*, from Latin, *homo*, "man") and fealty (*fidelitas*, "fidelity"). In doing homage, the vassal became the "man" of his lord, and he then swore fealty, that is, to be faithful to him. The steps in the ceremony have been nicely described in a contemporary chronicle:

First they did their homage thus. The count asked the vassal if he were willing to become completely his man, and the other replied, "I am willing"; and with hands clasped, placed between the hands of the count, they were bound together by a kiss. Secondly, he who had done homage gave his fealty to the representative of the count in these words, "I promise on my faith that I will in the future be faithful to Count William, and will observe my homage to him completely against all persons, in good faith and without deceit." And, thirdly, he took his oath to this upon the relics of the saints. Afterward the count, with a little rod which he held in his hand, gave investitures to all who by this agreement had given their security and accompanying oath.

It should be realized that this ceremony would often be followed up by written contracts. The vassal would put in writing his homage and fealty and what fief or fiefs he was getting in return, and then the lord would write and acknowledge having received the homage and fealty of the vassal and would indicate the fief granted. These contracts were duly attested and signed. It should be noted that the feudal relations required mutual obligations on the part of both vassal and lord, and if either failed to live up to them the agreement would be broken. We shall return to this later when we stress the concept of the supremacy of law embodied in feudalism.

We have examined the establishment of the personal bond between the vassal and lord. We are now interested in the details of what each received from the arrangement. It has been pointed out already that the fief constituted the real basis of the relationship. Depending on the rank and importance of the vassal and the lord, the fief might be a single manor or a whole duchy.

Hence some of the feudal contracts were a short paragraph while others were pages of detailed description of the lands and appurtenances involved. On occasion the vassal might hold some other income-producing fief instead of the ordinary fief consisting of manors. But whatever its size or form, the fief was the main thing that the vassal received for his share in the relationship. Land held in fee, as it was under feudalism, must be distinguished from freely held (alodial) land. Although the land held in feudal tenure tended to increase, such alodial holdings persisted in a number of areas throughout the Middle Ages. Their owners were freemen who were outside the feudal system, at least so far as their alodial holdings were concerned.

For his part, the vassal owed a variety of services and obligations to the lord. The primary service was, of course, military. As the feudal systems crystallized, military service due for fiefs was computed in units of "knight service." A given manor might carry with it the obligation of one knight's service, that is, the supplying by the vassal, on demand of the lord, of the service of one knight fully armed and equipped for a stated period each year (often forty days). The larger the fief the greater the number of knights' services required. Hence, if the fief was large, the vassal would have either to subinfeudate his land further in order to gain the knights or else to maintain them in his retinue. Maintenance was an expensive proposition, and so the practice of subinfeudation was widely followed. Vassals could be called on for extraordinary military duties. Castle guard duty could be specified. In England military service was often commuted to a money payment or some form of service other than military.

The vassal was also obliged to serve with fellow vassals on the lord's court. Thus he assisted the lord in carrying out the judicial duties associated with the lord's holdings. It should be noted that the lord had no arbitrary rights of justice with respect to the vassal. His vassal rated a hearing before a court of his peers, that is, his fellow vassals.

The vassal was also expected to feed and entertain the lord when the liege was passing through the fief. While not subject to any arbitrary taxes without his consent, the vassal was required by feudal law to render occasional payments to the lord. Some of these payments were known as feudal aids: sums to be paid on the knighting of the lord's eldest son, on the marriage of his eldest daughter, for the ransom of the lord, or for crusades. Still another payment was the "relief." This was a payment made to the lord any time the fief changed hands, whether by inheritance or any other form of alienation. The relief was proof that, although the heir of the vassal had the right to continue holdings in fee, he had no absolute proprietary right. This is further

illustrated by the fact that when the vassal died without an heir the fief returned (or "escheated," in feudal parlance) to the lord. Relief was also paid when the lord was succeeded.

The lord also exercised the right of wardship over the vassal's heir if the heir was a minor when the vassal died. In addition, the heir or heiress needed the consent of the lord to marry, as did the widow of a deceased vassal. These rights of wardship and marriage served the purpose of securing a suitable vassal to replace the deceased. Often they served as a money-producing device, for the lord might release the parties from their obligations upon the payment of a fee. A prospective, anxious, and wealthy bridegroom could be held up for a tidy sum.

The remaining significant element of feudalism, the exercise of private sovereignty within the fief, has already been illustrated in the discussion of the Frankish grants of immunity and the spread of feudalism in the ninth century. We can merely note further that this was a well-established feature of feudalism. As one feudal lawyer tells us, "each baron is sovereign in his own barony." This of course was modified by the strength of the overlords. In the case of such strong duchies as Normandy fewer prerogatives pertained to the barons than in those places where the counts or dukes were weak. The principal prerogatives obtained by the feudality were those associated with the administration of justice. In the main, the central authorities—whether the king in England or the counts and dukes in France (in the eleventh century)—tried to retain their jurisdiction in the most important cases, those "for which a man may lose his head and hand" (high justice). Those minor cases "when a person would only be chastised in skin or hair . . . were left to local potentates" (low justice).

Thus we have stressed the ceremony and contracts cementing the feudal relationship, the granting of fiefs by the lord to the vassal, the services and obligations owed by the vassal to the lord, and the private exercise of sovereign powers. These appear to have been the most important features of feudalism in most areas where it was accepted.

The nature of the feudal hierarchy, extending from king to the lowest knight, varied in different countries; in fact, as a strict and orderly hierarchy it existed nowhere. In France, or in the greater part of it where feudalism existed, the king was the supreme overlord (in theory, that is; actually he was weaker during the eleventh and much of the twelfth century than some of his powerful vassals, for example, the count of Flanders and the duke of Normandy). The great vassals who held from the king were of all grades. Beneath counts and dukes were viscounts, who were sometimes the agents of the dukes

and counts, sometimes fiefholders, and sometimes both agents and fiefholders. Below these top grades were barons or seigneurs. These words were used as general titles for nobility and at the same time as the technical titles for fiefholders above the lowest rank, the knight or chevalier. The number of gradations of titles increased greatly in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

As the greatest landowner and landholder in Europe, the Church could not, of course, escape feudalism. In spite of the prohibition against shedding of blood by a member of the clergy, the higher clergy in the ninth and tenth centuries often fulfilled in person the military obligations associated with their fiefs. And it is by no means uncommon to read of a bishop or abbot leading his knights in a foray. As clerical reform took place (see Chapter III, pages 84 ff.), the clergy no longer personally engaged in military activity; instead they ordinarily enfeoffed part of their holding to lay knights, who would then fulfill the necessary service. Most often the churchmen held their fiefs not for military service but in free alms (*frankalmoine*), that is, in exchange for prayers and masses for the lord and his descendants.

There remains but to examine the important principles with respect to law that are evident in feudalism and, as a matter of fact, in political literature of the early Middle Ages prior to the rising influence of Roman law and Aristotle's *Politics*. Certain basic political concepts were directly inherited by the early medieval society from Roman-Christian tradition, while others came down from Germanic tradition. There has been considerable discussion as to how much comes from each of these; but it makes little difference for this account as to where the traditions originated, since we are mainly interested in the concepts as taken up by the Middle Ages and passed into modern thought.

From the Roman-Christian sources the early Middle Ages drew and reexpressed the following basic political theories: (1) *The "natural" and the "conventional" in government must be distinguished.* This distinction the Christian fathers took up from post-Aristotelian Stoic tradition. While "natural law" and "natural reason" were thought to lie at the basis of man's individual ethics, the existing organs of government were considered mere human conventions rather than "natural" organic units. In the same way private property had no basis in natural law but was a man-made convention. (2) *All men are basically and spiritually free under natural law.* No man was naturally the slave of another. Differences in station were thought to have arisen from the necessity to control the evil intent of man after his original sin. From this principle was inferred a third: (3) *Spiritual life and the institutions representing spiritual authority in the form of the Church should not be part of the*

state, but should be free and unfettered. The churchmen found this principle behind Christ's statement, "My kingdom is not of this world" (John 18:36), and His admonition, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's" (Matthew 12:21, and Mark 12:17). Previously religion had been closely tied to the state, the nation, or the tribe. This separation was reiterated during the first three centuries of Christianity. It is true that after the acceptance of Christianity by the Roman Empire in the fourth century this separation of church and state was not consistently maintained. In the East the Church and its principal patriarch, the bishop of Constantinople, fell under the domination of the Emperor, thus restoring, at least in part, the union of state and church. But the principle of separation was well established and was a living force in the West, in the writings of the Fathers and in the activity of the bishop of Rome. (4) *The political order, although conventional in its actual structure, is of divine origin.* As Paul asserted, "The powers that be are ordained of God"; or, as the author of the First Epistle of St. Peter said, "Submit yourself to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake. . . . Fear God. Honor the king." While seemingly contradicted by the statement of St. Augustine that the origin of the state is in man's original sin, actually no contradiction was thought to exist. It was rationalized that, since man had fallen, the state was necessary for the control of man's sinful actions and thus was sanctified by God. This is not to be confused with the concept that the person of the king is divinely sanctified and thus no one can legitimately resist him. This latter doctrine appears occasionally in medieval writings, but does not really become important until early modern times. (5) The two preceding concepts were united in a far-reaching and important doctrine: There are two realms and two powers in society, the spiritual and the temporal. These powers are autonomous authorities of divine origin, each supreme in its realm. This doctrine produced a great deal of discussion and activity in the Middle Ages.

In addition to these principles derived from the Roman-Christian tradition (of which further aspects will be discussed in Chapter III), important political concepts passed to the early Middle Ages from Germanic sources: (1) *The laws or customs of a society are supreme, and all members of that society from the lowest free man to the king are responsible to the law.* Some historians have sought the origin of this principle in the statements of Roman lawyers to the effect that the emperor owed his authority ultimately to the sanction of the Roman people. But this principle among the Germans was a living, actual force, while among the Romans it was a theoretical expression of the origin of authority. (2) *One succeeds to the kingship by the election or ap-*

proval of the community. This remained true even after the kingship became hereditary. The new king still had to be duly sanctioned or recognized by the freemen of the nation and raised on the shield as a mark of approval and election to the kingship.

The foregoing principles, then, appear to be the most important political concepts inherited by feudal society. Their further elaboration through the twelfth century succeeded in establishing at least three characteristically medieval concepts: (1) The over-all purpose of the state is the maintenance of justice. The state thus has a basic moral purpose. This was an extension of the principle of the divine origin of the state. The ruler was God's servant so long as he carried out the purpose of the state—to maintain justice. (2) Furthermore, the law as the embodiment of justice is supreme. All elements of feudal society were considered responsible to the law. This basic concept of the supreme position of the law was subscribed to by both the political writers of the early Middle Ages and the feudal lawyers. It rested on the old Germanic principle of the supremacy of the customary law. The customary law growing up with a society expressed justice for that society. The unique position of the customary law made the concept of the ruler as legislator foreign to the early Middle Ages. The modern concept of sovereignty, which seeks that element of government which possesses legislative powers, was thus equally foreign to feudal society. The king and council in the earlier period were thought of as interpreting the law or issuing decrees on matters not covered by the law. (3) The king's relationship with his subjects rests on the mutual understanding that he help maintain the law and justice. This concept is a corollary of the first two. Both this concept and the preceding one can be aptly illustrated by reference to the feudal customs drawn up for the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, the so-called Assizes of Jerusalem (early thirteenth century):

If any man or woman has obtained a judgment of the court, whether he be a chevalier or a burger, and the king or queen of the land endeavors to prevent its execution, he (the king) does wrong and goes against God and his oath. . . . For the king swears upon the saints to maintain all the grants of other kings, to maintain the good customs and usages of the kingdom, to maintain and guard the rights of the poor and the rich. . . . If he breaks this oath . . . he has denied God. His men and his people ought not to permit this, *for the authority of the lord or lady is only the authority to do right. . . . But it is well known that it is never the authority to do wrong.*

Thus the king and those in authority have that authority only when they do right and follow the law. Other typical feudal legal phrases express this point of view: "There is no king where will rules and not law"; or, "The king is under God and the law." Carried to its logical conclusion (as it was in

medieval political literature), this third principle implied the deposition of tyrannical rulers. One author of the eleventh century speaks of deposing the ruler who has broken the contract:

When he who is chosen to defend the good and to hold the evil in check, himself begins to cherish wickedness, to stand out against good men, to exercise most cruelly over his subjects the tyranny which he was bound to combat; is it not clear that he justly forfeits the dignity conceded to him and that the people stand free of his rule and subjection, since it is evident that he was the first to violate the compact (*pactum*) on account of which he was made ruler?

And another author of the twelfth century recommends slaying the tyrant: "But to slay the tyrant is not only permissible, but equitable and just" (John of Salisbury). The feudal lawyers supported a less violent but equally effective procedure: if the king or lord does not rule according to law, the vassal should withhold his services, for the basic feudal relations are mutual and contractual. Of course such withholding of services constituted an extreme action, to be taken only after the vassal had carried his complaint to a proper court and secured a favorable judgment which his lord had ignored.

We can conclude this discussion of the basic concept of law evolved and followed in feudal society by quoting two historical observations, the first describing the character and importance of the feudal contractual theory, the second stressing the subjection of the lord to the legal authority of the feudal court:

The medieval conception of contract is not a speculation of a pseudo-historical kind, related to some original agreement upon which political society was founded, but rather a natural and legitimate conclusion from the principle of the election or recognition of the ruler by the community, and the mutual oaths of the ceremony of coronation; it is an agreement to observe the law and to administer and maintain justice.

The whole system of feudalism as a form of political authority was based upon the principle that the lord, even if he were king, was subject to the legal authority of the feudal court, whose function it was to declare and enforce the laws which regulated the mutual obligations of lord and vassal. This is the doctrine expressed in almost all the feudal law books. (R. W. and A. J. Carlyle.)

THE GROWTH OF PARLIAMENTARY BODIES

"Parliamentary institutions have, in fact, been incomparably the greatest gift of the English people to the civilized world." Such is the judgment of one of the premier historians of the English Parliament as he sets out to describe its growth. While it was the English Parliament which survived the

Middle Ages as the most vigorous of the European parliamentary bodies, we should misrepresent the facts if we presented parliamentary origins in terms of the English efforts alone. The growth of representative institutions was a common European phenomenon of the high Middle Ages. The cortes in the Spanish kingdoms, the provincial assemblies and Estates-General in France, the diets in Germany and in eastern and northern Europe—all were representative bodies with varying organizations, powers, and effectiveness.

Certain background factors are essential to the understanding of the parliamentary movement. Still persistent in the thirteenth century was the concept of the supremacy of the law. The further idea that changes in customary law demanded the consent of the community was also a well-established principle. Under feudalism this community was limited largely to the feudal nobility, the lords spiritual, and the lords temporal. It was not only a right but a duty under feudal law for the king to hold the court or council of his tenants-in-chief to give satisfaction to their petitions and complaints.

Under feudal law the king was expected to take no action not allowed by custom or feudal law. He could not, for example, demand extraordinary aids or fees from his vassals. Hence, when the king desired further financial aid he appealed to his feudal tenants-in-chief in council. This was made abundantly clear in the *Magna Carta*, which was exacted from King John at Runnymede in 1215 by his barons. It was essentially an expression of feudal custom; inherent in it was the feudal right of the vassal to be consulted on affairs of the realm and, thus, the obligation of the lord to seek counsel. It is also clearly evident that vassals had to give their consent for any unusual feudal exaction. *Magna Carta*, then, reiterated the basic feudal principle that the king was limited by customary law. The charter was continually reissued in succeeding centuries as a symbol of the king's subservience to the law.

If we stressed feudal principles only, we would miss other background features equally important to the growth of parliamentary institutions. The more direct and "national" relationship of monarch to subject had never been completely extinguished. In those feudal areas where the king or duke retained public prerogatives, the king's justice reached more directly to all but the servile elements of society, not just to the feudal nobility. This was particularly true of England. By the twelfth century and the reign of the greatest of the Norman-Angevin kings, Henry II, the king's court or *curia* and its various judicial offshoots had given to England new courts and new judicial procedures that brought royal justice to all parts of the realm. The spread of these new procedures (for example, the starting of an action in a king's court by the purchase of a writ, which was a formal and standardized command from

the king to a sheriff or some other justice to undertake legal action) was particularly stimulated by a system of traveling or itinerant justices. By the use of the more standard, royal procedures, a common substantive law began to be welded together from Anglo-Saxon customary law, Norman customary law, feudal law, and other divers laws current in England. The product of this fusion came to be known as the common law, the law common to the realm; and local variations began to disappear. The fashioning of common law into a fairly distinct whole was one of the great achievements of the Norman political organization in England.

We have left until last the development which is of greatest importance for the evolution of parliamentary bodies, the rise of the middle class, whose growing influence in the political realm is the subject of this section. On the whole, a parliamentary or representative body can be distinguished from an older feudal council of the king by the inclusion of representatives of the middle class, or, to use an expression common in the high Middle Ages, the third estate. The king, then, in the early parliaments summoned representatives of the third estate to meet with the other two estates that made up his council, the lay and clerical nobility.

The word parliament (*parlamentum*, "general colloquy") came into common usage for special full sessions of the king's council during the first half of the thirteenth century. It was particularly used in France (*parlement*) for the meetings of the king's *curia* for judicial purposes. Actually, the first parliaments or national bodies with middle class representation appeared not in England but in Spain. Special augmented versions of the king's council, known as *cortes*, were called. Medieval Spain was broken up into a number of kingdoms: Leon, Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia. As early as 1188 the king of Leon included in his council "citizens selected from individual cities" as well as bishops and magnates. At that council the king swore to guard the good customs which had been instituted by his predecessors, and above all he promised not to wage war, make peace, or issue a decree without the counsel of the bishops, nobles, and "good men by whose counsel I ought to be ruled." The expression "good men" was continually used to describe the town representatives in Spain and elsewhere in Europe. In 1208 in another council of Leon attended by a "multitude" of city representatives, the king announced that he had issued a particular law with the consent of all.

In the course of the thirteenth century representatives from the towns were invited to cortes in other Spanish kingdoms, if not regularly at least on many occasions. When the *bourgeoisie* (townspeople) were called, it was often to secure their financial assistance. The need of the king for such assistance

remained, in Spain as in England, one of the great stimuli to the growth of parliamentary institutions. From 1295 on, the cortes of Castile and Leon regularly included representatives of the towns. In that year at the cortes of Valladolid the town representatives met and acted separately from the nobles and clerical prelates, thus foreshadowing later bicameral systems. Two years later the Castilian cortes wrung from the king the promise to have representatives of the cities regularly appointed to the king's council during the intervals between the cortes. A Castilian cortes of 1358 is worthy of particular note because it regulated the expenditures of the king's household. The power of the third estate in Castilian cortes continued to rise. It was at its height during the minorities of the kings and at those times almost assumed the form of a permanent council of government. Even a cursory reading of the records of the cortes of Castile and Leon will reveal that during the fourteenth century they exercised a wide variety of functions, of which the financial was the most important. Their petitions when granted by the king became law.

The cortes of Aragon in the latter part of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries showed even more independence than that of Castile and Leon. Petitions were granted and proclaimed as law by the king while the cortes was still in session, a practice not followed in Castile and Leon. This was important since the king would then have no opportunity to change the law in his final proclamation. The cortes also formed an interim representative council with the power to check on the faithful execution and observance of the laws by the king and particularly on his administration of public revenue.

The Spanish cortes declined in the fifteenth century before the rising power of the king, who found means of financing his activities other than through taxes periodically approved by the cortes. His appointed administrative officials assumed more power at the expense of the deputies to the cortes.

If Spain had the oldest parliamentary bodies with middle class representatives, England had the most permanent; it was the primary source of modern parliamentary systems. Here, as in Spain, the king's council or *curia* was the original core of the parliamentary body. The *curia* had already shown its political fertility, for from it had emerged or were emerging the principal king's courts: the King's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer. It was providing the source for those parliamentary bodies which were called together irregularly for special approval of or assistance to the king's actions. We have characterized as the essential feature of the new parliaments, distinguishing them from the older feudal councils of the king, the addition of the middle class or, to put it more broadly, the addition of the nonfeudal classes. The

addition of nonfeudal middle class elements to parliament had its background in that very fertile institution, the sworn inquest. In the sworn inquest the king ordered local inhabitants to act as an inquest to determine a "disputed or denied fact" about their locality. The sworn inquest may go back to late Roman times, but it was certainly used by the Franks and later by the Normans. Its use in Norman England was fertile in two directions. From it grew trial by jury, on the one hand, and the ordering of local representatives of nonfeudal elements before the king's council to find the temper of their localities, on the other.

In England the first major addition to the king's council beyond the magnates and prelates was not the townsmen, as in Castile, but rather a class called "knights." The decline of feudalism by the thirteenth century had made a special case of the knights. They were small landowners who held land valued at £20 (later £40). Their interests were not adequately represented by the great temporal barons (magnates) nor by the spiritual lords (prelates). In the first part of the thirteenth century the knights had more than once been ordered for special inquests, but they were first called to a general council meeting as a parliament in 1254. Also called were the lower clergy. These new elements ~~were~~ to report on possible contributions to the king's current war in Gascony.

The burgesses were called to a parliament first in 1265 by the Earl Simon de Montfort, who was holding the king captive and wished to secure general approval for reforms. Along with the prelates and magnates and two knights from each shire were summoned two representatives from each of many cities and towns. Although all the elements that were later to make up the parliamentary houses were now represented, Simon de Montfort's parliament did not initiate a regular summoning of burgesses and knights. During the next twenty years these classes were summoned to parliaments occasionally, but by no means regularly.

The turning point which ended the period of early formation and began the real growth of Parliament was marked by the Model Parliament, summoned in 1295 by Edward I. Edward wished general approval of his foreign policy and particularly the assurance of financial support. The Model Parliament included the classes of the *curia* (the magnates, prelates, and some officials of the king's household) and the noncurial classes (the lower clergy, the knights, and the burgesses). In the fourteenth century the household officials tended to drop out or become the "servants" of the magnates and the prelates, and the magnates and prelates joined to form the House of Lords. Similarly,

the knights and burgesses drew together. By the end of Edward III's reign (1327-77) they were meeting together as the House of Commons, the lesser clergy dropping out.

The phrasing of the summons to the Model Parliament showed the influence of the Roman law. But at the same time it revealed the general concept that the king's actions in important matters ought to have the approval of all classes of the realm. "What affects all should be approved by all; common dangers should be met by means provided in common." The burgesses and citizens were to have "full and sufficient power" to act for themselves and their cities, burghs, and counties and to accept decisions made in common council of the Parliament. In the course of the thirteenth century, then, the knights and burgesses, starting merely as appointees to sworn inquests, emerged as deputies that were approaching the status of real representatives. Where the idea of representation itself (the idea of representatives free to act for the community as a whole) originated is a highly debatable question. Selecting representatives to Church synods and councils presented interesting parallels of language with the practice of calling for lay representatives later. The system of organization by the Dominican and Franciscan orders employed a series of representatives (see Chapter III, pages 88 ff.). But there is little evidence that either of these developments affected the growth of parliamentary representation.

Although the basic principles behind parliamentary representation had been clearly established in the thirteenth century, "parliament entered the fourteenth century still vague and formless, with composition, organization and methods of working still undetermined" (G. B. Adams).

Certainly at the beginning of the fourteenth century the Parliament still showed its heritage from the king's council: it was judicial in its actions. At first the king was petitioned in Parliament for justice in a wide variety of affairs. The king would either approve or deny petitions, depending perhaps on how much financial support he wanted. Early in the fourteenth century petitions of common grievances were being presented as a unit by the commons. The common petition, if accepted, resulted in legislation. Here we see the beginnings of the legislative activity of Parliament. The common petition accepted by the king would be turned into the positive form of a statute. As in the case of petitions of the Aragonese cortes, it came to be customary for the king to accept and approve or deny petitions before the close of the Parliament.

One of the chief factors in increasing Parliament's legislative activities in the fourteenth century was the king's need for money. The idea that the king

could not make any unusual tax exaction on a particular class without the approval of that class had been growing in the thirteenth century. This was an outgrowth and generalization of the older feudal idea embodied in *Magna Carta* that the king could not levy any extraordinary feudal aids without the "common counsel of our kingdom." In the fourteenth century the heavy demands of the war with France forced Edward III to grant the basic principle that no tax could be levied without the consent of Parliament. He further submitted in 1377 to the appointment by Parliament of two persons sworn to supervise the spending of the tax money specially granted for the war. This has been characterized as the "starting point of parliamentary appropriations, of appropriating the national revenue to government expenses in detail" (G. B. Adams). It was also during Edward's reign that at least a step was taken toward making the king's ministers responsible to Parliament: the impeachment of ministers was introduced in 1376. This was indirectly effective. A number of ministers were tried by the Lords after being accused by Commons, with the result that they were convicted and removed.

In its manifold activity of the fourteenth century Parliament had taken important steps toward the development of a permanent institution to limit the king and protect a young but recognizable constitution. It had, as we have seen, rather completely limited the taxing activity of the king, and it had taken partially successful steps to limit the king's legislative activity outside of Parliament, that is, to obtain for Parliament nearly exclusive legislative powers. It was strong enough to survive the determined opposition of Richard II, who was deposed in 1399. The medieval concept of the supremacy of the law had its greatest triumph here, or to put it in the fourteenth century fashion, it was clearly shown that "the authority of the ruler was a limited and conditional authority."

For the next half-century England was ruled as a parliamentary monarchy. The civil wars between 1450 and 1485 and the coming to power of a strong Tudor house having some of the absolutist tendencies seen in other European areas of this time checked the growing ascendancy of Parliament but did not, as on the Continent, virtually destroy it.

Having considered a Continental example of parliamentary bodies in Spain and the successful development of the Parliament in England, we need not examine in detail the rise of the Estates-General in France and the diets in Germany. Although there were real differences in detail, the activity of these bodies represents the same basic phenomena, the rise of the middle class to governmental significance in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the close relation of the third estate with tax control and statutory legislation.

The similarities between the various parliamentary bodies are striking. One historian has noted some of these similarities:

. . . The new practice [of parliaments] was apparently connected with the growth of a well-to-do middle class of which the governments had good reason to take cognizance. This in turn was closely connected with the growth of towns, and this again with the extension of trade. Political institutions have a development that is closely analogous to organic evolution. The typical medieval monarchy may have gone through a normal series of changes in which the summons of a third estate to its counsels was a natural stage.

Coincidences extended far beyond the common dates of origin, to the forms of summons, to organization, to experiments in taxation, to the development of powers and to the subjects of legislation. The wording is almost identical in the royal writs convoking the nobles and prelates to the English parliament, in the analogous summons of the French estates general and in the orders convoking the cortes of Castile or the German imperial diet. In all these the king sends greetings to his "beloved and faithful," declares his intention of holding a "deliberation," "convocation," "colloquy," "discussion," "council," or "parliament" at a certain place and time, explains the reasons for the summons and orders the recipient to lay aside all other matters and attend the meeting. In the summons to the third estate, the writ was sent in England to the sheriff of each county, in France to the corresponding official, the *seneschal*, or *bailli* of each administrative division of the country.

There was an evident tendency in all countries of central and northern Europe for the assemblies to divide into four estates rather than the usual three. The petty noblesse of France, the knights and gentry of England, the lesser counts, lords, and knights of the Empire, the *hidalgos* or *caballeros* of Spain had interests different from those of the great princes, nobles, and barons, their feudal and social superiors. . . .

In England, on the other hand, certain unifying influences overcame separatist tendencies and put knights and burgesses together in the house of commons. In Germany the position of the nobility was anomalous; the electoral and other great princes were so powerful that all the other nobles great and small, fell into one class below them. In Hungary the lesser nobility formed the third estate, since there were practically no cities to be represented. Other variations occurred or seemed at one time likely to occur, but the grouping of the estates into three remained almost universal. . . .

It was claimed in all of these assemblies, and early acknowledged by the king, that he must ask for the money which was to be raised by taxation. This meant all payments beyond the most primitive and long established and customary dues to the crown. . . .

The answer to such a request from the king was usually conditional; at one time on supervision of the collection and expenditure of the fund by the body that gave it, at another on the redress of some pressing grievance, at still another on a favorable reply to the proposal of some piece of legislation. Laws were always enacted by the monarch, but they were very generally initiated by the aggressive third estate in the form of such a proposal. The whole system of estates,—parliament, cortes,—

whatever its denomination, was in its origin a monarchical device to attain ends of interest primarily to the ruler; but after the institution had taken shape, after use had given it security of position, and after the power of numbers, organization, and money had disclosed itself, these assemblages regularly used their powers to serve their own ends and in some countries to become rivals of the king in the government of the state.

In all countries alike, parliament exerted some control over the passage of laws. The uniformity of legislation which so often placed upon the statute books of different countries laws so nearly identical in their provisions and even in their wording was quite natural. The nations had the same problems and naturally met them in the same way. . . .

The simultaneous decay of parliamentary institutions in practically all the countries of Europe during the fifteenth century has been mentioned before. As they arose, so they declined contemporaneously. As the century progressed it became evident that the powers of kings and their councils were increasing, the activity and authority of parliaments were declining. . . .

Parliaments, cortes, estates-general were the bridge over which the medieval monarchs passed to the control of the centralized, popularly supported, governments of their respective countries. Only here and there, as in England, was the bridge left standing. The decline of parliamentary powers was so universal that it must have had a common cause. . . . (E. P. Cheyney.)

Although we conclude this chapter with a discussion of parliamentary bodies, the reader is reminded that other important political developments demand study: the church and state controversy and the rise of monarchical power. Since these events are intimately tied with the Christian conception of life and society and its decline we have put them off until the third chapter. But let the reader not overlook the fact that these important trends existed side by side with the feudal, legal, and parliamentary developments.

Chapter II

THE MEDIEVAL HERITAGE: THE CLASSICAL INFLUENCE



POLITICAL THEORY IN ANTIQUITY

WE PROMISED at the beginning of our study of the medieval heritage to discuss theory as well as practice, to discuss what man thought about his own activities and his intellectual aspirations. In the field of medieval intellectual history one fact of enormous importance stands out, and this is the essential continuity of the development of Western thought out of Greek beginnings. It was the Greek body of learning that passed through successive modifications by Islamic and Western schoolmen and became the foundation of our European thought. Nowhere is the continuity more clearly demonstrated than in the study of political theory.

I hardly need remind the reader of the greatest period of Hellenic cultural development, namely, the fifth and fourth centuries b.c. This was a period which produced so much of permanent intellectual value for Western civilization. The characteristic political organization which was the object of Greek political discussion was the city-state. Greek city-states varied greatly in size, constitution, or wealth, but they had certain features in common. Most of them had a city or town area surrounded by dependent rural or small-town areas. The city-states held in common the concept of citizenship, the obligation and right of a privileged group of freemen to participate in the government. This is not to be confused with modern ideas of democracy. The freemen at all times represented only a minority of the inhabitants. The concept of the importance or supremacy of customary laws was widely prevalent among the city-states. The striking position of customary laws (*nomoi*) was such that even the basest tyrant paid at least lip service to them. Unlike law in the oriental monarchies, Greek law was not considered to be of divine origin, however sanctified it might become after adoption.

This chapter, designed especially for the present volume, has been revised from its form in the first edition and is by Marshall Clagett.

The actual forms of city-state government varied from monarchy to democracy or, as was the case by the fifth century B.C., between some form of aristocracy and some form of limited democracy. In considering the various states we would be most rewarded by a brief glance at Sparta and Athens, since these states influenced the political speculations of Plato and Aristotle. The Spartan state had three well-defined classes: the so-called Spartans or Spartiates, the provincials (*perioikoi*), and the serfs or helots. The state was organized for and around the ruling Spartans, who occupied the permanent position of a conquering people. The Spartans were completely supported by the other classes. They concerned themselves only with political and military affairs. From the time he was seven years old the Spartan came under governmental care and training. He was trained to fight and to rule. Serving and supporting the Spartans were the provincials, the middle class. The provincials were occupied for the most part with industry and commerce. They exercised some minor degree of local political autonomy. At the base of society were the serfs or state slaves. They performed the basic agricultural labor that supported the others. They had no civil or political rights. Sparta had two kings with largely military duties but not much real governmental power; she had a senate or council which exercised mainly judicial functions and was made up of twenty-eight members elected for life; and she had an assembly of all adult Spartans, where theoretically the determinate powers of government lay. Actually the authority of the assembly fluctuated. An elected board of five ephors (overseers) assumed a paramount position in the government, thus tending to make Sparta an oligarchy.

The constitution of Athens can be contrasted sharply with that of Sparta. According to Greek sources the government of Athens developed progressively from a monarchy in early times, through an aristocracy, then a tyranny, to a democracy in the fifth century. This democracy, however, was one within the limited meaning already noted, that is, the rule of free citizens. It is the constitution of this democratic government of Athens which we shall describe here. At the base was the public assembly of all citizens, who were paid for their attendance. The functions of this body were largely executive. But the assembly was also legislative to the extent that it interpreted the customary law. In effect, its decrees were laws. In practice the senate of the five hundred, a smaller body, tended to exercise considerable power, since its members prepared the agenda of the assembly meetings. This body was chosen by lot from all the citizens. The use of choice by lot is, of course, the most democratic means of selecting officials, though not the most efficient. Routine daily business was conducted by officials chosen from the senate by lot. Military and

diplomatic affairs were in the hands of a board of generals elected by the citizens, who voted by "tribes." Most of the judicial affairs were handled by "dikasteries," citizen courts. These courts were made up from a group of five thousand citizens, chosen by lot from the whole citizenry. Those serving in the courts were paid. The archons, political leaders who formerly had held important political powers, now merely presided over courts and performed other minor duties. Each year they were selected by lot from the general citizenry.

Such, then, was the "democracy" of Athens. When Aristotle spoke of democracy, it was this kind of political organization that he meant. Athens was a thoroughgoing democracy so far as it went; but a moment's reflection will reveal its major limitation—citizenship was the prerogative of one group in society. Slaves outnumbered citizens and were, of course, banned from participation in government.

The city-state in its various forms provided the working models which exerted influence on Greek political theory. It is customary to begin a study of Greek political theory with the "sophists" of the fifth century, about whom we actually have little direct knowledge. But from the works of Plato we do know something of their ideas: the contractual origin of the state, the idea that law is not absolute but an expression of superior force, the identification of might with right, and so on. The reaction of Socrates (469–399 B.C.) and his pupil and successor, Plato (427–347 B.C.), to these doctrines was vigorous. Socrates has left no writings, and we must depend almost exclusively on Plato for an understanding of his opinions. Since Plato seems to have used Socrates as a medium for his own ideas, it is next to impossible to separate with any clarity the individual opinions of the two.

Plato discussed political theory in three dialogues, the *Republic*, the *Statesman*, and the *Laws*. As a literary masterpiece the first of these is by far the most important. In it the opinions of the sophists were combated, contemporary Greek political practice was criticized, the relationship of the individual to the state was explained, and the ideal state was described. The corruption of contemporary politics, Plato believed, resulted from a lack of civic virtue, from ignorance, and from the prevalence of sophist doctrines.

We must limit our glimpse of the *Republic* to a few high lights: (1) the individual attains the highest good in service to the state; the "just" man is the one who, among other things, performs his civic functions faithfully. Hence, a bond is forged between individual ethics and politics. Correct conduct of state affairs determines correct conduct for the individual. (2) The ideal state which will realize the common good has three classes: producers, warriors,

and guardians (magistrates and councilors). The first class will receive only technical training; the second gymnastics, military training, and some education in the arts; and the third the highest education. This stress is laid on education because good government depends on virtue or moral excellence, and virtue depends on education. The family and private property as roots of discord in states are eliminated. The state takes over the early training of the child, an idea suggested perhaps by the model of Sparta.

The *Statesman* and the *Laws* approach human nature and society in a somewhat more direct way than does the *Republic*. In the first we find an excellent analysis of the role of law in society. Since it is rarely possible to find the ideal philosopher-ruler, governments must remain subject to customary law, which constitutes the distilled wisdom and experience of the past. In the *Laws* Plato accepts private property but attempts to find a system for its more equitable distribution. The government that he suggests is a cross between monarchy and democracy, utilizing some of the features of the constitutions of Sparta and Athens. One historian of political theory (F. J. C. Hearnshaw) has succinctly expressed the importance of Plato to the development of political thought:

The influence of Plato on political thought has been immense, particularly from the period of the Renaissance to the present day. Cicero, indeed, showed traces of it, and still more strongly St. Augustine. But the real Platonic revival began with Sir Thomas More and the sixteenth-century Utopians. From them the Platonic tradition passed to Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, and through them it tended to mould English thought of the nineteenth century by means of the writings of T. H. Green and his disciples. The influence of Plato is seen in the emphasis upon the state as a moral institution; in its presentation as organic and not merely contractual; in the insistence upon its educational functions, and, above all, in the proclamation of its sovereignty and the supremacy of its authority over the individual.

The figure of Plato's greatest student, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), looms large in the field of political science. He has often been described as the founder of political science, in the sense that he first systematized its study in his treatise, the *Politics*. Although he starts from many of the same basic assumptions as Plato, he goes beyond the master in basing much of his political generalization upon the close study of a wide variety of actual constitutions. One Aristotelian scholar has emphasized recently that the thought of Aristotle proceeds from a period of modified Platonism when he was with Plato, through a period when he was still bound by Platonic methods, to a final period when as head of the *Lyceum* in Athens he directed great research projects investigating natural and social history. It was probably during this last period that he

undertook the collection and publication of some 150 constitutions of the Greek city-states, only one of which, the *Constitution of Athens*, survives.

This socio-historical type of investigation formed the background for parts of Aristotle's *Politics*. This is particularly evident in the fifth book, which constitutes an analysis of revolutions. There we find a mine of historical material on the Greek city-states and their vicissitudes. The procedure he follows is to cite some general causes of revolution, such as inequality, fear, or differences in race, deriving them from Greek history. He is particularly concerned with applying the various general causes of revolutions to each type of government: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, polity, and so on. His analysis of the way in which tyrants maintain power makes the citizen of the twentieth century feel perfectly at home.

Unlike Plato, Aristotle stresses the importance of the family and of private property. The state he describes as built up from family and village communities. The ideal state regardless of its particular kind of constitution is the city-state of some 10,000 inhabitants. Slavery is justified and gives the leisure necessary for good citizenship. The state is described as being a natural institution because man is a political animal by nature. Just as with Plato, the over-all purpose of Aristotle's state is the attainment of the highest good. It is in the state that man becomes free.

The state is an assemblage of citizens. Citizens are defined as those who enjoy participation in deliberative or judicial offices. One's virtue as a citizen lies in practical acquaintanceship, both as a ruler and as a subject, with the rule characteristic of a free community. The state can have any of a multitude of different constitutions or polities. Polities vary in different states according to the different organs of government employed and, particularly, according to where the supreme governing power resides. Aristotle describes three types of ideal polities, that is, polities wherein government is for the best interest of all. They are royalty, aristocracy, and polity proper: respectively, states where the governing body is one, a few, or many. In the last form, polity proper, the masses direct public affairs in the interest of all. In practice, perversions of these pure forms exist: tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. The perverted forms are marked by rule in behalf of the ruling classes rather than for the whole citizenry, or by perverted ideas of justice.

Aristotle further analyzes the various shades of polity and, in doing so, often seems to forget his original observations on the ideal types. In one place the distinction of types is seen to depend on principles that are everywhere in conflict: virtue, birth, wealth, and liberty. The various types of polity are redefined in terms of which these principles prevail: democracy (liberty), oli-

garchy (wealth), aristocracy (virtue), polity proper (liberty and wealth), mixed aristocracy (virtue, liberty, and wealth).

According to Aristotle there are difficulties inherent in all types of polity, but one principle should prevail—the law should be supreme. The best government that can be expected among actual men is the government of the middle class. On the whole, polity proper is best, but different conditions demand different forms.

It was the conquests of Alexander, Aristotle's own pupil, that initiated the decline of the city-state as a self-sufficient working state, a process that was continued by the rapid spread of the Roman Republic throughout the Mediterranean and completed in the formation of the Roman Empire. The imperial conquests of Alexander, and still more those of the Roman Republic, transformed the city-states into oligarchies in which political power was concentrated in the hands of propertied classes, and ordinary citizens were merely working urbanites, only remotely concerned with government. The philosophies that first heralded the passing of the city-state and the city-state ideal of Aristotle were the Epicurean, founded by Epicurus (c. 340-270 B.C.), and the Stoic, founded by Zeno (c. 340-260 B.C.). In these new philosophies, sophist ideas had their inning, and this time they fitted the political realities. Epicureans emphasized the following political doctrines: (1) Politics and ethics are separated. A strong hedonism (philosophy of self-interest) is asserted. As Epicurus says, "We recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, [but] we do not mean pleasures of the profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some . . . but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind." (2) Any abstract highest good or justice must be rejected. Justice is thought to be a convenience. The organic state of Aristotle is replaced by a contractual state. "Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time; it is a kind of a compact not to harm or to be harmed." (3) Any government is acceptable which can promise peace and order.

The Stoics laid great emphasis upon duty. Yet Stoicism also produced a political theory which departed radically from the theory of the city-state. Stoic philosophers were impressed by the existence of a universal law which they thought to be embodied in nature. This natural law they identified with universal reason. Every man partakes of the natural law of reason; hence there is a natural sympathy or bond among men, a universal brotherhood. The actual political governments are human conventions and fall far short of the ideal universal state which would embody the principle of universal brotherhood.

Most important of the Roman authors to take up Stoic opinions with respect to natural law was Cicero (first century B.C.). Cicero asserted the supremacy of natural law over the civil law. Natural law was for him an eternal divine law of morality. Man, who is endowed with reason, partakes of the nature of the Creator and in respect to the divine law has a community with Him. Man is born for justice, and justice and equity Cicero considered to be not mere establishments of opinion, but rather institutions of nature. The essential justice that cements society together is "right reason." Cicero believed that "right reason" has its source in natural law. Nature, on giving man reason, endows him with right reason.

The Stoic doctrines influenced the Middle Ages and Western civilization through their elaboration by Cicero, their expression by Roman jurists, and their partial acceptance by the Christian fathers. The supremacy of universal law over all human authority, the derivation of justice from that law, the distinction of conventional human government from the cosmopolitan ideal of a universal state conforming to natural law, and the proclamation of the universal brotherhood of man, were all doctrines of great importance in the development of the Western political thought, and we shall return to the fruit of these ideas in our next chapter when we examine the Christian concepts of life and society.

THE ORIGINS OF SCIENCE

When we examined the beginnings of political theory, we reached back into late Greek antiquity. Similarly when we turn to the origins of modern science, we find that we must also go back and examine the structure of Greek science and philosophy. Nor is such an examination of academic interest alone, since modern science and philosophy are built largely upon that structure, or at least upon that structure as it was modified by the Islamic and medieval Western schoolmen. Thus, before we examine the medieval legacy to modern science, an examination of science in antiquity is necessary.

How far back we can profitably trace its history depends to a great extent upon our definition of science. For the point of view of this account, we may think of science as *systematic* attempts to interpret, describe, and/or explain natural phenomena and the logical, mathematical, and physical tools necessary for those attempts. The breadth of such a definition permits us to investigate the most important roots of modern science. That which is characteristic of modern science and distinguishes it from scientific endeavor in antiquity is the necessary use of careful observation and experiment as criteria for the acceptance of scientific theory. There were numerous instances in antiquity

of the use of careful observation and even experimentation to confirm scientific theory, but Greek science did not consistently, exclusively, and of necessity utilize them as criteria of science.

From the period of man's earliest development through the rise of civilization in the valley of the Nile and in the Land of the Two Rivers (Mesopotamia) in the fourth millennium before Christ, we are presented with a picture of the close relationship between man's technological activities and his knowledge of nature. An examination of his metallurgy reveals his rudimentary knowledge of the chemistry of metals. His tools of all kinds can be considered "the embodiment of science," for they represent "a practical application of remembered, compared and collected experiences of the same kind as are systematized and summarized in scientific formulae, descriptions and prescriptions" (V. G. Childe). But we are not so much interested in the scientific knowledge revealed by the arts as in the growth of systematized scientific knowledge itself. Among Egyptians and Babylonians such scientific systematization was restricted to mathematics, astronomy, and to some extent medicine and surgery. From an examination of Egyptian and Babylonian achievements in those fields of endeavor, we can deduce the main characteristics of Egyptian and Babylonian science: (1) This science was, above all, empirical in nature. For example, the methods of trial and error were particularly evident in the arithmetical procedures used by both the Egyptians and Babylonians. (2) The objectives of this early science were largely social. Pure science was almost indistinguishable from applied science. Thus the beginning of astronomy can be sought in the need for determining an adequate seasonal calendar, the calendar being a necessity for agricultural and governmental activities. Similarly, the early development of mathematics in Babylonia can be closely related to the evolution of procedures for the keeping of temple records, and in both Egypt and Babylonia to the necessity for field and constructional measurements. The only theoretical developments worthy of note were in Babylonian mathematics, in which algebraic solutions of quadratic equations (equations involving the square of the unknown, such as $ax^2 + bx = c$) are presented, and in Babylonian astronomy where mathematical techniques were applied to the construction of lunar tables. (3) There are some instances of the inductive organization of observed data. One of the best examples of this is a surgical treatise, called by the name of its modern owner, the Edwin Smith Papyrus. Copied in the seventeenth century B.C. from a work produced sometime during the third millennium B.C., this treatise is a systematic exposition of the results of wounds to various parts of the body. It starts with cases involving wounds to the head, proceeds to those of the neck, the

collarbone, the arm bone, thorax, and so on downward. Each case is itself systematically organized, giving the title of the injury, the examination, the diagnosis, and the treatment. It is completely free of the magical tendencies found in other medical papyri. (4) This early science reveals an occasional example of the use of scientifically organized data for the prediction of natural phenomena. Again, the best example is the construction by the Babylonian astronomers of lunar tables to predict the first visibility of the new moon each month. Another example appears in the surgical papyrus mentioned above. There it was assumed that if certain symptoms were observed, then a given diagnosis must be made and a particular type of treatment followed. The author, then, was attempting to predict and control the course of disease on the basis of previous experience. (5) There was some use of mathematics among the Babylonians to describe and express scientific theory. Thus we see astronomers applying their knowledge of the properties of numbers to natural phenomena which appear to take place with some regularity (as in the use of arithmetical series to describe the variations in the sun's apparent velocity). But such applications were more the exception than the rule. (6) In Babylonian and Egyptian science there were strong religious or magical elements, for the most part in the motivations of science, but also occasionally in the method of science. Hence, one important stimulus to the study of astronomy was the astrological use to which it was put, even when the actual recording of astronomical data was a straightforward empirical procedure. On the other hand, both Egyptian and Babylonian medicine had strong elements of magical procedure in the use of incantations as a part of prescribed cures. Here the procedure, rather than the motivation, was magical (and to some extent religious). Turning to Egyptian and Babylonian efforts to describe the origins and development of the universe (cosmogony and cosmology), we find both motivation and methodology pervaded by mythology and religion.

It has been a constant source of wonderment and admiration to historians of philosophy and science that in the sixth century B.C. there developed on the periphery of the Greek world (Ionia) a remarkable secular approach to the investigation of natural phenomena. This admiration has led to use of the expression "The Greek Miracle" to describe the seemingly sudden genesis of that approach. Close examination of the historical evidence goes far to eliminate the "miraculous" element. Yet our admiration remains. Such basic cultural developments as the discovery, in about 1200 B.C. in Asia Minor, of improved methods of reducing and working iron led to the cheapening of the production of tools and arms. This made possible the successful military and economic competition of smaller, less centrally organized states (such as

the Greek city-states) with the older oriental monarchies. Similarly the invention of the alphabet in Phoenicia at about the same time and its spread at some later date to Greece worked for the broadening of the intellectual base in society. Learning was not to be the exclusive property of the priesthood.

While these and a number of other important factors operated to further the growth of Greek society in general, we must still remark on the reasons for the development of science in the Ionian Greek settlements in Asia Minor and more specifically in the Ionian city of Miletus. Miletus was situated on the coast of Asia Minor. It was a commercially important center. The commercial class had a significant part in its government and the association of the nobility with religious orthodoxy, which was traditional on the mainland, was not an important factor in the city's government. Thus, secular tendencies were freer to develop there. Miletus was also well situated to benefit by contacts with the higher cultures of Egypt and Babylonia. To some extent she learned directly from these states. She no doubt learned more indirectly from the Lydians and other peoples of Asia Minor who had fallen heir to the culture of the older states.

Such factors and no doubt many others combined to produce that group of natural philosophers in the sixth century known as the Ionian naturalists. Both Greek tradition and modern scholarship unite in considering the Ionian philosophers as the immediate founders of Greek science and philosophy. From meager beginnings in the sixth century there developed in the course of the fifth and fourth centuries the full flower of Greek philosophy and in the two succeeding centuries the most significant developments of Greek science.

Before tracing the direction of Greek philosophy and science, it would be well to outline their characteristic elements, achievements, and methodology. Much of Greek intellectual activity inherits something of the secular tradition which we have characterized as first evident among the Ionian naturalists. One line of activity in which the secular approach bore particular fruit was in the medicine of the Hippocratic school of Cos (fifth and fourth centuries B.C.). An important step was taken in the history of science and medicine when the unknown author of the medical treatise *The Sacred Disease* began with these words:

I am about to discuss the disease called "sacred." It is not, in my opinion, any more divine or more sacred than any other disease, but has a natural cause, and its supposed divine origin is due to men's inexperience, and to their wonder at its peculiar character. . . . But if it is to be considered divine just because it is wonderful, there will not be one sacred disease but many, for I will show that other diseases are no less wonderful and portentous, and yet nobody considers them sacred.

Another distinctive feature of Greek scientific activity was the development of the concept of "generalized" sciences. This concept can be contrasted sharply with the empirical approach to scientific data that was evident among the Egyptians and Babylonians. The Egyptians were accustomed in their mathematical papyri to set a specific problem, like the area of a particular triangular plot of land, and to give the specific solution. The Greeks, on the other hand, generalized the empirical procedures used in the particular problems. Thus they arrived at the general solution of the area of any triangle. And this they did in a very logical fashion, starting from commonly accepted axioms and postulates. Whereas there were individual rules of geometry among the Egyptians, there was an abstract science of geometry among the Greeks. Another striking example of this generalizing feature of Greek scientific thought can be found in connection with the study of the lever. The lever and the balance as practical instruments, the one for moving heavy objects and the other for weighing materials, certainly go back to an early period in man's cultural history. Balances have been found in Egyptian archeological remains of the fourth millennium B.C., and they were used everywhere in the Near East before the Greeks had reached even the beginnings of their cultural development. Yet it was not until the fourth and third centuries B.C. that the principles of the lever and the balance were generalized by Greek scientists into the science of statics.

Closely associated with the development of the concept of generalized science was the evolution among the Greeks of a strict methodology of reasoning or logic. In this area it is hard to overestimate the importance for modern science of the achievements of the Greeks. Regardless of how much emphasis we put on the verification of scientific theory by careful observation and experiment in modern science, we would be at a complete loss to form scientific theory without the full development of logical thinking behind us. A historical examination of important scientific theories developed in the course of modern times will not only reveal that scientific theory proceeds out of observation or experiment and generates new observation and experiment, but will also show that the relationship of observation and experiment to scientific theory is expressed in terms of logical (and/or mathematical) procedures, namely, deduction and induction.

The establishment of a separate discipline of rational thinking, or logic, was an almost completely independent achievement of Greek thought. We associate that development in the fifth century with the Eleatic philosophers and Socrates, and in the fourth century with Plato and, above all, Aristotle. It is perfectly clear from the logical works of Aristotle that he understood and

outlined the theory of induction, the drawing of general inferences from particular cases. Greek natural philosophers were prone, in many instances, to substitute reasoning by analogy for induction. Nor was Aristotle free from this procedure. We can also point to the usage, and in one case the description, of induction in the medical works of the Hippocratic school of Cos.

The development of deductive thinking, that is, the derivation of necessary consequences from assumptions, was carried to great heights by Greek mathematicians and philosophers. Greek mathematics is a monument to Greek deductive thought.

It has been pointed out that Greek scientists often relied on careful observation and experimentation for the verification of scientific theory. From at least the fourth century B.C., the great test of Greek astronomical theory was whether it "saved the phenomena," that is to say, whether it accounted for observed data. Furthermore, we can cite the use of experimentation from the time of Pythagoras in the sixth century B.C., or, at least, of Empedocles (fifth century B.C.), to the time of the great mathematician and astronomer Ptolemy, in the second century A.D. For example, Empedocles showed the corporeal nature of air by experimentation, while Ptolemy carefully measured angles of refraction of light rays as they passed at various angles from one medium (air) into another medium (water). We should be careful to remember, however, as was pointed out before, that experimentation was not thought to be a *necessary* procedure for the uncovering of new facts or for the verification of scientific theory.

We have concerned ourselves up to this point largely with the characteristics and methodology of Greek science. Now some of the substantial achievements of that science must be noted briefly.

Critical for scientific development was the problem of the understanding and meaning of nature. The problem was given three different solutions by the Greeks—solutions that have been of fundamental importance in the history of Western thought and that still have vitality today. The first of these is usually called the physical or material view of nature. It emphasized the reality and permanence of matter and motion and, in its most mature form, the existence of the void, or empty space. This view of nature reached its highest expression in the atomic theory of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. The second solution to the problem of nature was that which is called the formal or mathematical view of nature. It emphasized the reality and permanence of forms, structures, relationships. The world of the senses, matter, was conceived to have a transitory nature. This view attained its best expression with Plato. The third and final view of nature, that of Aristotle, can be char-

acterized as functional or biological. In this view of nature emphasis was laid on "becoming," on the actualizing of things that exist in potentiality. Nature is motion conceived in its broadest aspect as any kind of change. Rejecting the adequacy of the emphasis that the materialists had placed on matter and the Platonists on form, this view pictured matter and form as inseparable, and thus as equally important for the understanding of the more fundamental character of nature. Aristotle was probably led to this view by the necessity of accounting for generation (coming into being) and corruption (passing away), and also for the kind of organization that we find in living organisms.

We have already intimated that the Greeks created a secular medicine that often employed the methods of observation and experiment. This medicine was codified by Galen (second century A.D.) into a system which can be called the Hippocratic-Galenic system. In this form it served as the basis first for Arabic and later for Western medicine. Clinical description of disease in Greek medicine was excellent. On the other hand, the Greek study of anatomy was only fair, being based almost exclusively on animal dissection. Human dissection was practiced for just a short time in Alexandria, if at all. Greek physiology was particularly poor, since it was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the venous and arterial systems. These were considered as distinct and for the most part unconnected, the veins carrying blood and the arteries a mixture of blood and vital spirits.

In the fields of zoology and botany, the Greeks have left us an important inheritance in the works of Aristotle and of his disciple and successor, Theophrastus. Aristotle's discussions have had profound influence on the course of biological studies. We may cite as an example his analysis and support of the doctrine of epigenesis, namely, the idea that as the embryo grows the parts and organs develop out of homogeneous or undifferentiated material. Aristotle's views on the classification of animal species continued to exert influence until the nineteenth century, when the general acceptance of the theory of evolution served as a basis for classification.

Progress among the Greeks in those areas of study comprised in physics today was on the whole less important than in some of the other sciences. But in the field of statics (the science which studies bodies at rest or in equilibrium) something of permanent value was accomplished. It had as its point of departure the principle of the lever. The name of Archimedes (c. 287-212 B.C.) is associated with this fundamental work in statics. He gave statics a rigid, mathematical foundation. The study of dynamics—the study of bodies in motion—received its most significant treatment from Aristotle. Aristotle's discussions, however, were of a non-mathematical and non-experimental char-

acter. They failed to describe accurately the free fall of bodies, nor did they give a satisfactory account of the continuance of projectiles in motion. These two phenomena served as the points of attack on Aristotelian physics, an attack that started in late antiquity and continued among the Islamic philosophers and in the later Middle Ages until it culminated in the seventeenth century with the work of such men as Galileo, Descartes, and Newton.

We have already mentioned the importance of the Greek achievements in mathematics. Euclid's *Elements*, a summary of geometry and number theory (third century B.C.), has been one of the most influential works in the growth of Western thought. Even more brilliant was Archimedes, whose investigations into plane and solid geometry led him to anticipate the methods of integral calculus. Furthermore, it is to Greek mathematicians that we must turn to find the creation and development of the mathematics of conic sections (parabolas, hyperbolas, and ellipses).

Considering their important achievements in mathematics, it is little wonder that astronomy also had a fruitful growth among the Greeks, since one of the most important characteristics of Greek astronomy was its thorough-going utilization of mathematics. Of equal importance in their successful development of astronomy was the well-accepted fact that observed data formed the ultimate criteria for the acceptability of astronomical theory. Obsessed with the Pythagorean or Platonic assumption that the apparently irregular motion of the planets could be explained in terms of uniform, circular movement, the Greeks in the course of six centuries (fourth century B.C. through the second century A.D.) devised a series of mathematical systems that attempted to reduce the observed irregularities to interrelated, uniform, circular movements. Most suggestive (but the least developed) of these systems was that of Aristarchus of Samos, who held that the earth, instead of being at rest as most Greek astronomers thought, actually possessed two motions—a daily rotation on its axis and an annual revolution about the sun. Thus, he proposed a system that Copernicus was to follow some twenty centuries later. Most carefully formulated and coordinated with observed data was the so-called system of epicycles that reached its highest development with Ptolemy (second century A.D.). The essential feature of this system lay in the assumption that each planet revolved in a small, independent circle (or epicycle) and that the center of this small circle in turn revolved about the earth. (See Chapter VIII.) Many complications and complexities were added to the system by Ptolemy to account for observed irregularities. It was the Ptolemaic system that found the greatest favor with the Islamic and Western astronomers down to the time of Copernicus (1543 A.D.). Having stressed the importance of observed data

as the test of astronomical theory, we cannot fail to mention the work of the Greek observational astronomer Hipparchus (second century B.C.). His exact observations and probable use of the wealth of astronomical tables of the Babylonians led him to detect the slow shifting or precession of the equinoctial points (points where the sun's apparent annual path intersects the equator).

We have passed in brief review the characteristics, method, and achievements of Greek science. We have done so because this science was, as we have said, taken up in its most essential features by the Islamic and Western authors, and thus ultimately served as the point of departure and basis of modern science. Let us now examine briefly the course of the transmission of this science to the Latin West, as well as the accretions to it and the new forms that it took en route.

GRECO-ISLAMIC LEARNING

By the sixth century A.D. the political and cultural division of the Roman Empire had reached an advanced stage. The quantity and quality of Greek learning and science salvaged in the West and passed to Western churchmen in the course of the early Middle Ages (up to 1000 A.D.) was greatly inferior to that in the East. For in the East the great body of Greek learning was still actually read and commented upon in the schools of Athens, Alexandria, and various centers in the Syrian provinces.

In the West the early scholars depended mainly upon the Latin Patristic literature, upon certain pagan authors who reflected some Greek learning, and particularly upon Boethius (c. 480–524 A.D.). Boethius's prime objective was to make Greek learning available by translation, commentary, and independent discussion. He appears to have been the first Latin to have used the term *quadrivium* for the four mathematical subjects associated together by the Pythagoreans: arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy. He composed manuals on these subjects, although only two, one on arithmetic and the other on music, are extant. A work on geometry that purports to be his translation of Euclid's *Elements* is probably not his, although it is unquestionably early medieval. In any case, it is an index to the knowledge of geometry in the early Middle Ages. The majestic proofs included in the work of Euclid are for the most part absent, and only the definitions, axioms, unsupported propositions, and theorems remain. What knowledge of Greek logic the scholars in the early Middle Ages had, they gained largely from the works or translations of Boethius. His stirring apology for philosophy, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, written during his last days in prison, proved to be one of the most popular and widely translated philosophical works ever written. Some

of the scanty knowledge of Plato in the early Middle Ages can be attributed to this work.

One characteristic type of work produced in the early medieval period was the encyclopedia. The *Natural History* of Pliny (first century A.D.) provided an example and background material for this type of work. It is a great, rambling work, written by a man with catholic interests and voracious reading appetite but untrained in science. It remains today one of the great mines of miscellaneous information on antiquity. The most representative of the early encyclopedias was the *Etymologies* of St. Isidore of Seville (died in 636). While the author's avowed purpose is to trace the origins of etymologies of words, he presents us with much information on the state of learning and science in the West in his day. It must be admitted that his understanding and knowledge of Greek science was superficial, if sometimes direct. Unlike many of the early church fathers he rejected the idea that the study of nature leads one away from the objectives of religion, "for to know the nature of things is not the wisdom of superstition so long as they are considered with sound and sober judgement."

Among the succeeding authors of encyclopedic works, an English church historian, Bede (c. 673-735), stands out. His work *On the Nature of Things* is little more than a copy and paraphrase of a similar one of St. Isidore's. Yet he reveals in it, and in another work, a mature theory of the action of the moon on the tides, based at least in part on personal observation. He was the first to state that the mean interval between the moon's meridian passage and the high water time is constant for a given port, but that it varies from port to port. The only other encyclopedic work of this early period worthy of more than passing notice is a treatise *On the Universe* by John Scotus Erigena (c. 800-c. 877). One of the few authors of his day to be thoroughly conversant with Greek, Erigena drew much of his pantheistic philosophy from Greek Neoplatonic works. On the whole, his thought is of a greater philosophic maturity than that of his contemporaries, but at the same time it indicates the increased interest in philosophical matters during his period. He is remembered in astronomy for suggesting a system of planetary motion that was partly heliocentric and partly geocentric. He believed that Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury "without cease circle around the sun." The sun, together with these satellite planets, he thought, then circled the earth.

Returning to the eastern part of the Empire, where the main stream of Greek learning flowed, we notice in the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, a great deal of philosophical and scientific activity. The standard type of work became the commentary, a work in which a sentence or passage from some

original work, most often Aristotle, would be stated and then followed by comments or a discussion on the part of the author. It was this kind of presentation, the commentary, that came to be the standard form of Islamic and Latin works up to early modern times. While the commentary form tended at times to restrict and standardize the selection of problems, it must not be thought of as completely sterile. It was in the commentaries on the *Physics* of Aristotle in late antiquity and the Middle Ages that some of the ideas which were to overthrow Aristotelian physics were first advocated.

In many ways the most original of the late Greek commentators on Aristotle was John Philoponus, a Christian of Alexandria (sixth century A.D.). Vigorously opposed to many of Aristotle's fundamental ideas, John may be best remembered in scientific development for saying that experiment shows that falling bodies do not fall with a speed that is proportional to their weight, as the Aristotelian physics would indicate, but that the times of fall of bodies having radically different weights would be about the same. He also rejected, largely with empirical evidence, the Aristotelian concept that it is the action of the air that continues the motion of projectiles after they have left the projector. He suggested instead that a kinetic force or power is impressed in the projectile. This idea was later in the West to mature into something resembling Newtonian ideas of momentum.

Not only was the Alexandrian school of natural philosophy enjoying some success, but likewise medical studies there and elsewhere in the Near East were maintaining the direction and continuity of the Galenic-Hippocratic medicine. Galen received particular attention from these late Greek physicians. They reedited his work; they reorganized his materials; they abbreviated and paraphrased and commented upon certain of his works.

These studies in the Near East, then, were still in progress when the Arabs in the first half of the seventh century quickly overran the whole Near Eastern area with the exception of Asia Minor, where the Greek Byzantine Empire maintained its independence. In the period just preceding and including the Arab conquests (actually from at least the fifth century), a considerable portion of the Hellenic learning was being turned into Syriac by Christians who, although for the most part subjects of the Roman Empire, where Greek was the language of learning, preferred to teach in their own Semitic language. There were numerous Syriac centers of learning where Hellenism thrived. This is of great importance, for when the Greek learning was first turned into Arabic it was often Syriac versions of the Greek that were translated; and even more important, the principal translators into the Arabic were *Syriac Christians*. In addition to the Greek and Syriac schools where Hellenism was still

being taught, there were Persian centers, which must not be overlooked. The famous city of Jundishapur was the most significant intellectual melting pot of the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries. There Greek pagan Neoplatonists mixed with Syriac Christians, Jews, Persians, and Indians. The medical center at Jundishapur acquired great fame.

It is, then, into countries where Hellenistic learning was very much alive that the Arabs burst in the seventh century. One of the most provocative facts of intellectual history is that the language of a people who were completely undeveloped from the standpoint of scientific learning became the language of science and philosophy over an area extending from Spain to the Indian border. It was a language that readily met the burden placed upon it. Little in the way of learning was accomplished under the Arabs until something over a century after their conquests—and the political and cultural center of the empire shifted to the East, where a new dynasty, the Abbasids, built a flourishing capital, Baghdad. There the flood of translation into Arabic of Greek, and to a lesser extent Indian, learning began and soon reached great proportions. This was a phenomenon of translating to be duplicated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when that same body of Greek learning, with Arabic and Jewish additions, was turned into Latin from Arabic and Greek. Syriac Christians and pagans, Jews, and Persians took part in the translations into Arabic. Most indefatigable of all the translators was Hunain ibn Ishāq, who seems to have been the head of a translation school in Baghdad in the ninth century. He is responsible for a whole host of translations from the Greek into Syriac and Arabic (some ninety-five Syriac and thirty-nine Arabic translations of Galen's work).

Underlying the achievements of Islamic science and philosophy were certain basic considerations. Islam was a monotheistic religion with a holy scripture of revealed truth and prescription (the Koran). It is no accident, then, that the Christian-Neoplatonic form of Greek learning that arose in late antiquity would appeal to Islam as well. There was a basic similarity in climate of opinion. Hence, Greek learning gained entrance to Islam because of the garb it had assumed in late antiquity.

The dependence of Arabic science and philosophy on Greek learning must be stressed. It was almost as if the body of Greek learning was a second corpus of revealed truth. This unique position of Greek learning inspired attempts to harmonize its apparent differences and inconsistencies—for example, the Platonic and Aristotelian components—a tendency that had already begun in the Neoplatonic works of late antiquity. Because of this dependence on Greek thought, it has been customary to play down the originality of the

contributions of Islam to science and philosophy. This is mainly a question of a star of greater magnitude obscuring its fainter twin. It has long been admitted by even the most ardent Hellenophile that the scientists of Islam contributed to the various sciences by extending and advancing observational and experimental techniques. An even cursory glance at Islamic astronomy, alchemy, and physics will reveal the truth of such an assertion. But the more closely scientific literature is investigated, the more we come to recognize currents of *theoretical* as well as *practical originality*; this is particularly true in discussions of physics, or where physics joins hands with philosophy.

Islamic philosophy points in at least three main directions. However, its philosophers can by no means be said to hew exclusively to one or another of these three lines of development. Many hold basic tenets associated with one type of development while at the same time revealing views that are characteristic of the other lines. The first position we can describe as fundamentalism, a complete dependence on and confidence in the Koranic picture of nature. God immediately and immanently controls everything including, of course, His created things. The one God is everywhere immediately present. Nature or natural law as secondary cause either has no place in such a scheme or has only a minor role. Fundamentalism did not (either among the Christians or Moslems) lead to the scientific investigation of natural phenomena.

A second line of development was a philosophical fusion between Neoplatonic and Aristotelian tendencies. Most philosophers taking this line held to "the Neoplatonic chain of creation"—a series of gradated emanations from an ultimate "uncreated unity" down to terrestrial form and matter. On this Neoplatonic chain were welded many characteristic Aristotelian doctrines, his ideas relative to form and matter, his concepts of the four terrestrial elements (earth, air, fire, water), and sometimes his doctrine of the fifth celestial element, as well as his doctrines of change and movement. The immanent God of the fundamentalists is now removed from the immediate causation of material phenomena. Secondary causation then has been placed between God as ultimate cause and given phenomena. Philosophers in this group differ widely as to how close they are to either pole, the Neoplatonic or Aristotelian. Thus the philosopher Alkindi (ninth century), although called an Aristotelian by the Arabs, shows strong Neoplatonic tendencies. Averroes (twelfth century), though not uninfluenced by Neoplatonism, still shows strong Aristotelianism. Most of the philosophers who contributed extensively to the development of Islamic science belong in this group.

The third line of development consisted in a peculiar kind of atomism. Traditional atomism of the form of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius

gained little support in Islam, although the great physician and chemist al-Razi (*Rhazes*, early tenth century) seems to have leaned in that direction. But another form of atomic philosophy without the materialistic strains of Greek atomism grew up among certain philosophers of a rationalist group, known as the Mutazilites (ninth century) and was developed further by Islamic theologians (*Mutakallimūn*). Matter, time, and motion—all were thought to be atomic. But the atoms of which the world and all bodies therein are composed have position but not extension. This seems to have been an attempt to make real the concept of a mathematical point. The popularity and wide extent of Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean philosophy made this type of thinking seem less incongruous. Perhaps the most radical element of this doctrine was the concept of time as discontinuous, as a series of "nows" or instantaneous moments. The apparent continuity of events, the continuous flow of time, is a product of the senses (just as the rapid passage of separate motion picture frames gives an apparent continuity to what transpires on the screen). This led to a revolutionary concept that Allah recreates the universe at every instant of time, making such changes or modifications as he wishes. Essentially non-scientific, this philosophy rejected all ordinary concepts of secondary causation, of natural law, leaving only the immediate causation of God. He was considered the *only* agent or doer.

Passing to some of the actual scientific ideas of Islam, we can first note achievements in chemistry. In late antiquity (about the third century A.D.) Egyptian metallurgy and certain Neoplatonic-Gnostic tendencies united with Aristotelian ideas of the elements and the formation of minerals and metals; this merger produced an alchemy which centered in the doctrine that by chemical and other procedures a transmutation of baser metals into gold and silver can be accomplished. Alchemical theory later held that this transmutation can be accomplished by finding or preparing an *elixir*, a special substance, which hastens or else makes possible the process. This doctrine was taken up by the Islamic chemists, who turned the investigation into experimental lines. Thus the alchemist Jabir (Geber) tells his readers: "The first essential in chemistry is that thou shouldst perform practical work and conduct experiments, for he who performs not practical work nor makes experiments will never attain the least degree of mastery." The practical knowledge of chemical substances and the fundamental procedures in chemistry such as distillation, sublimation, and the rest were greatly enhanced by the work of the Arabic chemists.

In mathematics the West owes to Islam the first systematization of algebra out of Greek, Indian, and most probably Babylonian sources. This algebra

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included the numerical (algebraic) and geometrical solutions of quadratic equations, those involving the square of the unknown, such as $ax^2 + bx = c$, and geometrical solutions of cubic equations, those involving the cube of the unknown, $ax^3 + bx^2 + cx = d$. Islam is also responsible for providing the West with the so-called Arabic (actually Hindu) numerals and system of calculations, the great social significance of which would be apparent to anyone who tried bookkeeping and simple calculation with Roman numerals.

In the field of physics, Islamic philosophers continued the criticism of Aristotle's ideas begun by commentators of late antiquity. One philosopher (Thābit ibn Qurra, ninth century) rejected Aristotle's idea that heavy bodies fall because they are attracted to their natural place at the center of the earth (which he thought to be the center of the universe). Thābit substituted instead a doctrine of a gravitational attraction between bodies, a doctrine interesting in its implications, but of course not given rigid mathematical formulation or generalized as it was with Newton. The doctrine of John Philoponus explaining projectile motion by an impressed power was elaborated upon and associated in an interesting manner with the acceleration of falling bodies. In the realm of experimental physics the Islamic philosophers went considerably beyond their predecessors—they made some very accurate determinations of the specific gravities of various metals, precious stones, and liquids. They utilized some highly accurate balances. The optical experiments of Alhazen (eleventh century) with reflected and refracted light are noteworthy, and they exerted considerable influence on Western Latin authors down to the time of Descartes.

The Arabic efforts in astronomy again demonstrate the empirical and to some extent experimental tendency so strong in the Islamic scientific activity. For the most part accepting the Ptolemaic system, they laid emphasis on larger and more accurate instruments, on the founding of observatories, on the finding of more accurate values for observational data and constants. At the same time they took up the beginnings which the Greeks and Indians had made in trigonometry (the chief mathematical tool of the astronomer) and advanced it considerably. They used all six of the basic trigonometric ratios (sine, cosine, tangent, and so on).

Even so cursory a summary of Islamic contributions to science has shown us something of the continuous growth of human knowledge based so largely on the Greek corpus. Throughout this whole period the high state of culture in the Greek Byzantine Empire, with its capital at Constantinople, reflected sporadic interest in the older Hellenic learning. While its achievements in science (so far as we know at present) were not significant, it preserved that

older body of learning. Constantinople was the principal source of Greek manuscripts for the Arabs and Latins alike.

By the twelfth century the whole body of Greco-Islamic learning was an impressive structure. And so it seemed to the Latins, who were having ever-increasing contacts with Islam. We must see in the next chapter how this learning was absorbed and utilized by the West.

Chapter III.

THE MEDIEVAL HERITAGE: THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF LIFE



BACKGROUNDS TO CHRISTIANITY

CHRISTIANITY was born and took form in late antiquity at a time concurrent with the rise, height, and decline of the Roman Empire. It represents, perhaps, the most remarkable effect of the spiritual and religious forces that beset the Empire from the first century of our era and reached a high point in the third and fourth centuries. The forces responsible for the evolution of Christianity also influenced and modified the philosophic traditions of the age. They were equally responsible for the early success of a number of oriental cults that offered competition for Christianity during the first two centuries of its formation—cults such as that of the Egyptian goddess Isis, which was widely followed in the Empire. Possessed of an organized clergy, prayer books, and vestments, this cult had secret initiations, a form of baptism, and fasting. In its maturity it presents us with the picture of Isis as the all-merciful mother, responding to the desires and woes of mankind. Similarly, these spiritual and religious forces helped to nurture a rising interest in astrology on the one hand and the formation of alchemy on the other.

Christianity is a body of religious doctrine and an organization. Both these aspects crystallized in late antiquity, and by the beginning of the Middle Ages the Church offered, at least in the West, the unique example of an institution that could provide for the religious, social, and to some extent the economic wants of its members.

The initial or embryonic period of the Church, often called the Messianic and Apostolic Period, extended from the time of Christ to about 100 A.D. It was during this period that Christianity's character as a proselytizing religion was determined. Its organization was rudimentary, possessing only elders. It had, as yet, no true clergy differentiated from the rest of the members of the small Christian communities. Of utmost importance in this period was the struggle

This chapter, designed especially for the present volume, has been revised from its form in the first edition and is by Marshall Clagett.

that took place within the communities, between the Jewish zealots led by James and the pro-Gentile element under Paul. The issue centered in the observance of Hebraic Law. In all probability no real expansion of the Christian religion could have resulted if strict observance of Hebraic Law and custom had been demanded of gentile members, as the Jewish zealots wished. However, the opposing views of Paul prevailed, and strict observance of Hebraic Law was not demanded. At the same time, Christianity retained a large Hebraic element—the Old Testament picture of a stern, awe-inspiring, and righteous God continued to exist side by side with the New Testament concept of a God of love enjoining the brotherhood of man.

Succeeding the Apostolic Period was a period of the growth and development of Christianity within the Empire, when Christianity was one of several competing cults and sects. This period lasted until the official sanction of the Church by the Empire, ordinarily called by Church historians the Peace of the Church, 313 A.D. During this period some of its principal ingredients were mixed into Christianity. Born as it was in a world where Greek philosophy was dominant and where its most advanced critics were imbued with the ideas and methods of Greek philosophy, Christianity, in defense, had to develop a theology under the influence of that philosophy. It was to a great extent in answer to pagan and internal critics that the first steps were taken in this period to fashion a consistent theology. At the same time ascetic and mystical tendencies, characteristic of Near Eastern cults, fused with the more intellectual tendencies. A system of sacraments began to grow.

As the Christian communities multiplied, there emerged an organized clergy in which bishops, presbyters, and deacons were distinguished. A stimulus to the growth of this organization was the rise in the third century of organized opposition on the part of the state. At one time it was the fashion among Church historians to paint the persecution of Christians in exaggerated colors. It later became the fashion to play down the persecutions as insignificant. The truth probably lies somewhere between these extremes. Opposition and persecution before 250 were for the most part unimportant. From the time of Decius (250 A.D.) until the Peace of the Church, systematic, if sporadic, attempts were made to stamp out Christianity. In the face of this opposition the organization of the early Church tightened.

The most significant period in the organization of the Church extended from the time of Christianity's acceptance on an equal footing with the other religions of the Empire (313 A.D.) to the time of one of its greatest leaders, Gregory the Great (died in 604 A.D.). Later in this chapter we shall mention what effect the acceptance of Christianity as the state religion (end of fourth

century) had on the basic Christian concept of the separation of temporal and spiritual powers. We are interested here in the growing Church organization. In the perfecting of the organization during this period, the bishop as the overseer was the first important official to appear. It was the development of a hierarchy below and above him that resulted in a more formal Church organization. As the bishop's flock began to grow, there was a tendency for deacons (bishop's assistants) and presbyters (independent leaders less important than the bishops) to assume the spiritual duties of administering baptism and presiding at the Eucharist (the Mass). This last was a ritual in imitation of the Last Supper. At some early date it began to have an important spiritual significance, implicit in the belief that the elements of the ceremony, the bread and the wine, were undergoing a spiritual transformation into the body and blood of Christ. Liturgical assistants and readers also appeared as the ceremony of worship crystallized. Thus by the fourth century a hierarchy of offices beneath the bishop had developed, so that a boy might start as a reader, become a subdeacon, then a deacon and/or a presbyter, and finally a bishop. Out of the multiplicity of officials who performed the spiritual duties evolved the concept of the priesthood, independent of the office held, that is, the concept of the priest as the administrator of spiritual sacraments.

As the federated organization of the Church grew, it relied a great deal on the model presented to it by the civil organization of the Roman Empire. As early as 451 A.D., the Council of Chalcedon declared that each *civitas* (city and its surrounding territory) should have one bishop. The bishop's diocese became almost equivalent to the *civitas*. Those metropolitan centers which were of importance in the provincial administration of the Empire became also the principal centers of influence in the Church. The bishops who presided over these areas carried more weight in the meetings of general councils. They began to be called metropolitans. This was particularly true in Alexandria, Antioch, Rome, and later in Constantinople. It was also during this period of the Church that monasticism assumed regularized form.

Among the metropolitans, the bishop of Rome assumed a preeminent position. Many factors contributed to his growing primacy. In the first place, as one of the great administrative and economic centers, Rome was the most favorably situated city in the West for the dissemination of Christian influence. The missionary zeal of Church members at Rome was effective in bringing under Rome's supervision many churches throughout Italy and other parts of the West. Also, on the theoretical side, it was pointed out that the Church in Rome, as in no other city, had a double apostolic foundation (Peter and Paul). In addition, a strong case for the primacy of Peter was made by Biblical

reference. It became quite widely accepted that Christ had built His Church upon Peter and had given unto him "the keys to the kingdom of Heaven." Very little further persuasion was necessary to establish the belief that Peter in turn entrusted the Church to his successors, the bishops of Rome. The bishop of Rome early became a symbol and champion of orthodoxy, and there are a number of instances when he acted as a final court of appeals in disputes. No less important in the growing influence of Rome was the tendency toward centralization of the wealth of the western part of the Church at Rome. At the same time, the bishopric was occupied by some men of extraordinary ability. Leo I (440-61 A.D.), who has been called "the first pope in the proper sense of the word," did much to enhance the stature of the Roman Church. He put in order every department of the Church. His authority helped decide a controversy arising within the Church in the East. His action against the Manichean heretics¹ in Italy was vigorous, and he twice saved Rome from the barbarians. By imperial edict he was declared "spiritual dictator and governor."

Of even greater importance in the establishment of the primacy of Rome was the activity of Gregory the Great (590-604 A.D.). In his personality and actions we find a curious mixture of the successful Roman administrator and the pious Christian father. He prided himself on not reading the classics and not having learned Greek. An unusual credulity is evident in his *Dialogues*, which detail the lives of some of the early saints. He asserted the primacy of Rome with great vigor and helped to maintain it as the foremost city in Western Christendom. Helping to organize the defense of Italy against the incoming Lombards, Gregory gave to the Roman bishopric an unprecedented influence in civil affairs. His ability for administration was put to use in the administration and organization of papal lands. In Sicily alone over four hundred estates (*fundi*) formed a part of the patrimony of the Church. Head of the patrimony in each area was a rector responsible to Rome. For the administration of the estates themselves Roman custom was followed and managers (*conductores*) were appointed. Under each rector were tax collectors, stewards, and justices. In short, we see evidences of the highly advanced organization of the Roman Church that matured in the Middle Ages.

Important steps were taken in late antiquity for the formation of religious dogma and doctrine—for fashioning a theology. A profitable search into the beginnings of Christian theology can be made in the Holy Scriptures them-

¹ Manicheism was a heretical (scarcely Christian) movement that arose in the third century in the Near East. It incorporated older Persian ideas of the dualism of evil and good. The earth was considered a creation and a manifestation of evil or the King of the Realm of Dark. Contrasted with the Dark was Light, and Jesus was considered to be pure Light. Manicheism seems to have been one of the important rivals of Christianity in the third and fourth centuries.

selves, particularly in the Gospel of St. John, where the influence of the Hellenistic philosophy is strongly evident in the doctrine identifying God with the Divine Word (*logos* in Greek), a doctrine rationalized and formalized in the second and third centuries A.D. Important to the maturation of this theology were the great controversies that centered about the concept of the Trinity (for example, the Arian controversy in the fourth century). The result of these controversies, in addition to a great deal of theological literature, was a successful formula that preserved the essential monotheistic character of Christianity and yet at the same time did not subordinate the natures of God as the Son and the Holy Ghost to that of God the Father. Similarly, a series of controversies over the nature of the Son (among them the Nestorian in the fifth century and the Monophysite in the sixth) also did much to stimulate the growth of Christian theology. The volume, and often the profundity, of the Greek theological works produced in the course of these controversies was greater than that of the Latin works, yet, for the character of early medieval Christianity, the Latin authors must be given greater attention. We must note, in particular, the significance of the works of the so-called Four Fathers of the Patristic Period: Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory.

By far the most important was St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.). Interested in the diverse currents of intellectual activity of his day, he studied Manicheism, astrology, and Neoplatonism, before he became a Christian. It was Neoplatonism particularly that influenced his later Christian beliefs. On his return to Africa from studies in Italy, he became active in the local Christian organization and in 396 became bishop of Hippo. Noteworthy among his compositions were the *Confessions*, which he wrote to indicate the steps that led him to Christianity, and the more monumental work, *City of God*, written between 413 and 426 as a defense of Christianity against the charge that it was undermining the Roman Empire and was responsible for the success of the barbarian invasions. In the *City of God* he pictured the continuing conflict of the good forces of God's city with the evil of the earthly city. In Roman history he identified the former with the Christian Church and the latter with the pagan Empire.

Augustine's general religious aims were to show the meaning of God for man's experience and the requirements for the salvation of the soul. In pursuing these aims, Augustine was able, at the same time, to uphold the authority of the Church and to emphasize the immediate certainty of religious knowledge for the individual. He made the inner certainties of man's conscience the starting point of his religious understanding. While he rejected the study of the Greek natural philosophers as a necessity for Christians, he still was

more sympathetic to the natural sciences than many of his contemporaries. But for him, as for most of the early Fathers, the study of Greek philosophy was legitimate only in so far as it supported the doctrines of Christianity. He realized, of course, that some of these philosophers had influenced his own development. For example, he praised highly Plato and the Neoplatonists, and in his discussions of the soul and the formation of knowledge he showed the strongest evidences of the Platonic trend. With Augustine, the doctrine of original sin played an important part. Man's punishment for that sin is the death of his body. Man can be saved from that sin, not by his own good works nor by his own will, but solely by the grace of God through faith. Augustine's position with regard to free will is ambiguous and has been the center of much controversy, since it seems to imply the existence of both free will and predestination. In general, he believed that man's free will was restricted upon his fall and that he could gain it back only through Christ's sacrifice and the compelling grace of God.

Much of the Christian doctrine of love, which became so highly developed in the Middle Ages and still is an essential part of Christian thought, had its roots in the writings of St. Augustine. He stressed love even above faith and hope. For him it is the aim and object of all the Commandments. Thus in many fields of religious expression, and in the formation of religious dogma Augustine may be considered the most important of the founding Fathers.

From the variety of religious opinion and dogmatic literature of the Patristic Period (to about 600 A.D.) there emerged important methods and principles of intellectual expression which were everywhere evident in the Middle Ages and are still present in Christian theological literature: (1) One of the most significant of these was the universal acceptance of divine revelation as the ultimate criterion of dogmatic truth. The source of revelation was, of course, the Holy Scriptures. Its importance as criterion of truth continues through the Middle Ages into modern times, even as other criteria such as logical validity, experience, and experimentation assume greater importance. (2) Also significant was the growing use of allegory. Allegorical expression became a standard technique in medieval religious writing. Scriptural reference under the influence of this technique increased greatly in richness and meaning. Beside the more literal and obvious meaning of a scriptural verse was placed its moral significance, its prophetic meaning, and finally its significance as revelation for the future life. (3) Granting that revelation was the ultimate source of Christian truth, the fathers went on to elaborate the principle that whenever there was no direct scriptural statement on a dogmatic question, the institutions of the Church became the final source of authority. At various

times and on various topics, authority was ascribed to the bishop, acting either alone or in council, or to a more general council of the Church, or finally to the bishop of Rome as pope. (4) Clearly evident in Patristic literature was a subjective, mystical type of expression which grew out of the belief that man by faith, prayer, introspection, and emotional experience could achieve a personal and mystical union of his soul with God. The writings of St. Augustine played an important part in the early formation of this Christian mysticism. It continually recurs in the writings of medieval churchmen, in the writings of men so temperamentally opposed as the domineering, vigorous administrator St. Bernard (12th century) and the unworldly, gentle St. Francis (died in 1226).

MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS

Christianity has been dually characterized as a changing body of religious doctrine and as an organization. As an organization it developed in two rather distinct branches: secular and monastic. The secular clergy consisted in the readers, presbyters, deacons, bishops, and metropolitans who ministered to the ordinary Church members. The monastic clergy (or "regular" clergy, from the Latin *regula*, "rule"), on the other hand, consisted in organized religious communities, living under some form of common rule and regulation. We have already noted the beginnings of the secular organization of the Church and the emergence of some of its principal officers in late antiquity. We must also turn to late antiquity and the early Middle Ages for the beginnings of monastic organization.

Monasticism was rooted in ascetic and mystical tendencies not exclusively Christian, but common to many individuals and sects within the Empire. The most frequently professed reason for withdrawal from the world in this early period was the mystical aim of undisturbed contemplation. The doctrine of the Judgment Day was not without its influence; no doubt many a solitary withdrew from this mundane life to prepare himself for the end of the world and the life to come. Out of these various drives and purposes, some expressing tendencies more general within the Empire and others doctrines peculiar to Christianity, developed the community organization we know as Christian monasticism.

The early development of monasticism can be divided into three phases: (1) A preliminary, less formal stage described as ascetic and eremitical (from the Greek *eremites*, "a man of the desert"; whence later "hermit"); (2) A second stage characterized by the development in the eastern part of the Empire of communal and cenobitic organization (from the Greek *koinobion*,

"life in community"); (3) A period in which the cenobitic trend was completed in the West with the submerging of the individual's activities to those of the community and the adoption of carefully worked out monastic rules.

The first phase can be said to have begun in northern Egypt. It was under the inspiration of St. Anthony (born about 250 A.D.) that a group of anchorites ("those who have withdrawn from the world") or monks (original meaning, "a solitary"; later, "any member of a religious community living under rule") first lived together in loose unity. This so-called Anthonian monasticism was characterized by excessive individualism, the purpose of which was the achievement of virtue and the ultimate salvation of the individual. Virtue was obtainable through strict ascetic practices such as rigorous fasts, vigils, and the like. The spirit of competition in ascetic activity was marked. With some justice were these early monks referred to as "the gentle athletes." A somewhat more cenobitical type of organization that developed in southern Egypt under the influence of St. Pachomius (about 290-346 A.D.) represents a trend toward the second phase. Pachomius's rule modified the severity of required ascetic observance in accordance with the strength, courage, and zeal of the individual. Labor assumed an important position in the Pachomian rule.

We have characterized the second phase as a development in the Greek East of a communal or cenobitic monastic life. This is revealed in the Long and Short Rules of St. Basil. These rules were introduced during the second half of the fourth century in a monastic community founded at Neocaesarea. The worth of the cenobitical life as opposed to the eremitical was stressed both theoretically and practically. A common roof, table, and work were provided. The admonition, "Next to God, love thy brother," became the motto of life in common. Hence, St. Basil's organization was interested in work of a charitable nature. Ascetic excesses were discouraged. The work of the individual monk was divided among prayer, labor, and reading of the Holy Scriptures. The Rules of St. Basil became standard for monasticism in the Eastern Church.

Meanwhile, monastic life (more often than not in Pachomian form) was introduced into the western part of the Empire. It spread rapidly in Africa, Italy, Gaul, and Ireland, taking particularly strong root in Gaul. The formative stage of Western monasticism was completed by the Rule of St. Benedict (c. 480-c. 550). This rule, we are told, was a rule for cenobites alone. The prologue stated: a "school of God's service is being established," with "nothing harsh, nothing burdensome." One of the most important contributions of Benedictine monasticism was the introduction of the Benedictine Oath: "I promise before God and His Saints, stability, conversion of ways, and obedience." Particularly significant in this oath was the promise of stability, the

promise to remain attached to the one monastic community. The tendency for monks to wander from one monastic center to another had made it difficult to maintain permanent communal organizations. Vows of humility, chastity, and poverty, so often associated with monastic life, were conceived as a part of the "conversion of ways," that is, changing one's mode of life. Benedict's Rule presents us with a remarkable example of the careful regulation of all phases of monastic life. We find there regulations with respect to the election and qualifications of an abbot, the selection of the community priest, the period of novitiate, the granting of gifts to monks, the courtesies owed to seniors, where and how to sleep, the amount of time to be spent in working and reading, and many other similar activities. It seems clear that Benedict has no intention by this rule of founding a "monastic order," using "order" in the sense that it developed later in the Middle Ages, namely, as an order for special work to be done on behalf of the Church.

It must not be thought that Benedictine monasticism was immediately accepted everywhere in the West. A virulent monastic movement in Ireland spilled over onto the Continent and contested the Benedictine movement in some places until the ninth century. It was under the Carolingians that Benedictine monasticism won a really dominant position. But the Benedictine movement was individual in character. The administration of each community was largely left to the individual abbot, and there was little over-all religious direction. Powerful abbots became involved in the rising feudalism. The scramble for feudal controls, then, drew in the regular (monastic) clergy as well as the secular. The extensive land holdings and the income-producing offices of the Church became lucrative objects of lay control. The practice of the purchase and sale of Church offices, "simony" (named from Simon the Magician, who attempted to buy from the Apostles the gift of the Holy Ghost), was widespread; it led to an increasing emphasis on temporal control and to the filling of Church offices with poor or untrained men. Worldly affairs led the clergy to worldly action. The provisions of canon law prohibiting the marriage of the clergy were quite widely disregarded.

The first important reaction against this state of affairs came in the tenth century with the development of Cluniac monasticism, a movement which spread out from the mother house founded in Cluny, France, in 910 A.D. The Cluniac reformers turned first to the regular clergy. Reformation was accomplished by establishing a highly centralized monastic congregation. The mother house of Cluny founded or took over daughter houses, retaining always their final direction. The order was limited to one abbot, the rector of the mother house. Daughter houses were directed by priors responsible to the mother

house. With this centralization the reformers hoped to control the manners and morals of their members and insure the faithful observance of the Benedictine Rule. They insisted upon celibacy (the state of being unmarried) for all clergy. They broke the lay control of their offices and properties by a vigorous campaign to acquire the rights of patronage or investiture (the act of granting or endowing with office) that had more and more been passing into lay hands. The movement inveighed against the prevalent practice of simony.

After accomplishing considerable reform within the monastic movement, the Cluniac reformers turned their attention to the secular clergy and to lessening the lay influence on the Church in general. They played an increasingly important part in the fairly widespread reform of the secular clergy in the eleventh century. But as the Cluniac movement acquired more and more daughter houses and became, itself, more intricately involved in temporal affairs, the old abuses returned. The situation became ripe for the further reform which broke like a flood over the ~~Church~~ in the twelfth century. The successive reform movements not only are indicative in a general way of the important role of the regular clergy in medieval society, but more fundamentally they reveal the continually rising secularism, the economic consequences of which we have already studied. These reform movements point clearly to and culminate in that sixteenth-century movement which we designate as the Reformation.

The multiple reform action that spread over and against the Church in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries took many directions. Two prominent mediavalists have characterized this manifold action by the expression "medieval reformation." They have ably described the meaning of this term:

The "medieval reformation" is a term meant to include several distinct but interrelated phenomena. By it we mean a whole series of monastic reforms within and without the framework of the Benedictine-Cluniac system; we mean a revolutionary development in monasticism, the founding of the new mendicant orders of Franciscans and Dominicans; we mean the large growth of heretical opinion, crystallizing into widespread organizations that attacked both the dogma and the priesthood of the Church; we mean the appearance of a cynical and light-hearted indifference to the Church in some circles of the new universities; finally, we mean the zealous measures whereby national monarchies and towns began consciously to restrict the sphere of jurisdiction and activity of the Church. . . .

If from the religious point of view the mainsprings of the Protestant reformation of the sixteenth century were a return to the unqualified authority of the literal words of one book and only one, the Bible, an attempt to recover the personality and imitate the life of the founder of Christianity, a longing for some inwardly satisfying personal religion to replace the cult of priests and sacraments, and a de-

sire to return to the simplicity and poverty of the early Church, in every one of these respects the medieval reformation of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was also distinguished. If in its economic aspect the later reformation was an adjustment to the demands of a flourishing commercial capitalism, then in part the earlier reformation was a bewildered protest against inchoate capitalism. Finally, if monarchs and princes of the sixteenth century championed Protestantism because they recognized the opportunity to subordinate the new religion to the state, it was because long centuries of similar attempts on the part of their medieval forebears had demonstrated the difficulty of subjugating the old, established, international religion. The Protestant reformation had its real beginnings in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. (J. W. Thompson and E. N. Johnson.)

One line of reform action within the monastic movement was the foundation of new monasteries and orders that returned to the older type of eremitical monasticism. The cenobitic ideal of the Benedictines was tolerated, but the real emphasis was again placed on individualism, on the retirement of monks to cells, on rigid asceticism. This movement adopted a modified "convention" or "congregation" type of organization between individual monasteries, rather than returning to the Benedictine form of independent monasteries. Nevertheless, it represented a reaction to the strong centralization of Cluny and the worldly and social character that Benedictine-Cluniac monasticism has assumed. The principal orders of this eremitical type of monasticism were the Camaldolites (Italian, founded about 1018) and the Carthusians (founded at Grand Chartreuse, near Grenoble, about 1085).

A second type of monastic reform action took place within the general framework of Benedictine monasticism. Its major objective was a return to a more rigid enforcement of the Benedictine Rule. Of this type was the Cistercian order, founded about 1100, the last of the great Benedictine reforms. The centralized organization of Cluny was modified by Cîteaux into a more federal type of organization. A principal Cistercian in the twelfth century was St. Bernard, administrator, mystic, and determined upholder of orthodoxy. Like the Cluniac movement before it, the Cistercian order soon became wealthy, powerful, and widespread and thus lost its reform character. The great importance of Cîteaux in the colonizing and deforestation that took place in western Europe should not be forgotten.

One of the principal forms of reaction against the Church in the twelfth century was the widespread growth of heresy. There is some evidence that the new quasi-industrial classes in the towns, as the textile workers, formed an important element in some of the heretical sects that sprang up at this time, and it appears reasonable to assume that the heretical sects offered an opportunity for canalization of social and religious unrest. Easily the greatest threat

to the Church was a movement known as the *Cathari*. Since one of the centers of this heresy was in the town of Albi in the south of France, its followers were also called Albigensians. While many of the heretical sects expressed a desire to return to a more simple Christianity and thus were not greatly different from the monastic reformers within the Church, the *Cathari* held doctrines that were clearly connected with Persian Zoroastrianism or Manicheism. In so doing they departed radically from the practices and doctrines of the Church. Like the Persians before them, the *Cathari* believed in the dualistic division of good and evil. The former was represented by the New Testament and the latter by the Old. The world was considered as a Kingdom of Satan, and the soul was considered bound through the body to matter which was impure and evil. Other doctrines appeared to be antisocial, for example, the view of marriage as legalized prostitution. The refusal to take oaths also put the *Cathari* in a suspect position with respect to medieval Christian society. A distinction was made between those who rigidly followed all the prescriptions of the sect relative to marriage, absolute poverty, and the like, and those who were simply believers in the *Cathari* doctrine and who did not yet follow all the stringent rules. The former were called "the perfected ones" and the latter "believers." There existed a ceremony (*consolamentum*) by which the "believer" became a "perfected one." It was incumbent on all believers to receive the *consolamentum* at death, but on the whole the *Cathari* followed the general tendency of the heretical and monastic movements of the time to restrict the use of ritual to the barest minimum. By 1200 the whole of southern France was affected by the *Cathari*. One parish priest, for example, remarked that in his parish only four people remained firm in the faith. At its greatest height the movement cut across all classes and represented as much a political and feudal division within France as a religious one.

Other heretical movements, such as that of the Waldensians, were far less radical in their doctrinal views, their accent being on evangelical poverty and early apostolic Christian simplicity. Their heresy lay primarily in the fact that the members who were laymen assumed the right of preaching the gospel. They also tended to have a heretical attitude toward the taking of oaths. Their doctrines relative to purgatory, prayers for the dead, and the granting of indulgences were held to be heretical. The similarity of their doctrines with Lutheran ideas in the sixteenth century will not escape attention.

Reaction of the church and state to the heretical movement took three forms. The first was a campaign of preaching and missions. The second was military, the so-called Albigensian Crusade which in the first quarter of the thirteenth century plunged France into a civil war, without gaining the overthrow of

the heresy. The third and most important reaction to the growing heresy was the creation of the Inquisition. The Inquisition took its first recognizable form under the rules promulgated in 1229 by a cardinal legate, acting for Pope Gregory IX at the Council of Toulouse. During the course of the first years of its existence, there was a tendency for the Franciscans and Dominicans, and particularly the latter, to become its administrators in place of local bishops. At the same time inquisitional officials came to be more directly dependent on the Holy See. As the procedure was systematized and succeeding bulls and decrees were published, handbooks or manuals for inquisitors appeared. Such, for instance, is the *Manual of the Inquisitor* of Bernard Gui (c. 1261-1331).

We can conveniently distinguish four stages of the inquisitorial procedure: (1) A period of grace of thirty days in which heretics could come forth to recant and receive pardon and penance without a formal trial. (2) The summoning of witnesses and the taking of their depositions. (3) The examination of the accused (with or without counsel or advocate, depending on the time and place). During the third stage torture was often used, following the accepted practices under Roman law. (4) The pronouncing of the sentence, called the "general sermon" or, in Spain, the *auto da fé* (act of faith). The inquisitors were required to seek the advice of lay and clerical jurists, *boni viri* (good men). The accused was protected to the extent that if he could name those who were accusing him, their testimony would be discredited. The general sermon, or *auto da fé*, was a solemn public assembly held in the church or in the square. Mass was said and sentences were pronounced—penalties ranging from simple penances to pilgrimages, imprisonments with terms ranging up to life, unfrocking if the guilty party was a priest, exhumation if the accused died impenitent, or binding over to the secular court for capital punishment of those who refused to abandon heresy. It should be noted that the secular court alone carried out the supreme penalty of capital punishment, usually burning at the stake. An execution could be stayed at the last minute if the heretic showed himself truly repentant. The supreme penalty, while not the rule, still was fairly common. This is clearly indicated by an examination of the record of Bernard Gui between 1308 and 1322. Of almost five hundred cases in which the sentence was carried out directly, almost 10 percent (forty) of the convicted were burned at the stake. On the whole, the Inquisition was the most effective of the methods undertaken by the Church to combat heresy.

The last important monastic movement in the Middle Ages produced the mendicant (begging) orders, the Franciscans and the Dominicans. They arose concurrently in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. The former


received a rather reluctant confirmation in 1210 by Innocent III and a definite rule in 1233 (after St. Francis' death, 1226). The latter was founded by St. Dominic in 1206 and confirmed by Pope Honorius III in 1216. St. Francis's order began as a lay order, motivated like the earlier monastic reforms and heretical movements by a revulsion from the worldly and secular character of the Church. Francis conceived it his mission to preach the Gospel to the poor and humble. The figure (and practice) of Christ, for whom he had an abiding mystical love, became his model. Most radical of his doctrines was his complete rejection of common or corporate property for his order. This was in addition to the customary monastic rejection of private personal property. In his will he attempted to preserve for the order his views on property. But in the course of the century they were thoroughly compromised by the papacy.


The Dominican Order was even more directly a foundation to preach the true word, to combat heresy. The order was to be one of preachers trained in theology and orthodoxy to accomplish that purpose. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Dominicans assumed an outstanding position in the administration of the Inquisition. Like St. Francis, St. Dominic forbade corporate or common ownership of property, with just as little ultimate success. A new form of monastic organization was fashioned by St. Dominic, a form which was eventually adopted also by the Franciscans. Its most distinctive feature was the use of the principle of elected representation. Each house in the province elected its prior. The governing group of the province was a provincial chapter, consisting of the priors of the various houses in the province and of an elected representative from each house. The provincial chapter, in turn, elected a provincial prior. The highest governing body of the order was the general chapter, composed of the provincial priors and delegates elected from each province.

Both of these orders had social objectives. Their members attempted to contact and preach to all elements of society, rather than to escape society for their own salvation. The increasing populations of the towns were very often the special object of their attention. While the Dominicans had more pronounced intellectual interests in the early stages, Dominicans and Franciscans alike played an important role later in the intellectual movements of the period. After a struggle with the secular clergy in the thirteenth century the mendicant orders assumed a commanding position in the new universities. These mendicant orders were "orders" in a new sense of the word. They were formed for the service of God in some specific task other than the individual salvation of their members.

We have seen in the preceding sections the important role that the Church

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES





assumed in political and economic affairs during the Middle Ages. That it was able to assume such a role was in part the result of the organization of its monastic and secular clergy. We have detailed at some length the successive forms of monastic organization. A description of the over-all secular organization of the Church will throw even greater light on the mechanism by which the Church played its important role in medieval society. A close examination of the accompanying diagram will reveal the prevailing organization of the Church in the high and later Middle Ages. Notice how the pope had become to a great extent the fountainhead of much of the Church organization. By this time the primacy of the bishop of Rome as pope was an accomplished and a most important fact of Church organization. He had assumed manifold privileges and prerogatives. An attempt on the part of metropolitan archbishops to set themselves up between the pope and the bishops had been defeated. Canonization and the approval of relics had become papal prerogatives. Certain sins (such as the murdering of a clergyman) could only be absolved by the pope. He claimed immediate jurisdiction over the whole Church, although in practice much of that authority still remained in the hands of important bishops and provincial councils. He now had the right of confirmation of bishops by letter. He disposed of the offices of those members of the clergy who died in Rome. He was the final court of appeals, and great stress was laid on his power to render doctrinal decisions. Schoolmen such as Thomas Aquinas supported his contention that on the basis of scriptural passages the pope alone had the right of making final decisions on all questions pertaining to faith.

The pope was able to act virtually as an independent political monarch because of the great executive, legislative, and judicial powers he exercised through his *curia* or "council," a body similar in organization to those of contemporary feudal rulers. The *curia* in larger session included the members of the college of cardinals as well as the papal household. The smaller *curia* was limited to the household departments, which might be headed by cardinals. By the fourteenth century four important departments had emerged. The first of these was the papal chancery, which handled a variety of papal affairs, particularly the extensive paper work, such as letters, constitutions, and bulls. A second department was the penitential department or *datery*, which handled absolutions. A third was the *camera*, the treasury or financial department, which administered the vast financial resources of the papacy. (By the fourteenth century a wide variety of revenues poured into Rome.) The fourth department was the *rota*, charged with papal justice.

The relationships of the pope with other offices of the Church are shown schematically in the accompanying diagram and hence will not be described

in detail in the text. Keep in mind the power still exercised by the bishop in his diocese. He made almost all major decisions on a diocesan level. Note further that the real contact with the great majority of the people was the parish priest.

Key to the success and influence of the Church on the individual Church member is found in its fundamental purpose, the administration of sacraments. Although the number of sacraments was not officially limited until the fifteenth century, by the high Middle Ages seven sacraments tended to be essential: baptism, confirmation, penance, the eucharist, extreme unction, marriage, and holy orders or ordination. Baptism and confirmation were always given but once, while extreme unction was seldom given more than once. Baptism freed the individual from original sin and any sins committed prior to the ceremony. It was administered by the priest. Confirmation, as the name implies, was a confirmation of baptism. Originally it was administered directly after baptism by the bishop. As time passed it was postponed until later years. Its administration is still a function of the bishop. Both these sacraments regenerated the recipient with grace. Extreme unction—the anointing of the body with oil consecrated by the bishop—was administered when death was expected, and it assured the dying person of salvation.

The sacrament of penance was necessary because of the likelihood of sinning after baptism and confirmation. It achieved the absolution of such sinning. It has three elements: contrition or attrition on the part of the sinner, confession of his sins to a priest, and absolution by the priest, with the assignment of penalties or penance, such as prayers, almsgiving, and pilgrimage. If the penance given by the priest was insufficient, the sinner, according to accepted theology, would have to spend such time in purgatory as was necessary to complete atonement for the sin. The time in purgatory, in turn, could be shortened by the acquisition of "indulgences." Christ and the saints through good acts were reputed to have built up a "treasury of merits." The pope, having access to this treasury, was able to grant its benefits in the form of indulgences. It was the sale of these indulgences that caused such widespread indignation in the late Middle Ages and during the time of the Reformation.

The sacrament of the Eucharist or Last Supper was closely connected with that of penance. It was considered a repetition of the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, the original sacrifice having been made in atonement for the sins of man. This sacrament consisted in partaking in the daily miracle of "transubstantiation" or the transformation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. Administration of the sacrament of ordination or holy orders was a prerogative of the bishop. By this sacrament the prospective

priest received the divine grace and power necessary to administer the other sacraments; in short, he was elevated to the priesthood.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these sacraments to the individual Church member. Hence excommunication or the withholding of the sacraments became a powerful sanction in the hands of the Church. In its most extreme form excommunication meant depriving the individual not only of the sacraments, but also of all contact with other Christians.

The Christianity we have described in this section forms one of the really important heritages of the Middle Ages for contemporary civilization. Its form has greatly changed; its emphasis in society has also changed; but the institutions are still with us and are playing a considerable role in our society.

REORGANIZATION AND GROWTH OF LEARNING IN THE WEST

As Europe expanded in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as her trade grew and her cities began to flourish, her growing intellectual maturity also became evident. It reflected itself first in a revived interest in dialectics or logic, in heated discussions of problems which were ostensibly theological in character but which pointed to a deepening interest in philosophy. One such discussion centered in the nature of general concepts or terms which were called "universals" (for example, the expression "man" is a universal; it embraces "Socrates" and all other particular men). The controversy was rooted in a short passage of Porphyry's *Introduction to the Predicaments of Aristotle*, translated by Boethius:

Next concerning genera and species, the question indeed whether they have a substantial existence, or whether they consist in bare intellectual concepts only or whether, if they have a substantial existence, they are corporeal or incorporeal or whether they are separable from sensible properties of the things of the sense, or are only in those properties and subsisting about them, I shall forbear to discuss. For a question of this kind is very deep and one that requires a long investigation.

Opinions on the nature of "universals" in the eleventh and twelfth centuries ranged between the extreme poles of "nominalism" and "realism." The extreme nominalist (from Latin, *nomina*, "names") held universals to be mere words; while the extreme realist thought them to possess reality independent of the material particulars they embrace. Between these two poles were two positions of a compromise nature: moderate realism and conceptualism. The first emphasized that the similarity seen in material particulars has reality; the second, that the universal is neither a mere word on the one hand, nor an independent reality on the other, but a mental reality—a concept abstracted from particulars.

The nominalist-realistic controversy had far-reaching practical consequences, because one or the other answer determined a theological position. For instance, those (nominalists) who denied the reality of universals altogether, found it difficult to explain the meaning of the universal, invisible *church*, which was something more than mere individual *churches*; or to explain how *mankind* had sinned in "Adam," and not just an *individual man*.

Of the early philosophers who engaged in the disputes on universals, we may point particularly to the brilliant Breton, Pierre Abelard (1079-1142), who assumed a middle-of-the-road conceptualism. His vigorous and active personality and intellect, his affair and marriage with Heloise, his struggle with St. Bernard—all combined to make him one of the most fascinating figures in the Middle Ages. In his work entitled *Sic et Non (Pro and Con)*, Abelard employs a technique of collecting and collating opposite opinions on theological matters. This device was to become standard scholastic procedure by the thirteenth century.

Another facet of the surging intellectual currents in the twelfth century was the almost feverish translating activity. It recalls vividly to mind the similar activity which took place in Islam in the ninth and tenth centuries. In both cases a people with a meager background of philosophic and scientific knowledge were striving to make their own a great body of learning, and in both cases there was a tendency for schools to grow up around a few brilliant translators working in teams.

The principal places of translation were in those areas where the Islamic and Christian civilizations overlapped, particularly in Spain and Sicily, but in addition there were some individuals, mostly Italians, who centered their activity in northern Italy and in Constantinople.

It is difficult to say just where the first translations from Arabic were made and by whom, but it is customary to begin the study of Latin translations from the Arabic with the activity of a curious figure, Constantine the African (latter part of the eleventh century). He may have been associated with the first important medical school in Europe, that at Salerno. It is alleged he was born in Carthage, and he may have learned his Arabic there or perhaps later during travels in the East. Regardless of whether or not he was a professor at Salerno, it is certain that he obtained numerous medical manuscripts from the East and translated them into Latin, passing some of them off as original works of his own. These translations were used at Salerno, and while they have been described as "corrupt, confused, and full of misunderstood Arabic terms" they nevertheless provided Salerno with a literature that made it the most famous medical school in the twelfth century. It is equally difficult to trace the precise

working area of the Englishman Adelard of Bath, the next most important figure in the early translating activity. Both Spain and Sicily have been suggested as probable places. We do know that he was active from 1116 to 1142 and that he translated from the Arabic some important astronomical tables and Euclid's *Elements*.

Translations from the Arabic made in Spain during the twelfth century were centered at the city of Toledo (recaptured from the Arabs in 1085). The initial stimulus to translation was given by the Archbishop of Toledo, Raymond I (1126-51). Here the translators worked customarily in pairs, the one familiar with Latin and the other a native dragoman (from the Arabic *tarjama* "to translate") who understood Arabic. Often these translators met in the common language of Catalan, and thus the translations were sometimes from Arabic into Catalan and then from Catalan into Latin. The most noteworthy pair during the first half of the twelfth century was Domingo Gundisalvo and John of Seville, a converted Jew. To them we owe a number of translations from the Arabic of Arabic and Greek astronomical and philosophical works.

By far the most important translator of the Spanish school, and perhaps of the whole of Europe during the Middle Ages, was Gerard of Cremona. Anxious to read the *Almagest* of Ptolemy, he went to Toledo. There he saw the great abundance of learning in Arabic. It was said by a contemporary that he felt sorry for the lack of learning available to the Latins and therefore resolved to study Arabic and make translations. The activity associated with his name is extensive; the translation of some eighty works is attributed to him. He probably did not do these alone but as the head of a translating school. So many of the works he translated are important that it is difficult to single out a few. Certainly that of Ptolemy's *Almagest*, made in 1175, is noteworthy, since this work was to dominate astronomy either directly or indirectly until the time of Copernicus. Gerard also translated the encyclopedic *Canon of Medicine* of Avicenna, a work which occupied a dominant position in the medical schools of the West until the sixteenth century.

Important translations were made in Italy and Sicily during the same period. As early as 1128 James of Venice translated several of the logical works of Aristotle that had not been available to students in the early Middle Ages. Not long afterward were found lost translations made by Boethius of these same logical works, and about 1150 still another version from the Arabic appeared. This was of great importance to the intellectual development of western Europe since the new logic was to be the most significant tool used by the schoolmen of the succeeding centuries.

Although not so prominent a center for the translation of Arabic learning into Latin as Toledo, Sicily certainly must be considered of great importance. It should be recalled that when the Normans occupied Sicily in the eleventh century they found there a heterogeneous population including Greeks, Arabs, and Latins. It is hardly surprising, then, that under the intelligent and tolerant rule of the Normans Sicily proved a fruitful place for translations from both Greek and Arabic. It is to these Sicilians that we owe the first direct translations of certain of the dialogues of Plato, as well as other important scientific and philosophical works.

Special note should be made of the progressive translation of the works of Aristotle, for these works were to occupy a unique and authoritative position in the curricula of the medieval universities. We have already mentioned that his logical works were translated by the second quarter of the twelfth century. By about 1200, translations from both the Arabic and Greek of Aristotle's *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, and *On the Heavens* had been made, in addition to some of his minor works. In the course of the next two generations the remainder of his works were turned into Latin, mainly from the Greek. Of these we mention only the zoological works, the first translation of which was made before 1220 by Michael Scot, who appears to have divided his translating activities between Spain and Italy.

By the end of the thirteenth century the first great wave of translations from Arabic and Greek learning was completed. It should be realized that this activity centered mainly in scientific and philosophic works, while the later translations, made in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries during the Renaissance, tended more toward literary works. It should be reiterated that the works translated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries formed the intellectual base for the development of philosophy and science in Western civilization.

The increased interest in dialectics and in the translation of Greco-Islamic learning manifested itself in another form, the great prominence assumed by cathedral schools, such as those at Laon, Chartres, Rheims, and Paris. The number of students, attracted to these schools by the new logical disputes, increased greatly. The fortune of each school tended to rise and fall as prominent dialecticians or teachers joined or left its staff. Just as the size of the student body fluctuated with the changing staff so the organization remained loose during the greater part of the century. The best-known cathedral schools were in France. Students were attracted to French schools from all parts of Europe, from England, Germany, and Italy. As one contemporary has said, "To Italy the papacy, to Germany the Empire, to France learning." But the

schools of Italy were far from unimportant, particularly those that concentrated on medicine and law.

In the early Middle Ages the curriculum of the cathedral schools, such as it was, consisted of a rather elementary study of the seven liberal arts: geometry, arithmetic, music, astronomy, grammar, rhetoric, and logic. By the twelfth century, as a result of the increasing maturity of interests, a higher education was beginning to be differentiated from the seven liberal arts. Thus theology and dialectics were now distinguished; law was growing out of and much beyond rhetoric, particularly in Italy at Bologna, while medicine, which was never a part of the seven liberal arts, was receiving independent instruction.

By the third quarter of the twelfth century conditions were ripe for more formal university development; there was a renewed interest in the use of dialectics, a growing absorption of Greco-Islamic learning, greatly increased attendance at cathedral schools, a differentiation of higher education from the seven liberal arts, and an increasing spread of the corporate ideals and techniques as embodied in guilds and the like. Thus it was that in the last quarter of the twelfth century the universities of Bologna and Paris took form. The roots of other universities, such as Salerno, Oxford, Cambridge, Angers, and Padua, also were planted in the latter part of the twelfth or the early thirteenth centuries. All of these universities (which later had royal or papal confirmation, or both) are spoken of as having a "customary" or "informal" foundation. Others, such as those of Rome, Pisa, and Avignon (the fourteenth century), were founded by papal enactment, and still others, as that of Naples (1224), were created by royal or imperial enactment. Finally, certain universities, such as those of Prague, Vienna, and Cracow (all in the fourteenth century) were fortunate enough to have the double investiture of royalty and the papacy.

The use of the term "university" (Latin, *universitas*) is somewhat misleading. During the thirteenth century it designated "an association or guild of either masters or students or both." But it was not limited to educational associations; it was often used for other associations or guilds. Thus university did not mean, as it does today, a group of faculties or schools. Something more in line with our use of the word today was the Latin term *studium generale*. But even this expression is somewhat misleading, since the term *generale* does not refer so much to different faculties as to the fact that the *studium* was open to all comers. The *studium* referred to the institution, its place, its courses, but not at first to the organization of its personnel. By the end of the Middle Ages, however, both "university" and *studium generale* were being used much as we use the term university today.

We must also reorient our ideas with respect to the word "college." In its early usage it too meant a corporation or guild; thus we find it used at Bologna for an organization of the masters, as opposed to the "university" of the students. Our use of the term college is an outgrowth of its usage at Paris in the thirteenth century for houses or living quarters established for poor students and later for other students. Gradually additional instruction was inaugurated in the colleges or transferred from the universities to the colleges. The "college" system is still strongly evident at Oxford and Cambridge. There is much confusion on the question of what constituted a "master" or a "doctor." On the whole, these words, and also "professor," were used interchangeably. They were ordinarily used to designate one who has been formally initiated into a university or some other corporation of masters. It became a tendency, however, at certain universities, to use the term doctor for law and then for medicine. In any case, "master" was by far the most common term.

It might be asked why formal corporate organizations of masters and students were initiated. For the most part, they had the same objectives as any other guild—the mutual protection and well-being of their members and the obtaining of privileges. The privileges were granted by royal or papal enactment and were often included in the foundation charter. These privileges included certain preferential legal treatment, freedom from various types of taxation, the right to retain absentee offices as sources of income, and the right of cessation of classes. This last has a modern ring. It was similar to the right of strike and was used when it was thought that the rights of the students or masters were being controverted. Other miscellaneous privileges which some universities enjoyed were freedom from military service and free entrance to certain kinds of entertainments. At the University of Turin on the Feast of the Epiphany every liquor dealer was obliged to offer a bottle of brandy and a pound of preserves.

We cannot study university organization in any detail, but even a cursory scrutiny of the universities of Bologna and Paris would show the roots of many present-day college and university institutions, particularly those of Europe. The organizations of Paris and Bologna were the two great prototypes followed by the great majority of universities throughout Europe, with numerous local variations, of course. The University of Bologna is spoken of as having a student type of organization, since the "universities" or corporations of the students exercised control. By the time of the thirteenth century the college of professors at Bologna was to a great extent at the mercy of the student organization. The professors were told how they were to lecture, at what hours, and what material had to be covered in a given time. There were

two types of student corporations or universities: the "transmontane university," composed of "nations" or corporations of foreign students who came from beyond the Alps, and the "cismontane university," consisting of students drawn from Italy.

The organization at Paris was quite different from that at Bologna. Power was vested in the hands of a guild of masters. It is perhaps to be regretted that this type of organization has prevailed in modern times over the Bologna type. In Paris the university was organized into faculties: theology, medicine, law and arts. It was not long before the faculty of arts became the most important of the faculties, at least so far as university administration was concerned, and the rector of the four nations of the faculty of arts became head of the university. His position was disputed at times by the chancellor of the university.

The modern system of granting degrees is also an outgrowth of the medieval university. Although there had been loosely formed schools and universities in the general sense of the word in Greek antiquity and in Islam, one noticeable lack was a system of examination and the conferring of degrees. In the early period at Paris the right to teach (the licentiate) was not a degree in any modern sense of the word, since no system of examinations was involved. It was conferred by the chancellor of the cathedral chapter and was little more than a permission to teach. But as the corporations or universities resembling guilds took form at Paris, examinations were introduced much in the same fashion as examinations were utilized by other guilds in the passage from apprenticeship through journeyman to the mastership. As the examination system grew more complicated, an examination known as the "determination" evolved. This was equivalent to a baccalaureate examination and was given by a board of examiners. The examinee was required to defend or "determine" a proposition or thesis. The examination could last several days. Upon its completion and after much ceremony before a large audience of friends, the student was "dragged off in the street" for the celebration. Wine and the usual celebrations followed. The next step beyond the determination was the granting of the licentiate. The qualifications for the right to teach varied from university to university, just as the period between the taking of the determination and the granting of the licentiate varied. The granting of the licentiate was not equivalent to receiving the mastership, but was often followed directly by it. The mastership was, of course, the admittance to the select corporation. In some cases it was not granted until two or three years after the granting of the licentiate. At the ceremony of mastership, the new master delivered his inaugural lecture or disputation in the presence of the faculty and received his magisterial biretta or cap.

The study of medieval universities has importance for a study of contemporary universities. It is also fruitful because it was in the medieval university that the Christian adaptation of Greek learning was made. As we shall see in the next section, most of the intellectual activity of the high and late Middle Ages centered in the universities and the schoolmen.

MEDIEVAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

The philosophy and science of the thirteenth century reaped rich benefits from the fundamental developments that have been described in the previous sections. The earlier essay into dialectics and philosophy in the cathedral schools pointed towards the "scholastic method" of the thirteenth century. The "new logic" of Aristotle gave to these disciplines a powerful tool for analysis, resolution, and synthesis. The body of Greek and Arabic learning provided basic texts on which to comment, as well as a fund of ideas to support, modify, or refute, according to the dictates of the various interests of medieval society. The universities served as the means of discussion, growth, and organization. And the new mendicant orders provided personnel possessing a high ideal of learning.

By the thirteenth century an Aristotelian classification of philosophy or the sciences had been widely accepted as embracing the various fields of scientific endeavor. Philosophy was thought to be of two basic kinds, theoretical and practical. As one earlier schoolman put it, theoretical philosophy "makes us know what ought to be understood," while practical philosophy "makes us know what ought to be done." Theoretical philosophy dealt with realities for their own sake. It was divided into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. Physics as a general science dealt with matter in so far as this was subject to change. Mathematics was concerned with intelligible quantity in its abstract relationships. Metaphysics sought the reality and first principles underlying the changing material world. Practical or "active" philosophy concerned itself with realities in so far as we consciously come in contact with them, in short, our reaction to realities. Practical philosophy also had a threefold division: ethics, economics, and politics. Ethics concerned the correct conduct of one's private affairs, economics correct household management, and politics correct state management.

All of these parts of theoretical and practical philosophy were considered as "general" or "universal" sciences, and they thus had broad and basic subject matters. Included in them but yet below them in the scale of knowledge were the "particular" sciences, which had limited objectives of study. Among these were optics, astronomy, the study of weights, zoology, botany, etc. It was

considered that these particular sciences were, for the most part, built upon sensory data. Unfortunately, the conclusions and the results of the investigations undertaken in the particular sciences were not systematically utilized in developing the general sciences, at least not in the thirteenth century.

Standing above both theoretical and practical philosophy in the thirteenth century was theology, "queen of the sciences," which crowned the other studies and gave them their *raison d'être*.

While this medieval Aristotelian classification of knowledge was quite widely accepted in the thirteenth century, we must not think that there was but one basic philosophic system. It is sometimes customary to present the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as being the characteristic medieval philosophy, but although his philosophy gained considerable authority there were many other equally vigorous currents in the thirteenth century that differed widely from it. We can point, for example, to the existence of a group of philosophers known as Averroists, who were particularly in evidence at Paris in this century. They were at least partially inspired by the Spanish Moslem, Averroes, who composed commentaries on the various works of Aristotle. (Aristotle was characteristically referred to as "the Philosopher"; Averroes, as "the Commentator.") Although the doctrine of the Averroists is not known in detail, its broad outlines are clear. From Avicenna rather than Averroes they were influenced by Neoplatonic ideas in their conception of intermediary beings or intelligences between God and created things. At the same time they put forth the principle that the world and all created things were co-eternal with God, a doctrine most distasteful to more orthodox philosophy. Furthermore, strong deterministic elements were present. Celestial phenomena were thought to exercise controlling influence on terrestrial activities. The most controversial point in their doctrine centered in the belief in the basic unity of the "active intellect" in all human beings. The active intellect in each individual was believed to be an imperishable constituent in the mind, which was not peculiar to individual human personality, but rather was a part of the single active intellect common to the whole human race. This doctrine was vigorously opposed by St. Thomas and other schoolmen, since it brought into question their emphasis on the personality of each man and it put into jeopardy the fundamental Christian doctrine of the immortality of the individual soul. Another doctrine of the Averroists that brought upon them the censure of Thomas was the doctrine of the "two truths," which seems to suggest that "that which is true in philosophy may be false in theology and vice versa."

Other groups and individuals present us with further divergent currents of thought in the thirteenth century, but we must restrict ourselves here to sug-

gesting some of the more prominent opinions of St. Thomas Aquinas and those who followed him, for it was Thomism which, in the course of the succeeding centuries, exerted the greatest influence on the Church and attained the widest support.

Thomas Aquinas was born of mixed Italian and Norman parentage at Rocca, Italy (1224-25). He studied at the University of Naples, joined the Dominican order, and went to Paris in 1245, where he studied under the greatest Dominican teacher of his day, Albertus Magnus. After some other travels, he received the licentiate at Paris and became a master there. Following upon a short period at Paris, he returned to Italy and had a varied teaching career there, only to return to Paris again in 1269. He taught in Paris until 1272, completing his teaching in Italy, where he died in 1274.

It is not uncommon to find the thought of St. Thomas described as a Christianized Aristotelianism. While this does not do justice to the vigor and originality of Thomas's writings, it does reflect an important element of truth. Logical tools that Aristotle forged were used with great skill and complete understanding by Thomas. So far as his scientific thought is concerned, particularly his physics, he is almost completely an Aristotelian. His psychology and theory of knowledge bear the imprint of both Plato and Aristotle. When he insists that human knowledge is rooted in sensory data and arises from abstractions made from those data, the Aristotelian strain is uppermost. This is a significant departure from the Augustinian-Platonic disposition to consider divine illumination as the starting point of knowledge and understanding.

Thomas engaged in a number of doctrinal struggles, not the least of which was his attack on the Averroistic doctrines. In his work entitled *Summa contra Gentiles* he gives the basic reason why he thinks the Averroists and others have gone astray: they have not properly interpreted the relations of faith and reason. His analysis of the legitimate areas of reason and revelation is of fundamental importance. Both reason and revelation can lead us to truth in divine matters, but certain doctrines relative to God, such as the doctrine of the Trinity ("that God is three in one"), are not subject to demonstration by human reason; or, as he put it, they "surpass the capability of human reason." These divinely revealed doctrines must be taken as true on faith alone. There are other revealed doctrines, however, which can be confirmed by the exercise of reason, for example, the basic doctrine of the existence of God. As a matter of fact, St. Thomas discusses five different logical proofs that can be given for the existence of God. In delineating the areas of reason and revelation, he is careful to emphasize again and again that there can be no conflict between

revealed truth and truth attained by reason, that, although the way to truth may be twofold, the substance of truth is only one. Here he is opposing the Averroistic doctrine of the "two truths."

Out of the schools of the thirteenth century there emerged a technique of investigation and presentation which is commonly called "the scholastic method." It is an expression without explicit definition, being rather vaguely used by some authors to include any dialectical approach to a philosophical question. Assuming such a definition, they see its existence in the early Middle Ages as well as the later period. But for the purposes of this account we shall accept its more common definition, as a rational technique developed in the universities of the high and late Middle Ages. This technique consisted in a detailed examination of all possible affirmative and negative arguments to a proposition or question, followed by a final determination of the truth or falsity of the proposition by utilizing the customary criteria: revelation, past authority, reason, and experience. In the form which this method assumed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it often led to a forbidding number of successive sets of arguments and counterarguments, so that the true opinion of the author seemed lost in a verbal forest, but on the whole it was productive of much fertile thought.

To clarify the meaning of scholastic method, let us suppose that we are discussing a physical question, such, for example, as whether the earth is at rest in the center of the universe (a commonly discussed question of the fourteenth century). Let us further suppose that the author supports the affirmative, that the earth is at rest. The method, then, of treating this question, might have the following steps (and this follows closely the way this question was actually handled by one of the fourteenth-century schoolmen):

- 1) The statement of the question or proposition (whether the earth is at rest).
- 2) A succinct listing of common negative arguments which were called "the principal reasons" (for example: the earth is a natural body; any natural body can have motion; therefore it is inconceivable that in all eternity this potentiality of motion would not at some time be fulfilled).
- 3) A brief statement of the opposite or affirmative opinion, perhaps referring to the highest authority supporting the position (Aristotle posits the affirmative position, that the earth is at rest).
- 4) The principal difficulties and doubts inherent in the proposition, such as those raised by the form in which the question is stated (the center of the earth might not always exactly coincide with the center of the world, although it might be said for all practical purposes so to coincide).

5) A detailed presentation of the negative side of the proposition in which might be included a series of "persuasions." (By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it was customary to separate supporting arguments into "experiences" or "appearances"—appeals to the senses—and "reasons"—verbal argumentation; for example: motion is to be considered relative to the observer; thus there would be no way of telling by the senses whether it is the heavens which are actually moving or whether it is the earth; furthermore, it would be simpler for a small body like the earth to rotate on its axis, with the heavens at rest, than for the heavens, so stupendous in size, so to move, with the earth at rest.)

6) A detailed presentation of the affirmative side of the proposition, including a detailed refutation of the negative side. (But even here the schoolmen might make preliminary answers to the affirmative side and then posit further negative answers, only to conclude finally with the support of the affirmative side of the question, as: Aristotle affirms the earth to be at rest, but admittedly "authority is not demonstration"; certain "appearances," however, finally tip the balance on the affirmative side of the question, particularly the observation that an arrow shot straight into the air falls to earth at the point from which it was shot.)

7) The explanation, solution, or granting of the difficulties or doubts.

8) The solution of the common negative arguments or "principal reasons" first adduced against the proposition.

Not only did the schoolmen of the thirteenth century, and particularly Aquinas, present us with a systematic exposition of the general sciences or philosophy, but also we find a slowly growing movement toward the use of experience and experimental techniques in the particular sciences. The chief, but certainly not the only, protagonist of the utilization of experience to obtain certitude of knowledge was the Franciscan Roger Bacon. He thought that experience was of two kinds: the external experience which came through the senses, and the internal experience which arose from divine illumination. In stressing the necessity of external experience for the understanding of natural phenomena, Bacon also tells us that this external experience should be interpreted by mathematics. Thus it is the utilization of mathematics in interpreting experience that distinguishes the trained scientist from someone without training.

While Bacon was a strong advocate of the use of experience and experiment in the investigation of natural phenomena, there is not much evidence that he achieved any remarkable results by his own practice of experimentation. He and a number of other schoolmen, particularly Witelo and Peckham, performed and repeated a number of the optical experiments already performed

by the Islamic scientists before them. They went little beyond the Islamic authors in theory. Particularly significant, however, in the field of optics, were the experiments performed by the Dominican Dietrich of Frieberg (before 1311). By experiments with balls filled with water in order to produce spectra similar to rainbows, he showed that the rays making the bow visible are reflected on the inside of spherical drops of water. This theory was later adopted by Descartes. It was Dietrich, also, who remarked that in spite of previous authorities "one ought never to renounce what has been made manifest by the senses."

Considerable progress was also made in the science of statics, the study of bodies in equilibrium. A number of original propositions relative to the equilibrium of the straight lever, the bent lever, and the equilibrium of weights on inclined planes appeared in a series of works attributed to a Jordanus de Nemore, who may be identical with the Dominican master general, Jordanus Saxo (from 1222). To the thirteenth century we also owe the experimental study of magnetism made by Peter the Stranger of Maricourt, in a work entitled *Letter on the Magnet* (1269). Peter was praised by Bacon as the only Latin who understood experimental science. This work is a model of the observational and experimental technique in physics. It has no concern with supposed magical properties of magnets, but simply describes their physical properties.

There are a number of other manifestations of the growing attention to experience and experiment in the century. It is evident in the invention of the mechanical clock, following upon the invention of a suitable escapement mechanism to produce a relatively steady fall of the weights used to operate the clock. Contemporary architectural decoration shows a growing naturalism in the representation of floral and animal forms. Some of the thirteenth century herbals, such as that of Rufinus, reveal an increasing attention to the physical description of plants instead of simply indicating the medicinal properties of plants. At the same time certain practical zoological treatises such as the *On Hunting with Birds* (a work on falconry) of Frederick II, reveal clearly this growing concern with observation and experience, and the illustrations of birds that accompanied some of the manuscripts of this work are remarkably naturalistic. Technological and alchemical treatises continue the trend toward experimentation started among the Islamic authors.

It can be asked why this trend toward the use of experience and experimentation took place at this time. The answer is by no means sure, but the trend seems intimately connected with the growing secularization of Christian

society. The urbanization, the rise of money economy, the steady growth of the *bourgeoisie*—all seem to have had their influence on every element of society, and the schoolmen were no exception. The appeal to observed fact was becoming more common. At the time of the very triumph of the Church, of its greatest systematization of thought, there were evidences that the reign of brute fact was hard by, just around the corner.

The previous sections have, in summary, revealed the thirteenth century as a period rich in contributions to the intellectual heritage of the Middle Ages for contemporary civilization. It produced the university. It passed on a system for the classification of knowledge and for the relating of general sciences to particular sciences, a system which served as a framework within which and around which Western thought grew. It produced the greatest Christian synthesis in the works of Aquinas. Finally, it pointed to the growing importance of experientially based knowledge and to the increased use of mathematics and experimentation in scientific investigation.

In passing from thirteenth-century thought to that of the fourteenth we are coming closer to modern thought, both in time and in spirit. In the fourteenth century a strong reaction to the Thomistic philosophy took place in the formation of a new critical philosophy, the so-called Terminism or Nominalism of William of Ockham (or Occam), a Franciscan who taught as a bachelor at Oxford University in the first quarter of the century. This philosophy draws its name from Ockham's psychology. His nominalism was more mature and complicated than the early nominalism of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Although we cannot enter into the details of his philosophy, his reevaluation of the distinctions that must be made between intuitive or directly experienced knowledge and abstract or "thought about" knowledge was highly influential. All knowledge, intuitive or abstract, can be reduced to "signs," which stand for the object in question. In abstract concepts the immediate relationship with experience is missing. These concepts "apply to the object *as thought of*, not to the real object itself, for the abstract does not exist *in any way* outside of the mind." Thus universals have no reality as separate things but only as one kind of mental terms or signs. Only the "particular" or the "individual" stands as independently real. Although Ockham himself cannot in all probability be charged with skepticism, some of his successors certainly were led in that direction. For them the existence of God became strictly an object of faith and not of demonstration.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were a battleground for the struggle that took place between those who took up Ockham's philosophy (the

"moderns") and the followers of Thomas and the older scholastics (the "ancients"). The moderns became particularly noted for their attention to dialectical subtleties.

In the field of physics the moderns at the universities of Oxford and Paris successfully challenged and overthrew some of the basic tenets in the scholastic-Aristotelian system. From their activity developed a number of striking physical concepts that were taken up in the sixteenth century and exerted some influence on the development of modern physics. These physical philosophers paid increasing attention to experience and appearances as criteria for physical theory. At Paris the greatest of them, John Buridan and his student Nicholas Oresme, discussed in considerable detail the possible diurnal rotation of the earth. It is at least possible that Oresme was an advocate of that theory. Many of the arguments used by these men in discussing these theories reappear later in Copernicus's treatment. But most significant of the developments furthered by this group (first at Oxford) was the quantitative study of various modes of change and particularly of accelerated motion. Theirs was the first serious attempt in the course of scientific development to represent accelerated motion quantitatively. There developed at Oxford a theorem which permitted a uniformly accelerated movement to be represented in terms of its mean speed, a theorem which was to be essential later in Galileo's analysis of the acceleration of falling bodies. This theorem was proved graphically by Oresme with singular neatness. The fourteenth-century natural philosophers were never able to describe correctly the free fall of bodies. Most of them believed that the speed of free fall increased directly as the distance of fall rather than the time of fall. But both John Buridan and Albert of Saxony almost had the correct description within their grasp. However, they did not realize it. The explanation of the continuance of projectile motion by an impressed power, which we saw develop in late antiquity and which was picked up by the Arabs, now in the hands of Buridan and his successors ripens into a mature theory. Buridan designates this impressed force as an impetus. He describes this impetus as varying directly with the speed imparted to the moving body and with the quantity of matter (mass) of the body. His description of impetus resembles Descartes's and Newton's mathematical description of momentum, that is, the product of mass and velocity. At the same time Buridan declared that the impetus imparted to a projectile would last indefinitely if it were not destroyed by the resistance of the air and the gravity of the body. He applied his concept of impetus to the acceleration of falling bodies, and he explained that acceleration by the ever-increasing impetus imparted to the body by a continually acting gravity. We see in this idea at least the germ of one of the

most fundamental concepts of modern physics, namely, that a constantly acting force produces a uniform acceleration.

The dynamics of Paris and Oxford passed to the universities of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as to those of Italy. In Italy it competed successfully with a great variety of philosophical ideas, and it unquestionably had some influence on the activities of Galileo.

We leave to a later chapter the detailed description of how Galileo and his successors evolved a powerful mathematical-experimental method and thus a new physics out of the modest beginnings made in antiquity and the Middle Ages.

CHURCH AND STATE

We have described something of the formal religious organization of the medieval period and its philosophical and scientific achievements. Now there remains but to describe how the Church contested political control with the state, and then how the state in the person of the monarch began to gain greater political significance. These are the topics of the last two sections of our chapter.

One of the most significant of the concepts inherited by the Middle Ages from early Christian tradition asserted the independence of the spiritual and temporal powers. We have already characterized the independence of spiritual life as a cardinal doctrine of the nascent Christianity of the first three centuries. Before the beginning of the Middle Ages this doctrine had ripened into the principle that the spiritual and temporal powers in society were not only separate but were each sanctified and autonomous. This has been called the doctrine of the two powers. Much political theory and activity in the Middle Ages centered in the elaboration or emendation of this doctrine. The comparative dignity and authority of these two powers were explored thoroughly.

It has been pointed out that the doctrine of spiritual independence was somewhat obscured by the acceptance of Christianity, at first on equal footing with the other religions of the Empire (313 A.D.), and then later (end of fourth century A.D.) as virtually the state religion. In the eastern part of the Empire and thus in the later Byzantine Empire, the emperor often succeeded in establishing himself as the real head of the Christian church. The patriarch of Constantinople quite regularly submitted to his direction. But in the West a different picture obtained. The Fathers of the Church tended to support the freedom of the Church from the domination of the emperor. St. Ambrose (fourth century A.D.) maintained, "The Emperor is within the Church, not

above it. . . . The things that are divine are not subject to Imperial power." It was this same father who refused to turn over a church demanded in the name of Emperor Theodosius the Great with the statement: "The palaces belong to the Emperor, the churches to the priesthood."

The classical exposition of the principle of the two powers was that of Pope Gelasius I (fifth century A.D.). The emperor was spoken of as the son of the Church, not its director. It was Christ, according to Gelasius, who separated the two authorities. The emperor needed the priest for eternal life, and the priest needed the emperor in temporal matters:

There are two authorities by which principally this world is ruled, the sacred authority of the bishops, and the royal power, and the obligation of the bishops is the heavier of the two in proportion as they shall render account to God for the kings of men themselves.

So, then, there existed two authorities, secular and ecclesiastical, temporal and spiritual, imperial and papal. This basic dualism of powers was handed on to medieval society. It was reiterated in the ninth century and remained in the background of much of the political controversy of the succeeding centuries.

It was one thing to define separate areas of jurisdiction and power and quite another to keep those areas from overlapping in a society that was rapidly falling into feudalism. The Church held vast lands, many in feudal tenures; and thus the clergy were obliged to fulfill many feudal obligations to the laity. At the same time the lay lords, and particularly the emperor in Germany, came to have extensive control in selecting bishops (although they were theoretically elected by the clergy and people of the diocese). The emperors were investing bishops not only with the office and its temporal appurtenances but also with the spiritual things of office (the staff and ring). The continued influence and sometimes dictation of the emperor in papal elections only served to intensify the difficulties. Hence, there were numerous points of increasing conflict between the two authorities.

The struggle between temporal and spiritual authorities was most spectacularly illustrated in a series of contests that took place between the papacy and the revived Empire.

As background to these controversies, we should recall that the Roman imperial authority had almost disappeared in the West with the barbarian invasions and the formation of the barbarian kingdoms. The power of the bishop of Rome as pope tended to increase in the West as the imperial power diminished. The papacy in Rome, and certain other officials in Italy and Sicily, maintained ties of fluctuating strength with the Byzantine Empire at Constantinople from the sixth through the eighth centuries. By the end of the

eighth century relations between the pope and the Byzantine emperor were so strained that Pope Leo III took a drastic step and crowned as emperor the powerful Frankish king, Charlemagne (800 A.D.). While this action had no effect on the position of the Byzantine Empress Irene in the East, it revived the dormant idea of imperial authority in the West.

The empire of Charlemagne quickly broke up under his successors, but the imperial title was conferred later upon the German king, Otto I (962 A.D.), who was actively interested in Italian affairs. By this action Otto became the first Holy Roman Emperor. It was this revived Empire that maintained a continuous existence until the first part of the nineteenth century, and it was the struggle between the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire that brought into particularly sharp focus the relations of church and state. But it must not be thought that this struggle was limited to the Empire and the papacy. It was waged also in France, England, and elsewhere.

We can mention five particularly bitter phases of the struggle: (1) The contest (eleventh century) between Emperor Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII over the lay investiture of spiritual offices; (2) the struggle (twelfth century) between Emperor Frederick I and Popes Adrian IV and Alexander III over imperial "rights" in Italy and the imperial interference in papal elections; (3) the struggle (thirteenth century) for Italian control between Frederick II and Popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV; (4) the contest (1296-1303) between King Philip IV of France and Pope Boniface VIII over the temporalities of the clergy and clerical contributions; (5) the dispute (fourteenth century) between Emperor Louis IV and John XXII over papal confirmation of imperial elections and other matters.

It is not the purpose of this account to trace in detail the varying issues in these five phases of the over-all struggle between church and state. But we can examine some of the general trends observed in the abundant political literature produced by the continuing contest. At first glance it would seem that we could, without much comment, classify the participators in the great struggle into three groups: (1) those who supported imperial supremacy; (2) those who maintained the theory of two separate spheres of power; and (3) those who asserted papal supremacy. Actually the question is complicated, the opinions shading into each other. For example, many authors asserted that the spiritual and temporal powers were independent, but at the same time they readily admitted that the papal authority possessed superior intrinsic dignity. Still others granted that the papacy could exercise spiritual authority over the emperor and thus a certain amount of "indirect" control over him. We should keep still another question in mind as we discuss these groupings—how far

either of the two powers exerted *actual* interference with, or control over, the other, regardless of its own theoretical views on the relations of the powers.

In the first group supporting imperial supremacy we can immediately place those emperors who assumed practical control without concerning themselves greatly with the theoretical aspects. A Constantine or a Charlemagne or an Otto I was certainly acting as if he controlled spiritual as well as temporal matters. There were, however, very few imperial partisans who would deny the papacy its special spiritual prerogatives and dignity—at least until the fourteenth century, although they would and did say that those spiritual prerogatives did not include the deposition of the emperor or the freeing of his subjects from their oath to him. It was during the final phase of the contests that all spiritual or temporal coercive action against the emperor by the clergy was repudiated. This repudiation appeared in one of the most celebrated political works of the Middle Ages, *The Defender of the Peace*, composed by Marsiglio of Padua and John of Jandun in 1324. In this work the emperor is described as the “servant” as well as “creature” of the community (subject, however, not to a simple majority of the people, as some historians have asserted, but to the dominant portion of the people, “having in mind the number and quality of people in that community”). But at the same time the authority which has been granted to him as prince clearly extends over all members of the community, spiritual and temporal. The clergy, therefore, can take no coercive action against temporal authorities, but must limit themselves to preaching and administering the sacraments. The Church is reduced to a department of the state.

Much more numerous is the second group that included those who upheld the independent existence of the two powers, coequal and sanctified. This position was subject to the modification noted above, namely, that it was generally agreed the spiritual power was superior in dignity, if not in authority. This dualistic position came to be more and more the refuge of the imperialists defending themselves against the pretensions of papal supporters, but it was equally the position adopted in the earliest phase of the struggle by papalists trying to free themselves from imperial control or supervision. The dualistic position was well expressed by Frederick I, who, angered by a letter of Pope Adrian IV implying that the emperor had received his Empire as a benefice from the pope, declared:

We have the kingdom and empire through the election of princes from God alone, who by the Passion of Christ, His son, subjected the world to the rule of two necessary swords . . . and Peter the Apostle made this known when he said: “Fear God;

honor the king." Therefore, whoever says that we have received our imperial crown as benefice from the pope is a liar.

When the papacy more vigorously stated its claims to control and confirm imperial elections in the waning years of the struggle in the fourteenth century, the electors of the Holy Roman Empire responded with the enactment *Licet Juris* (1338) in much the same fashion as Frederick had almost two centuries earlier. And even the vigorous antipapist Wycliffe later in the century in one place merely reasserted the older dualistic position: "We hold that God himself instituted both powers immediately, and not in the sense that one of them should institute or authorize the other."

Even those who thought in terms of the two equal swords or powers often held the view of a more fundamental, unified, or single Christian society, of which the two powers were but different aspects. And such an opinion was almost universally held by those who supported papal supremacy.

There is little evidence until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that papal supporters preached papal control over the strictly temporal affairs of the emperor and royal monarchs. Previous to that time actual control of, or interference in, imperial and royal activities had been accomplished by the use of the papacy's admitted spiritual prerogatives. Thus excommunications and depositions of monarchs followed alleged spiritual offenses. It is disputed as to whether Pope Gregory VII in the eleventh century claimed the spiritual authority of the papacy as the source of imperial temporal authority with a consequential right of papal interference in the temporal affairs of the Empire. But the evidence seems to show that Gregory VII did not claim any such direct temporal control, or if he did so on occasions, this did not represent his considered judgment. There can be no question that Gregory inaugurated a new "policy" with respect to the emperor by trying to bring him more directly under the spiritual control of the papacy. At the same time Gregory insisted that the spiritual offices be free from the lay control that had been so widely exercised.

Although assertion of the temporal as well as spiritual supremacy of the papacy was not common before the thirteenth century, there were one or two notable instances of it in the twelfth century. Honorius of Augsburg not only supported the superior dignity of the spiritual authority, but seemed to believe that the source of temporal authority was the earthly spiritual authority (the papacy) rather than God. This view was pressed much further in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In actuality, Pope Innocent III (1198-1216), who headed the Church during the period of its greatest strength,

exerted wide authority over the temporal affairs of rulers, particularly with regard to elections and coronations. A number of European rulers accepted Innocent as their feudal overlord. King John received England back from Innocent as a fief; and Peter II of Aragon came to Rome to do homage to him for his kingdom. Innocent's suspension of *Magna Carta*, however, was on spiritual grounds rather than feudal. And, as a matter of fact, Innocent's claim to temporal authority was less important than his emphasis on the control that flowed from his over-all spiritual authority. He did claim some temporal jurisdiction:

It is not alone in the patrimony of the Church where we have full power in temporal things, but even in other territories, that we exercise a temporal jurisdiction incidentally [*casualiter*] and on investigation of certain cases; not that we wish to prejudice another's right or to usurp a power not due us.

In demanding to adjudicate a quarrel between the kings of France and England, he specifically stated that he did not wish to "usurp another's jurisdiction." But later canon lawyers were to build on Innocent's manifold activities and assert the complete papal supremacy in temporal as well as spiritual affairs.

As has earlier been indicated, by the thirteenth century the Church had grown into what was virtually a state with the administrative machinery of a state. Under the influence of legal concepts fostered by the revival of the study of Roman law, a more comprehensive canon law (Church law) was fashioned for that state in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This institutional growth of the Church and the elaboration of the canon law unquestionably influenced the increasing papal claims to temporal authority. Not unimportant in the support given to the growing churchly state was the translation and introduction of Aristotle's *Politics* in the second half of the thirteenth century. The concept of the state as an organic unit embodying the highest good for man was applied to an ideal, universal Christian state with the pope as its head.

It was during the fourth and fifth phases of the contest between church and state (listed on page 111) that the full theory of papal supremacy was put forth. The papal bull, *Unam sanctam*, written by Boniface VIII in the course of his struggle with Philip IV of France, was an important step in that direction. A number of canon lawyers and political writers supported the unlimited power of the papacy. As one of the canonists put it, "the emperor holds his imperium by the Roman church and may be termed its official or vicar." The position of full papal authority can be best represented by reference to the work *On Ecclesiastical Power* (1301) of Egidius Romanus, a doctor of both canon and civil law. The importance of this work for the state-church controversy has been characterized neatly by Professor McIlwain:

In short, we have in this book the completest and the most thoroughgoing of all the theological and philosophical defences of the furthest doctrines of the canonists, that the Pope is supreme lord in his own right over all the world and in all matters temporal as well as spiritual, and that all princes are his mere subordinates even in the secular administration of their own realms.

Not long after this treatise of Egidius was written, the papacy fell on bad days. Its universal pretensions were in sharp contrast to its subjection to the French kings during the so-called "captivity" of the papacy at Avignon (1305-77). The papal position and authority were further weakened by the schism (1378-1417) which split Europe between popes and antipopes. The papacy's unique authority within the Church itself was seriously threatened by a movement to vest the ultimate authority in a general council of the Church. These events, combined with the growing secularism, the insurgent nationalism of the monarchies, and the continued spread of heretical movements, not only made mockery of papal claims, but at the same time prepared the way for the Reformation in the sixteenth century.

We are not to think that, because the contest between the papacy and the emperor dwindled into insignificance in the later Middle Ages, the problem of the relations of state and church disappeared. It remained as a heritage from the Middle Ages to plague individual monarchs and states, and today we cannot yet say that the problem has been completely resolved.

THE RISE OF MONARCHICAL POWER

Up to this point we have examined the characteristic features of medieval life which were important in the growth of Western civilization. In this final section we must study a phenomenon which had its principal development in early modern times, but at least its beginnings in the Middle Ages. This is the trend toward the formation of national monarchies in which the monarch assumed a prominent, if not absolute, position. It was a trend particularly evident in France, England, and Spain, but it was not without influence in eastern and northern Europe. In each case, however, the growing monarchical power was still tempered at the end of the Middle Ages by the medieval concept of the supremacy of the law and the limitation of the legislative power of the monarch—a limitation that was represented by parliamentary institutions.

The growth of monarchical power has been called the rise of absolutism. Such an expression raises the question as to what is meant by an "absolute" king. If this means a king who has unlimited and arbitrary power, then we must look beyond the Middle Ages for a clear-cut example. On the other hand, if it means a king who is for the most part "irresponsible" (not immedi-

ately and directly responsible to any group in the execution of his authorized powers) and who exercises complete authority within his proper sphere, then we can find medieval examples of kings embodying this concept, and we can find in particular a definite trend at the end of the period toward the king's increasing "irresponsibility" and the enlargement of the sphere of his proper authority.

Symptom and cause of the increasing power of the monarch are inextricably tied together. We must keep this in mind as we proceed to examine the important conditions pertinent to the rise of monarchical power. (1) Feudalism was continuing to decline in those areas where monarchical power was growing. The king-subject relationship had displaced the lord-vassal bond. The civil wars 1450 to 1485 completed the decline of the feudal nobility in England. And the Tudor house which came to power at their conclusion reaped the immediate benefits. At the same time Louis XI (1461-83) in France was making successful efforts to break the strength of the powerful nobility. (2) Of great importance for the consolidation of royal power was the growing nationalism evident in the high and late Middle Ages. The series of engagements between France and England, extending over the period from 1338 to 1452 and known as the Hundred Years War, started as a feudal, territorial, dynastic, and to some extent economic war and ended as a war of nations. We need only mention the patriotic appeals of Henry V in England and Joan of Arc in France to illustrate this point. The nationalistic spirit was in great evidence in central and eastern Europe, in Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and Albania. This nationalism tended to center in the king and did much to enhance his influence and authority. (3) The growing importance of the king's appointed officials and the consequential decline of representative bodies were influential in directing the trend toward absolutism. Even in England, where the decline was less advanced, Henry VII (1485-1509) summoned only seven Parliaments during his reign and only one of them during the last half of his reign. In France the Estates-General lost their importance as the king dealt with the various provincial estates separately. As a whole body, the Estates-General met only rarely in the fifteenth century after 1440. (4) One of the most significant causes of the decline of parliamentary bodies and the growing royal power was the attainment by the king of some financial independence. For example, in France the king had obtained a perpetual and annual *taille* or tax, which produced at the end of Charles VII's reign (1422-61) a revenue of one and three-quarter million pounds. In addition, he acquired other independent aids, taxes, and loans that tended to free him from parliamentary grants, although there is continuing evidence of the granting of taxes

by the provincial assemblies. Not unimportant in the achievement of financial independence on the part of kings were their financial dealings with the middle class financiers which the growing capitalism was producing. Thus, the middle class which had been so important in building up the parliamentary bodies limiting the king's authority came now to be important in helping him attain his independence from those bodies. (5) Of some significance in the growth of absolutism was the spread of the increased study and use of Roman law, with its basic assumption of the complete legislative authority of the prince, and this aspect of absolutism we shall examine in some detail shortly.

While we are stressing in this section the growth of monarchical power, we must not lose sight of other political tendencies at the end of the Middle Ages. In Germany localism and feudal tendencies were ascendant and the Holy Roman Empire assumed a federated structure. In Italy, the battleground first of the papacy and the Empire and then of the Angevins, the French, the Aragonese, and others, the city-state was the common political unit. There was, of course, no centralized monarchy. In the fourteenth century these city-states walked the uneasy line between republicanism and despotism, falling now to one side, now to the other. In the fifteenth century despotism was the prevailing polity. So here too, on a local scale but with a more pronounced spirit than elsewhere, absolutism was not only on the rise but an accomplished fact. But it was a localized absolutism, resembling little the growth of monarchical power elsewhere.

We can now turn from the actual conditions fostering the rise of monarchical power to a study of the development of political ideas supporting or revealing this trend toward absolutism.

It is in the writings of the jurists trained in the Roman law that we find the first medieval opinions attributing to the prince complete and independent legislative authority. Hence, we must first trace the fortunes of Roman law in the Middle Ages. In the nineteenth century it was fashionable among historians of Roman law to accent the increased or revived study of the subject in the eleventh century and thus to ignore the similar study in the earlier Middle Ages. There is some basis for this practice, since far greater attention was paid to the study of Roman law in the period of the high Middle Ages (beginning with the end of the eleventh century) than in the preceding period.

As codified by the lawyers of the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century A.D., the body of Roman law contained four different works. The first was the *Justinian Code*, a compilation of statutory law from the Emperor Hadrian in the second century to Justinian in the sixth. This was more familiarly known as the *Code*. The second was the official digest of the commentaries

by Roman jurists; it was called the *Digest* or *Pandects*. The third was a textbook or compendium of the principles of Roman law, which bore the name of *Institutes*. Finally the *Novels* contained new laws adopted by Justinian and his immediate successors. These four works: the *Code*, the *Digest*, the *Institutes*, and the *Novels*, together were known as the *Corpus juris civilis*, the body of civil law.

While receiving less attention in the early Middle Ages than in succeeding periods, Roman law (ordinarily in pre-Justinian codes) had affected the Germanic kingdoms greatly. Several barbarized Roman codes were compiled in the early Middle Ages. The Roman law survived because of the legal concept among the barbarians known as the personality of the law. The individual had the right to be tried under the customary law of his own tribe. Hence, when barbarians imposed their rule on Roman citizens, the latter had the right to trial under Roman law. The Roman law which was territorial rather than personal helped to transform the concept of personality of the law into the concept of a single law for all the inhabitants of a given territory, that is, into territorial law. There were a few scattered evidences of glosses, explanations, and commentaries on parts of the Roman law in the early Middle Ages. And the Roman law exerted some further influence on the canon law of the Church, particularly with respect to procedures.

There was evidence of the increasing study of Roman law in the eleventh century in at least four centers: Provence in southern France, and Lombardy, Ravenna, and Bologna in northern Italy. Of these centers the most important was Bologna. It was here, from the time of the first of the great civilian lawyers, Irnerius (flourished about 1088), to the middle of the thirteenth century, that a really critical examination was made of the *Corpus juris civilis*. It was here also that important commentaries were composed. The earliest group of commentators were known as the glossators.

The civilians (as the jurists versed in the civil law were called) as a whole repeated the great principle of Roman law which saw the origin of authority in the Roman people, who transferred or conferred that authority on the Roman emperor. The latter's absolute legislative power was epitomized in the phrase "Whatever is pleasing to the prince has the force of law." The question undecided in the *Corpus* itself was whether, after granting the legislative power to the emperor, the people had lost it beyond hope of recovery, or whether they retained some of their old power, or at least the right of resuming it. This question occupied the medieval civilians, who were about equally divided on it. For example, we are told by Irnerius that, while custom once made law, the people had transferred the lawmaking power to the emperor

and could no longer set the law aside. Another of the civilians tells us "our law is both written and unwritten—but the latter cannot abrogate the written laws . . . for the people in transferring the common power to the prince reserved none of it to themselves." And still another of the early civilians mentions that only the emperor or someone to whom he granted the authority could make the laws. The other school of civilians tells us that written law could be abrogated by the universal custom, and that while the people had conferred power on the emperor they still exercised some authority through their customary law. In this group the more common medieval custom of subjection of the ruler to law was having its influence.

It is of interest to note that, of those who held that the emperor was sole legislator, some claimed that he should exercise his legislative and administrative powers only with the consent and counsel of the senate. Although reference is made to passages in the *Code* for support of this latter opinion, it seems likely that contemporary concepts of the necessity of counsel for the modification or interpretation of customary law also had their influence. Civilian lawyers were also split on the basic question of the power of customary law against the prince's law. On the whole they supported the importance of customary law as a restriction to the prince.

Contemporary with the civilians, most of the political authors were supporting the "normal" view of the supremacy of the customary law and the adherence of the ruler to it; but the controversy over the relative power of state and church produced an occasional exaggerated claim for the emperor. As early as 1111, one imperial advocate clearly supported the doctrine of non-resistance to the ruler regardless of how evil he was, since as prince he was ordained of God.

Much more characteristically medieval than the extremist Irnerius, who placed the prince in a unique position with respect to the law, was Thomas Aquinas. His *On the Governance of Rulers* and many passages from his great *Summa Theologica*² reveal that for the most part he supported the traditional ideas of the limitation of the prince's actions. In the former work he argued that monarchy was the best type of government when the monarch had the common good as his objective. In most cases he thought tyranny ought to be tolerated because of the danger of getting a worse government, should the tyrant be overthrown. But he admitted that, if the monarch were excessively

² The term "summa," widely used in medieval literature, has no precise English equivalent. Furthermore, its meaning varies somewhat in different contexts. "Summary," "summation," "compendium," "systematization" are approximations, depending on the circumstances. *Summa Theologica* could be rendered "Systematization of Theology." Another work of Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, could be rendered "Summary (of the arguments) against the Heathens."

tyrannical, the multitude could depose him. In his *Summa Theologica* he stated something similar, namely, that subjects were not bound to obey a usurper or others who ordered unjust acts. Aquinas was one of the first to use Aristotle's *Politics*, which his friend William of Moerbeke had first translated into Latin, and many passages of the *Summa Theologica* reveal a dependency on that work. It is particularly in the *Summa*, however, that Aquinas has shown that he was a man of his times and believed not in an absolute monarch but in one limited by the law, although it is undoubtedly true that he was influenced by Aristotle in the decision. In a good government, "all should have some part in the authority; through this the people's peace will be conserved, and all should love and guard the order, as is said in the second book of the *Politics*." The passage goes on to decide in favor of a constitutional or limited monarchy: "Whence the best constitution . . . is one in which one man is set above the other because of his virtue . . . and below him are other people in authority because of their virtue. Then such a government belongs to all . . . for those in authority can be elected by all and are elected by all." It should be clear, then, that Thomas did not support the tendency among certain of the civilians to favor the absolute, unlimited authority of the prince. Thus for the most part the political writers reinforced the earlier ideas of the king's relation to the law as well as the actual state of government, *and nothing was more foreign to medieval government than unlimited rule.*

Yet we must continue to note the trickle of absolutist ideas that finally began to coincide to some extent with the actual state of affairs at the end of the fifteenth century.

In passing on to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we see much the same conclusions reached by civilians as by the earlier jurists. There could be no doubt that the people had transferred their authority to the prince, and, in granting that the legislative authority of the prince was wide, many felt that he was bound to observe contracts made with his subjects when these were based on mutual justice and equity. Since it is in the fifteenth century that we find the first actual steps toward absolutism, we need observe even more carefully the opinion in that century. One of the civilians, Paulus de Castro, has stated that while the prince should consult the experts when making laws, his laws are nevertheless valid without his having done so. The prince could make laws on his authority without any counsel. And even those jurists who did not accept the absolute legislative authority of the prince explored the question thoroughly and presented the arguments of the opposition. For example, the Englishman Sir John Fortescue, in a work on the laws of England, presented the opposing views in the form of a dialogue between

the chancellor and the prince of Wales. Fortescue associated with England the view of the limited authority of the king, whereas France was ruled to a great extent according to the civil law. He drew the picture of a France where people were harassed by the police, burdened with various kinds of special and ordinary taxes, and open to special punishments and executions without proper trial. In England, on the other hand, Sir John tells us in his exaggerated picture of the differences between the two countries, a man's possessions were safe from seizure; arbitrary taxes were not imposed on him without consent of the kingdom meeting in Parliament. The unfortunate state in France, Sir John points out, had been brought on by the war with England. The whole discussion has special interest for us because it shows that men in the fifteenth century associated Roman law with the exercising by a contemporary monarch of something approaching absolute authority. It is undoubtedly true, however, that Fortescue has given us a strongly biased and colored picture of the arbitrary authority of the French king.

We shall see that in the early modern period absolute rule was given support by the doctrine of the divine right of kings: a king's power is sacred because of his anointment at coronation; he is personally answerable to no one but God, and hence it is unlawful to resist him. We have indicated earlier (Chapter I, pages 42 ff.) that this is not to be confused with the medieval doctrine of the sanctity of political authority, that is, sanctity of the kingship. But the doctrine of the divine right of kings did appear on occasion in the Middle Ages. Stated at the very beginning of the period by Gregory the Great (died in 604), it was advocated by one imperialist writer in the twelfth century (whom we have already mentioned). Wycliffe in the fourteenth century stated the doctrine strongly. He spoke of the king as the vicar of God. Subjects owe absolute obedience to the king and it is wicked to resist him. There are also scattered instances of its expression in the fifteenth century. One of these was, of all places, in the proceedings of the cortes Castile and Leon at Olmedo in 1445. Inspired by a revolt and turbulent conditions, the cortes stated very strongly that divine law has expressly forbidden anyone to touch the king, since he is anointed of God, or to speak evil of him, since he is God's vicar. The king's authority was considered by the cortes to be so great that all laws were subject to him. Somewhat the same position has been outlined by an Italian humanist, writing just one year later. The king, we are told, ruled over all temporal affairs at God's command, and all were to do his bidding without resistance.

We have traced the tenuous threads of political theory supporting the absolute power of the ruler down through the fifteenth century and have seen

some evidence that that theory was beginning to coincide with political actuality, but it must be admitted that even as late as the fifteenth century the majority of political writers were still speaking of the limitation of the king by law, whether a socially made law or natural law. But with the spread of the study of Roman law throughout France and some of the rest of the Continent, absolutist concepts were not without their influence.

How the doctrine of monarchical power fared in the early sixteenth century may be seen by an examination of the work of Machiavelli (1469-1527). Machiavelli was writing in a period when once again Italy had become the object of foreign invasion, and the conditions of disunity and localism had been impressed on him to such an extent that his foremost desire was for the unification of the country. While he stated that the historical method of political analysis was soundest, his attention was very much on the world of practical politics, on politics in action, or what the Germans call *Realpolitik*. The more theoretical aspects of political thought received much less consideration than the technique of the art of government. Although he was to some extent influenced by Aristotle, his objectives and ideals were very different. The city-state in Italy could not stand up against the great powers across the Alps and across the sea; hence he was interested not in the balanced city-state, but in an expanding dynamic state in which Italy could be united.

Machiavelli shows his divergence from most of the political theory of the Middle Ages by his separation of politics and ethics. The only moral considerations that a ruler must take into account are those which clearly influence the effectiveness of his rule; further than this he must not let moral principles stand in the way of successful government. His position is well illustrated by a passage from his *Discourses on Livy*: "Where the safety of one's country is at stake, there must be no consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, glorious or shameful; on the contrary, everything must be disregarded save that course which will save her life and maintain her independence."

His attitude toward religion reminds us of his general attitude toward morality. Statesmen must not overlook the importance of religion to an effective political rule. They should maintain a respect for religion since its decline might make ruling more difficult.

Machiavelli's two most important writings on politics are the *Discourses on Livy* and *The Prince*. In the first he analyzes republican government; in the second, monarchy. He is by no means free of earlier medieval ideas. For example, he praises the French monarchy as living in security because the kings are bound by the laws. Although his concept of liberty is difficult to

delineate, his discussions of it are not unsympathetic. In one place he concludes that it is better to entrust the protection of liberty to the people than to the nobility.

But after admitting the occasional survival of medieval political theory in Machiavelli's works, one is forced to conclude that a significant change in political writing has taken place. Just as the kings in France and England were no longer in the sixteenth century the feudal kings of the Middle Ages, so the treatises of Machiavelli were no longer moral tracts or feudal expositions of the supremacy of the law. By the time of Machiavelli the trickle of opinion supporting monarchical authority had become a stream, and the stream in the course of the next century was to swell to the size of a river under James I in England and Louis XIV in France.

Chapter IV

CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT AND THE SECULAR POLITICAL SPIRIT



i. DYNASTIC CONSOLIDATION

To the mind of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries affairs of state and the problems of politics had an importance and a majesty transcending the sphere of the economic activities and changes. . . . The function of the ruler had long been the subject of intense and elaborate speculation; it was conceived as an eternal problem on which universal judgments could be made. The legitimate ruler belonged in a traditional hierarchy in which there was no place for the great figures of economic life. . . . The bankers might indeed be in many senses rulers of men, but in the formally delimited sphere of government they had no place. The state was endlessly compared with the individual on the one hand and with the universe on the other. The same principle of order was to be discerned at all three levels, and disorganization in one was followed or accompanied by disorganization in another. The planets in their courses, the rulers in the state, and the passions in the individual were clearly related. Indeed, thinking in terms of the body politic, always traditional in the European inheritance, became increasingly popular in the age of Francis I, Henry VIII, and Charles V.

Yet, although the state and its problems thus occupied a large place in men's minds, in considering fifteenth- and sixteenth-century politics we must guard particularly against the danger of being dominated by modern preoccupations. We have become so accustomed to a world of mutually exclusive sovereign states, organized for the most part on a national basis, that it is extremely difficult to put ourselves back into a situation in which neither the external boundaries of states nor the scope of their political power was so

This chapter consists of material by two different authors. Section 1 is from *The World of Humanism, 1453-1517* (pp. 71-74, 100-109, 122-138; New York, Harper and Brothers, 1952), by Myron P. Gilmore. Section 2 is from *Imperial Spain* (pp. 53-60, 64-74, 94-109, 125-127, 133-137; New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1931), by Edward Dwight Salmon.

precisely defined. The entities we now know as France and England, Italy and Spain, insofar as they existed at all in the fifteenth century, had meaning and connotation very different from those we attach to them.

The whole European political system was still enmeshed with feudalism. Political authority and private property, although theoretically and in some important respects practically distinct, nevertheless were in other ways closely identified. Throughout the territory of Latin Christendom a host of authorities, lordships, jurisdictions ecclesiastical and lay, city states, and larger territorial governments exercised some form of political power and overlapped in their responsibilities. The duke of Brittany, for example, within his territory, exercised functions of government that were not very different from those exercised by the king of France in his. The authority of the prince-bishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne was equal to that of secular princes. Frontiers can hardly be said to have existed at all in the sense in which we have come to know them. In this situation it is profitless to attempt to determine which political units fit the modern classification of state. The necessary preliminary to the analysis of the dynamic developments of the period is a general indication of the more important types of political organization.

The old ecumenical institutions, the Empire and the papacy, had clearly lost much of their former authority by the middle of the fifteenth century. The papacy had emerged from the conciliar period confronted by the necessity of making compromises with various secular governments and regional churches. The pope, deriving his authority ultimately from his religious functions, still presided over a government that touched the lives of more people in Europe than that of any other ruler; but in the coming period the papacy would be increasingly preoccupied with its Italian possessions and with its position as a territorial power in Italy. The emperor had now for many years ceased to have any real authority outside the Germanic territories. Within these territories he was titular ruler over a confused network of jurisdictions and principalities, although his actual control was largely theoretical. There were the great electorates, the territories of the independent princes and knights, and the free cities. In order to assert any authority at all against this combination, the emperor was increasingly thrown back upon attempts to build up and extend the territories belonging directly to the imperial house. Thus, during the next half-century the imperial policy of both Frederick III and Maximilian was concentrated on the effort to acquire real political power over a nucleus of lands that would become the hereditary basis of the Hapsburgs.

At the other end of the scale from the old universal institutions of western

Christendom were the small, compact lordships such as the Italian despotisms and the city states, some few of which, like Venice which possessed a Mediterranean empire, could be considered among the great powers of Europe. This type of political organization reached its culmination in northern Italy in the duchy of Milan and the republics of Florence and Venice, but even in the north of Europe there were still illustrious examples of the exercise of large political powers by independent communes or leagues of city states. The Swiss cantons and the cities of the Hanseatic League were illustrations of government extended from a communal to a federal basis.

Somewhere between the large, weak universal institutions and the small compact territories are to be ranged most of the governments of fifteenth-century Europe. The nucleus of government was commonly allegiance to the person of the individual ruler or dynasty. Such allegiance often provided the basis for a political organization entirely unconnected with any existing national or state consciousness. Consider, for example, the position of the duke of Burgundy, who in the middle of the fifteenth century undoubtedly represented the most considerable political power in western Europe. With a position achieved more by personal effort than by institutional growth, the dukes of Burgundy had developed effective control over an extraordinary agglomeration of territories bound together solely by the tie of allegiance to a common suzerain. Of the same order of importance territorially, although in most cases much smaller in actual power, were the political authorities that were to evolve as the great national monarchies of modern times. But it must again be emphasized that at this point, in the mid-fifteenth century, although the foundations of national monarchy had been laid in the course of a long evolution, it was still by no means clear that state and nation would become increasingly identified.

The Iberian Peninsula was divided into the independent kingdoms of Portugal, Castile and Leon, Navarre, and Aragon, to say nothing of the continued existence of the emirate of Granada. France was emerging from the long struggle of the Hundred Years War, and the territory that Louis XI could claim to govern when he came to the throne in 1461 bore little resemblance to the France that later dominated the European continent. In the west the dukes of Brittany exercised a practically independent authority, while in the east and north the great power of Burgundy overshadowed the monarchy. Provence in the south, with all the other territories of the Angevin inheritance, remained outside the French king's control. England in 1450 was still in the midst of civil war, and it was to be another thirty-five years before the new dynasty of the Tudors was securely established. In northern and

eastern Europe large kingdoms existed, some of them ephemeral creations produced by the attempts of a momentarily effective royal power to achieve a larger territorial basis. The Scandinavian kingdoms had thus been ostensibly united since the Union of Kalmar at the end of the fourteenth century; Poland and Lithuania were under the common rule of the Jagiello dynasty. Hungary and Bohemia, which had been brought within the orbit of the Hapsburg territories, were now again detached and were on the verge of the great period of independence achieved in the second half of the fifteenth century under Matthias Corvinus. . . .

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT

Almost everywhere in Europe in the middle of the fifteenth century the form of government was monarchical. The tradition of kingship had been derived from the Germanic tribes and was nourished by classical political theory. With the exception of the Italian signories, the Swiss cantons, the cities of the Hanseatic League, and some few free cities of the Empire, men lived under a monarchy whether hereditary, as in most countries of western Europe, or elective, as was the case of many of the states of eastern and northern Europe, including Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, Sweden, and Denmark. Elective or hereditary, these monarchies were organized upon a basis which defined in specific terms the rights and duties of a king.

Territorially the kingdom was usually composed of an agglomeration of feudal principalities, seigneuries, and towns, each with its own local history and particular privileges, brought together by the results of war, the ambition of a dynasty, or the divisions of inheritances, and having a common bond in their allegiance to the person and office of the monarch. Politically and socially the subjects were divided into a complicated hierarchy of individuals, groups, and orders, determined in theory by the functions performed for the group as a whole and endowed with certain privileges reflecting the political and juridical recognition of those functions. The highest expression of such privileges was to be found in the assemblies of estates; not only the estates, however, but other groups and individuals within the body politic were regarded in theory as endowed with rights which the monarchy had to respect. The structure of government in fifteenth-century Europe therefore commonly presented a dualism. On the one hand were the defined powers of the crown, which enabled it to fulfill its function of government; on the other hand were the privileges of subjects, the guarantee of which was regarded as one of the chief purposes of monarchical rule. In practice the chief theme of the internal history of government in this period therefore followed the fluctuations

between the advance of the monarch's power and the successful assertion of privileges against the monarch.

In its commonest form this struggle centered on the relations between the crown and the nobility. The latter saw their functional position in the state and their real power being undermined, and attempted by a variety of means to recoup their losses. The monarchy on its side discovered that one of the secrets of greater popular strength was the application of its expanding powers to cutting down the privileges of the feudal baronage. The emergence of strong monarchies was accompanied by the suppression of the political role of the nobility. To this extent a common pattern can be perceived in most of the great states of western Europe, although it appeared with variations in methods and time. To the anarchy of the first part of the fifteenth century—the Hundred Years War in France, the Wars of the Roses in England, the troubles in Spain—succeeded the relative order of the final decades of the century, wherein the growth of the internal powers of government paralleled the course of territorial expansion.

The Spanish monarchs were perhaps the first to realize lasting success in the regulation of the feudal class. They began by appealing to the towns. In the Middle Ages there had existed an organization known as the *Hermandad*, a league of municipalities which provided mutual assistance and protection to its members. This organization was now utilized by the crown and transformed into something like a national militia for the preservation of order. As the public peace was primarily threatened by the feudal nobility this development amounted to an alliance between the crown and the burghers against the magnates. The reorganization of the *Hermandad* was begun by Isabella in Castile. After it had proved its usefulness in providing a militia paid for by the municipalities it was extended to the kingdom of Aragon in 1488.

The creation of a police force primarily directed against the nobility was accompanied and followed by other measures. In Castile Isabella ordered the destruction of baronial castles and strong places. Lands that had been alienated to favorites in the disorderly period early in the century were now resumed. Perhaps most important of all, the crown took over direct control of the three great orders of Spanish chivalry. This was accomplished by having the king made hereditary grand master of each of the orders. In this way the monarchy received the great financial benefit resulting from the revenues of the orders as well as the political advantage of eliminating a series of offices that might have been a focus of rivalry and disaffection.

The result of all these measures was that the Spanish nobility came in-

creasingly to identify its political fortunes with those of the monarchy. This submission, which was already so largely prepared by Ferdinand and Isabella, was furthered by their grandson Charles when he came to the throne. The traditions of the Burgundian court which he had inherited and in which he was brought up had created a ceremonial or symbolic substitute for the functional position of the nobility. Gorgeous banquets and elaborate rituals became ends in themselves; a court etiquette began to evolve; the ritual that surrounded the chapters of the Order of the Golden Fleece led in a direct line through the Spanish monarchy to the courtiers at Versailles. Hence when Charles received his Spanish inheritance in 1516 he brought with him to his new kingdoms lessons from his Burgundian experience which reinforced the work of Ferdinand and Isabella.

One of the corollaries of the suppression of the political role of the nobility was the increasing importance of professionally trained lawyers in the king's councils. The alliance between the monarchy and the towns was productive of other organs of administration. Educated administrators of bourgeois origin took the place of nobles whose position had been determined by birth. The identification of interest between the monarchy and the towns gave the crown an increasing control over the municipalities. In these circumstances the representative assemblies like the cortes ceased to have the importance they had enjoyed in the medieval period as a makeweight to the crown. With appointments to the higher clergy increasingly in the royal control, with the nobility more subservient to the policy of the court, and with a third estate whose representatives were nominated under royal influence, the independence of the historic assemblies was rapidly disappearing. For long periods during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the cortes did not meet with any regularity and when they did, it was to confirm plans for the succession or to aid the crown in pressing financial necessity. This last purpose remained the greatest bulwark of the privileges of the cortes and was the ground for their opposition to Charles V at the beginning of his reign, when efforts were made to recover the medieval liberties. In reality, however, it was already too late. The battle had really been lost in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella and the decisive superiority of the crown had destroyed the medieval balance.

In England, by an institutional development which offers in many ways striking parallels with that of Spain, the Tudors furnished another example of the aims and methods of the new monarchy. The founder of the Tudor dynasty, Henry VII, confirmed his questionable genealogical claim by conquest at the battle of Bosworth in 1485. Behind him lay twenty-five years of civil war and intermittent bloodshed. The great need was for the establish-

ment of order, which could be undertaken only by the crown. Henry VII was able to meet this need although not without having to deal with repeated conspiracies from disaffected elements and with attempts to install pretenders to the succession in the early years of his reign. As in Spain, the Tudor program included a direct attack on the abuses of privilege among the high nobility and the strengthening of the administrative and judicial machinery available to the crown.

The capacity of the English nobility to disturb the peace rested principally on the practices of livery and maintenance. The higher nobles had supported bands of retainers equipped with the badge or livery of their patron, who were often in fact no more than groups of desperadoes whose services could be used for any reckless purpose. Although these armed bands had been the subject of much complaint and there had been attempts to remedy the situation, Henry VII was the first to achieve any substantial measure of success. This he did by using the judicial powers of the council, defining a part of the council as the Court of Star Chamber in 1487, and giving it jurisdiction over cases involving livery and maintenance and disturbance of the peace. This court functioned under the direct control of the king and without the procedure of the common law. It was thus a powerful instrument for suppressing what the gentry and the bourgeoisie looked upon as the tyranny of the nobility and not for many years was it regarded as an instrument of tyranny on the part of the crown itself.

The establishment of the Court of Star Chamber was accompanied by other measures designed to extend the scope of royal authority. Illegitimate castles and fortifications were destroyed; royal domain which had been alienated was recovered; lands and fortunes of overmighty subjects were confiscated. In this way the king's revenue was augmented and it became unnecessary for him to call on Parliament for financial support, a call which was bound to alienate the sympathies of the class upon which the Tudors most relied for political support. Thus it happened that Henry VII used Parliament as little as possible, yet when he died in 1509 he left one of the largest treasures of any Christian monarch. His internal policies were substantially continued in the first period of the reign of Henry VIII, though the accumulated treasure was rapidly spent in support of an extravagant and pretentious foreign policy. On the eve of the Reformation the English monarchy had acquired an extraordinary degree of political and social control and Parliament was not again to play an important role against the monarchy until the seventeenth century.

France was slower than either of the two great neighboring monarchies to

adapt the position of the nobility to the new authority of the crown. The consequences of this delayed reaction are to be observed in the history of the civil strife in France during the sixteenth century. A promising beginning was made under Louis XI. The internal history of his reign was punctuated with the recurrent warfare between the crown and the greater vassals, of which the War of the League of the Public Weal in 1466 was the most notorious example. By skillful manipulation Louis was on the whole able to prevail over his enemies and to secure the same kind of advantages for the crown that his contemporaries in Spain and England were winning. Yet at the end of his reign the whole position was brought again into question. His successor was a minor and a weakling. The great nobles became rivals for the control of the government and medieval privileges of all kinds were reasserted.

The high point of this reaction was the meeting of the Estates-General summoned at Tours in 1484 to debate the question of the regency and to present the grievances of the kingdom. This assembly produced the most significant assertions of the privileges of the subject in the whole late medieval history of France. In one speech it was maintained that the kingship was a dignity which could not be expected to follow the ordinary rules of private property and that no taxes could be levied without the consent of the estates. Actually these fine statements seem to have been inspired by the attempt of the high nobility to retrieve their own position. By proclaiming constitutional doctrines which had a certain breadth of popular appeal the feudal interests attempted to strengthen their own case for privilege against a strong monarchy. In actual fact, however, the crucial battle over the power to tax had been fought many years before and the French assemblies had during the Hundred Years War lost that control over supply which their English counterpart was later able to recapture. To this extent the French king had a position envied by his contemporary monarchs; yet in spite of his better control of the purse, he had to confront a feudal nobility still able to offer a greater degree of effective political opposition. During the reigns of Charles VII and Louis XII and during the early part of the reign of Francis I, the energies of that nobility were drained off in the campaigns of the Italian wars, yet the problem remained to become one of the principal factors complicating the history of the kingdom during the wars of religion.

What the monarchy accomplished in varying degree in the three great national states of western Europe was repeated on a different scale in the smaller countries. Most of them showed the same pattern: increase in the scope of the crown's authority, attack on the feudal nobility, restriction of the meet-

ings of the medieval assemblies and alliance between the king and the middle-class servants who entered the bureaucracy. . . . Wherever a strong monarch appeared, he had to meet the threat of the higher nobility, and in the ensuing struggle relied chiefly on the lesser gentry or the town burghers. On the whole the political and social evolution of Europe was on the side of the new monarchies. Their cause was so popular that they were able to minimize or in some cases dispense altogether with the traditional representative institutions of the Middle Ages.

Yet there were important areas which illustrated an opposite current. The Empire could not be expected to follow the pattern of development of the national kingdoms. Throughout the fifteenth century there was a continuing struggle between the electors and the imperial authority for control of the emerging organs of administration. As early as 1455 a reform party in the electoral college put forth a program for the attainment of a greater degree of order in government. This program was backed by the desire of certain of the electors to secure a larger share of participation in the actual process of governing the Empire. Thus the struggle in Germany was not so much a difference of ends as it was in the contests between monarchy and nobility elsewhere. It was rather a conflict to see who would get possession of instruments of government that all were agreed were indispensable. . . . The Empire remained a political unit dominated by the uneasy balance between the great feudal element, now become the princes of states, and the imperial authority.

Farther east, Poland provided the classic example of a country that followed the extreme opposite of the pattern of development of a strong monarchy. During the fifteenth century the whole body of the gentry secured privileges of immunity and the right to participation in authority at the expense of the crown and the great nobles. The competence of the general assembly, which was composed of deputies of the lower nobility, was defined and confirmed. Assurance was given that district and provincial assemblies would be held prior to the general assembly of the estates, so that delegates might be instructed on the agenda and the opinions of the class might be formed. Thus the gentry as a class enlarged its gains at the expense of other classes in the state and came finally to wield an authority greater than that of the monarchy itself. The aristocratic Polish republic of the eighteenth century had an elected king as a figurehead and a diet whose *liberum veto*¹ had become a famous symbol of parliamentary inefficiency. In these circumstances Poland became an easy mark for more aggressive and better organized neighboring states.

¹ [A rule by which a single noble could veto a proposal.]

Although three hundred years separated the triumphs of Casimir Jagiello from the first partition in 1772, the foundations of Polish weakness were laid at the beginning of the sixteenth century in the social and political changes which gave the gentry so much power at the expense of the monarchy on the one hand and of the commercial middle classes on the other.

Poland remained the extreme case in which elements of the medieval assembly of estates acquired political power beyond that of the king. For most of the European monarchies the same period showed an increase in the prestige and power of the crown. In those countries where the political evolution moved away from feudalism the scope of governmental activity broadened. The function of the medieval king had been defined in terms of the concepts of justice and peace. The former implied in practice the preservation of existing rights and privileges, and the latter the maintenance of order. Operating with these concepts, royal government superior to other kinds of feudal government, but not supreme, was in fact often very limited. The natural corollary of increasing power was a redefinition of the objectives of government, giving to the crown a wider sphere of action and a more comprehensive control over subjects which would never even have been considered in a medieval court. Victory—at least partial victory over the nobility—control of more sources of revenue, a greater degree of political independence of the estates: all these were reflected in a more aggressive foreign policy, the support of larger armies and innovations in the character of government at home. The techniques of administration were still far from sufficiently developed to permit the regulation of all departments of life in the state by a central administration. Compared to the experience of even nontotalitarian governments today, early sixteenth-century royal governments would seem very limited and inefficient. But the trend of evolution toward greater centralization was already producing decisive results. The growth of an army and a bureaucracy, the twin pillars of the absolute state, accompanied the increase in the power and resources of the monarch. The states in which this process had been most effective were now in a position to undertake external expansion and to overwhelm the older, smaller governments, whose whole organization was on a different scale and who were unable to compete with the national monarchies.

The major unit in western Europe where the government was not organized on the basis of monarchy and estates was Italy. For a number of historic reasons Italy showed the greatest deviations from the common European pattern. Even there, however, were governments where the structure of politics centered on the system of estates as in the larger monarchies.

In the duchy of Savoy, for example, the estates met and functioned very

much as they did in France. Clergy, nobility, and bourgeoisie were assembled from the several provinces to negotiate with the ducal power the assessment of financial aid. The dukes also showed the same tendency as contemporary kings to find means for dispensing with meetings of the representative assemblies and in fulfilling this aim they were largely successful. The government of the papal territories also made use of assemblies of estates. In the various provinces of the papal states all who had seigneuries and all ecclesiastics who were bishops and abbots appeared in person and were accompanied by representatives of the cities and countryside. The chief occasions for such assemblies were no different under the papal administration from what they were under secular states. Money was needed to support the troops who were the chief instrument of papal policy in Italy. Finally in the kingdom of Naples, the only really territorial state in Italy, the parliament had a long and historic tradition dating back to medieval times. . . .

Savoy, the papacy, and Naples were, then, the exemplars in Italy of the more general European pattern based on a balance between monarchy and estates. Outside this pattern the governments of the Italian city states like Florence, Milan, and Venice, as well as the smaller lordships and principalities, were characterized by a much greater flexibility of political form. The opportunity for political improvisation, the relative independence of traditional institutions, the disregard for "legality," the consciousness of politics as an autonomous area of activity marked off especially from ecclesiastical control—all this led Jacob Burckhardt to see in the Italian scene the birth of the state as a "work of art." Following Burckhardt's interpretation, many historians have emphasized the critical importance of the history of the Italian states in this period, attributing a "political Italianization" to the northern monarchies, from which date the beginnings of modern politics. From the institutional point of view the thesis that the origins of the modern state are to be sought in Italy cannot be sustained. But the political history of Florence, Venice, Milan, and the lesser Italian city states did provide an environment in which certain attitudes toward political activity and certain norms of statecraft were for the first time sharply defined. The question of origins apart, it is in a sense not too fanciful to see in the experience of these states, as in the city states of ancient Greece, a microcosm of the issues which confronted the great national states of Europe at a later period, both in their internal development and in their relations with one another. . . .

THE RESOURCES OF GOVERNMENT: PROPERTY AND POWER

Whether kingdoms or city states, all governments of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, like governments of other periods, were constantly in need

of regular sources of revenue. In some states like Milan, Florence, and Venice, where there were large accumulations of capital and where, as in the case of the Medici, there was a practical obliteration of the line between private capital and public revenue, the problem was not acute. The role of the public authority was well defined and that authority was on the whole able to command revenue sufficient to enable it to perform its assigned functions. In those states organized on a corporative basis, however, and among them especially those whose scope was expanding both territorially and administratively, the situation was different. The ordinary sources of revenue available to medieval governments were no longer sufficient to meet developing political and military needs. European monarchies attempted to solve this problem in different ways and with varying degrees of success. The king of Poland had certainly as much reason for demanding an increase of revenue as the king of France or England, but the Jagiellos were never able to establish their claims as securely as the Valois and the Tudors. The solutions of the financial problem that had the most important social and political consequences depended on the complex interaction of the common European political inheritance and the differences in regional and local circumstances. Comparative study of this problem is a most important key to understanding the diversity that developed within the framework of a common culture.

The great issue of the rights of the monarch over the property of the subject, or, in more general terms, the relation between authority and property, had been one of the central themes in the history of all the states of Latin Christendom. The views inherited from feudal institutions as well as from feudal theory had insisted that a king "should live of his own," and that only certain emergencies justified requests for grants from his subjects. The famous maxim of Seneca—"To kings belongs authority over all; to private persons property"—which Professor McIlwain has declared best embodies the living political conceptions of the later Middle Ages, continued to have vital relevance to political practice as well as to political theory, even though the meaning of both "property" and "authority" was being transformed. In many ways the theoretical separation of the functions of property and those of power paralleled the dichotomy between the privileges and powers of the monarch and those of the individuals, groups, and estates who were the subjects. With the domanial or ordinary revenues failing, governments were confronted with the task of increasing the extraordinary grants from their estates or else finding new sources of revenue.

The appeal to the estates of a realm was the traditional recourse for financial assistance. Such grants might be of several kinds, but were usually limited to the duration of a defined emergency. The estates were almost everywhere in

Europe increasingly reluctant to make grants of this sort, even in the most pressing circumstances. There was widespread public opinion in favor of increased governmental action, as of the crown against the nobility, the extension of public order, the prosecution of an aggressive foreign policy, and other aims, but when it came to footing the bill, those who had the money were, perhaps not surprisingly, more attracted by the possibilities of further capital accumulation or the necessities of maintaining a position than they were by the needs of contributing to the interests of the wider community to which they belonged. Chancellors exhausted themselves and their audiences in pleading for amounts sufficient to carry on enterprises to which government was committed. In some cases, notably that of the French monarchy, there had been established permanent taxes which had originally been emergency grants but which could now be collected annually without the necessity of recourse to the estates. Such was the celebrated *taille* as well as numerous *aides*.² For this achievement the French kings were envied by neighboring monarchs. Maximilian, for example, is reported to have described Louis XII as the king of beasts because he could get from his subjects what he wanted, Ferdinand of Spain as the king of men because he was granted a reasonable sum, and himself as the king of kings because he was not able to extract anything at all from his subjects. Yet, even on this favorable view, the revenues collected by the French monarchy were entirely insufficient to meet its commitments.

In the absence of an adequate regular revenue established by the consent of the estates, many governments resorted to . . . borrowing from bankers and private capitalists [such as] . . . Jacques Coeur and the Fuggers. Such borrowing was the more necessary, even when the regular taxes brought in a considerable amount, because the way in which the revenue was collected did not permit the accumulation of an immediately available sum of capital. The *taille*, for example, was collected over a period of a year, came in dribs and drabs, and was almost invariably spent before it had been received. Hence the resort to tax farmers or bankers, who could advance the estimated sum to be collected, in return for themselves taking over the rights of collection or at least a mortgage on the results. Similarly, custom duties such as those on woolfells and leather were collected over a long period, and did not supply the want of immediate cash. Such cash could usually be secured only by loans from bankers, often at exorbitant rates of interest and at the price of a lien on some source of government revenue.

The relationship between impecunious monarchy and the merchant capitalist . . . developed during this period with many variations. Loans were se-

² [Personal tax and excises.]

cured by the alienation of regalian rights of all kinds, and in some cases, as in France during the reign of Francis I, the beginnings of government bond issues are to be found in the allocation of the revenues of the Hôtel de Ville in Paris to the payment of interest and amortization charges on short-term loans.

In addition to grants from the estates and loans from bankers and private individuals, many other expedients were adopted by early modern governments to increase their revenues without violating too openly the property rights of the subjects. A method much resorted to, especially by Henry VII in England, ably served by Empson and Dudley, was the interpretation of legal precedents so as to justify confiscations of the property of the nobility. These measures served the double purpose of depressing the overmighty subject and improving the economic status of the crown.

Among the methods for increasing governmental revenue none was more interesting and fraught with more consequences than the sale of public office. This was classically developed in France, where it eventually became one of the regular sources of funds for the *ancien régime*.³ Under Louis XI certain financial and judicial offices were declared irremovable, and from this it was but a short step toward regarding them as the dispensable property of the incumbents. As more and more offices were offered for sale, entrepreneurs who had accumulated some capital found that it could be profitably invested in buying an office. In this way capital, originally derived from commercial or industrial activity, was deflected from further utilization in such activity. The opportunity to improve one's status by association with the royal service was a powerful attraction to many of the bourgeoisie. A life of commercial or industrial adventure was exchanged for security, and the wages paid for fulfillment of the duties of the office could be regarded as a more than reasonable return on an initial investment of capital. From the point of view of the monarchy sums of ready cash were thus acquired, the repayment of which to individuals took the form of disbursements that the monarchy would in any case have had to make. In the long run the whole system became an elaborate mechanism by which new forms of wealth were infused into the old hierarchy of power, and the practice is an illustration of the social and economic consequences of the monarchies' search for revenues. It flourished most completely in France, but it was practiced also in Spain, where it was partially applied to municipal offices, and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands, in Germany, and in Italy. Seen as a European phenomenon, the development of property in office represented a stage between a feudal and a bureaucratic society.

³ [The old or "former" régime—i.e., prior to the French Revolution of 1789.]

Another source of wealth for the state was the attempted regulation or control of various forms of economic enterprise. The activities of the Portuguese and Spanish governments in the commerce of Asia and the New World . . . were among the principal sources of revenue for the Iberian crowns, and it was eventually upon wealth derived from the New World that the Spanish effort to dominate the continent of Europe was based. In addition to the obvious wealth derived from overseas enterprise, the control and encouragement of wool-growing in England, responsible for the enclosure movement, perhaps diminished the average wealth of the community as a whole, but certainly added to the royal exchequer through the export taxes on wool. Similarly in Spain the organization known as the Mesta⁴ was granted a succession of privileges because of its financial importance to the government. In all these ways and many others the economic and social divergences within the system of European states were conditioned by the nature of their solutions to the fiscal problem.

There was a very wide variation in the degree of success achieved by these efforts to increase the resources of government. Henry VII of England left a full treasury to be dissipated by his successor, in contrast to the condition of practical bankruptcy that so constantly frustrated the Emperor Maximilian. Yet it is important to reflect that no state in western Europe, however devious and persistent the methods adopted by its ruler, succeeded in getting the kind of control over the property of the subject that was enjoyed by the Ottoman sultan, so strong was the western tradition that property was one thing and government another. It may indeed be argued that, from the point of view of maintaining institutional limits to state authority, the struggle between government and property was to fill much the same kind of function in the coming period as the struggle between state and church had done in the earlier. As the real wealth of the European world increased in the late medieval period the concept of property changed. What had been the ownership of defined rights tended to be transformed into the ownership of defined things. Roman legal ideas prevailed over medieval. Those rights which came to be thought of as functions of government were still regarded as "owned" by the rulers, while tangible property, which had been the focus of a variety of rights, became the subject of exclusive ownership by single individuals. Medieval dominium was becoming divided into sovereignty on the one hand and property on the other. One of the important effects of this dualism was to create sanctions, moral, legal, and institutional, for the proprietary rights of subjects. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the existence of these

⁴ [The sheep-raisers' guild.]

sanctions was one of the conditions providing the most powerful incentives for the dynamic activity of the western European people in this period.

Clearly, the fact that the increasing capital accumulations were not developed under direct control of the state made more difficult the task of finding resources to supply the needs of governments. The solution arrived at in the various ways described above had the merit of maintaining the institution of property with all its sanctions as a makeweight to the authority of the state, and at the same time making available to the government through a series of expedients a share of the generally increasing wealth, in amounts sufficient to make possible territorial consolidation and political and military action on a larger scale. These changes were reflected both in political theory and in the emergence of the European state system.

FORMAL POLITICAL THEORY

Political theory, whether legal or philosophic in form, had necessarily to take into account the institutional changes described in preceding chapters. As the scope of political action increased and its content changed, older ideas about the nature of the state were modified. These modifications centered chiefly on an analysis of the responsibilities of the ruler and on the establishment of an autonomous and secularized realm of political activity. The modern state began to take shape in theory as well as in fact; indeed, many students have considered this the most striking characteristic of the age of Machiavelli.

In spite of significant innovations, however, the older traditions naturally persisted. Fundamental ideas on the nature of political authority and the purpose of political organization had been shaped by the long tradition of classical and Christian thinking on these subjects. In every western European country secular authority was distinguished from ecclesiastical, but society was universally believed to be directed to a spiritual end. The state existed to support justice, and one of the most important aspects of justice was the maintenance of the Christian religion. Another aspect was the maintenance of the rights of the subject, which were, as we have seen, defined in proprietary terms. Thus, both the sphere and the object of the state were interpreted in terms of specific institutions like the church and property, as well as in terms of traditional morality. Views derived from this inheritance were still reiterated; yet side by side with the traditional analyses—and even among those who considered that they were only stating past truths—there appeared significant new descriptions of the powers of government.

Political theory vacillates between the effort to set before mankind an ideal commonwealth and the attempt to describe the general rules governing

political behavior as it is. Both realist and idealist may deviate from traditional lines, but those whose business it is to define the actual functions of government cannot depart too far from surrounding fact. Perhaps lawyers are, of all such theorists, the most closely attached both to circumstances and to inherited tradition in an especially rigid form. For this reason the views of legal theorists are sometimes particularly symptomatic.

Many among fifteenth-century authors whose political writing was cast in legal terms recognized the claims of the new monarchies. In England Sir John Fortescue was the author of a series of important treatises on the government and laws of England. A portion of his work was dedicated to the exposition of a program for strengthening the monarchy. Fortescue considered it essential that the crown be endowed with revenues sufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of government and he emphasized also the importance of a council, selected on the basis of ability, to advise the king in the making of policy. It was also necessary to have a sufficient staff of well-trained administrative servants to carry out the policies determined by the king in council. All this reflected the contemporary need for order, acutely felt during the period of the Wars of the Roses. In spite of his understandable desire to strengthen the monarchy on lines later realized by the Tudors, Fortescue was concerned also to defend the rights of the Parliament. Particularly, he reiterated the traditional doctrine that the estates had an inalienable right to consent to grants of money required by the crown for extraordinary expenditures. In this respect Fortescue considered that there was a great contrast between the French and English practice. . . .

Fortescue's analysis of France, however, was far from being accepted by all his continental contemporaries. Philippe de Commynes, for example, the famous servant of Louis XI and Charles VIII, asserts in his *Memoirs*—in terms quite as strong as those used by Fortescue himself—that no king in Christian Europe, unless he be a tyrant, has a right to exact monies from his subjects without their consent. The same doctrine was upheld, in fact, at the estates of Tours in 1484, when Philippe Pot made a stirring address in which he maintained that the kingship was a public dignity and that its support concerned the representatives of all the estates of the realm. It is apparent that many men, like Commynes and Fortescue, practical men of affairs, were very clear-sighted in perceiving and analyzing the needs of contemporary government. They all agreed that the powers of the monarchy ought to be extended in order to permit the state to preserve a greater degree of order. What they were not willing to face was the reluctance of assemblies of estates to grant means to the governments in anything like the amounts, or with anything

like the regularity necessary to support the kind of program they wanted government to undertake. The need for order was deeply and widely felt, but, as is not infrequently the case, people were reluctant to pay the price. Where this reluctance was firm, long-continued, and institutionalized—as in England—it provided a basis for later political control. Elsewhere, as the government was frequently driven to resort to measures of getting money that would avoid the control of the estates, a basis for a more absolute and comprehensive state power emerged.

Those who were in favor of a more absolute conception of governmental authority found support in the teachings of Roman law. As political power emerged more and more in fact from its connection with feudalism, many theorists discovered that texts of the Roman law were more adaptable to the new situation than the current coin of medieval custom. Such a work as Peter von Andlau's *Monarchy of Caesar* emphasized the extent to which all power must be regarded as emanating from the state. His work was of the greatest importance in preparing for the reception of Roman law in Germany, and also in developing the concept of the imperial authority that lay behind the reform movement of the great diets at the end of the fifteenth century. Not alone in Germany, however, but everywhere in Europe the Roman law tended to be accepted in lieu of the customary traditional law. This was a process that was realized to the maximum in Germany and to the minimum in England, with a wide range of variation between these two poles.

Side by side with those who hoped to solve the problem of government by an appeal to the Roman legal tradition, and by emphasizing the legal and institutional framework of the state, were those who appealed equally to tradition but emphasized the moral training of the individual rather than the legal basis of the state. *The Institution of a Christian Prince* of Erasmus was perhaps the leading example of this type of literature. Written in 1516 for the instruction of the future Charles V, who was then being prepared to receive his vast political inheritance, Erasmus's treatise belongs to a long line of "Mirror of Prince" literature extending back beyond the writings of St. Thomas and Egidius Romanus. The usual pattern was a description of the duties of the prince, followed by an analysis of those qualities that would best enable him to fulfill his responsibilities. Many of the humanists produced pieces of this sort upon commission from contemporary rulers, but in spite of their edifying character these treatises were increasingly unrealistic and had little effect upon the actual conduct of government.

Erasmus's work was the product of the scholar's study and far removed from the experience and insights of such men as Commines and Fortescue. Yet

even here the signs of the times were to be found. The comparison between the position of God in the universe and that of the prince in the state was old and familiar, but it was developed by Erasmus with such richness of detail and allusion that we seem to be already on the way to the triumphant cry of Bossuet: "O Kings, you are gods on earth!" Precisely because the position of the ruler is so powerful, every effort must be directed toward providing him with a proper education. Here Erasmus reflected the humanist faith in what could be accomplished by education. If only rulers could be rightly taught, then the age of the philosopher-kings dreamed of by Plato would have arrived. For a brief moment in the second decade of the sixteenth century it seemed as if this age were dawning. Charles V, Henry VIII, and Francis I had among their preceptors and friends the greatest representatives of the new learning. If they controlled more power than their predecessors, they also had more opportunities for enlightenment. Within a short span of years, however, these bright hopes were blasted and it became clear that even the best of educations was not enough. While the hope lasted, however, the homilies and moral treatises directed to the edification of the prince mirrored not only an intensified moral tradition but also the growing importance attached to the position of the ruler.

Thus in different ways the lawyer like Fortescue, the statesman like Commines, and the humanist like Erasmus revealed a consciousness of the growing scope of governmental activity. Yet all these men maintained traditional views about the purpose and limits of governmental authority. In their works the old and the new were balanced, but among their contemporaries was one whose break with the past was far more decisive, and whose name has ever since been associated with the beginning of the theory of modern politics.

Niccolò Machiavelli was born in 1469, the year in which Lorenzo de' Medici came to power in Florence, and the year in which Ferdinand and Isabella were married. His youth was passed in obscurity, and he emerged as a politically active figure only in 1498 when he was appointed secretary to the council of ten of the Florentine republic. He continued in this office, with numerous diplomatic missions and with many opportunities to observe the course of practical politics, until the restoration of the Medici in 1512. He was then forced to leave office and for the remainder of his days, in spite of numerous attempts to re-enter political life and to gain the favor of the Medici, he lived as a private citizen. All his work was produced during this period of retirement and some of it was directed to the immediate end of recapturing a position in politics. He died in the year of the sack of Rome, 1527, disillusioned

with the course of affairs in Italy and embittered by his long exclusion from useful political activity.

The latter half of Machiavelli's life fell in the period of the Italian wars. From 1494 until his death, in a span of a little more than thirty years, Machiavelli saw Italy devastated by the invasions of the French, the Spanish, and the Germans. He was able to look back on the age of Lorenzo de' Medici as a golden age of political stability. He had seen governments rise and fall; he had seen great powers league together to destroy smaller powers; he had seen examples of the success that attended bad faith and the violation of treaties. It is natural, therefore, that his greatest concern was to find some formula for retrieving a sense of security, for re-establishing a condition in which at least the minimum requirements of civil order would be met.

In order to find the answer to his questions Machiavelli turned to history. As has frequently happened in time of great crisis, when revolutionary events seem to deny the basis of historical continuity, men adjust themselves by seeking a reinterpretation of the past. More than a century of humanist tradition had concentrated upon glorification of the classical past, and therefore it was to Roman history that Machiavelli directed his analysis. Looking back over the centuries he was profoundly impressed with the long and successful course of the Roman republic and the Roman Empire. If any light could be shed on why the French and Spanish were defeating the Italians, and why Florence was failing in the sixteenth century, it could perhaps be found by asking why Rome succeeded. Could not historical rules, uniformities, be extracted from the history of Rome, and might these not be applicable to political success in all times and in all places? In his approach Machiavelli was following a good humanist example. Argument from classical precedent was decisive.

Among reasons he considered most important in explaining the continuity of Roman political institutions was the ability of the founders—or, in his terms, the *virtù* of the legislators. . . . This quality, the ability to carry out in practice an abstract scheme, was what Machiavelli primarily meant by *virtù*. It was a quality historically possessed by all great leaders and, in Machiavelli's opinion, conspicuously absent in the Italy of his own day, though possessed by the Ottoman Turks, the French, and the Spaniards. From this he concluded that there was a static amount of this kind of ability in the world. When it was concentrated at a single time and in a single place, as it was at the foundation of the Roman republic, it bore fruit in a marvelous set of institutions that endured through centuries.

In addition to the abilities and achievements of the great men of Rome, Machiavelli considered that great importance attached to the maintenance of

the Roman religion among the people. Religion was a binding force that kept alive the loyalties of a people living together in a community. When the old Roman religion began to decay, it brought about also the decay of the civilization of the republic.

Another factor, part cause and part symptom of the healthy condition of a republic, was the existence of a citizen army. The devotion of men to the fatherland, and their willingness to die for it, was a measure of the soundness of its institutions. Here again it was obvious how great a contrast existed between the past and the present which Machiavelli saw all around him. Warfare in Italy was then typically conducted by mercenary armies instead of by citizens. This was in part a natural result of the oligarchic constitution of the Italian city state. It was felt to be dangerous to arm the poorer citizens and the inhabitants of the countryside, lest they turn against their rulers and dispossess them. As Machiavelli only too well perceived, it was equally dangerous to entrust the fate of a government to an army of mercenaries. If the mercenaries failed, all was lost anyway; but if they succeeded they were only too likely to dominate the state for which they had fought.

Thus, from his analysis of Roman history Machiavelli concluded that among the principal factors of stability in a political society were leadership, religion, and patriotism. Where these qualities could be realized there would be both a powerful and a peaceful society, one in which the individual might expect a certain degree of liberty and the protection of life and property.

Yet there remained a great question. Rome had possessed all these advantages in the beginning; and yet Rome had fallen. How was the decay of Roman society to be explained? Here Machiavelli drew on a philosophy of historical change. This philosophy was primarily based upon a view of the nature of man that was interestingly related to both Christian and classical traditions. Machiavelli accepted a large measure of the Christian tradition on the nature of man. For him, men were evil and corrupt and had to be coerced to do good. Because of the evilness of man the institutions he creates are always bound to decay, no matter how firmly established they seem to be. Thus, a belief about the nature of man which is essentially Christian was combined with a belief about the course of human affairs which was essentially cyclical and classical. There exists a cycle of human institutions in which fortune plays a considerable part. Those favored moments in history when good institutions have been established and a happy life is possible are bound to wither away.

In his emphasis on inherent evil in the nature of man Machiavelli was appealing to a continuous element of the Christian tradition. His description of

good, on the other hand—especially social and political good—was limited to the interest of the community. Thus Machiavelli defined the good solely in terms of whether or not the individual is acting in the interests of the community as a whole. He pointed out that every man has a temptation to serve his own interests, but it is the community he ought to serve, and if necessary should be compelled to serve. Now, it was certainly in the tradition of western Christian political thought to emphasize the general interests of the community, and this teaching can be found in the great writers on political theory from St. Augustine to St. Thomas Aquinas. In addition, however, there is found in this Christian tradition an emphasis on a higher law beyond that of the interest of the community, a law to which the individual can appeal. This part of the Christian tradition of political theory is not found in Machiavelli. In his identification of morality with action in the interests of the community—especially the community defined in terms of a particular state—lies his greatest departure from the Christian tradition.

Because of the existence of a historical cycle, in which good times are bound to deteriorate and bad times are likely to last for a considerable period, it is necessary to act in accordance with the morality that prevails at the particular stage of the cycle that has been reached. Machiavelli found himself living in a bad time. The first necessity was, therefore, to recognize that action was only possible within certain limits. The kind of security Machiavelli would have liked was the kind provided by the Roman republic; but, living in Italy in 1513, he saw that this kind of society would be impossible to create. The only kind of public order that could be achieved in a time when morality was decaying was the public order created by a prince who was feared. It was necessary to act in accordance with the times. It was no good longing for the existence of religious and patriotic feelings that could not, in the nature of things, be attained overnight. Therefore, limiting himself to what was possible under contemporary conditions, Machiavelli tried to point out in *The Prince* what could be accomplished by intelligence and will. Even in the worst of times leadership need not be lacking; and extraordinary leadership might struggle with fortune and improve the situation.

The methods that would have to be used in such a struggle were those suited to the character of the age. Machiavelli had seen Florence defeated and brought nearly to ruin by the perfidy of the French, the papacy, Caesar Borgia, and others. In a time when your enemies are using every subterfuge and bad faith against you, you cannot observe traditional morality. Hence, Machiavelli wrote a program for an Italian prince who might take advantage of the favorable conjunction of events existing in 1513.

Shortly after the Medici had been restored in Florence, Leo X, son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, was elected to the papacy. Thus there was created a situation in which a single family controlled both the papacy and one of the most important governments in Italy. A somewhat analogous situation had existed under Alexander VI, when his son Caesar Borgia had been nearly successful in building a large territorial state in the Romagna. Hence, when Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* he recurred to the example of the Borgias, in order to point out how near they had come to success and in the hope that the younger Lorenzo de' Medici, to whom the treatise was dedicated, would succeed where Caesar Borgia had failed.

Machiavelli hoped that, if such a leadership could be found, Italian national feeling would rise to the occasion. The famous last chapter of *The Prince* is an appeal to the national sentiment of the Italians, and an apostrophe to the savior who will deliver Italy from the barbarians. It voices the hope that such a liberator will be welcomed everywhere in Italy and hailed as the father of his country. Whether or not this chapter was written separately from the rest of the book, it hardly accords with the realism Machiavelli had shown throughout the earlier chapters. In many ways these earlier chapters may be interpreted as a refutation, chapter by chapter and page by page, of the ethical and idealistic treatises on the virtues of the prince, characteristic of humanistic literature. It almost looks as if Machiavelli, when he came to the end, made a desperate appeal to the existence of a patriotic sentiment which his whole observation of the Italian scene must have proved simply was not there. He had bewailed its absence; he had studied its effect in Roman history; he had invoked the dictator in Italy precisely because the sense of community was wanting. Yet he seemed in this last chapter to feel that an Italian national sentiment could be created overnight by the provision of forceful leadership. The great analyst of the methods of political realism yielded here to a romantic view of nationalism, the other great force that was to dominate the modern political scene. *Realpolitik* could use nationalism, and indeed became far more powerful when based on nationalism; but it could not create nationalism. Louis XI and Ferdinand of Aragon could accomplish what they did, not only because of what they were in themselves, but also because of a certain sense of community in their realms. Caesar Borgia was no Romulus. The forceful union of people under a prince who was feared—a dictator—was a substitute for the sense of community and genuine patriotism that might have flourished in other historic conditions. Had Machiavelli been consistent to the end, he would have realized that, where nationalism did not exist, the most skillful efforts of

Realpolitik to evoke it were, at least in the short run, doomed to failure.

At the very time when Machiavelli was proposing the remedy of the strong man for the evils of his time and country and holding up to admiration an ideal derived from the study of Roman history, a younger contemporary in England was also engaged in examining contemporary politics and society. As in all times of crisis, there was a widening gap between the way things ought to be and the way things were. If Machiavelli applied himself to the latter, Thomas More described the former. The older traditional approach to the problem of government was thus neatly split into a realist and an idealist tradition. In the work of More the traditional materials of political thought were used to construct a frankly unreal Utopia, existing neither in time nor in space, contrasting with the real world of European monarchies, while in the work of Machiavelli the new realistic analysis was used to describe the contemporary scene. Both drew on the inspiration of humanist interests, but Machiavelli remained fundamentally a pessimist about the immediate future of the European situation, while More represented the optimistic hopes of the Erasmian circle.

This optimism was not without qualification and there were many aspects of the coming capitalist society that More condemned. In the first book of the *Utopia* what More was against was made very clear. Hythlodaye's long speech, describing what he would do if he were in the council of the French king, was More's great plea against the Italian wars. It was argued that all this activity and expenditure of men and money might in the end be of no effect, and that a king would do better to devote himself to the realm God had given him and the improvement of the condition of his subjects. More and Hythlodaye join in the bitter recognition that if any such advice were given, it would not be heeded. The same book contained the famous indictment of the enclosure movement in England. . . . There were also complaints against interference with the status of the clergy.

In these cases More was opposing the new politics and the new economics, and expressing fear of their effect upon the church. He made these protests in the name of justice; and the ideal of justice that he cherished was a medieval one. Every estate as well as every smaller group, and even every individual, was regarded as having certain rights. The existence of the civil society of Christian Europe was maintained by the protection of these rights. It was the duty not only of rulers but of all men of good will to resist their infringement. Thus, the More who pleaded in the *Utopia* for restraints against the greedy landlord, and who deplored the wars of Francis I, Henry VIII, and Maximilian,

was the same More who ultimately refused to recognize the oath of supremacy and who considered it beyond the competence of Parliament to separate England from the corpus of Christian Europe.

But if the *Utopia* was in part an attempt to restate Christian social and political ideals which More felt to be passing away, it was also an attempt to establish rational norms by which the extent of the present evils could be judged. The second book contained the description of the imaginary community described by Hythlodaeus. . . .

What More was really trying to do in the second book, aside from some humanistic *jeux d'esprit*,⁵ was to show how far a community of men, operating on a basis of natural reason, could proceed to the development of a good society. If the pagan virtues of wisdom, temperance, justice, and fortitude could accomplish so much, then Europeans who had the advantages of Christian revelation ought to be the more ashamed that they had not risen to a higher level than the contemporary scene represented. In the light of reason as well as in that of revelation, in the light of the classic as well as the Christian tradition, the abuses in European institutions were condemned. But the basis of those institutions, their true and proper use as distinct from their abuse, was left untouched by More's excursion into the imaginary realm of natural reason.

It is a remarkable fact that, at the moment when the national state was in fact emerging as the dominant force in the political life of Europe, the greatest theorists of their generation misunderstood, denied, or deplored the current trend in politics. Machiavelli and More both recognized that monarchies like France, Spain, and England disposed of the decisive power in the world of the sixteenth century, and they recognized further that that power was being arbitrarily used, unchecked by the moral laws of the Christian tradition. To this extent they both recorded an existing state of fact. The realm of political behavior was more cleanly separated than ever before from the world of ethics, just as economic activity was also achieving a separate compartment, though the latter process had not then gone so far. Machiavelli envied France, but he had his eye fixed on the city state. His *patria*⁶ was Florence, and his ideal was the expanding city state of antiquity, the Roman republic. He never really understood the impossibility of an effective national sentiment appearing in the Italy of his time, and his predilections led him to put far too great an emphasis on what could be accomplished by an individual state.

The thinking of Erasmus and More also revealed an admiration for the kind of city state that had been discussed by Plato and Aristotle. The Utopian

⁵ [Flights of intellect.]

⁶ [Homeland.]

community was made up of a league of city states and Erasmus praised this form of polity even in the work he wrote for Charles V. All his life he significantly signed himself Erasmus of Rotterdam and shunned the capital cities of the monarchies in order to live in the semi-independent communes of the Netherlands and Switzerland. More of course lived under a national monarchy and served it well but ultimately went to his death rather than yield to the claims of the new nationalism.

The admiration for the institutions of the city state was not entirely nostalgic. The constitution of Venice was widely admired, and the Swiss cantons were considered to have as free and healthy a government as was to be found in Europe. Even the Hanseatic League had not as yet entirely decayed, while Flemish towns continued to be centers of culture that in many ways rivaled their Italian counterparts. There were many indications that the day of this city-state civilization, which had had its most brilliant period in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, was done. Yet those who perceived this most clearly were still free to regret it; Machiavelli looked with nostalgia on the golden age of Lorenzo de' Medici, which was destroyed by the aggression of the northern barbarians; and More, with a far wider horizon, deplored the growth of the monistic power of the state at the expense of a medieval pluralism in which he found a greater guarantee of the rights of individuals as well as groups. Far apart as were their ethical systems, both realist and idealist were in substantial agreement about the actual forces governing international political action. Their analyses reflected the facts of the relations between the powers, and provided the framework within which evolved the European state system.

2. IMPERIAL SPAIN

CHARLES V—THE EMPIRE ESTABLISHED

Accession of Charles V. In January, 1518, the cortes of Castile assembled at Valladolid to swear allegiance to the new sovereign. With characteristic frankness the delegates protested against the presence of foreigners, told the king that the realm should not be impoverished for the benefit of favorites and aliens, criticized his inability to speak Spanish, referred to him as "Your Highness" in the old Spanish fashion instead of as "Your Majesty" which Charles preferred, and named his mother, Joanna, specifically as joint ruler.⁷

⁷ Joanna was placed ahead of Charles in official designation. As king of Castile, king of Aragon, king of Valencia, count of Catalonia, and so on, Charles was officially "Charles I," since no other ruler of that name had ever occupied the Spanish thrones. But in the position of Holy Roman Emperor, Charles was the fifth of the name and it is by his title of "Charles V" that he is most commonly known, in Spain as well as elsewhere.

Charles secured a subsidy of 600,000 ducats and then proceeded to Saragossa to secure the recognition of the cortes of Aragon. Here he encountered similar opposition, particularly when it came to getting the grant of money Charles wished the cortes to vote him. It had become known by this time that the Emperor Maximilian, the king's Hapsburg grandfather, had not long to live and it behoved Charles to start his campaign of bribery of the imperial electors to secure his election as emperor. The Aragonese were stubborn, however, and the king was obliged to remain until the end of January, 1519, before he could obtain Aragon's recognition and a modest grant of 200,000 ducats. He next journeyed to Barcelona for the Catalan cortes's recognition and although the Catalans were so determined not to be victimized by the Flemings that they turned the tables and fleeced the foreigners, the royal affairs went more smoothly than in the two preceding meetings of Castile and Aragon.

But on the way to Catalonia news reached Charles that his grandfather was dead and he was eager to get to Germany to look after his political interests there. In haste to get away from Spain, the king cancelled his visit to Valencia, sending a proxy to secure the allegiance of the cortes of that kingdom, and summoned the cortes of Castile to meet him at Santiago de Compostela. . . .

Meantime the attention of Europe had been directed to the contest for the imperial election, in which the ability of Charles's backers to continue the sordid bribery of the electors longer than his French rival had given the young Hapsburg the dignity of Holy Roman Emperor over the active candidacy of Francis I of France and the tentative candidacy of Henry VIII of England. Charles excused his departure from Spain by citing the necessity (according to the Golden Bull of 1356) of ratifying his election by the ceremony of coronation; on October 23, 1520, he was crowned king of the Romans at Charlemagne's old capital of Aix-la-Chapelle and from that time was legally entitled "Emperor Elect." In addition to the traditional medieval office of emperor of the Holy Roman Empire Charles V at this time united under his personal sway an unprecedentedly vast expanse of territory and political power. From his Spanish grandparents he possessed the Spanish realms of Castile, Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, the old Aragonese imperial lands of Cerdagne and Roussillon across the Pyrenees, the Balearics, Sardinia, the kingdoms of Sicily and of Naples, and the more recently acquired Castilian holdings of the Canaries and the New World, as well as the Spanish conquests of North African fortress cities. The successor of the Catholic kings could add to the extensive lands of their old and new empires wide territories inherited from his paternal grandparents. These comprised the Burgundian possessions of Charles's father's mother, Mary of Burgundy, which included Flanders

and Artois in northeastern France, Franche Comté and Charolais in eastern France, Luxemburg and a host of small states making up the Low Countries. Also Charles had inherited from his paternal grandfather, Maximilian, the Hapsburg patrimony of Austria, Carinthia, Carniola, Styria, Tyrol and scattered Swiss holdings, lands on the upper Rhine, and a claim to the duchy of Milan in Italy. No ruler in European history had headed so enormous an extent of territory, yet the magnitude of Charles's empire was to be increased during his reign by discovery and conquest beyond the seas. To Spain, however, the grandiose power of her new king meant little; the old separatist isolation from the rest of the world and the old hatred of the foreigner conspired to leave the impression with the Spaniards that their king left the Peninsula in 1520 merely because he preferred Germany to Spain, and they might have remained unreconciled to the fact that their king was busying himself in affairs across the Pyrenees had not an event occurred in Germany which also touched the closest interest of Spaniards.

That event was the religious revolt of Martin Luther and the beginning of the Protestant Reformation. Following his coronation Charles had summoned his first imperial diet to meet at Worms in the spring of 1521 and at that memorable meeting he had called Luther before the assemblage of the great ones of the Empire and had denounced the Saxon monk's attack on the Church. Hating heresy and hating still more anything which savored of rebellion against constituted authority, Charles outlawed the entire reform movement and made it clear that he should exert his whole strength to defend the fabric of the old Roman Catholic faith. . . . This religious element put a final touch on the process of imperial and international education of the Spanish people, especially the portion of the population in the interior of Spain which had lacked the Catalonian and Aragonese experience in expansion, trade, and foreign dominion in the past. From this time Spaniards became Continentally minded and imperially minded, accepting the idea that it was their national destiny to hold an empire and to play a large part in the European affairs of which they had for centuries been distant and aloof spectators.

The dawning of interest in the imperial opportunities opening before their king and the Spaniards' belated acceptance of the situation came at about the time Charles returned to the Peninsula in 1522; in the meantime his authority had been threatened by revolt. The bad impression the young monarch and his foreign train had made upon his Spanish subjects was intensified by the manner of his departure and by his dealings with the Castilian cortes at Santiago and Corunna. . . . The discontent in Castile soon flared up in a rising against the king's regent and the movement, starting in the towns and

at first enlisting support from all classes, rapidly became a revolution of dangerous proportions. From the practice of proclaiming a commune or *Comunidad* to govern the cities from which the rebels expelled the royal officers, the revolt has been called the *Comunero* movement. After a promising start the old class separatism weakened the solidarity of the *Comuneros* by causing the withdrawal of most of the nobles, and the delay of the leaders and the conservative fears that the revolt would go too far in the direction of democracy combined to defeat the revolution. Its two years of activity came to an end in 1521 and left the royal power stronger than it had been before. . . .

Internal and Economic Affairs. In handling internal affairs in his Iberian kingdoms Charles carried the unification of the separate parts somewhat further than his grandparents but he did not bring about a complete or definitive union of the kingdoms. For one thing he did represent a personal union hitherto absent, for he united in his person the titles of all the Iberian states but Portugal. But the force of the past was too strong to bring about an extinction of separate institutions; Charles wisely refrained from trying too much, and his government was a "de-centralized despotism" like that of the Catholic kings. Like them he utilized the councils as effective instruments for absolute administration and even carried their development further, adding new groups and regulating conciliar powers. . . .

Economically the reign of Charles V started the Spains on the way to a decline which Spaniards heroically staved off but which overtook the nation in the next century. Ironically enough that reign saw the streams of bullion from the New World pouring into Iberia in the 1540s and 1550s, so that the world at large looked upon the fortunate Peninsula as Hesperides in very truth. Yet in spite of the treasure from Mexican and Peruvian mines Spain was pinched and badly off materially. Buying most of her food supply and her manufactured goods from outside and exporting chiefly soldiers and priests, the precious metals tended to flow across the Pyrenees. The great source of economic distress, however, lay in the responsibilities and necessities of her Hapsburg sovereign. Charles was forced to find huge sums of money to carry on the great undertakings of governing his widespread territories and of fighting wars in every corner of western Europe and the Mediterranean. Spain alone of all his lands could supply a great sum; the emperor had no means of extracting money from Germany or Italy, and throughout his reign and that of his son, Spain furnished the monarch with the lion's share of the money and men he employed in war and diplomacy. This expenditure was too heavy a burden for regions only recently arrived at the status of a European power, especially for regions so largely made up of uncommercial and non-industrial population

as the inland Iberian districts. Charles aggravated the situation by measures to produce immediate revenue which were unsound economically. But the backbone of the difficulty was that the Spanish realms had to shoulder expenditures too heavy for them, burdens they bore willingly enough since they saw that much of the emperor's effort was going to crush the Lutheran heresy and the might of Islam on the sea and in North Africa. . . . The economic weakness of the kingdoms at the end of Charles's reign, however, was not apparent to contemporaries, and the impression of boundless wealth in Spanish hands persisted for generations as a universal belief.

Foreign Affairs. The external problems of the Hapsburg king of the Spains were of the utmost complexity and variety. Purely from the Spanish side his foreign relations were bound to be complicated and grave, for the empire he had inherited from Ferdinand and Isabella in the Old World involved rivalry with France and participation in general Continental diplomacy. In addition to these Spanish interests Charles must encounter opposition and even greater international activity arising from the interests of his paternal inheritance, the Burgundian-Hapsburg empire. The third great division of Charles's imperial possessions, the lands in the New World, belonged by itself and in that monarch's time remained rather outside the current of Continental European politics; it did not affect seriously international problems until the period of the next Spanish king, Philip II. External European affairs had engaged the attention of Charles V before he had set foot in the Iberian Peninsula and all through his eventful career they were always pressing and always demanding a large share of his effort. France from the start was an enemy; there were many reasons for this hostility. Politically, the quarrel of Louis XI and Charles the Bold of Burgundy, the latter the great-grandfather of Charles V, continued in the Valois desire to add Franche Comté to the French royal domain and in Charles's wish to recover the duchy of Burgundy which Charles the Bold had lost to the French king. In Italy the Hapsburg suzerainty over the duchy of Milan clashed with the ambitions of Francis I of France to hold that trans-Alpine duchy. The triumphs of Ferdinand the Catholic in gaining the kingdom of Naples, the kingdom of Navarre, and the counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon bequeathed to Charles another cause of dispute with his neighbor, since Francis I might hope to reverse the defeats his predecessors had suffered in those regions by taking them from Charles. Geography came into play when Charles gained the crowns of Spain because he then held lands on two sides of France, the Netherlands to the northeast and east, and Spain to the south. Then in 1519 this "encirclement" of France became aggravated by Charles's election to the imperial dignity, for then France was caught between

two fires in earnest. That was the reason that war between Hapsburg and Valois became inevitable as soon as Charles had come into all his political and territorial inheritance. The safety of the French dynasty of the Valois was threatened by the preponderance of the Hapsburg holdings; as a result family or dynastic wars on an international scale appeared in European history to remain the leading factor in international relations for generations to come.

In addition to France, Charles V had two other constant and inveterate enemies, the Protestants in the Holy Roman Empire and the Turks in the Mediterranean basin and in the Danube valley. Against these three foes the emperor labored to build up alliances, to concentrate diplomatic and military strength, and to carry on warfare, and around these struggles the history of Europe in the first half of the sixteenth century turned. At the outset Charles had the support of Henry VIII of England, of several of the Italian princes, and of the pope; he had the advantage of the veteran Spanish army, which the Great Captain, Gonsalvo de Cordova, had organized and led victoriously in Ferdinand's Italian wars. From 1521 until his abdication in 1556 Charles fought and concluded four wars with France and began a fifth which he left in progress, wars which are known as "Hapsburg-Valois Wars" from the dynasties involved. Although the emperor started the duel with so heavily predominant power that he appeared certain to defeat his French rival and dismember the French kingdom, he was forced at the end of the fourth war (by the Peace of Crespy, 1544) to be content with a draw, with neither side securing any territorial gain. The wars were marked by Charles's victory at Pavia in 1525 in which his army not only crushed the French but actually took the French King Francis a prisoner, by the sack of Rome by the Imperialist-Spanish army in 1527 which made the pope a captive in the hands of Charles's forces, and by the emergence of the international principle of the Balance of Power. For it was the fear that Charles's success would make him so overwhelmingly powerful that he would menace the safety of all other European states which led England to withdraw from alliance with the Emperor and which made states trust their security to the doctrine of balanced strength against too great a concentration of power in the hands of any one state. The Balance of Power principle did not emerge as a clearly appreciated maxim at this time but the germ of it came out of this situation.

Another consequence of the emperor's French wars was the extension of Spanish domination in Italy. Following the lead of Ferdinand the Catholic in gaining Naples, Charles secured the duchy of Milan as the fruit of his victory over Francis I at Pavia. Thus firmly established in key positions in the northern

and southern ends of the peninsula, Spanish influence extended during the reign over Florence, Siena, Savoy, Genoa, and several smaller principalities. . . .

Because of her experience with the Moslem at home and her centuries of the Reconquest Spain felt an interest in the condition of North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. Her maritime commerce to the eastward had for long been subject to piratical raids by Moorish corsairs⁸ who found good hiding-places in the rocky Barbary coast from Morocco to Tunis. Spanish interests in the Moslem region across the water to the southward had also been increased by the offensive launched under the initiative of Cardinal Ximenes, in the preceding reign, which had yielded the conquest of several fortified ports. The presence in North Africa of Moors driven out of Castile and the Aragonese realms concerned Spaniards, since those exiles stirred their co-religionists to plundering attacks on Spanish coasts and shipping. Another stimulus to activity against Islam came from the rise to importance of the Ottoman Turks who had in 1453 driven out the eastern defender of Europe and planted their expanding power at Constantinople to menace the Christian west. The Turkish Empire under its greatest Sultan, Suleiman (II) the Magnificent, was a threat to Europe in two quarters; overland the Turks had begun to march up the Danube to attack the Hapsburg lands from the east, and by sea they were advancing through the Levant and challenging Christian sea-power. Besides these factors peculiarly influencing his Spanish subjects to desire war on the infidel, Charles was concerned in his capacity as head of the Hapsburg house and as Holy Roman Emperor to block the invasion of Austrian lands and the blow at Europe from the east. For him too the Turkish problem was complicated by the fact that his Valois enemy had allied with Suleiman after Pavia. . . .

With the approval and encouragement of the Spanish realms, Charles waged intermittent warfare against Turks and Barbary pirates. Part of the struggle lay in the Danube Valley and was straight land warfare, in which the emperor generally stood on the defensive as in the repulse of Suleiman's siege of Vienna in 1529. But the greater part of the conflict lay on the sea and the North African coast. These naval wars ran steadily throughout the reign and marked an apogee in the development of galley-fighting. As a whole the wars with the infidel saw no permanent gains for Christian arms and as far as Spain was concerned they brought a loss of influence and control in North Africa. They did, however, create Spanish naval power in the Mediterranean

⁸ The word *corsair* means a summer campaign and indicates the characteristic raiding of commerce by the North African pirates during good weather.

and establish a Spanish naval tradition based on the use of the galley, the typical fighting-ship of that tideless sea since classic antiquity. . . .

Charles's Abdication. For all the unprecedented magnitude of his Empire in both hemispheres, Charles V had known rather the cares of high place and its responsibilities than any joy in power. . . . On January 16, 1556, after having previously bestowed his Burgundian lands upon his son Philip, Charles formally made over to his heir all the Spanish dominions in the Old and the New Worlds. To the Spains the eventful reign of their first Hapsburg king had brought an increase of lands and greatness beyond the wildest dream of romance or fancy. Yet that expansion to imperial greatness and that rise to political domination in the old field of European politics came at high cost to the Iberian realms. For they were suddenly jerked up to that pinnacle without time to build the necessary foundation and without having developed the resources to support so vast an undertaking as the maintenance of the Spanish Empire Charles had established. Finally, there is to be noted in addition to the internal factors just mentioned, the fear and the hostility of rival states which felt their safety threatened by the might of the Spains of Charles V.

PHILIP II—THE EMPIRE, THE FAITH, AND SEA-POWER

Philip's Inheritance and Character. To any well-informed observer of European politics in 1556 it must have seemed that the mighty Spanish Hapsburg power of Philip II was a thing of permanence and unshakeable solidity. The new king of the Spains, the master of the lion's share of the far-flung imperial possessions of Charles V, headed an imposing array of dynastic lands. It is true that the events of the closing years of his father's reign, particularly the failure of the emperor's policy in Germany, had necessitated the division of the holdings Charles had possessed in the east. Charles V had been unable to secure support from the territorial princes of the Holy Roman Empire for Philip as imperial heir-apparent, and had been compelled to pass the inheritance of the Hapsburg lands to Ferdinand, his brother and regent in the Empire. For all his Hapsburg ancestry, Philip showed the effects of the Hispanicization his father had undergone and was as Spanish as a Castilian grandee. From this circumstance of his appearing an alien to the Germans arose their opposition to him, a curious reversal of the situation prevailing in Spain on Charles's succession to the Catholic kings and a parallel to it as well.

Yet although Charles had been forced to split his vast dominions in Europe, he had bequeathed no inconsiderable heritage to his beloved Spanish son.

Partly to compensate Philip for the loss of the Empire and the Austrian patrimony of his house, and partly to continue the strategical concentration against the dynastic enemy France, the emperor gave to Philip the old Burgundian domains of the Low Countries, Luxemburg and Franche Comté, and the duchy of Milan, which Charles had gained outright during his reign. These territories had never before had any Spanish connection and they were now united directly with the lands of the Catholic kings: the realms of the Spains, the Italian kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, Cerdagne and Roussillon, and the *presidios* in North Africa. Moreover, as king of Castile, Philip II inherited the great colonial empire of the Indies. . . .

International rivalries of the period of Charles V had been dynastic in character; the Council of Trent and the Counter-Reformation (or Catholic Reformation) brought the religious element more strongly to the fore, and by a close union of religion and politics transformed European affairs. At the same time colonial and economic factors, growing out of the overseas expansion of Portugal and Castile, became decisively active in the international situation. Because of the developments of his father's reign, Philip II was heavily involved in the international conflict dynastically and imperially, and because of his intensely religious temperament he was deeply drawn into the worldwide struggle as champion of the old faith and church.

In the mid-sixteenth century the personal qualities of monarchs counted heavily in the history of the world; the national states centered about their absolute sovereigns with a completeness unknown to the earlier feudally limited kings or to the later rulers bound by powerful nobility or powerful parliament. A striking example of the influence of the character of a king upon the fortunes of his country is furnished by the Spanish Empire under Philip II. . . . His character shows as a dominating trait an unswerving and very high sense of duty. This made him toil unsparingly to serve the state he controlled and to carry forward the cause of God on earth as it seemed so plainly manifested to him. Without conspicuous brilliance he nevertheless possessed a shrewd mind, capacity for concentration and hard work, and a tenacity and conscientiousness far above the average. Modest, cautious, patient, simple and unostentatious in his living, gentle with his intimates and loved by them, devoted to Spain and ceaseless in his endeavors to promote Spanish interests, he was perfectly suited to make a successful local ruler and to complete the internal unification of Iberia. But the circumstances of his birth and of his time forced Philip to be a prominent actor on a wider stage than the Peninsula and his own nature and his inheritance made his conduct of larger affairs decisive for the future and disastrous to the Spanish Empire.

It was the element of religion, strengthened by the religious training and conceptions of Philip, which proved of so great consequence in world history. . . . He opposed the papal authority and he manipulated secular politics like the most cynical of Renaissance statesmen, yet in everything he was motivated by the fixed idea that he was acting solely for the faith. For the same end Philip freely poured out Spanish treasure and military strength, continued to drain Spain and the Indies of money, and like his father kept up the exhaustion of the economic capabilities of his empire. Yet for all their distress the Spaniards, in whom the crafty policy of Ferdinand and Isabella had inspired a mighty religious exaltation, gladly bore the burdens of supporting their king's championship of Roman Christianity in its royal Spanish form. National pride also prompted Philip's subjects to aid his projects. Unlike his father, who was immersed in cosmopolitan activities, Philip directed his widespread affairs from Iberia and made Spain the center and source of his policies.

Relations with France. At the time Charles V abdicated the Iberian crowns, Philip II found himself with a general European war on his hands. This was the fifth Hapsburg-Valois war, produced by the usual clash of interests between Henry II of France and the emperor and by the violent hatred of the Hapsburgs entertained by Pope Paul IV, a member of the Neapolitan family of Caraffa who had long opposed Spanish ascendancy in Italy. In 1559 an end came to the war in the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. This treaty was another epoch-making settlement. . . . The peace was designed to enable Philip and Henry II to cooperate in repressing Protestantism and the friendship between the two countries was sealed by the marriage of the French princess Elizabeth de Valois to the Spanish king as his third wife. For Spain the treaty promised to end the French practice of aiding Protestants in Hapsburg dominions and it cleared the way for Philip to devote his strength to the cause of the faith. For France the treaty marked the redirection of French policy toward the north and east, toward the desired realization of the "natural frontiers," and away from Italy where for over sixty years French kings had dissipated their resources in chimerical ventures.

Amidst universal rejoicing in France over Cateau-Cambrésis, Henry II was accidentally killed in a tournament celebrating the treaty; in the removal of that strong monarch Philip found an opportunity to advance his inspired cause and the interests of Spain. In succession to Henry three of his sons reigned, but since they were weak and incompetent the actual power lay in the hands of Henry's widow, Catherine de' Medici, a stout, goggle-eyed daughter of the great Florentine house. Many difficulties beset Catherine, the jealous opposition of the strong border family of the Guise from Lorraine,

the turbulence of the other nobles which found an outlet in the devastating civil and religious wars from 1561 to 1593, and the question of the treatment of Huguenots. Philip took advantage of the weakness of Catherine's position to press on his mother-in-law a vigorous policy against the Protestants in France, but although a Catholic, the queen-mother was essentially interested in keeping the crown for her sons and in gaining political strength rather than in forcing religious uniformity upon France.

At the outset Catherine de' Medici had to defer to Philip because she needed his support; the massacre of Protestants on St. Bartholomew's Eve (1572) took place with royal connivance. Later she encouraged French Huguenots to encroach upon the Spanish Empire in Florida and in Brazil, gave aid to Philip's rebellious Dutch subjects, and provided a fleet for the Portuguese pretender. Disappointed in his hopes of exerting a controlling influence in the French kingdom, Philip was able to retaliate by aiding heavily the Catholic League formed by the duke of Guise in 1576. This organization of the Catholic extremists opposed the Huguenots at the other end of the religious scale and the larger party of moderates between the two extremes. In the war of factions resulting in France, a nationalist issue cut across the religious, for the extreme parties were calling on foreigners for help, the League on Catholic Spain and the Huguenots on Protestant England. The friend of the ultra-Catholic faction was the old national enemy Spain, considered with good reason the chief menace to France. It was this element of nationalism which gave the contemptible Henry III a following and made the middle party formidable. When in 1588 Henry III had his rival the duke of Guise assassinated, only to fall himself a victim to the dagger the following year, the last Valois in the direct line was dead and Philip came forward as a candidate for the French throne in the right of his deceased wife, Elizabeth de Valois, or of their daughter the Infanta Isabella. Against him was the claim of the head of the Protestant party, Henry of Navarre, as a collateral relative of the Valois kings. For Philip the situation in France was of the gravest importance; the political desirability of expanding Spanish control across the Pyrenees is obvious and to his religious ardor it was unbearable that a heretic should wear the French crown. Four years of warfare saw the national principle ascendant over the religious in the minds of Frenchmen and saw general defeats for the forces of the Prudent King in the field. Finally, in 1593, Henry of Navarre, now Henry IV of France, accepted the Catholic faith with the cynical comment, "Paris is worth a mass," thus gaining the recognition of all his subjects. When five years later Henry issued the Edict of Nantes giving toleration to Protestants in France, Philip's ambitions and policy in France culminated in total defeat. At the end of

Philip's reign all possibility of Spanish ascendancy over France had gone and with the extension of tolerance to Huguenots failure had come to the dearest aim of the King of the Spains.

Revolt of the Netherlands. Another serious problem on the Continent was the revolt in the Netherlands which broke out about ten years after Charles V had turned over those provinces to his son. The rising in the Low Countries was international in its implications, involving France and England and giving them an opportunity to play off their hostility to Philip by aiding the Dutch rebels. France was concerned because of the proximity of the provinces, because the Protestant Netherlanders in the north were Calvinist in doctrine and so in close touch with French Huguenots, and because it was an effective way for the Valois to strike back at Philip's interference in France by covertly helping the Dutch. For England there were many reasons for interest in the struggle. There had been since the Middle Ages a close economic connection between wool-growing England and the wool-manufacturing towns of the Low Countries. There was the factor increasingly appreciated by the government of Elizabeth, that the safety of England depends on the country across the narrow seas being held by a friendly or a weak power. This conception of the Netherlands as Britain's first line of defense was clearly marked as soon as the ruler of the Spanish Empire, to which the Burgundian lands belonged, entertained designs on the island. It was conversely the importance of the geographical relationship which had caused Charles to plan the marriage of his cousin Mary Tudor to Philip II (concluded in 1554). For the emperor, in his desire to bestow the Low Countries upon his son, hoped to secure the flank of the long line of sea-communication to Spain by renewed alliance with England, and Charles realized how difficult Philip's control of the Netherlands would be without the friendship of the island kingdom. But the fear of foreign domination caused Mary's councillors to draft the marriage settlement in such a way that Philip possessed no hold on England when Mary died childless in 1558.

From the standpoint of Spain's interests the emperor's bequest of his Burgundian lands to Philip's Spanish Empire seemed contemporaneously advantageous, but from our distance in time, and to our after-the-fact perspective, it was unfortunate. Spain had paid heavily for the magnitude of Charles's burdens; the splitting of the Hapsburg dominions in Europe bade fair to relieve Spain of the crushing weight of impoverishing responsibilities beyond her strength to support. The same costly burden, however, was perpetuated in linking the Netherlands up to the rest of Philip's lands. The Low Countries had never had customs, traditions, or political experience in common with

Iberia. They regarded Charles as one of themselves since he had been born in Ghent and reared among the Flemings, but his son was completely an alien. The wealthy and self-sufficient cities with their independent and autonomy-loving burghers hated such Spanish things as the Inquisition and autocratic government, and they feared that Philip would force a foreign, centralized system upon them. Consequently the Low Countries were certain to revolt against the rigid religious and political domination of Philip.

In 1565 the king's efforts to stamp out the Calvinist heresy which had spread into the southern Burgundian towns from the neighboring industrial towns of France precipitated a general resistance which was national rather than religious, as is indicated by the appearance of Catholics as well as Protestants in opposition to the Spanish Inquisition and to Spanish absolutism. The leader of the rebellion, William the Silent, Prince of Orange, was one of many Catholic nobles who came into the struggle to resist Philip's encroachments on the old cherished institutions of the provinces. The rebellion continued throughout the remaining forty-three years of Philip's reign, always a heavy drain on Spain's resources and a liability in international politics for the Spanish Empire. Under the successive governorships of Philip's sister Margaret of Parma, of the duke of Alva, of Luis de Requesens, of Don John of Austria, and of Alexander of Parma, every shade of treatment from repressive frightfulness to attempted leniency failed to end the revolt or to produce a general *modus vivendi*. The utmost Philip was able to salvage from the turmoil and bitterness of the rebellion was a separation of the ten southern provinces, predominantly Catholic in religion, from the seven northern Protestant provinces; the Catholic districts remained under Spanish control, while the northern group, the United Provinces, became the Dutch Republic, whose legal independence was recognized in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. From this religious separation of the Low Countries has come the present division between the states of Belgium (Catholic) and Holland (Protestant). So violent and lengthy a struggle demanded of Spain tremendous effort and sacrifice, a ruinous drain in a cause destined to fail and for an object widely removed from the welfare of the Spanish Empire.

Mediterranean Naval Power. Among the problems in foreign affairs handed on from Charles V, Philip found the war against the infidel a constant and troublesome concern. Even though the Prudent King did not have to defend the Danube valley directly, he encountered many of the difficulties of the late emperor in repelling corsair and Turk in the Mediterranean. . . . The treacherous seizure of the island of Cyprus from Venice by the Turks in 1570 awoke the west once more to the Moslem menace and the efforts of

Pope Pius V succeeded in creating another Holy League. This was one of the few genuinely holy leagues of the many bearing that name during the sixteenth century and was made up of the Pope, Spain, Venice, the Knights at Malta, and some of the Italian maritime cities, notably Genoa. Philip made the largest contribution to the force of the League and his illegitimate half-brother Don John of Austria headed the Christian armada. A great naval concentration, after the usual delays, sought out the Ottoman fleet and won a resounding victory off Lepanto at the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth on October 7, 1571. So great was the renown of this victory that all Europe rejoiced at the notion that the might of Islam on the water had at least been broken and the belief has persisted to our time that Lepanto broke the Turkish naval power for good and all. This is too sweeping a verdict; the fleet of the League followed precedent by separating after the victory, failed to follow it up by pursuing the fugitive galleys or striking more mortal blows at Ottoman ports, and did not free the seas from Moslem piratical activity. It did achieve a partial success, it restored Christian morale and confidence, it rebounded hugely to the credit of Spain, but it was the line of weak Sultans and the growing decadence of Ottoman administration which weakened the Turkish navy rather than the battle. Amid the universal acclaim in Europe, Lepanto raised the maritime prestige of Philip's Empire and made Spain the pre-eminent naval power of the Mediterranean. . . .

Rivalry and War with England. From the standpoint of his continental interests Philip's relations with England were vital all through his reign. His marriage to Mary Tudor had failed to yield the expected political advantage and when, upon Mary's death in 1558, her half-sister Elizabeth succeeded to the throne, Philip tried to perpetuate the English alliance by proposing himself as a suitor for the young queen's hand. She refused the offer and, since the circumstances of her birth practically compelled her to be a Protestant, there were religious as well as personal reasons for hostility between the two countries. In addition, a strong political cause for enmity lay in the rebellion of the Low Countries. Appreciating the danger of Philip's using the Netherlands as a base for any operations against England, Elizabeth winked at the seizure by her subjects of treasure and supply ships destined for the duke of Alva in Flanders, urged other rulers to help the Dutch keep on with their revolt, and adroitly led her Valois suitors to aid William of Orange. All this Elizabeth did while officially and ostensibly at peace with Philip, for she had sound reasons for fearing war until she had strengthened her precarious hold on the English crown and she wisely saw that only by letting the

foreign situation develop without seeming to force it, could she rally all shades of opinion in England to support her.

On his side too, Philip was reluctant to engage in war with England. In the early years, thanks to Elizabeth's diplomacy, he had hopes of regaining the old alliance; he always had a host of other problems on his hands and he had a strong legalistic reason for keeping peace with the heretic queen. Legally the Catholic Mary Queen of Scots (Mary Stuart) had a strong claim to the English throne, but she was a niece of the duke of Guise and the widow of the short-lived Valois, Francis II, who had reigned in France from 1559-60. . . . This element in the political situation helped restrain Philip from war during years of English depredations on his ships and on the coasts of his empire. Finally, in 1587, Elizabeth reluctantly executed Mary Stuart, who had been driven out of her kingdom of Scotland to take refuge in England some years before, and who had served as a center of plots against Elizabeth. Then at last the way was clear for Philip to move against the heretical and piratical English and to defend both the faith and Spain's Empire by crushing the rising power of England on the water. . . .

Alongside the grievances occasioned by the European situation, the rivalry between England and the Spanish Empire had brought conflict and injury on the sea and in Philip's colonies. Both France and England resented their exclusion from the rich colonial field Spain had monopolized in the New World and found it hard to resist the temptation to seize Spanish ships and plunder the wealth of the Indies. A color of legality came from letters of marque issued by such enemies of Spain as France, during time of war, and the rebellious Low Countries. Religion played a part too, for Huguenots, Dutch, and Englishmen could assert that their Protestantism justified them in robbing the great persecutor of their sects. Some of the privateers were undoubtedly sincere in their religious incentive, but many were far more concerned with the acquisition of booty than with vengeance for the severities of the Inquisition. Also the line between a privateer's semi-legal attack on a foe and a pirate's lawless plundering was slender and not easy to fix in the sixteenth century. For example, the Beggars of the Sea, the naval contingents from the Low-Country ports who were effective in harassing the Spanish forces, were so greedy for spoil that they became the terror of friend and foe alike. . . .

By the spring of 1587 it was known that the king of Spain was preparing his ships to attack England. . . . In his meticulous way the king drew up a detailed plan for his fleet. It was to sail up the Channel, drive off the enemy

squadron covering the Flemish coast, and convoy the army of the duke of Parma, which was to be in readiness on the shore, across to the conquest of England. Elizabeth's weak army was no match for Parma's veteran *tercios* of the splendid Spanish infantry. The account of the defeat of the Invincible Armada at the hands of the swift-sailing, hard-hitting English fleet [in 1588] . . . it is too well known to need repetition here. In that action it is to be observed that there was a conflict between opposing naval theories, significant for the future. The Spanish style of large ship, with its towering structures forward and aft and its few, rather weak guns, was designed for close fighting by running alongside an enemy, boarding and using its force of soldiers in an infantry combat on the decks. The English great-ship was "race-built," that is, she had flush decks and was less cumbersome and more easily handled in the wind; the ordnance was heavier, of longer range, and more numerous than aboard the Spanish galleons, enabling gunnery to decide battles. Hence in the running combats up the Channel, the more unwieldy and weaker-gunned Spaniards were at the mercy of the English with their better seamanship and greater weight of metal. . . .

The End of Philip's Reign. On all sides things were going badly for Philip. His wars in France and the Low Countries as well as on the sea were swinging against him and the financial drain had brought impoverishment to his kingdoms and had forced him to mortgage the ordinary revenue and the expected treasure from the Indies for three years in advance. Worn out by thirty-five years of unremitting toil, suffering physical anguish, but patient and uncomplaining in the face of accumulating disasters, confident that he had fought the good fight and had labored well in God's cause, Philip II passed to his reward in September, 1598. Hardly suspected at the time, the Spanish Empire was actually near the brink of material ruin as a result of his policy. The world was still dazzled by the glory and the fabulous vastness of the empire and could not see that the seeds of its decay were already sprouting within the glittering structure. What contemporaries could appreciate, however, was that the naval war had destroyed the overwhelming preponderance of Iberia on the water. Spanish ships still sailed the oceans but they were never again to dominate the sea as they had or to guarantee the unquestioned monopoly of the Spanish colonial system. England, during the years Philip had ruled, had won a position of naval might which advanced her commerce and placed her on the way to colonial expansion. The launching of the modern era in sea-power was further shown by the beginnings, at the end of Philip's reign, of the maritime career of the Dutch, who were to contest the newly won strength of England. Technically the period had seen important developments

of sailing craft and of naval tactics, a few of which have been indicated, and these developments were to bring naval science definitely out of the Middle Ages and into ways which have not entirely disappeared today. Finally, in the picture of Alexander of Parma, helpless on the Flemish shore with an army of incomparable Spanish infantry which was far superior to Elizabeth's land forces, we have a shining example of the rôle sea-power was to play in the coming age.

In concluding this survey it is well to remark how marvellously rapid the rise of the Spanish Empire had been and how significant for the future the history of the Empire and the attacks upon it were to prove to be. In an incredibly short time the small, disunited kingdoms of Iberia had produced the fabulous oversea possessions of Portugal and Castile. Under Charles V the Spains had become the center of preponderant world power, acquired more suddenly than their resources could well warrant. In the reign of Philip II that Empire, increased by the annexation of Portugal, stood as the embodiment of the old ways and the old forces of European civilization. Religious uniformity, political absolutism, aristocratic domination of society, economic monopoly, in short the old privileges and the old traditionalism of medieval Europe, found their vigorous champion in the Prudent King. He staked the existence and the full strength of the Spanish Empire in the struggle to maintain those elements against the rising forces of individualism, the tide of the new age. The expansion of Europe into new worlds had created new conditions and had provided the opportunity for new commercial classes and interests, whose advance not even Philip could stay or retard.

Chapter V

EARLY MODERN CAPITALISM AND THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE



CAPITALISTS AND THE NEW SPIRIT

MANY PEOPLE talk about capitalism, but nobody seems to know exactly what it is. Indeed, the concept has grown so big that most authors, when they try to define it, seem merely to be listing the outstanding characteristics of modern economic life. It is clear, however, that a fully developed capitalism existed in 1914 in most of the Western world and had existed there for the previous century or so. Similarly, it is clear that there was little or no capitalism in the early Middle Ages. A sensible way to define capitalism, therefore, would be to say that it is the economic system which dominated most of the world in the early twentieth century and which had come into being since the twelfth century.

To talk intelligently about capitalism and its development, however, we must have a somewhat more definite notion as to its chief characteristics, which are many. True capitalism can exist only when there is a wide market and a money economy. It implies private ownership of the means of production and exchange. It seems to tend toward large-scale operations, toward rational and accurate methods of doing business, combined with planning for the future, toward competition, and toward a society in which wealth gives power and in which most people work directly or indirectly for the wealthy and powerful. All these features of capitalism are important and must be discussed. But for the sake of simplicity we can focus our attention, in describing the rise of capitalism, on three main features: (1) the growth of the capitalist spirit—that is, the desire for profits as a dominating motive in life; (2) the accumulation of capital—that is, the heaping up of money¹ which is

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¹ Capital to the economist means essentially actual goods such as machines, factories, railroads,

then used in business for the purpose of making profits (more money); (3) the development of capitalist techniques—that is, methods by which capital can be built up, handled, transferred, and used in business so as to make profits. From this point of view, capitalism is a system in which the desire for profits is the driving motive and in which large accumulations of capital are employed to make profits by various elaborate and often indirect methods.

It is evident that the early Middle Ages were not capitalistic. In the twelfth century, for example, the desire for profits was not the most powerful or even an important motive in men's lives. There were no large accumulations of capital. Capital was not generally used in any fashion to make profits. . . . Between 1100 and 1500 the situation changed so much that capitalism can be said to have been born in those four centuries. . . .

Even in the thirteenth century, usury was common and profit seeking was winked at. Dante assigned the moneylenders of Cahors a special place in hell, but a pope gave them the title of "peculiar sons of the Church." Church councils and popes thundered against usury and greed, but Pope Nicholas III threatened to excommunicate Archbishop Peckham of England if he did not pay the usurious interest he owed certain Italian bankers. A medieval writer commenting on Dante's poem said cynically of usury, "He who takes it goes to hell; he who does not goes to the workhouse."

In the world of business between 1300 and 1500, many ways were evolved by which a loan at interest could be made to look like something else—a sale, a lease, an exchange transaction, a partnership. High profits might be immoral, but it seems that many a medieval merchant sought them with the utmost avidity. In the realm of ideas, the same period saw a weakening of the moral stand of the earlier day. Teachers, preachers, and writers began to justify usury and profits, from a dozen different angles. It was early held that if the lender suffered a loss by lending he might charge interest as compensation. Before long some people were maintaining that if by lending money a man missed a chance to make profits, it was proper to take interest. Gradually the very word *usury* took on its modern meaning of excessive charges for loans, while *interest* or some other pleasing word was used for moderate charges. The same gradual weakening took place in regard to the doctrine of the just price. By the fifteenth century a churchman so holy that he was later made a saint

raw materials. The businessman, however, thinks of capital as sums of money or of goods or securities marketable for a definite sum of money. Historically, as capitalism grew, capital was usually first gathered together in the form of money and then used in trade or industry or finance. Down to early modern times, say 1700 or 1800, it is not a serious mistake to think of accumulations of capital as accumulations of money.

(Saint Antoninus, 1389-1459) was arguing that it was sometimes permissible for a seller to charge as much as 50 per cent more than the fixed price.

The development can be summed up briefly. In the centuries following the twelfth, with the rise of commerce and business, there grew up a class of merchants, traders, and financiers who sought profits and in many cases took usury as a normal part of their business life. As they became more and more important and as the Church, itself wealthy, became involved in the financial and business mechanisms of the times, the ideas of the Church and the public slowly readjusted themselves toward the acceptance of the capitalist spirit. The process was not complete by 1500, since more than a century later usury was still being denounced by churchmen, rulers, and publicists; but by the end of the Middle Ages the change was well under way.

One way of tracing the rise of the capitalist spirit is to focus our attention on those who possessed it. In the eleventh century most people were busy fighting, praying, or working in the fields, as they should have been according to medieval ideas. But some were engaged in the trade or industry of the towns that were just beginning to grow, and already a small class of moneylenders had come into existence. These moneylenders were mainly Jews. On the one hand, the Jews, because of their religion, were excluded from landholding and most of the normal medieval pursuits. On the other hand, the prohibitions against usury issued by the Church could mean nothing to them since they were not Christians. The Jewish moneylenders were providing mainly consumption credit; that is, they were financing needy peasants, workmen, and nobles. They charged high rates of interest and demanded good security in the shape of jewels or farm equipment. Their business was not unlike that of a modern pawnbroker.²

By the twelfth century the Jewish moneylenders were doing business in the medieval towns on a larger scale. Occasionally they advanced money to a merchant to use in his business. At the time, such loans were not distinguished from the older type, but actually they were a new and important thing—business credit. Before the end of the century, Christian businessmen from the growing Italian towns were engaging in moneylending. Many of them came from the small towns of northern Italy (or Lombardy) like Asti and Chieri and they were known collectively as Lombards. Other Christian moneylenders came from the south of France and were called Cahorsins after the town of Cahors. These various moneylenders did not stay in their native towns but moved to new cities, gradually working into northern Europe as opportunities developed there, especially in the thirteenth century. Many a city still has a Lombard Street to testify to their activity. By the end of that century, Italians

were opening loan offices called *tables de prêt* in Flanders. The right to open a loan office in a Flemish town was first granted in 1280, but by 1300 they were common. Such offices continued in existence in Flanders till the mid-fifteenth century.

By the thirteenth century more elaborate transactions than those of a mere pawnbroking type were going on. Money-changers were engaging in money-lending and vice versa. Loans were being made at the fairs in connection with business. Moneylenders and money-changers were beginning to accept deposits; that is, they were agreeing to accept money and hold it for its owner. Sometimes they merely kept the money safe. Gradually it became customary for them to loan out the money they held, keeping only enough on hand to pay a small portion of the depositors at once. This kind of financial activity is called deposit banking. It was very primitive at first, but it rapidly grew more complicated and more important. When it was well organized the banker could afford to attract more deposits by paying the depositor interest—say 5 per cent or even 10 per cent since he himself was lending out the money at 10 per cent to 30 per cent or more.

Some of the deposit banking was carried on by groups not originally organized for business purposes. The Templars, for example, were an order of knights founded to assist in the Crusades. They grew wealthy from the gifts of the pious and acquired tremendous landed estates, castles, fortified palaces in the towns, and large stocks of money. As early as 1182 and 1188 Henry II of England was depositing funds with the Templars. During the thirteenth century they were active in finance, accepting deposits, collecting and transferring funds, loaning money. Their activity, in fact, was brought to a close only in 1307-12 when the French king, anxious to seize their wealth, suppressed their order on trumped-up charges with the aid of the pope and other rulers.

During the thirteenth century a new kind of banking was built up by a series of Italian firms, usually partnerships of the family type. These new bankers were no mere pawnbrokers sitting behind tables and making small loans in the Lombard Street of some European city. They were wealthy financiers who participated in trade and moneylending on a big scale. Such Italian bankers were loaning money to German churchmen at the fairs of Champagne as early as 1213. In 1233 bankers from Siena were acting as financial agents of the papacy. These bankers sought out profit in any line of work that seemed to promise it. They dealt in wheat, spices, cloth, and wine. They financed ships and trading voyages. They transferred money from city to city. They loaned money to needy rulers and ambitious merchants alike.

Two factors that helped the Italian banking firms to become important were the kings and the papacy. The kings of France, England, and Castile were gradually consolidating their territories and slowly organizing them into more unified states. Continually involved in wars, they needed money to pay for troops, supplies, and fortifications, to bribe their enemies, or to keep up a kingly luxury. When they had used up all the income from taxes and feudal dues, they frequently had to resort to borrowing, paying the bankers who could supply the cash they needed handsome rates of interest that ranged from 10 per cent to 40 per cent or more.

The papacy was even more important. It collected taxes, dues, fees, Peter's pence, or the like, from almost every land in Europe. These moneys had to be collected. They had to be sent to Rome or elsewhere. They had to be held till they were needed. Sometimes, despite its wealth, the papacy had to borrow money to meet a temporary need. All the financial machinery thus required was gradually converted into a highly organized working system during the course of the thirteenth century. In this process the Italian bankers played a great part as fiscal agents, collectors, lenders, transmitters, and holders of deposits.

The towns and cities were also active in financial affairs. They borrowed money to build walls, wage wars, make public improvements, or buy grain in famine times. It was in connection with municipal debts and financial transactions that the first public banks of deposit were founded—in Barcelona in 1401, in Valencia in 1407, and in Genoa (Bank of St. George, which carried on deposit banking from 1407 to 1445 and again after 1586). These banks were created and controlled by the cities to facilitate the handling of their debts and money affairs. But many towns with large debts were dependent on private bankers, often the big Italian firms.

Florence by 1250 had eighty important trading and banking firms like the Spini, Spigliati, Bardis, Pulci, and Alfani. Other towns such as Siena, Lucca, and Pistoia boasted dozens of wealthy firms, but Florence became the financial capital of Europe in the fourteenth century. The Florentine firms had branches in other Italian cities and in France, England, Flanders, Germany, and Switzerland, not to mention connections in the Levant and the Mediterranean islands. The importance of the bankers of Florence was further enhanced by the breakup of the order of the Templars in the early part of the century.

The Bardis, one of the most successful of the Florentine houses, may serve as an example. Their prosperity began in 1294 when they began to deal with the king of Naples, who was also count of Provence (in southern France). They lent him money to finance his wars and in return got the exclusive right

to control the exports of grain, fruit, and dairy products from Apulia (southern Italy) and grain from Provence. Later they traded extensively in French textiles and scarlet cloth from Ypres. In 1303 they became one of the firms active in banking for the pope, and in his behalf they transferred funds in Europe, to Cyprus, and even as far as Armenia. They helped to collect Peter's pence in England for the pope, and used the proceeds to buy wool which they sent to Florence to be manufactured into fine cloth. By 1310 the Bardi had surpassed their chief rivals, the Acciaiuoli and Peruzzi. Already in 1300 their interests in northern Europe were so extensive that none of the fifteen partners was residing in Florence. In 1320 the capital of the firm was 149,796 livres of Paris. From 1310 to 1330 its annual profits averaged about 20 per cent. But troubles lay ahead. Joanna of Naples repudiated half the debt owed to the Bardi by her kingdom. English mobs rioted against the foreign usurers. Finally in 1345-46 Edward III of England was unable to pay the huge sums he had borrowed from the Bardi. This catastrophe threw the Bardi into bankruptcy and they paid their creditors only "forty-eight cents on the dollar." It was probably little comfort to them that the Peruzzi was involved in the same crisis and likewise went bankrupt.

A number of firms survived the crash of the mid-fourteenth century, but the financial leadership in Florence in the fifteenth century went to a relatively new family, the Medici, whose coat of arms (red balls on a gold field) gave rise to the modern pawnbroker's sign. In the early fifteenth century, the Medici banking firm had branches in Paris, London, Bruges, Lyons, Venice, Rome, Genoa, Naples, and eight other cities as well as the home office in Florence. Mixing politics with finance, the Medici made themselves actual rulers of the city-state of Florence. They used their great fortune for diplomatic as well as business ends, and also beautified Florence with churches, paintings, and sculpture. Cosimo de' Medici (1389-1464) spent more than \$10,000,000 (1940 dollars) on such patronage of art and religion. At the time of his death, the income of his family was more than \$3,000,000 a year. The most famous of the Medici, Lorenzo the Magnificent, ruled Florence in splendor from 1469 to 1492. Though the political power of the family waned after the end of the Middle Ages, they remained important. They gave the Church a number of cardinals and two popes, and France two queens (Catherine and Marie). Branches of the family were princes and dukes down into the eighteenth century.

The influence of the Italian bankers permeated all Europe. Two of them, Biccio and Musciatto, dominated the finances of France in the reign of Philip the Fair (1285-1314). But some countries were able to produce resplendent

native capitalists. Perhaps the most startling of these was Jacques Coeur (c. 1395–1456) of France. The son of a rich merchant, he was, by 1432, active in the trade with the Levant. He traveled as far as Damascus dealing in gallnuts, carpets, brocades, silk, goat hair, and other wares. Establishing himself in Montpellier, he added financial activity to commercial, and organized the French trade with the Near East to compete effectively with the Italian cities. In 1436 the king, Charles VII, summoned him to court and put him in charge of the recoinage of the French money. Growing in royal favor, Coeur was made a noble in 1441 and president of the High Court of Languedoc three years later.

In 1445 Coeur's agents negotiated a treaty with the ruler of Egypt and opened up a new and profitable trade for France. In 1447–48 Coeur was French ambassador to the pope. He financed the successful French effort to drive the English out of Normandy in 1448–50. By that time he was the richest private citizen France had ever seen. He had business houses in every important French city, a large number of ships, and three hundred factors and agents. He owned houses and real estate in dozens of French cities, the most famous being a veritable palace, the Hôtel de Jacques Coeur at Bourges. He had built chapels, rebuilt churches, and founded colleges (at Paris, Montpellier, and Bourges). Carrying on an enormous trade in arms, cloth, fur, spices, and jewels, chief financial agent of the crown, he still had time to look after his family interests. His brother had become bishop of Luçon, his son archbishop of Bourges; a brother-in-law was secretary to the king, and the viscount of Bourges was his son-in-law. As the biggest banker in the country he was owed money not only by the king but by most of the royal family and a great number of the courtiers. People said, with some exaggeration, that there was no business deal in France from which Jacques did not take the profits.

Coeur's very wealth and power proved his undoing. He had become too strong. In 1451 he fell from royal favor and was accused of a variety of crimes—poisoning the king's mistress, sending French gold to infidels, kidnapping sailors for his galleys, and sending Christian slaves back to the Turks—which were either trumped-up charges or part of his ordinary commercial activities. He was fined a tremendous sum and condemned to prison. He escaped to Italy in 1455 and died the following year. After his death, some of his wealth was restored to his sons.

The dazzling career of a Jacques Coeur should not lead us to ignore the fact that the rise of capitalism was based on the work of hundreds of shrewd merchants and bankers operating in various fashions all over Europe. An-

other success story will illustrate a different kind of activity. Francesco di Marco Datini was born in Prato (Italy) in 1335. Left an orphan by the plague at the age of thirteen, he became the shopboy of a merchant of Florence. After a fight with his guardian, he sought his fortune abroad and was settled in Avignon, the papal city in France, by 1354. Within a dozen years he had built up there a successful business which was based on the sale of arms and armor but was connected also with other types of trade. In the 1380's he left the Avignon business to partners and opened a branch in Pisa and another, engaged mainly in banking, in Florence. Founding a trading company in Genoa (1392), he went on to open branches in Barcelona and Valencia (1393) and in Majorca (1395). By this time he was chiefly interested in the trade in goods between Italy and the Levant and Spain. Rich, a friend of nobles and bishops, he died in 1402, leaving his fortune to charity.

An important point to notice in connection with most of these early capitalists is the combination of commercial and financial activities, of trade and banking. The type of capitalism which was growing up in Europe in the Middle Ages and was well established by 1500 was predominantly of this sort. There were examples of purely financial capitalism in the early Jewish or Lombard moneylenders, and there were rich merchants who did little banking and much trade. But as wealth accumulated and the capitalist's desire for profits grew, it was normal for a firm to use its money in the way that seemed to promise the quickest, surest, and largest return, whether that involved investing in shipping, loaning money to merchants, churchmen, and rulers, or dealing directly in goods. For the most part the production of goods was still carried on in a small way, on the basis of handicraft work.

INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

There were certain sections of Europe, however, where even industry came to be organized along capitalist lines. This was especially true in the cloth and metal industries of Flanders and in the textile industry of Florence and northern Italy, which were producing on a large scale for export markets. Here the so-called domestic or putting-out system was in full swing by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Under the *putting-out system*, a wealthy merchant (the capitalist) buys the raw material, pays a variety of laborers to work it up into a finished product at home or in shops, and sells the finished product. The characteristics that distinguished it from the ordinary handicraft system were that it was done on a large scale by hired labor, that the worker did not own the materials on which he worked and frequently not even his tools, and that one man controlled the whole process from start to finish. The

Arte della Lana or cloth manufacturers' guild of Florence in the fourteenth century may serve as an example of the putting-out system. Its members bought wool abroad, brought it to Florence, had it made into finished cloth by carders, spinners, weavers, fullers, and dyers to whom they paid wages, and sent the product abroad for sale. The domestic system in the centers where it was practiced created a large body of poverty-stricken workers dependent for a living on the wages they could earn. But such a state of affairs was exceptional in the Middle Ages. Even in Florence or Bruges or Ghent, industrial capitalism was never highly developed in the modern sense. There was nothing truly comparable to the factory system of the nineteenth century. Predominantly, medieval capitalism was commercial and financial.

Few aspects of medieval life were untouched by the rise of trade and finance with their increasingly capitalistic tone. It was the growth of markets and the increased use of money that enabled the serfs to free themselves and substitute money payments for labor dues, and permitted the landlord to lease his land for money instead of superintending the farming himself and taking his return in agricultural products. Similarly the new developments, by making possible the collection of taxes in money, allowed first the cities and then the states to strengthen their governmental machines and increase their control, while the facilities for borrowing money enabled greedy rulers to wage wars and extend their territories.

The growth of commerce led to improvements in shipping and navigation that were to pave the way for the great era of exploration. The compass, for example, originating perhaps in China, was known in the Mediterranean by the twelfth century. The magnetic needle was put on a pivot instead of being floated in water or oil in the thirteenth century, and the improved instrument was in general use by the early fifteenth century. Likewise the astrolabe (invented in the East and perfected by the Arabs), by which a navigator can determine how far north or south he is of a given point, was widely used on shipboard by the fifteenth century. Charts and maps, which were at first closely guarded as professional secrets, were being improved steadily, and fairly good ones were not uncommon by the same period. The development of the rudder and new techniques for rigging and handling sails made it possible for ships to tack against the wind.

The increase in trade led likewise to an enlarged demand for goods, and thereby to technical improvements in modes of production. The methods of making steel, pottery, and glass and of smelting iron were gradually made more efficient during the Middle Ages. Alloys like pewter and bronze were

improved. The power of windmills and water mills, at first employed largely for grinding grain, was adapted to a number of different uses. For example, the fulling of cloth was done originally by trampling with bare feet on a mixture of fuller's earth, water, and cloth in a trough. By the fourteenth century the water mill had begun to replace man power in this process and was being used also for pulping rags for paper, for polishing armor, for sawing wood, for beating hides, and for spinning silk. Before the end of the Middle Ages, water power was being used also for crushing ore and for pumping out mines. The windmill was introduced as early as the twelfth century and was in fairly common use by the fourteenth; but it reached its highest development only in Holland of the seventeenth century.

The inventions that were to change the character of medieval life were not, however, in the field of power. These truly disruptive inventions were gunpowder, paper, and printing. The origin of gunpowder is obscure. By some its invention has been traced to China and by others to Roger Bacon (1214-94). At any rate, the explosive nature of a mixture of saltpeter, charcoal, and sulphur was known by about 1300, and primitive cannon or "firepots" were in use in the early fourteenth century. The handgun was not developed as a usable weapon before the middle of the fifteenth century. The effects of the introduction of cannon were manifold. They decreased the value and importance of the heavily armed knight, the stone castle, and personal bravery. They created a demand for the production and working of iron and bronze. They strengthened the hands of the wealthy rulers of national states, who alone could afford large trains of artillery. They necessitated new types of fortifications that required skilled military engineers for both the defense and the offense. They increased the cost and the deadliness of wars; they changed entirely the tactics of naval warfare. By the end of the fifteenth century, when both cannon and small arms were in common use, gunpowder had profoundly altered the military, governmental, and industrial aspects of medieval civilization.

Paper was a more peaceful but no less revolutionary invention. Paper was made in China before the beginning of the Christian era. The Arabs were using it by the ninth century, and it was being manufactured by the Moors in Spain by the twelfth. The making of paper from the pulp of linen rags was established in Italy and France by the thirteenth century, and in Germany by the fourteenth. Between 1350 and 1400 the use of paper became widespread, and during the fifteenth century it gradually superseded parchment for most uses. Paper was so much cheaper than parchment that it permitted the keep-

ing of records and accounts; it encouraged the reproduction of books; it promoted the spread of education; and it made possible the introduction of printing.

The invention of printing is one of the most cosmopolitan in history. Half of the world had a part in it:

China invented paper and first experimented with block printing and movable type of metal. . . . Korea first printed with type of metal, cast from a mould. India furnished the language and religion of the earliest block prints. People of Turkish race were among the most important agents in carrying block printing across Asia, and the earliest extant type are in a Turkish tongue. Persia and Egypt are two lands of the Near East where block printing is known to have been done before it began in Europe. . . . France and Italy were the first countries in Christendom to manufacture paper. As for block printing, and its advent into Europe, Russia's claim to have been the channel rests on the oldest authority, though Italy's claim is equally strong. Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands were the earliest centers of the block printing art. Holland and France as well as Germany, claim to have experimented with typography. Germany perfected the invention, and from Germany it spread to all the world. (T. F. Carter.)

The printing press using movable type seems to have been perfected by Gutenberg at Mainz in the 1440's. The invention spread like wildfire. Before 1500 there were thousands of presses in Germany, France, Italy, and England. In these early days books were printed so beautifully that collectors still bid frantically for them at auctions. Unhampered at first by guild restrictions, free of taxes, lending itself to large-scale production, printing grew from infancy to lusty youth in less than half a century. By 1500 there was a printing establishment at Nurnberg with twenty-four presses and a hundred workers. The flood of books that poured from the early presses made available to the public the works of classic Greece and Rome, religious books, treatises on alchemy, politics, and warfare, and poetry and prose in the vulgar tongues. Almost at once, the printing business was seized upon as a field for capitalist enterprise, and the Aldi of Venice and the Plantins of Antwerp became true printer princes.

Who bought the flood of books that poured from the new presses? Churchmen, nobles, kings, and courtiers purchased their share, but the most important market was to be found in the rising middle class of the cities. Wealthy from trade, finance, and occasionally industry, the bourgeoisie were beginning to chafe a little under the caste system of the Middle Ages that made them vulgar shopkeepers and set store only by the noble and the ecclesiastic. There were two levers by which the bourgeois could raise themselves—riches and education. Riches were already coming to them from the increasingly capital-

istic enterprises of the later Middle Ages. Books and schools would give them the power of knowledge. They bought books and sent their sons to school. Some sought to graduate to the upper classes, and shocked the nobles by buying estates, titles, and offices, and by wearing gaudy clothes. But for the most part the middle class stuck to business, growing rich and strong and educated. The next era was to see it beginning to grasp for power.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERN PERIOD

. . . The new factors that began to play a role in the sixteenth century were not all economic, by any means, though most of them had important economic implications and connections. The rise of the national states, for example, was to a large degree a political phenomenon. In the Middle Ages the kings of France, England, Spain, and Portugal had gradually transformed their feudal leadership into royal dominance. They had used the bourgeoisie of the rising cities as allies against the strong feudal lords. They had consolidated their holdings and rounded out their territories, so that by 1500 each of these countries was truly a national state ruled over by a king possessed of considerable authority. Though this process was and continued to be mainly political, it had enormous repercussions in the economic sphere. The new states, by taxing, by borrowing money for wars, by taking the lead in exploration and colonization, by adopting national economic policies, profoundly influenced the rise of capitalism, the course of international trade, and even the development of industry. The very methods employed by the kings to extend and strengthen their political control were used for purposes of economic regulation as well.

The history of the Reformation is similar. It was a widespread and deep-rooted movement springing from social, religious, and intellectual changes. But its course was influenced by economic factors—the rise of prices and the development of a money economy, the lust for the wealth of the Church on the part of German princelings and an English king, and the dislike of the various peoples for a system which drained off much of their money to Rome. It has been argued, too, that it was the Reformation which broke the shackles that the Church had placed on economic life, stimulated the rise of economic individualism, and made possible the rise of capitalism.

The causes of the changes in population are obscure, to say the least, and before 1800 the figures are estimates and guesses rather than accurate statistics. It is nevertheless clear that the population of Europe was growing in the sixteenth century. The best guess for the population of western Europe (the British Isles, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Den-

mark, Norway, and Sweden) in 1300 is about 53,000,000. The same area seems to have had a population of about 70,000,000 in 1600. From 1300 to 1450, what with the Black Death, other plagues, and the Hundred Years War, there is reason to believe that the total population increased but little. The increase of 17,000,000 therefore took place largely in the period 1450-1600.

This growth of population may have been due to improvements in diet, sanitation, and social custom. It may also have been influenced by the breakdown of medieval conditions. As long as a serf's only chance of livelihood was a place in the village system of agriculture, he might have to wait long years before he could afford to get married. Similarly the craftsman, who had to undergo a long apprenticeship and then seek admission to the guild before he could set up a shop and a home, often married late. By 1500 the rigidity of rural life was breaking down. Certain alternatives were open to the young peasant. He could rent land, or work as a laborer for hire, or go to a town for employment. The young artisan of 1500 had much less chance of becoming a guild master than his predecessor two hundred years before. He was much more likely to become a hired laborer for life. It is probable that the movement away from medieval conditions, where the serf could hand on to his son only a single plot, and the craftsman his one shop, led gradually in the period after 1450 or 1500 to a tendency toward earlier marriages and thus to an increase in population. In any case, the growth of population, creating as it did new markets for goods, new labor for agriculture and industry, and people ready to emigrate overseas, was an important economic fact.

So far we have discussed factors in the sixteenth century which were only partly economic. Expansion overseas was likewise a many-sided movement, though its implications were so tremendous that it looms large in every phase of economic life. It was caused in part by economic considerations—the search for new trade routes, for overseas markets, and for sources of supplies; the desire for gold and silver; the wish to enslave or exploit backward peoples. But it was caused, too, by population pressure, religious dissent, restlessness, the quest for adventure, zeal to convert natives, and national ambitions. Professor W. R. Shepherd summed up all the motives for expansion neatly as "Gospel, Glory, and Gold." . . . It can be pointed out further that the effects of the expansion permeated every phase of European life—artistic, military, literary, political, philosophical, scientific, and religious. Yet of them all the economic effects were the most overwhelming. It is sometimes argued that, had there been no discoveries, the economic development of Europe, working out trends already apparent in the Middle Ages, would have been in the long run much the same as it was. Such guesses are merely idle speculation. The discoveries

were made; new lands were opened up; the Europeanization of the world began; and Europe itself was gradually transformed.

It is probable that the main influence of the expansion was to intensify certain trends and, in strengthening them, to ensure their triumph, which had been by no means certain before. Capitalism, stimulated by the growth of trade, the new goods, the influx of precious metals, and the new economic horizons, came rather rapidly to dominate commerce and to extend its influence over agriculture and industry. The rise of national states was accelerated since they lay in the areas from which the new commerce could be carried on. The attention of these nations was turned more and more to economic matters as the rivalry for trade and colonies became more intense. Aside from certain intercity conflicts in Italy, it is hard to find a war fought for predominantly economic motives before the seventeenth century; but beginning with the Anglo-Dutch and Franco-Dutch wars such motivation was almost the rule.

The combination of circumstances involved in the rise of national states and capitalism and the expansion overseas led to the development by the new nations of the economic policies, theories, and practices which have come to be called mercantilism. It is a hazy term but it covers the efforts of the various countries to make themselves powerful, wealthy, and united. It led to tariff wars and colonial struggles, industrial regulations and big navies, bounties on early marriages and the foundation of great trading companies. Perhaps most important of all, it convinced people that it was as proper and natural for the national state to be active in the economic sphere as it had been for the medieval cities to regulate their markets.

Interlocked with expansion and mercantilism were the factors involved in the development of capitalism. The Middle Ages had seen the accumulation of some stocks of money and the creation of techniques by which money could be loaned, transferred, and used in commerce and to a lesser degree in industry. Capitalism had made headway by 1500 and was to be found flourishing in certain urban centers like Venice, Augsburg, and Antwerp. But its progress might have been slow and painful, the twentieth century might have been still only semicapitalistic, had it not been for the tremendous stimulus given to it by expansion overseas. Three coins jingled in 1600 for every one that had existed a century earlier, and probably the number of businessmen and the size of their dealings grew almost as fast. Assisted in many ways by mercantilist policies and by the increasing power and activity of the national states, capitalism grew toward maturity in the two centuries after 1500.

Capitalism moved least rapidly in the domain of agriculture. English agri-

culture was not predominantly capitalistic before 1800, and French agriculture is only so in some senses to this day. But agriculture was changing in the early modern period as the increase in markets, the new demands for raw materials, the rising prices, and the slowly improving techniques outmoded medieval ways. New forms of land tenure, the increased use of money, growing dependence on city industries, had so changed European agriculture by the end of the early modern period that the persistence of serfdom in central and eastern Europe seemed to many like a strange survival from remote time.

In industry, too, the old ways were changing though the revolution was not to occur till the nineteenth century. The handicraft shop was still the dominant form of industrial production at the end of this early modern era. But wind and water power were more widely used. Machines, often of wood, had been developed for many operations. New and improved processes had been adopted for mining and the extraction of metals from ores. Transportation by road, canal, and ship had been improved. There were signs that some day the findings of science would be put to the service of industry. . . .

OVERSEAS EXPANSION

The expansion of Europe which began in the fifteenth century was a two-way process. On the one hand, Europe exported to the other continents populations, ideas, languages, institutions, and ways of doing things; on the other, it imported from the overseas areas goods and ideas which profoundly modified its own civilization. Both phases of the process are important, though the former has been studied much more than the latter. The outward movement was more spectacular, with its voyages of discovery, its fights against native peoples, its missionary heroism, its foundation of permanent colonies. But the inward movement, though slower and so subtle that contemporaries often failed to perceive it, altered the course of European civilization for good or ill.

The Crusades may be considered as an earlier expansion movement which began at the end of the eleventh century and lasted long enough to be linked with the Portuguese and Spanish explorations. Though superficially religious in nature, the crusades had economic bases and results. They opened up trade with the Levant. They brought Europeans into contact with new peoples, new luxuries, new ways of life; but they focused attention on the Mediterranean world, known since antiquity. They made the Mediterranean more than ever the center of European trade and played their part in the commercial rise of the Italian cities. Partly as a result of the Crusades, European attention was turned eastward and a number of monks and merchants in

the thirteenth century journeyed to the Orient and brought back stories of wealth, great cities, and strange folk. In the fourteenth century, the Mohammedans conquered western Asia and made it impossible for traders of other faiths to go to the East overland. Contact with the Orient was preserved only through the trade routes, over which Arab merchants brought spices, drugs, dyes, and perfumes by way of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, or the Black Sea. Meanwhile the rise of Turkish power was expelling Christians from the Near East and by the fifteenth century was threatening Constantinople itself. The Turks did not shut off trade between Europe and the Orient in the fifteenth century, for they profited too much from the flow of commerce through their lands; but they did block off any large-scale expansion eastward from the Mediterranean world.

The immediate motives for the explorations of the fifteenth century seem to have been twofold. One was to find new trade routes to the East so as to break the Venetian monopoly of the spice trade. Venice by 1450 had outstripped rivals like Genoa. By a variety of arrangements in the Near East, it controlled most of the oriental goods that were worked through to the Mediterranean. It was to Venice that western Europe had to come for its spices, incense, drugs, and luxury fabrics. Venice profited greatly from this monopoly, and other lands resented Venetian dominance and eyed Venetian gains jealously. Even after the Turkish conquest of Constantinople (1453) Venice continued to control the spice trade. The other motive links back to the Crusades. The growing power of the Mohammedans was a threat to Europe. Their ships harried Mediterranean commerce. Christian slaves toiled in every Moslem stronghold. If ships could go direct from Europe to the East they might not only get oriental goods without the intervention of Venice, but they might also attack the Moslem power in the rear—especially if they could make contact with the legendary Christian kingdom of Prester John, which was supposed to lie somewhere in the East. It was not entirely by chance that the Spaniards finished their age-old crusade against the Moors in Spain by the capture of Granada in the same year that Columbus sailed west. Nor was it chance that the man who inspired the Portuguese explorations, Prince Henry the Navigator, had won his spurs fighting in doughty fashion against great odds at the taking of Ceuta (1415) in one of the many belated crusades against the Moors of North Africa. Both the Spaniards and the Portuguese who played the leading role in the explorations were men hardened by long warfare against the Moslems and zealous in their loyalty to the Catholic faith.

In the fifteenth century the use of the compass, the astrolabe, and maps

progressed fast enough to permit ocean voyages out of sight of land with some hope of return. Much of the progress was due to the work of Prince Henry himself, who had better maps made and better tables of the position of the heavenly bodies worked out. But much of the sailing was by rule of thumb, and landmarks like mountains and capes were very important to pilots. Shipbuilding had also advanced, though some of the Portuguese voyages down the coast of Africa were made in *barcas* of only about twenty-five tons, with a single mast, a square sail, and a crew of fourteen men. By 1440 the Portuguese had evolved the *caravel*, a ship of fifty tons and up, sixty-five to one hundred feet long, twenty to twenty-six feet in width, equipped with three (later four) masts for lateen sails, and with a castle at the stern. These caravels sailed best before the wind, and part of the Portuguese technique was to learn routes that would give favorable winds for a whole journey; but they could sail also with side winds. For the stormy voyage around Africa the caravels were too low in the water and lacking in strength. Vasco da Gama used a true ocean-going vessel developed before the end of the fifteenth century. This was the *nau* (the *galleon* was much like it) of from 400 to 1,000 tons, with castles at bow and stern. A later development was the clumsy *carrack* with seven or eight decks and able to hold two thousand persons. Many Portuguese ships bore great red crosses on their sails and voyaged under such names as the Holy Cross, Our Lady, Saint Anthony, or Queen of Angels. . . .

Europe's knowledge of the world grew with almost incredible rapidity. The main impulse still came from Portugal, but now with the aid of the Portuguese example and Portuguese trained navigators other nations on the Atlantic coast joined in. . . . The net results of these voyages were tremendous. In 1487 Europeans knew Europe, the shores of the Mediterranean, most of the west coast of Africa, and Iceland. They had some knowledge of the north-east coast of Africa, of the overland routes to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, India, and China, and of the Malay Peninsula and the Spice Islands. By 1523 Europeans knew in addition almost all the east coast of the two Americas, the interior of Mexico, the West Indies, the whole coast of Africa, Madagascar, the coasts and islands of Asia from Arabia to China, the Philippines, the extent of the Pacific, and the south end of the west coast of South America. The sea routes for reaching both the Americas and the East were all well established. The horizon of Europe had been lifted as if a curtain had been raised, and Europeans could look out into a world that was larger and stranger than anyone had dreamed.

The Spanish shared with the Portuguese this work of exploration and discovery. The Portuguese did more in the East, the Spanish in the West. The

motives that caused the Spanish crown to finance Columbus were much the same as those which sent the Portuguese around the Cape of Good Hope—the desire to break the Venetian monopoly and to find a new sea route to the Indies. Indeed, Columbus and his Spanish backers were bitterly disappointed when it gradually dawned on them that he had reached the eastern shores, not of Asia but of a new land mass that stretched nearly from pole to pole. It was not until the New World proved itself rich in gold and silver that the Spanish came to realize the value of their discoveries.

The rivalry between the Portuguese and the Spanish in the new overseas areas was somewhat allayed by papal pronouncements and diplomatic negotiations. The Portuguese had long been trying to protect their monopoly of the discoveries south of Cape Bojador. Now the Spanish sought aid from the pope in monopolizing the lands found by Columbus. In a series of bulls (papal edicts) in 1493, Pope Alexander VI (a Spaniard by birth) granted to Spain the exclusive right to exploit discoveries to the West. Dissatisfied with the papal decrees, the Portuguese negotiated directly with the Spanish and at length reached an agreement in the treaty of Tordesillas (June 7, 1494). This treaty set up a line 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. To the east of the line the Portuguese were to have a monopoly of trade and settlement. To the west of it, the monopoly was to be Spanish. The line could not be determined in the existing state of geographical knowledge, and both sides violated the terms of the treaty. But in a general way it did mark off the spheres of the two powers. To Portugal went Brazil, the African coasts, and the East Indies; to Spain the Americas (except Brazil). After the voyage of Magellan the Spanish laid claim to the Philippines and Moluccas. But the Portuguese bought off the Spanish rights in the Moluccas by paying Charles V 350,000 gold ducats under the treaty of Saragossa (1529). The treaties and papal bulls dividing the world bolstered the claims of Portugal and Spain to exclusive rights in the overseas areas, and it was not until the seventeenth century that their monopolies were successfully challenged. . . .

In the seventeenth century the English, French, and Dutch took the lead in exploration, trade, and colonization. By 1640 the French had made settlements in Canada and were gradually opening up the interior, while the English were doing the same in New England and Virginia, and the Dutch in New York. All three nations were busy colonizing unoccupied islands in the West Indies, and in 1630–54 the Dutch came close to success in their effort to seize Brazil. The English and Dutch had shattered the Portuguese monopoly in the East Indies, while traders and pirates of the three countries were impairing the Spanish monopoly in America.

In the sixteenth century, however, the fruits of the discoveries went almost exclusively to the Portuguese and Spanish. At first it seemed as if the former had won the richer prize. Their first problem in the East was to oust the Arab traders who had hitherto carried the spices from the Indies to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and who had trading colonies strung down the east coast of Africa. These Arab merchants had the support of the Turks and of the Venetians who had profited from the old spice trade. But the Portuguese had bigger and better ships and cannon, and daring seamen to whom fighting Arab merchants seemed a religious as well as a commercial duty. Furthermore, the Portuguese were playing for great stakes. They were prepared to risk scurvy, shipwreck, and warfare to gain control of the spice trade. . . .

COMMERCIAL EFFECTS OF EXPANSION

It must not be supposed that the news of the discoveries or their effects burst on Europe suddenly. There were probably people in France or Germany who had not heard of the Americas a score of years after Columbus sailed westward. Nevertheless the expansion movement had repercussions that slowly changed the whole economic scene.

In the fifteenth century, just as the preliminary discoveries were being made, northern Italy in general and Venice in particular had been enjoying a period of great prosperity. The Mediterranean was still the focus of European trade, the hub around which European life revolved. It is true that the cities of southern Germany, such as Augsburg and Nürnberg, were beginning to grow lusty, that Antwerp was becoming an important trade center, that all northern Europe was feeling a quickening of economic life as the early capitalism evolved in the Middle Ages took hold of the urban centers. But without the impulse from outside, it seems likely that the evolution that was under way would have been extremely slow and sluggish.

As it was, this evolution, the trend northward of business activity, was immeasurably hastened. The Venetian monopoly of the spice trade, the most highly prized commerce of Europe, was shaken within six years of Da Gama's voyage. It was shattered when the Portuguese victory at Diu gave them control of the eastern seaways. The Flanders galleys sent out yearly by Venice, which somehow symbolized the dependence of northern Europe on the Mediterranean, made their last voyage in 1532. The conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks (1517) seems to have made it more difficult for the Venetians to get spices over the old routes, but in any event the new route was cheaper. In 1521, anxious to get back in some way its old hold on the spice trade, the Republic of Venice offered to buy all the spices brought west each year by

Portugal. The offer was refused. For a century Lisbon, not Venice, was to be the entrepôt for the commerce in spices. In 1503 alone, the Portuguese secured 1,300 tons of pepper in the East. Venice did not collapse like a punctured balloon. It had trade and manufactures that were still important. It had stored up wealth and capital—fat on which it could live. Four times between 1499 and 1716 Venice had strength to go to war with the Turks, but each time it emerged shorn of some of its holdings in the Near East.

The decadence of Venice was paralleled in other Mediterranean lands. Italian cities like Genoa, French cities like Marseilles, Spanish cities like Barcelona, loomed less and less large on the economic horizon as the years progressed. This decline was probably not absolute. It is quite possible that Mediterranean commerce in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, despite the growth of piracy, was larger than it had been in the fifteenth. It certainly was larger in the eighteenth century. But meanwhile other areas had forged ahead and come to the forefront. In comparison with Atlantic ports, those of the Mediterranean were stagnant. The Mediterranean from the central position in Europe trade sank till it was almost a backwater. In part the change was caused by political factors. The new, strong, national states threw their weight behind their merchants and pushed their trade by force of arms. Lusty young countries like France and Spain made Italy their battleground. Living on past glories Italy, by the eighteenth century, was merely a place to which young English gentlemen went when they made a Continental tour.

The major factor in the decline of the Mediterranean area was the shift in commerce occasioned by the discoveries. In the Middle Ages the open Atlantic had been an awesome ocean into which mariners scarce dared to venture. The expansion overseas made it the high road to the Americas, the African coast, and the East. The improved ships designed for ocean voyaging could brave all but the very worst storms. New types of ships were developed for the coasting trade, and commerce between the western European countries increased rapidly. For example, ships from Flanders, France, and England flocked to the harbor of Lisbon, bringing goods and money to exchange for spices.

It happened, whether by accident or by an entangled interrelationship of causes, that the new national states which had been slowly developing—Spain, Portugal, France, England (and later Holland)—all had good harbors on the Atlantic coast. They had governments strong enough and rich enough to push the explorations and develop the colonies. The very fact that they had not played a major role in medieval commerce made them all the more eager to seize the new opportunities and all the more ready to venture in untried ways.

Moreover, in the era that was dawning, the state was to play an active role in commerce. A city which was not part of a big national state could scarcely hope to compete in naval rivalry, in tariff wars, in the struggle for markets.

The same circumstances which led to the decay of the Mediterranean cities after 1500 reacted unfavorably against those on or near the shores of the Baltic, especially the towns of the old Hanseatic League. The Baltic had been an area of trade second only to the Mediterranean. Now it too was left behind. The German towns suffered when spices ceased to come north over the Alps from Venice. They lost ground as the growing power and organization of Russia and Poland cut down their commercial opportunities. It was an added blow from nature when the herring, the basis of the Baltic fisheries, ceased, in the early sixteenth century, to go to that sea to spawn. The long war which ravaged Germany for thirty years (1618-48) merely completed an economic decline that had long been under way.

The growth of commerce in the western lands more than offset the stagnation or decline in Mediterranean and Baltic. The harbor at Lisbon was crowded with ships—stately naus of the East India trade, vessels bound to or from Brazil, and boats from a dozen different ports that had come thither bringing foodstuffs or other goods and seeking spices. The seaport at Cadiz and the river port of Seville became thriving centers of shipping. Merchants from many lands flocked there, eager to profit in one way or another from the stream of silver that flowed thither. Bordeaux, Saint-Malo, Nantes, Calais, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, Bristol, and most of the other Atlantic ports large enough for the new ocean-going vessels quickened with life and activity. Trade grew not only in the interchange of overseas products but also in the exchange of European staples. The new herring fisheries of the North Sea prospered, together with the cod fisheries of the Newfoundland banks.

With the shift and the growth of trade came changes in the types of commerce as well. In the sixteenth century the two most important streams of trade were the flow of spices from the East and of bullion from the West. But gradually new overseas products became staples of consumption in Europe and grew in commercial importance. Indigo from the East gave Europe a beautiful new blue vegetable dye far superior to the old home-grown woad. China and porcelain from Asia made the old earthenware seem clumsy. Cocoa introduced from America in the sixteenth century, and tea and coffee from the Far and Near East in the early seventeenth, were three new beverages destined to change the habits and social life of Europeans. Cotton, long imported from the eastern Mediterranean, gradually became an important article of trade in the form of textiles from India, and in a raw state from the Americas,

while dyewoods from Brazil, Central America, and the East and cochineal from American insects were employed to color European fabrics. Sugar, first from the Portuguese islands and then from Brazil and the West Indies, became slowly a common foodstuff in Europe. Silks and precious stones from the East made possible new heights of luxury in dress. Tobacco, despite all opposition, won its way into popular esteem. Consumed in pipes or as snuff, it gave Europe new habits and a new object for taxation. North American furs were in great demand by the early seventeenth century, and beaver fur eventually made possible a new kind of felt hat.

In 1640 a well-informed observer would probably have classed spices and bullion as still the most important products of overseas areas coming into Europe, but already the traffic in the other types of goods was growing in significance. Furthermore, as meat improved in quality and the popular taste moved toward less highly flavored foods, the appeal of spices decreased. The imports of bullion from America fell off in a fashion that was already marked by 1620. The ensuing years were to see the trade in such overseas products as tobacco, coffee, tea, sugar, rum, furs, cotton, cotton fabrics, and dyes assume a major role.

The network of trade radiated from Europe but it served also to link the remaining continents. For example, a considerable portion of the bullion from America eventually found its way to India and the East to pay for the spices secured there. More dramatic was the slave trade, which brought Africa into contact with the Americas and gave to the New World from Brazil to Virginia a substantial Negro population. The Portuguese were the most active slavers at first. But before the end of the sixteenth century the English had made a number of slaving voyages, and in later years the Dutch and French played an important part too. It was "a Dutch man-of-war with 20 Negars" that introduced the first African slaves into Virginia in 1619.

The slave trade was usually triangular. A European ship with a cargo of guns, colored cloth, liquor, beads, mirrors, iron bars, knives, and other trade goods went down to the Gulf of Guinea and bartered its cargo to local Negro chiefs who had captives or other slaves to sell. When from a hundred to four hundred slaves had been collected and chained in close confinement below decks the ship sailed westward. So crowded and unsanitary were the slave decks that anywhere from 10 to 30 per cent of the human cargo usually died, and it was said that a slaver could always be recognized by its smell. The slaves were taken to the mainland of North or South America or the West Indian islands and bartered for sugar, tobacco, or gold and silver. Then the ship returned home and disposed of its freight. Despite the risks and the loss

of life among the slaves, the profits of such a voyage were apt to be handsome. The Spaniards did little slaving, but they needed slaves in many of their colonies like Cuba or (present-day) Colombia and Venezuela. Accordingly they made the slave trade a government monopoly and then sold the monopoly to the Portuguese by an agreement or *Asiento*. The Portuguese retained the asiento trade from the late sixteenth century till 1701.

As commercial connections between the various continents were formed, there began an interchange of domestic animals, fruit trees, and vegetable seeds that has continued to the present day and has made many species common in every corner of the world. The interchange between America and Europe began with the voyages of Columbus, who seems to have brought the hot and sweet pepper plants of the New World to Spain on his first voyage. On his second voyage (1493) he stopped at the Canary Islands and from there took orange, lemon, and citron trees to Cuba. To Columbus also is given the credit for introducing the muskmelon (native to India but long grown in Europe) into the West Indies, whence its culture spread so rapidly that by 1535 Indians were growing it as far north as Canada. Peas were likewise brought from Europe to the West Indies.

The list of vegetables, grains, and fruits introduced from the Old World into the Americas by explorers and settlers is a long one. It includes sugar cane, wheat, barley, rye, "English" walnuts, coffee, onions, cabbages, radishes, hops, turnips, carrots, beets, parsnips, lettuce, apples, pears, peaches, apricots, common plums, sweet cherries, and sour cherries. . . .

America's gifts to the Old World were likewise important. New types of strawberry were taken from Chile to Europe and eventually came back to the Americas in improved form. The tomato, native to tropical America, was introduced into Europe in the early sixteenth century. It was grown in England for ornamental purposes in the seventeenth century, and for food in Italy on an extensive scale by 1800. It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that it was much grown for the table in the United States. The potato was introduced from the New World into Spain, whence it traveled to Italy and then by way of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland to France. Legend has it that Drake brought the potato from America to Ireland about 1586. From Ireland it seems to have been taken to New England as the "Irish" potato in the early eighteenth century. Pumpkins and squashes, grown by the Indians of North and South America, were taken to Europe from both continents. String beans were introduced from America into Europe by the mid-sixteenth century. Corn or maize was a major contribution of the New World to the Old. Sweet corn, not mentioned in the records before 1779, was developed

by the Indians of the American Middle West. Cocoa was for long grown only in Central and South America, but eventually it became an important crop in the East Indies and Africa. . . .

The growth of trade between the various continents did more than spread species of plants and animals all over the globe. It introduced European goods and manufactures into even the most distant areas. The development of overseas markets in turn increased existing industries and in some cases created new ones. It stimulated shipbuilding and the production of naval stores. It increased the production of guns, gunpowder, and munitions of all sorts to be used in fighting in distant lands and in the contests for the seaways or to be sold to backward peoples. The output of textiles and dyestuffs grew, as it was found that brightly colored European fabrics could be advantageously disposed of in Africa and the Americas. Mirrors, beads, bottles, hardware, cheap pictures, and a whole collection of gewgaws and cheap tinselly articles were made in ever increasing quantities because they sold well to savages. Distilling of brandy and of rum became more and more important as it was found that strong liquor had an enormous appeal for American Indians and African Negroes alike. The Chinese were ready to buy European eyeglasses and spectacles; so the output of these articles grew apace. Scientific instruments for navigation on the long voyages were made in larger quantities. The refining of sugar and the preparation of tobacco for use were new industries dependent on overseas products, as, indirectly, was the manufacture of pipes for smoking and of snuffboxes. Thus, though the chief growth of business and the main impulse to capitalism from overseas expansion was in commerce and finance, even industry was clearly affected by the new forces.

FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF EXPANSION

Between 1300 and 1450 it seems that the production of gold and silver in Europe was declining somewhat as the old mines were worked out. At the same time, more bullion was finding its way eastward to pay for the spices and luxury goods of the Orient, while the demand for the precious metals for use in coin, plate, and jewelry in Europe was slowly rising. Thus, about the middle of the fifteenth century, Europe was facing a shortage of gold and silver that might, had it continued, have become serious. Between 1450 and 1520 the situation was relieved somewhat by two developments. First, a number of new mines in Germany and Austria were discovered and opened up. They were mainly for silver, like those at Schwatz, Schneeberg, Annaberg, and Joachimsthal, but included the Salzburg gold mines. Second, as the Portuguese pushed down the west coast of Africa and began to trade with the natives,

they secured increasing quantities of gold, which by 1490 were running to substantial sums each year. These increments of treasure were sufficient to stimulate business and even to raise prices, but they were a very minor prelude to the great revolution in money and prices that was caused by the influx of bullion from the New World in the sixteenth century.

In the early voyages to the West Indies the Spaniards, avid for gold, had secured small quantities from the Caribs of the islands. In the ensuing decades Hispaniola (Haiti and Santo Domingo), Cuba, and Puerto Rico contributed substantial amounts of gold secured from the natives or from the working of deposits. Beginning with 1519, the loot of the Aztec Empire flowed to Spain, and in the 1530's came that of the Inca Empire. Far more important was the opening and exploitation of the rich mainland silver mines. Potosí was discovered in 1545, and even before that the exports of silver from the New World had come to outweigh by far those of gold. The amalgam process, in which mercury is used to separate the silver from the ore, came into use about 1576. It increased the output of the American mines greatly, both by making it possible to work lower grade ores, and by increasing the amount of silver recovered. . . .

One important effect of the great increase in the supply of gold and silver in Europe was to speed the change from a barter to a money economy. This change had been going on during the Middle Ages, and by 1500 most business in the cities and towns was carried on by means of money. The influx of precious metals made possible a rapid rise in the amount of coin in circulation and made it easier for villages and rural areas to get a stock of money. The result was that, except for isolated and backward areas, it had become customary by the seventeenth century to buy and sell for money, and to pay rents, wages, and taxes in terms of money.

A more startling effect of the increase of money in circulation was the rise in prices—a rise so rapid and so far-reaching in its influence that it has, with reason, been termed the price revolution. The price rise was felt first in the region of Cadiz and Seville, the points at which the American treasure arrived. It spread rapidly to the rest of Spain and somewhat more slowly to the other countries of Europe. . . . To sum it all up, it seems that starting at 1500 the price of goods in western Europe had doubled or tripled by 1650, that wages tended to lag far behind, and that the peak in various countries came between the end of the sixteenth and the middle of the seventeenth century. Of course prices did not go up every year. Sometimes they stood still or even dropped back. At other times they shot up rapidly. But during the price rise, *on the*

average, the cost of goods increased something like 2 or 3 per cent a year, depending on the country.

During the great price rise, a good many people knew what was going on, but very few realized why it was happening. Writers, politicians, officials, and churchmen in Spain, for example, sought to explain the rise in prices as the result of one or more of the following causes: bad crops, too heavy exports, monopolies and frauds of foreigners, speculation, high taxes, high wages, decrease in population, excessive luxury, debasement of the coinage, laziness and idleness of the workers, manipulation of the markets. In France in 1566 a certain Sieur de Malestroit, a financial official, wrote a book which he called *Paradoxes about Money*. In it, he claimed that although everyone was talking about the rise in prices there really had been no rise. His idea was that it cost the same amount of silver or gold to buy an article, say a piece of velvet, in 1566 as it had two or three hundred years earlier, but that the coins had been so debased that each contained much less gold or silver than formerly; therefore it took more coins to buy velvet, and therefore prices seemed to have risen though they actually had not.

Malestroit's book is chiefly important because a famous French thinker and writer, Jean Bodin (1520-96), wrote an answer to it called a *Reply to the Paradoxes of M. Malestroit* (1568). He admitted that debasement had something to do with the apparent rise in prices, but gave figures to show that the rise was far more than could be accounted for by the changes in the coinage. The chief reason for the increase in prices was, he felt sure, the influx of precious metals from America. Bodin seems to have been the first man clearly and carefully to demonstrate the connection between these two great events. His work laid the main foundations for what is now called the *quantity theory of money*, which holds that, all other things being equal, an increase in the amount of money in circulation will raise prices. The theory has been made much more elaborate in the intervening centuries, and modern economists are careful to take into account such things as the amount of credit and the speed with which money circulates. But there can be little doubt that Bodin was right. It was the flood of American treasure that produced the price revolution in Europe. The quantity theory of money has been shown to hold true in a rough but real way again and again in history, especially in cases of paper money inflation; that is, the issuance of very large quantities of unsecured paper money by a government is almost certain to produce a rise in prices.

The price rise brought about by the influx of American bullion created profound dislocations in the economy of Europe. One of the most important

and obvious was the effect on rents. The landlord who was collecting money dues or rents fixed by custom or long leases found that as prices went up he could buy less and less with his income. This situation put a tremendous pressure on the landlord to break through the old customs and substitute, so far as he could, short-term leases, under which the rent could be raised from time to time, for the old tenures. If the landlord was himself farming the land, he was driven to make it more productive so that his income might go up as fast as prices. This he might do by changing from grain raising to sheep raising, by adopting new and better styles of agriculture, or by enclosing old common fields and cultivating them intensively. In the same way, the leaseholder whose rent was raised by the hard-pressed landlord was squeezed and had to make his land pay better in one way or another. What all this meant to the English yeoman in the sixteenth century is described by Hugh Latimer (c. 1490–1555), an English bishop who suffered at the stake under Mary for his Protestant views. He tells of his father, who rented the land he farmed:

My father was a yeoman, and had no lands of his own; only he had a farm of three or four pounds a year at the uttermost, and hereupon he tilled so much as kept half a dozen men. He had a walks for a hundred sheep, and my mother milked thirty kine. . . . He kept me to school; he married my sisters with five pounds apiece, so that he brought them up in godliness and fear of God. He kept hospitality for his poor neighbors, and some alms he gave to the poor, and all this he did of the same farm, where he that now hath it payeth sixteen pounds by year or more, and is not able to do anything for his prince, for himself, nor for his children, or give a cup to drink to the poor.

If the conditions were such that the landlord could not raise the rents, then he suffered and the tenants, whether they held by custom or by lease, benefited. Such landowners often sank from wealth to poverty in the course of the sixteenth century. Frequently they had to sell their land to the people who were well-off, the rising bourgeoisie of the cities. Thus it was that merchant families could gain the prestige and social position which went with land-owning. In a general way, it may be said that the price rise worked great hardship on the agricultural classes which could not adjust themselves to it, and provided a powerful incentive for the use of new and more productive methods of farming.

Another class that suffered somewhat were the people on fixed salaries, though this class was relatively small. More important were the wage earners. We have seen that wages tended to lag far behind prices in the general rise. Laborers, therefore, got less and less for their wages in the decades after 1500, and by the seventeenth century were frequently in a much worse position

than their grandfathers had been. The high cost of living was a vital factor during these years, and the sufferings it caused were obscured only by the more dramatic events of wars and religious strife.

On the other hand, the price rise benefited some people and proved a powerful stimulus for some types of business. It is obvious that if laborers are getting less real wages, the employers of labor are apt to be getting more for their money. Furthermore, if a manufacturer buys raw materials at one price level, works them up, and sells them some months later at a new and higher price level, he has made an extra profit. Thus the price rise was probably a favorable factor for manufacturers, especially for those who were working on some sort of capitalist basis, such as the putting-out system. In somewhat the same way, in a period of rapidly rising prices, the merchant stands to win, both because he pays his help relatively less and because he is in a position to reap extra profits when the goods he holds advance in value.

In a different way the influx of precious metals also helped the new capitalists. By increasing greatly the amount of coin available, it made it easier to gather large sums of money for business and investment. It made it easier to deal in money and goods. It gave a better basis for the various kinds of credit that were coming more and more into use. The rapid changes in prices that were a part of the rise opened the way for the speculator. For more than a century, the man who bought goods hoping that they would increase in value had the cards stacked in his favor.

By stimulating industry and commerce and aiding the accumulation of capital and the use of credit, the influx of bullion strengthened the middle class and helped it along the road to dominance. At the same time it probably speeded the transfer of economic and financial power from the Mediterranean countries to those on the Atlantic into which the bullion first flowed. It led also to an increased belief in the importance of the precious metals and to efforts on the part of the various nations to secure a large share of the American treasure—efforts which taken together are important in what is called mercantilism. It seems likely, too, that by making it easier to collect taxes in money, and to raise the sums needed for war or administration, the influx of treasure, despite the rise in prices, strengthened the governments of the different countries, though in England it turned out to be Parliament, not the king, that was made stronger in the long run since the old revenues collected by the king were more or less fixed, while new ones had to be voted by Parliament. There can be little doubt that, all in all, the treasure won by theft and extortion, or by exploiting the natives who sweated blindly in the mines of America, exerted a profound influence in the development of Europe.

POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF EXPANSION

It is customary to think of the expansion of Europe in terms of what it did to the rest of the world in the way of taking overseas European products, peoples, languages, religion, and customs; yet the effects of the process on Europe, though less obvious, were just as profound. It was not possible to change Europe from a small, isolated peninsula jutting west from the Asiatic land mass to the center of the world in commerce, wealth, navigation, and political dominion without profoundly affecting the life of European peoples in every respect. The effects of expansion were gradual and often hidden. They were mixed up with all sorts of changes. Europeans were largely unconscious of them. Nevertheless, some of the more important can be detected and described.

The shift in economic power toward the Atlantic seaboard that accompanied the expansion of Europe brought with it a shift in political strength. The great nations after 1500 all had Atlantic ports. Germany and Italy were not again able to play leading roles in the political sphere till the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Spain dominated the sixteenth century, France and Holland the seventeenth, France and England the eighteenth, and England the nineteenth. Each of these nations owed its greatness in some degree to the expansion movement and the changes that movement inaugurated.

In political thought, too, expansion overseas wrought changes. It brought Europeans into contact with peoples who had governments of all sorts and in all stages of development. It made Europe self-conscious about its own ways of doing things. Montaigne (1533-92) drew lessons for his fellow Frenchmen from the customs of Brazilian cannibals. When Thomas More (1478-1535) in his *Utopia* sketched a new social, economic, and political system, he pretended that he was describing a new land that explorers had found south of the equator. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) used the same device in his *New Atlantis* to describe an ideal state shaped and guided by his new philosophy. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) built a whole new theory of government on the idea that life among savages in a "state of nature" is "nasty, brutish, and short," that men form governments to escape such evils, and that these governments must be strong and must be obeyed to prevent a relapse into savagery. International law was shaped, too, by questions that arose during the expansion movement. To whom did new territories belong? How could a state acquire rights over new lands? Could Spain and Portugal close whole oceans to the ships of other nations?

In the same way other fields of thought were affected. Religious thinkers

were made aware of cults vastly different from those of Europe. They were faced with such perplexing problems as whether or not degraded savages had souls. They were roused to missionary zeal by the thought of the millions of primitive and uncivilized people who had never heard the Christian message. The Catholics were far more active in missionary work than the Protestants. Priests of the Jesuit order and others penetrated into darkest Africa, preached in the cities of India, China, and Japan, set up missions for the Indians in the Americas, and faced tortures among the redmen of Canada. They sent back reports of their strange and stirring adventures and roused the home folk, especially in Spain and France, to new zeal and new enthusiasm. Pope Gregory XV in 1622 founded the Congregation of the Propaganda, a committee of cardinals whose duty it was to have charge of missionary works and to administer the affairs of Catholics in non-Catholic countries. Five years later Pope Urban VIII organized the College of the Propaganda to educate missionaries.

Sometimes missionary enthusiasm led to excesses of zeal and even to cruel treatment of native peoples. It was in part religious fervor that led the Spaniards to destroy so much of the Aztec and Inca civilizations. It can be argued, too, that the expansion movement caused a degradation of the moral nature of Europeans who were engaged in the exploitation of backward peoples, the pillaging of alien races, or the infamies of the slave trade.

The field of knowledge most clearly affected by the expansion movement was that of geography. Europe was gradually made aware of the rest of the world. Magellan's voyage demonstrated vividly that the earth must be round. A keen interest in lands and peoples overseas was aroused in the folk back home. To feed that interest, hundreds of books—cosmographies, geographies, travelers' tales, collections of voyages, volumes of letters from abroad—poured from the printing presses and were eagerly read by all classes that could read, and especially by the rising middle class. Some of the books were crude, inaccurate, and often purely imaginary accounts of the wonders of the new-found lands. Others with careful maps, accurate descriptions, and authentic reports added bit by bit to the knowledge of the world, its peoples, its plants, and its animals.

From the many who contributed to this knowledge a few may be selected as examples. Gerardus Mercator (1512-94) worked out the best maps of the world and the best globes that had been made up to his time. "Mercator's projection," a way of showing the round world on a flat map, is still in use. Theodorus de Bry (1528-98) and his son issued in twenty-five parts a monumental and finely illustrated *Collection of Travels in the East and West Indies*.

He was helped in his work by Richard Hakluyt (c. 1553–1616), who himself translated, edited, or published a number of collections of voyages, of which the most important was *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*. Hakluyt's work was continued after his death by Samuel Purchas (1575?–1626) in *Purchas his Pilgrimes, containing a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Land Travells by Englishmen and others*. Sometimes the explorers themselves wrote and published accounts of their voyages. Jacques Cartier (1491–1557), for instance, wrote a book called *Brief Account of the Voyage made to the Islands of Canada*, while Samuel de Champlain (1567–1635) wrote several accounts of his trips into the interior of Canada. It was from works like these that Europeans learned of the tropics and Arctic regions, of savages and mountain ranges, of new seas and new beasts, of great forests and vast deserts.

Knowledge of new lands and peoples changed somewhat the writing of history. There was a beginning of attempts to write real world histories. There was a tendency to include in histories more accurate information and fewer wonder stories and miracle tales, for the boundaries of darkness and mystery had been pushed back and it had been found that truth might be stranger than fiction and more interesting. Some writers also undertook to compose histories of the new areas that had been opened up. João de Barros (1496–1570), a Portuguese who long held an official position in the India trade and who was also involved in an attempt to colonize Brazil, wrote a long work, *Da Asia*, on the Portuguese conquests in the East, in which he used oriental as well as European sources. The work was divided into decades and was continued by Diogo do Couto. A Spaniard, Bartolomé de Las Casas (1474–1566), known as "The Apostle of the Indies" for his long efforts to protect the natives of America from ruthless exploitation, served for a while as a bishop in Mexico. He wrote a great deal on America. His *Brief Account of the Destruction of the West Indies* published in 1554 was as fierce a denunciation of the Spanish treatment of the Indians as could have been penned by any enemy of Spain. His *History of the Indies* was not published till the nineteenth century. The accounts of Captain John Smith (1579–1631), an adventurer and colonizer who took part in the settlement of Virginia, are another example of the kind of history inspired by overseas areas. Smith wrote a number of works describing North America and the efforts of the English to found colonies there; in them he seems sometimes to have used his imagination as well as facts. One of his works is entitled *The General History of Virginia, New England and the Summer Isles* (the isles being the Bermuda group).

Aside from geography, the science most stimulated by expansion overseas

was probably astronomy. Thousands of new stars became visible to the explorers who sailed below the equator and to scientists who peered through the new telescopes, while the efforts of navigators to improve the methods of determining latitude and longitude led to intensive study of the heavens. In the long run, knowledge of the animals and plants of other continents was to help to create scientific biology and botany in Europe. Up to the mid-seventeenth century it had led chiefly to the production of descriptive works, but accounts of plants from overseas found their way into books like the *Herball* of John Gerard (1597), while the plants themselves were cultivated in botanical and private gardens. Some exotic animals and birds were kept in private collections or zoos from the sixteenth century on. Medicine was enriched by new drugs from distant lands. Of these, by far the most important was quinine (also called Jesuit or Peruvian bark), which came into use in Europe as a specific for malaria and other fevers after it had been employed in 1638 to cure the Countess of Chinchon, wife of the governor of Peru. But many other plants, products from Asia and America like sassafras, sarsaparilla, ipecac, rhubarb, senna, opium, and camphor, were used as medicines in seventeenth-century Europe.

Even more than science, literature in Europe was influenced and inspired by the new discoveries, explorations, and settlements. As the horizons of Europe expanded, the wondrous works of nature, the boundless oceans, the vast continents to east and west, the frigid Arctic area with its ice and snow, the sun-smitten tropics, the strange peoples, the thrilling adventures of explorers, sailors, and settlers, offered subjects for song, story, and drama. In Portuguese, for instance, Luiz Vaz de Camoens (1524-80) wrote the *Lusiads*, the greatest epic poem of the language, which sings of the voyage of Da Gama. Camoens himself had voyaged to the East. Shipwrecked off the coast of Cambodia, he saved the manuscript of his great poem by swimming ashore with it. A Spanish poet named Ercilla (1533-95), who had fought against Indians of Chile, found his inspiration there and wrote a great epic on those wars called *La Araucana*. Shakespeare himself in the *Tempest* made his magic island much like the Bermudas, of which he had heard, and got some of his ideas for Caliban from accounts of savages.

It is a fact that the great ages of literature in Spain, Portugal, France, and England were those in which there was a widespread interest in overseas areas. It is possible that the stimulus to imagination and the flow of wealth from outside Europe may have played a part in the literary achievements. More clearly, expansion overseas helped the vernacular (or common) languages of Europe to triumph over Latin as a medium of expression. Many of the

voyagers, colonists, and explorers were unlettered folk who naturally wrote or told their stories in everyday speech. Moreover, the middle classes, people who were ready to buy books about the new lands, could not as a general rule read Latin.

Most of the tongues of Europe were gradually enriched in the centuries after 1500 by a wide variety of words that came from or dealt with the overseas areas. Into English, for example, there came by way of Portuguese words like *albatross*, *caste*, *molasses*, *mandarin*, and *palanquin*; by way of French came *quinine*, *nicotine*, and *buccaneer*; by way of Dutch, *freebooter*; while from America, often by way of Spanish, came words like *tobacco*, *moose*, *cocoa*, *chocolate*, *potato*, and *maize*; and from the Orient words like *harem*, *caravan*, *toddy*, and *bamboo*. In addition, hundreds of geographical words and place names, unheard of or not existent before 1500, were in common use in western Europe within a century or two, so that Potosí stood for wealth untold, Nova Zembla meant frigid cold.

The products brought to Europe by ships plying from Asia, Africa, and America made possible a rapid growth in luxury during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—luxury in which kings, nobles, and churchmen led the way, with the wealthier merchants of the rising middle class not far behind. The abundance of gold, silver, and jewels encouraged the use of silver tableware, of jewelry, or ornaments of precious metal, of gilding, and of gold and silver thread to an extent hitherto undreamed of. Dyes like indigo, cochineal, and brazilwood produced bright-colored clothes for the upper classes. Silk, fur, and ostrich plumes in greatly increased quantities enriched the costumes of the upper classes, while ivory was employed more and more for articles like combs. The use of perfumes increased as additional supplies of musk, civet, sandalwood, and ambergris became available. Rich carpets and rugs from the Near or Middle East or homemade imitations of them slowly replaced rushes as coverings for the floors of castles and town houses alike. New woods, from Asia or America, gradually came into use for cabinet-work. By the mid-seventeenth century the wealthier people of western Europe were living in surroundings far more luxurious than those enjoyed by their great-grandfathers, and much of the luxury depended on imports from overseas.

In food too, added variety and richness were made possible by importations. Slowly spices long known—pepper, ginger, cinnamon, nutmegs, cardamon, cloves—decreased in price as the quantities brought from the East rose, while new flavors were introduced from America, like allspice (West Indies) and vanilla (South America). Fish from the American coasts increased the supply of food for all classes. Guinea fowl made popular by the Portuguese added a succulent item to the list of European poultry, and turkeys were already

associated with Christmas festivities by 1575. Luscious wines from the Canary and Madeira islands supplemented those from European vineyards.

Despite all opposition on grounds of health, morals, and religion, despite the prohibitions of kings and popes, the use of tobacco became common in Europe and gave that continent a completely new habit. The tobacco plant was brought to Spain in 1558 and was introduced not long after into France by Jean Nicot. At first it was thought to be a miraculous cure for all ills, but it was employed more usually for smoking. Sir Walter Raleigh "tooke a pipe of tobacco a little before he went to the scaffold" for his execution, and many others were imitating him under more pleasant circumstances by the early years of the seventeenth century.

For each country of western Europe overseas expansion had results more profound than any change of diet, dress, or habits, though the origins of social change are so complex that it is not proper to think in terms of simple cause and effect. Still it seems clear that in Portugal the increase in luxury, the introduction of slavery on a large scale, some depopulation, and a certain growth of pride and indolence in the upper classes were connected with the acquisition of an overseas empire. In Spain expansion probably enhanced the tendency to view military and religious pursuits as more worthy than industrial, commercial, and agricultural activities, and it may have led to a decrease in population in some areas. In Holland the rise of a moneyed aristocracy of merchants, an increased devotion to commerce, and the adoption of a hardheaded, materialistic outlook on life were perhaps tied up with the expansion movement. In England and France such effects were not so apparent by the mid-seventeenth century. Furthermore, in all these countries, the rapid development of capitalism was so intimately connected with overseas expansion that it is difficult to consider the results of the one apart from those of the other.

EXPANDING CAPITALISM

The century and a half after the discovery of America provided an atmosphere much more suitable to the growth of capitalism than that of the Middle Ages. The various forms and methods of capitalism had been developed in the earlier period, but they had been somewhat constricted by tradition and by the limited opportunities of a self-contained Europe. The new era of expansion gave capitalism in every phase a tremendous stimulus. The influx of precious metals hastened the rise of a money economy and made possible the accumulation of large stocks of coin which could be used as capital. The rise in prices proved a stimulus to business. The rapid growth of trade opened up opportunities for large-scale commercial enterprise.

The effects of these changes can be seen in the great increase in the number

of middle-class capitalists. Rich bourgeois had existed long before 1500, and there had been some very wealthy men like Jacques Coeur. In the sixteenth century there were not only more extremely rich men who had made fortunes from commerce and finance, but there was also in the different cities and towns a growing class of well-to-do merchant-capitalists possessed of substantial fortunes equivalent perhaps to between \$5,000 and \$50,000 in modern money. In the town of Augsburg alone there were more than a dozen rich merchant-banker families like the Fuggers, the Meutings, the Welsers, the Hochstetters, the Manlichs, the Haugs, the Adlers, and the Rems. In 1540 the 278 wealthiest men in that town had a total capital of between 5,000,000 and 10,000,000 gold gulden. The gulden had gold in it equivalent to something like \$5.00 (1932) and would buy a good deal more than \$5.00 ever would. The existence of a substantial middle class increased the demand for many luxury and semiluxury goods and thus in its turn stimulated trade, industry, and capitalism.

THE IMPROVEMENT OF CAPITALIST TECHNIQUES

The businessmen of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century not only had more money; they also gradually improved the methods of handling it that had been developed in the Middle Ages. The use of credit increased. The techniques of capitalism were perfected. Bills of exchange were much more widely used and were often employed for transactions within a country as well as for foreign trade. The practice of endorsing bills became common in Italy and France after 1550. Endorsing is a device which makes a bill of exchange more useful and easier to handle. . . .

There was, too, a gradual introduction in the sixteenth century, especially in France and Holland, of promissory notes made payable to the bearer. . . . Such promissory notes when given by a banker were practically like bank notes, and in fact it is from them that bank notes developed in the seventeenth century. . . .

All these developments in the use of credit instruments (bills of exchange, notes, etc.) were in the direction of making them more negotiable—that is, easier to transfer from person to person, easier to turn into cash, easier to use in business. Greater negotiability made for greater use of credit and helped merchants and others to do business in distant cities and lands. It caused a great many legal problems about the responsibilities of endorsers, accepters, and others, which were settled only slowly in the ensuing centuries. The validity of endorsements by the man to whom a bill was payable was not fully established in Holland till the mid-seventeenth century or in England before the

end of the century. Negotiability of credit instruments added greatly to the importance of the people who dealt in them, particularly the private bankers.

In the period before 1640 most of the banking operations of Europe were carried on as they had been in the Middle Ages by private bankers, either as individuals or in partnerships (often of the family type). But changes were taking place. German, French, Dutch, Flemish, and even English bankers were outstripping the Italian in importance, and cities had replaced fairs as banking centers. Though banking was still mixed up with commerce, insurance, and other businesses (in England in 1640 the goldsmiths were the chief bankers), the tendency to specialize was growing; that is, some firms found it advantageous to drop their trade connections and to devote themselves to banking or to some phase of it, such as accepting deposits or dealing in bills of exchange. The big, successful bankers had far greater sums of money at their command and were far more important than their medieval predecessors. The tie-up between government financing and banking which goes back to the Middle Ages became even more significant in the sixteenth century. Towns, princes, and provinces borrowed money for their various needs, usually through one of the large banking firms.

There was, too, a gradual growth of public banking; that is, of banks organized and supervised by a government. The first banks of this type were created in the early fifteenth century at Barcelona and Genoa. Gradually abuses of sixteenth-century private banking led to a demand for more public banks. In Venice there were special difficulties. The merchant-bankers who accepted deposits and invested the money thus acquired in commerce suffered heavy losses as the result of the dislocation and decline of Venetian trade. In other cities money-changer-bankers were accused of melting down the best coins that came to them as deposits or otherwise. In Venice the Bank of the Rialto was established by the government in 1587 to accept deposits and transfer money, but it was forbidden to make loans. Six years later Milan set up a similar bank. Amsterdam organized a public bank for deposit and transfer in 1609, as did Hamburg in 1619 and Nürnberg in 1621. These banks performed significant services by providing a safe place for deposits, by making it easy for customers of the bank to transfer money to each other (it required merely a bookkeeping operation), by facilitating the handling and payment of bills of exchange, and by establishing a bank currency or standard money of account which did not vary in its content of silver or gold from year to year.

While banking was growing more important and more specialized, other techniques of handling and using money were also developing. As commerce expanded and as the use of credit and the negotiability of credit instruments

increased, the need for improved methods of buying and selling developed. The fairs in the Middle Ages had provided opportunities for buyers and sellers, borrowers and lenders, to come together. By the sixteenth century these opportunities were no longer sufficient. Year-round centers for such transactions were essential. Most of the larger cities developed such facilities and became, as it were, permanent fairs. Sometimes there was just a street corner or a square where merchants and bankers gathered to transact business. The most important centers of trade carried the tendency further and created *bourses* (or exchanges). Some of the bourses had a special building, though often business might be carried on more or less in the open. Bruges had had in the Middle Ages a bourse much frequented by Italian merchants and bankers. Antwerp opened one in English or Wool Street about 1460, largely for the trade in goods; but far more important was its splendid new bourse opened there in 1531 chiefly for financial transactions. The bourse at Lyons, which grew out of the fairs there, was also devoted mainly to dealings in money. Usually a bourse was founded by a city or a group of merchants, but the Royal Exchange of London had a somewhat different origin. Sir Thomas Gresham had been much at Antwerp acting as financial agent for the English crown in the money market there. He was distressed that London businessmen had no place like the Antwerp Bourse at which they could get together. Accordingly he offered to erect an exchange at his own expense if the city would provide a site. The building was opened in 1571 by Queen Elizabeth. Gresham made 700 English pounds a year from the rent of shops in the upper part of the building, and the merchants had a place to foregather and do business.

Though the bourses were in many ways like year-round fairs, there were significant differences. At the fairs, the goods dealt in were usually on the spot. In the bourses, merchants bought and sold goods that were in warehouses, or in other cities, or even in ships at sea. At the fairs, loans usually arose out of commercial transactions, with the seller or someone else financing the purchase of goods. In the bourses, there were all sorts of loans and money dealings which had no connection with trade or were connected with it only indirectly by means of bills of exchange or other credit instruments. The bourses represented a continuous concentration of business transactions. The businessmen who came together there could arrange deals, draw insurance contracts, borrow money, make bottomry loans, and exchange news. The bourse was the center of business gossip, and the transactions there reflected all the rumors that flowed in of bad crops, wars, shipwrecks, or piracy.

One of the principal activities at the bourses, especially in maritime cities, was the writing of insurance. Bottomry contracts² were widely used in the

² [A loan for a maritime venture, secured by the ship itself.]

Middle Ages, and real marine insurance was developed in Italy in the fourteenth century. The growth of commerce and the undertaking of longer and longer voyages with the ever present risks of shipwrecks and piracy gave marine insurance an increasing significance after 1500. The insurance contract by which the insurer undertook to bear all or part of specified risks for a voyage or voyages was well developed by the middle of the seventeenth century, and in some cities like London insurance contracts were registered to prevent fraud. Often a merchant or banker wrote insurance as a side line to his regular business. Frequently, large groups of merchants joined together to insure an important voyage. But more and more there was specialization, and a class of people grew up who were particularly skilled in writing insurance. Some were brokers who brought together merchants who wanted to insure ships and people who were willing to share the risks. Others were underwriters who made a specialty of risking their money in insurance contracts.

By 1504 there were said to be in Antwerp six hundred persons who made a living out of the insurance. Premiums (the sums paid to insure a vessel) slowly became more standardized, though each contract was the result of a separate bargain struck between the insurer and the insured. Other types of insurance were growing up. German cities like Hamburg were developing fire insurance under the auspices of the town government in the sixteenth century. Crude life insurance appeared, though it was rather more like a bet that someone would live or die than like a scientific sharing of risks. When, as in Antwerp, it was possible to insure a man's life without his knowledge, the way for fraud and even for crime was open.

Other forms of bets and risk-taking gave rise to various kinds of speculation, some of which proved to be important parts of the mechanism of modern capitalism. In Antwerp in the sixteenth century, it was possible to buy goods like pepper for future delivery. The buyer hoped, of course, that the price would rise before the goods came into his hands. It was also possible to bet on the future prices of a commodity or future exchange rates, and thus to profit by either a rise or a decline. Sometimes this was done for gambling purposes, but it could also be a form of insurance for a merchant who did not want to suffer from changes in prices. Prices of goods and of various moneys (foreign exchange rates) varied considerably among the various cities of Europe—a situation which made it possible for well-informed persons to enter upon arbitrage operations. *Arbitrage* consists in buying something in one market and at the same time (or as nearly at the same time as possible) selling it in another market. If wheat costs 8 shillings a bushel in London and was selling for 10 shillings a bushel in Amsterdam, a merchant could buy in Lon-

don and sell in Amsterdam, pay the transportation charges, and still make a handsome profit.

The possibility of making speculative profits led inevitably to attempts to manipulate prices. In Antwerp, especially, groups or consortiums⁸ of merchants got together to corner the supply of some kind of goods like pepper or mercury. The effort was to buy up all of the commodity that was available and then sell out at high prices. Similarly people who were speculating in foreign exchange (that is, the price of foreign currencies at Antwerp) sometimes tried to affect the rates by spreading rumors or otherwise. There were even attempts to manipulate the interest rate, making money temporarily "tight" or "easy."

All the speculative activity put a premium on news and information. The big banking houses established regular services and had their agents send in news letters to headquarters. By knowing a little ahead of his fellows when a war had broken out or a fleet had been lost, a speculator could often make a big profit. The spreading of news was greatly assisted by the improvement in mail service. Regular routes with weekly or monthly service were established, and it became possible to send letters between European cities with some assurance that they would arrive in a reasonable time. In 1633 it was estimated that a million letters a year came to London from the 512 market towns of England.

The desire to speculate and gain a gambler's profits seemed even to outrun the possibilities offered by real business. An example of this was the tulip mania in Holland. Tulips were grown in that country in the latter half of the sixteenth century. They became increasingly popular with the rising merchant class that had time and money to spend on luxuries like flower gardens. About 1633, people began to speculate in bulbs, buying them in the confident hope that the demand would grow and prices would rise. By 1636, the speculation had run wild. Everybody was buying bulbs, and rare varieties were selling for hundreds of dollars. Servants and professors, doctors and merchants, sailors and ditchdiggers, joined in the scramble to buy bulbs and reap easy profits. Ladies sold their jewelry to buy bulbs, sure that they would make enough money to buy more and better jewels in the end. Early in 1637 the collapse came. Prices dropped; fortunes were lost; people were ruined. The trade in bulbs slowly returned to normal.

The tulip craze was only a special case of the boom and crash that seemed to become part of business life as capitalism grew. Years of good business, or prosperity when everybody did well, were followed by times of bad busi-

⁸ Special groups gathered together for a single deal.

ness, with failures, price declines, and bankruptcies the order of the day. Sometimes the turn from good times to bad seemed to be the result of bad crops, or of wars, or of the failure of some prince to pay his debts. Sometimes it was hard to determine what caused the change. But whatever their origin, the ups and downs of business gave golden opportunities to the canny speculator as well as the shrewd merchant.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION

The businessmen of the period 1500–1640 who engaged in trade, insurance, banking, or speculation (or frequently in a mixture of all four) acted sometimes as individuals, but the forms of partnership developed in the Middle Ages were still the typical business organizations. There were family and non-family partnerships, partnerships in which all members were active, partnerships of the commenda type with one or more members providing the capital but taking no other part in the enterprise. There were partnerships for a single deal or voyage and partnerships that were, so to speak, handed down from father to son and persisted for generations. The opening up of overseas areas and the expansion of trade gave rise to new problems, but the partnership was so flexible a business unit that it could meet and solve most of them.

As Dutch commerce expanded into the Baltic, it became common for Dutch firms to plant a partner in a Baltic port and keep him there permanently to handle the northern end of the business. Spanish firms sometimes had one partner in Seville and another in America, though sometimes they—and Dutch firms as well—might use a factor as agent in the distant port instead of a partner. Partnerships could even be used to defeat the law. Thus French, Dutch, or English merchants by a secret partnership agreement with a Spanish merchant could evade the regulations which forbade foreigners to trade with America. Partnerships were used to finance piratical and privateering voyages. They were even employed for the conquest and colonization of overseas areas. The two- or three-man partnership was common, but frequently a partnership might have ten or twenty or more members.

Another form of organization inherited from the Middle Ages and used especially in England was the regulated company, of which the medieval Merchant Staplers were an early and a not fully developed example. The regulated company was in part like a partnership, in part like a guild, and in part like the later joint stock company. It was essentially an association of merchants (sometimes hundreds of them) to monopolize, control, and exploit some particular branch of trade. It was chartered and given its monopoly by the government, which backed up its efforts to exclude outsiders. Each mer-

chant provided his own capital, traded on his own account, and took the profits or the losses that came to him. But the governor and directors of the company decided on policy—when the ships were to sail, and other matters—maintained foreign trade centers, provided protection, and laid down rules for the conduct of business. The member of a regulated company was in one sense a merchant trading on his own, but he was also a sharer in a big monopolized trade under the control of a group of officers chosen by him and his fellows. The most important regulated company was the Merchant Adventurers of England. Other English examples were the Eastland Company, the Muscovy Company, and the Levant Company.

The last two companies started out as joint stock companies, but were eventually changed to the regulated type. Joint stock companies or something like them had existed in the Middle Ages in Genoese commerce and German mining. It is not possible to determine whether the English and Dutch companies owed anything to these forerunners or grew out of local conditions and needs. The essential feature of the joint stock company is that it is a union of capital rather than of persons. A number of people put money into a venture, entrust its guidance to officers or directors, and share the profits or losses in proportion to the capital invested. . . . The shareholders were the owners of the company and they chose its officers, who were in actual charge of the business and decided on policies. At first, in some joint stock companies as in the older regulated companies, voting was done in stockholders' meetings by a show of hands with one vote per person, but gradually it came to be the rule that a man had votes in proportion to the number of shares he held. It was capital, not men, voting since the company was a union of capital, not of men. Many of the companies showed signs of their development out of earlier forms like guilds or regulated companies. Sometimes (as in the guilds) members addressed each other at meetings as "brother" and the company made contributions to charity. Sometimes (as in the regulated companies) a fee or fine had to be paid for admission to the company. Some of the companies held banquets and other festivities.

The great advantage of the joint stock company was its permanence. It could last as long as the shareholders wanted. Unlike a partnership, it was not disrupted by the death of members. As long as its capital remained it was immortal. Moreover, it formed a means of getting together larger sums of capital than any partnership could raise. The need for permanence and large sums of money in overseas trade to distant places was one of the chief incentives to the rise of joint stock companies. The voyages were long. Forts must be built and maintained overseas. Arrangements must be made with native rulers.

All these matters the joint stock company could handle better in the long run than could a partnership or even a regulated company.

The rise of the joint stock company was hesitant, not rapid. Men kept looking back or going back to older ways. Some of the English voyages of the mid-sixteenth century for trading, exploration, slaving, and piracy were organized on a joint stock basis. When the voyage was over the profits (if any) were divided in proportion to the capital invested. Drake's voyage of 1577-80 was financed on a joint stock basis with the queen as one of the investors. Drake came back with a rich cargo to be knighted on the quarter-deck of his *Golden Hind* by a grateful queen. From one Spanish treasure ship alone he had taken thirteen chests of money, eighty pounds of gold, twenty-six tons of silver, and some jewels. The lucky investors drew nearly 5,000 per cent in dividends.

In some of the early joint stock companies—the East India Company for example—there was a tendency to divide up the capital and profits at the end of each voyage, and then provide a new capital for the next one. There was even a confusion between capital and profits. If a voyage had a capital of £100,000 and made another £100,000 in profits, and if all the money was divided up at the end of the voyage, it was spoken of as a dividend or distribution of two capitals. There was a tendency, too, for companies founded on a joint stock basis to go over to a regulated form before many years. Like the regulated companies, the joint stock companies sought a charter from the government to give them a corporate existence and to grant them a monopoly. Indeed, the early joint stock companies together with the regulated companies are sometimes lumped together as "chartered companies."

In England the first chartered joint stock companies were formed in 1553. One was the Muscovy Company for trade to Russia; the other the Guinea or Africa Company for trade to that section. The former became a regulated company before many years were out, and the latter did not long survive. In 1568 two joint stock companies of a different sort were organized—the Mineral and Battery Works Company for brass founding and the making of wire and other articles from copper or brass, and the Mines Royal Company for copper and silver mining. On December 31, 1600 (the last day of the sixteenth century), the East India Company, which had a great future, was chartered, and two years later the Dutch East India Company, destined likewise to a remarkable career, was formed. In the seventeenth century, chartered joint stock companies became more and more common, especially for trade and colonization overseas.

Chapter VI

THE MORAL TEMPER OF THE HUMANIST RENAISSANCE



THE GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE HUMANISTIC SPIRIT

IT IS, of course, impossible to speak of the Renaissance, as though it were a single age or a single force, and had a definite date, like the French Revolution. Moreover, dramatic and painfully beautiful as were the life and the products of the Italy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the age of the humanists and of the noontide of Italian art does not mark one of the major intellectual events of the Western peoples. The earlier renaissance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was a much more unmistakable rebirth of the mind, while the forces at work in the Middle Ages, which in the sixteenth century were clearly revealed as disruptive of the old order, did not produce their fundamental revolution in men's ways of thinking until the seventeenth and eighteenth. Nevertheless, though the old forms and the old beliefs persisted relatively unchanged, that period which we loosely call the Renaissance was marked by the increasing prevalence of attitudes and interests that had hitherto played but a minor rôle in the life of Western Europe. These growing interests burst the bonds of the narrow if intricately carved medieval world and left men toying with the fragments. It was for the next age to seek the broad foundations upon which those fragments could be builded into a new structure. Ordered and precise Versailles was then to succeed Rheims.

If, then, the central feature of the period of the Renaissance is an outgrowing, a freeing from ties that have proved to be bonds, it is evident that we have to do with new forces arising within an old order, with stresses and strains, with unstable attempts to effect some kind of adjustment between traditional allegiances and modern appeals. The age of the Renaissance and the Reformation was above all others an age of compromise. If in the joy of widened vistas many were intoxicated by the beauty and the lusts of life at its richest, many

This chapter is from *The Making of the Modern Mind* (pp. 111-41, revised ed.; Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940), by John Herman Randall, Jr.

more were caught half-hesitant, reluctant, like Bruno, both to leave the Father's house and not to venture into the glorious world. What was best in Renaissance and Reformation could not last; it was the noble enthusiasm of youth, and what was needed was the hard and painful work of maturity. Nor could what was worst endure; it was the incongruous compromise between elements neither of which was clearly understood, the Christian tradition and the natural, pagan view of man's life and its scene. The Western peoples were leaving the old world; eagerly they snatched at the treasures of Greece and Rome as they moved onward to the new. But not till the turn of the seventeenth century did any man realize the nature of that new world, and not till the nineteenth did its features impress the average man. Only in Mr. Shaw's plays do the Saint Joans of history talk wisely of the Protestantism and Nationalism they are ushering in.

The ordered society of the Middle Ages allowed the forces that had created it to develop until they naturally outgrew the fixed and narrow framework through which they functioned. The gradual accumulation of a surplus and a greater store of physical objects, the growth of an urban population, and the increasing desire for knowledge, led men to take more and more interest in themselves and in their environment. Eagerly they turned to the literature of Greece and Rome, which revealed to them men who had had similar interests, and eventually led them on to investigate the actual world in which they were living. The complex hierarchy of medieval society, with its fixed group control, proved increasingly inadequate to satisfy the new needs and demands of human nature, and to organize men's diversified and changing activities. The forces centered in the individual members broke down the nicely adjusted binding ties, and in every field of human endeavor, in religion, in science, in art, in economic life, in political control, more and more emphasis was laid on the growth and expression of the potentialities of the individual elements and less and less on the organization of these elements into wholes, toward which the individual members felt a diminishing sense of responsibility. The typical ideal of the period, individuality and self-sufficiency, served as the ground of a new attempt to order the world, an order that became more mathematical and mechanical than hierarchical and organic.

We have spoken of new forces at work within the old forms. These forces were many rather than simple, but they all bore a close relation to the fundamental force . . . bringing the barbarians out of their pioneering ignorance and building the thirteenth century. This is the economic growth of European society that made the towns and was now making the nations. It is trade and commerce and material riches that can alone explain the possibility of

the rich and diversified civilization of Medicean Florence or the France of Francis I or the Germany of Luther or the Netherlands of Erasmus, just as these things had founded Periclean Athens and Imperial Rome. We can even explain many of the contrasts between these cultures in terms of the varying relations between the old agricultural classes and the new merchants and bankers, though we should be on our guard lest we assume too facile an explanation of the peculiar forms life took in Florence or in London. No one would seek in economics the source of Petrarch's delight in landscape, or Luther's combats with a personal devil, however unintelligible the import of these things without it.

It is not for us to narrate here the well-known story of the tremendous economic changes that, gathering momentum slowly in the town life of the Middle Ages, have rushed on with ever greater speed through finance, commerce, agriculture, and industry, and are working greater transformations to-day than ever before. But the significance of this growth must be kept in mind if we are to understand the making of the modern world. Expanding commerce demanded a money economy in place of the crude barter and exchange of goods of the early Middle Ages. German mines supplied a wealth of silver, and America poured in her golden hoard. Kings and nobles grew rich, merchants even richer. Banks and bankers, with the mechanism of credit, were soon developed in the Italian and German towns. Rich bankers, like the Fuggers, put their wealth into extensive enterprises in mining, manufacturing, in sheep-raising and wheat-growing, and created a full-fledged capitalism. The great merchants and commercial companies needed a far larger production than guild methods could afford. Commerce, seeking new worlds to conquer, found India and America, and simultaneously trade changed from luxuries to staples. Towns proved too small as units; trade must be national in scope to hold colonial empires.

In the face of these startling transformations, the old city guilds, with their traditional regulations and their spirit of serving a small community, proved totally inadequate. As they decayed or were legislated out of existence, the new class of bankers and capitalistic merchants rose to power. The Church was superseded as leader in urban society by the bourgeoisie, the great middle class. Needing firm and stable government against their rivals in other lands, as well as freedom from the stupid interference of the feudal nobility, these commercial classes built up strong centralized monarchies. The economic support which they could give the national monarchs, especially the mobile subventions and taxes in money, enabled the latter to build up standing armies, to cut loose from reliance on feudal levies, and to consolidate the national

domain and establish the "king's peace" and the "king's law." The nobles were crushed and their lands taken, the Church was plundered and dispossessed in their greed for more. Art and learning they bent to their glorification, and the lower classes they held in subjection. With the magnified power of money and commerce, those who lived by commerce and money became more and more a political and social power. No longer was the aim of society the service of God in Christian love, but national prosperity for the middle class.

This rapid growth involved fundamental readjustments in every institution of society; it also demanded thoroughgoing intellectual reconstruction. The changes that came over the mind of Europe during this period, its new knowledge and new ideals, were conditioned by a multitude of other factors, but every new belief, every changed view of man and his destiny, was worked out by men living in such a society and powerfully influenced at every turn by the forces of this society. Only against this background is it possible to understand the new aspirations of the European nations, their achievements and their errors. But if the roots of the new world of the Renaissance are to be sought in economic conditions, its justification and its meaning are to be found in the new spirit and knowledge that destroyed monasticism and Aristotelian science as capitalism was destroying feudalism and the guilds.

This new spirit consisted at bottom in an increasing interest in human life as it can be lived upon earth, within the bourne of time and space, and without necessary reference to any other destiny in the beyond or the hereafter. It meant the decay of that Oriental dualism in which the flesh for so many long years had lusted against the spirit, and the growth in its stead of the conviction that the life of flesh and spirit merged into one living man is not evil, but good. It meant that when society offered more than a rude mining-camp existence of blood and toil, the monastic temper declined, and gave way to a new and vital perception of the dignity of man, of the sweetness and glory of being a rational animal.

It happened that those who felt the call of human experience had a great literature to which they could turn, a literature written by peoples who had been stirred by the same passion for the free life of man in its natural setting. The frenzied zeal with which they did find in this literature a confirmation of their own inward stirrings in the face of a rich urban society, has left an indelible impress on the form taken by this interest in the natural man. But if the manuscripts of Greece and Rome had perished every one beneath the monk's missal, the outcome would not have been essentially different. Men would still have turned to man and nature, and if the modern world might not so soon have come into being, it is quite possible that men would not have

wandered down so many blind alleys. Of a truth the Renaissance discovered the humanities, but it found them in Florence or Augsburg or Paris, not in ancient books. The books had always been there; they were discovered when men had grown fit to appreciate them. The polished and urbane Cicero, he who had taken the intellectual world of Greece and translated it from the idiom of free and heaven-questioning Athens into the Roman tongue of the market-place and the law-court, he who had dropped from the already fundamentally anthropomorphic wisdom of Hellas all that led the mind away from the passions and the will of the mortal life of man, became naturally the idol of those whose days were passed in palace or piazza; and his conception of culture as essentially *Studia humanitatis ac litterarum*, the study of humanity and letters, was acclaimed by those dissatisfied with Aquinas's "truths of God."

HUMANISM IN THE MIDDLE AGES

This interest in humanity had indeed lived strong and clear from the ages before the barbarians were conquered by Christianity. The Homeric life of their pagan epics has the true savor of human existence, and we can be sure that it was never lost under the imprint of the saintly ideal. The most that the Christian tradition could do was to make it disreputable, especially among the clerical class gifted with the power of literary expression. Throughout the later Middle Ages there existed a stream of vulgar songs extolling a frank enjoyment of life and its pleasures, all the freer in their animal exuberance in that they lived *sub rosa*, as it were, beyond the pale. Not only ribald soldiers, but the selfsame clerks who later rose to write *summæ* and hymns to the Virgin, enlivened their student days at the great universities with lauds to wine, women, and song. Who can read these songs of the "Wandering Clerks" and believe that the age of the Crusades lay crushed under the terrifying fear of Hell? In the most thoughtful note is "Gaudeamus igitur";¹ for the most part it is:

We in our wandering,
Blithesome and squandering,
Tara, tantara, teino!
Eat to satiety,
Drink to propriety,
Tara, tantara, teino!
Laugh till our sides we split,
Rags on our hides we fit;
Tara, tantara, teino!

Jesting eternally,
Quaffing infernally,

¹ ["Let us then rejoice."]

Tara, tantara, teino!
 Brother catholical,
 Man apostolical,
 Tara, tantara, teino!
 Clasped on each other's breast,
 Brother to brother pressed,
 Tara, tantara, teino!

So soon as ever a lay and vernacular literature arose, it portrayed the same pagan enjoyment of the goods of life, high and low. The troubadours of gay Provence, whose delight in life as well as unnatural flight from it stirred stern Dominic to wrath and the pope to the bloody Albigensian Crusade, turned Christian chivalry into a glorification of human love; at the court of the Emperor Frederick II, at the very time Francis was singing and begging his way through Umbria, these joyous songsters lived and reveled amidst surroundings as rich, as learned, and as cruel as those of any Renaissance despot. The "sweet new style" Dante and the other North Italian poets took from them symbolized heavenly things in the most earthly of guises. It is significant that the most frank and realistic of these poems sprang from the bourgeois culture of the towns; the obscene French *fabliaux*² rose to the level of the shrewd delight in all sorts and conditions of men as they really are, with a special love for rogues and scoundrels and the foibles of the clergy that marks the motley crew of Chaucer and the rogues' gallery of Boccaccio. In sober Aquinas there is already the blend between this sense of the worthwhileness and dignity of all that is specifically human, and the antique humanism of Aristotle. Thomas has hardly a trace of asceticism; his whole treatment of the flesh and its impulses is inspired by the Aristotelian principle of maintaining the supremacy of the most characteristically human part of man, his reason. For this reason, and this alone, is carnality to be regulated. Though the head of scholasticism reached to heaven, its feet were firmly planted on the solid ground of a humanistic appreciation of man's life as an organic union of soul with body.

Indeed, from the twelfth century onward such an attitude and such interests became increasingly respectable, and the thirteenth century merged almost imperceptibly into what we call the humanistic revival in its narrower sense. Art tells the same story as literature; the earlier virgins and saints on Chartres, with their childlike, beatific countenances, pass into realistic portraits, and the conventional Byzantine madonnas are transformed into Italian peasant girls.

² [Popular tales composed in meter.]

THE DISCOVERY OF THE HUMANITY OF THE CLASSICS

It was but natural that these interests should turn men more and more to the records of the past. The interest in the ancient literatures really dates from the founding of the universities in the twelfth century; the early students had as intense a love for the classics as the fourteenth-century scholars. Abélard's pupil John of Salisbury collected the Latin poets and delighted to read them. The discovery of Aristotle and the consequent preoccupation with science, with man's destiny rather than with his life, only postponed the later revival. Europe was learning from the past, taking what she fancied. In Dante the two interests are equally vivid; he is full of ancient Rome, and pagan and Christian symbols serve him alike throughout his masterpiece. Petrarch, seventeen when Dante died, is the vanguard of the changed emphasis. Distrustful of Aristotle, disdainful alike of the human and the literary value of the scholastic writings, loving the glory of this world and intensely interested in his own personality, author of an autobiographical and posing *Letter to Posterity*, devoted above all others to his beloved Cicero, writing immortal sonnets to his earthly Laura in the Italian tongue, yet desiring such lapses from Ciceronian grace to be expunged, insatiable in his search for the manuscripts of the ancients and stirred to wrath by their neglect—he laments that he was born out of his time: "Among the many subjects which interested me, I dwelt especially upon antiquity, for our own age has always repelled me, so that, had it not been for the love of those dear to me, I should have preferred to have been born in any other period than our own. In order to forget my own time I have constantly striven to place myself in spirit in other ages, and consequently I delighted in history." In reality his hearkening to the call of the new and his retention of the old were intensely of his own age. He turned from Aristotle to Plato, remarking, on hearing the former's authority taken, "Sometimes I asked, with a smile, how Aristotle could have known that, for it was not proven by the light of reason, nor could it be tested by experiment." He preferred rational to supernatural explanations of events, yet religiously he was faithful to the medieval world; the Fathers he read, yet it was Augustine the man rather than the thinker whom he admired. His Latins he interpreted allegorically, yet was a careful scholar as to texts. The monastic life he approved of—as giving tranquillity to the scholar. A curious blend of the old and the new, he sums up his attitude. "There is a certain justification for my way of life. It may be only glory that we seek here, but I persuade myself that, so long as we remain here, that is right. Another glory awaits us in heaven and he who reaches there will not wish even to think of earthly fame. So this is

the natural order, that among mortals the care of things mortal should come first; to the transitory will then succeed the eternal; from the first to the second is the natural progression." Let us leave him climbing Mount Ventoux for the view—strange aberration, in medieval eyes!—and reading Augustine on sin and concupiscence at the top.

Even beyond Cicero there beckoned another world, a world of cities like Florence, where the widest human interests, in science and philosophy, were made to revolve about man the citizen. Petrarch and his friend Boccaccio yearned for the Greek tongue, and patiently endured the barbarities of a Greek-speaking rogue whom they set up as professor and put to work on a plodding translation of Homer. It was not till the third generation of humanists that any could really read Greek. Glorious was the day when a learned Byzantine, Chrysoloras, accepted a chair at Florence. Bruni gives us the spirit of the age:

I was then studying Civil Law, but . . . I burned with love of academic studies, and had spent no little pains on dialectic and rhetoric. At the coming of Chrysoloras, I was torn in mind, deeming it shameful to desert the law, and yet a crime to lose such a chance of studying Greek literature; and often with youthful impulse I would say to myself, "Thou, when it is permitted thee to gaze on Homer, Plato, and Demosthenes, and the other poets, philosophers, and orators, of whom such glorious things are spread abroad, and speak with them and be instructed in their admirable teaching, wilt thou desert and rob thyself? Wilt thou neglect this opportunity so divinely offered? For seven hundred years, no one in Italy has possessed Greek letters; and yet we confess that all knowledge is derived from them. . . . There are doctors of civil law everywhere; and the chance of learning will not fail thee. But if this one and only doctor of Greek letters disappears, no one can be found to teach thee." Overcome at length by these reasons, I gave myself to Chrysoloras, with such zeal to learn, that what through the wakeful day I gathered, I followed after in night, even when asleep.

Petrarch and Bruni represent the first enthusiasm; succeeding scholars grew alike more critical and more influential. The demand for learning seemed insatiable. The answer was the production of books printed on paper from movable type, in place of the old and imperfectly copied parchment manuscripts. Forty-five copyists working for two years under Cosimo de' Medici produced only two hundred volumes; by 1500 there were in Europe at least nine million books, of thirty thousand titles, and over a thousand printers. The new printing spread with a rapidity that would have been impossible with the communications of a hundred years earlier. The first surviving specimen was printed in Mainz, on the upper Rhine, before 1447; three years later Gutenberg and Fust had set up there a partnership whence issued the famous

forty-two line Bible and the thirty-two line Latin grammar of Donatus, symbolic of sacred and secular learning, the Reformation and humanism. By 1465, the press had reached Italy; by 1470, Paris; London followed in 1480, Stockholm two years later, Constantinople in 1487, Lisbon in 1490, while Spain characteristically lagged behind till 1499. Thus by 1500 all the chief countries of Europe were provided with the means for the rapid multiplication of books. The consequences for intellectual life were momentous. The number of those who could share the best knowledge increased a thousandfold; it became worth while to learn to read, and to write for a wide circle of readers. A library could now contain a wide variety of secular works, instead of the few expensive writings of the Fathers and doctors. Prices sank to an eighth of the former cost, and, judged by our standards, were low indeed. Ideas could now be sure of a wide hearing; and though the Church soon attempted to control the new force by her censorship, the printing-press had made it impossible ever to extirpate a living idea.

Above all, the circle of the educated, formerly confined largely to the clergy, broadened immeasurably; that rapid spread of knowledge and beliefs we call a period of enlightenment was made possible. It is difficult to see how the great movements of the next century, the permeation of the humanistic attitude, the spread of the Reformation, the rise of national literatures to consolidate the national state, could have occurred without the printed page. Ducal collectors in Italy might be ashamed to own a printed book, but all Europe learned from them. Universities, too, sprang up in every land as strongholds of the new learning, nine in Germany, seven in Spain; and for the first time schools appeared in the towns, as training places for other than the clergy, like Deventer in Holland and Saint Paul's in London. Princes and merchants vied with each other as patrons, from Alfonso of Naples, whose emblem was an open book and who reverently received a bone of Livy from Venice, to the magnificent Lorenzo, the banker and boss of Florence, patron of all the arts and letters, connoisseur and dilettante, who danced through life singing, "Quant' è bella giovanezza!"⁸

Lefèvre d'Étaples brought the new learning to France in 1492, Colet was leader in England, Reuchlin in Germany. These Northerners shared less of the pagan exuberance of the Italians, and were all more interested in combining their new life with the Christian tradition. Biblical critics and reformers of ecclesiastical abuses, they were intent on making of Christianity a purer and simpler gospel for this world. While the Popes were reveling in beauty and putting the earnest Christian Savonarola to death, d'Étaples was discovering

⁸ ["How beautiful is youth!"]

the message of Jesus and the Protestantism of Paul. Greatest of all these apostles of Enlightenment, Dutch Erasmus was editing the Bible, undermining by subtle thrust the medieval ideal and system, and preparing the way for the revolt from the Church that was to break his heart.

THE HERITAGE OF ROME AND GREECE

What did these eager scholars find in the literature of Rome and Greece that so admirably expressed the sentiments they felt rising all about them? They found the arid field of textual criticism, the tools of the grammarian, the thin white light of the scholar's passion; they found the periods of Cicero and the rules of Quintillian. These things doomed Europe to centuries of schooling in the polished and studied but meager literature of Rome, to a formal and barren preoccupation with the bones of language, with style engraved on mediocre thought, to the sodden horrors of imitation Horace and veneer Virgil; if they did not stifle scientific thought, they at least guaranteed that no schoolboy should hear of it. In countless ways the world has paid dearly for the revival of learning. Yet this was not what they were seeking, and it was not the true gold they found. They discovered a great authority for their break with the medieval spirit, and out of the conflict of authorities eventually arose freedom. They discovered the beauty of form that men about them were prodigally pouring forth, and in Plato its justification. The Platonism of the Renaissance, if it lacked the full-bodied life of the Greek poet and wandered off into the vagaries of Neo-Platonic mysticism, of astrology and magic and strange secret lore, compounded of Arabian and Jewish dreams, had at least regained its joy in beauty. In spiritually minded, disembodied Florence the Platonic Academy lived again as in a vision. There Ficino the translator and the musician sought to reconcile Plato and Moses, Socrates and Christ, and burned his lamp before his master's shrine. These gentle, tolerant, all-sympathetic Pico, "the Earl of Mirandola, and a great Lord in Italy," celebrated Plato's birthday, and sought a universal religion commingled of Platonism, the Jewish Kabbala, and Christianity. There Bembo the Cardinal discoursed of the love that is not of the flesh fleshly, but of the spirit in beauty, and made living again the *Phædrus*, and Socrates's wise priestess, Diotima, like a figure of Botticelli. Tempered with the sanity of Aristotle, Spenser even pressed Plato into the service of the Virgin Queen, and carried a haunting and romantic beauty into the green fields of England. Plato, too, brought mathematics once more into repute, and thus by devious ways led Europe to take up again the thread of Alexandrian natural science. Full earnestly the age believed with the poet of the myths that "the soul that hath most of worth shall come to birth as a poet, lover, philosopher, musician, or artist."

But most of all the humanist scholars brought from their Cicero and their Greeks the happy, natural, and wholesome enjoyment of the goods of human life in a refined civilization, and the wisdom and sanity of balance, temperance, the golden mean. Harmless pleasures and natural tendencies they here found regarded as the means out of which reason is to order a good life, not a thing of the Devil to be repressed by divine aid or else to be indulged in shame and guilt. With these ancients, living well was an art, a skillful technique, not a moment of ecstatic rapture in a day of despairing self-torture. Their ideal was "excellence," the complete and perfect functioning of all the potentialities of human nature; their maxim, "Be perfect," be healthy and skilled in mind and body, do not miss a single opportunity of well-rounded development in this rich world. And though in their new-found freedom from monkly asceticism and self-discipline most of the worshipers of the free life of Greece yearned romantically for all the joys and pains of human experience at once, and burned for that crowded hour of glorious life that is really so remote from Greek prudence, not all flared up like Gaston de Foix, who lay dead in his beauty at twenty, lord of five victories. The true Aristotle of the *Ethics* was discovered in deed as well as in text, and the magnificent energies of a Leonardo da Vinci were kept in control by the calm wisdom of an indomitable will. In Spenser's vast allegory of the *Faerie Queene* the moral throughout is Aristotelian moderation.

THE REVOLT FROM THE CHRISTIAN ETHIC

All this meant, of course, a revolt from the Christian ethic: in place of love, joy in the exercise of man's God-given powers; in place of obedience to the will of God, freedom and responsibility under reason; in place of faith, it became more and more clear, the fearless quest of the intellect. Nowhere is this conception of the worth of human personality in itself so nobly expressed as in Pico's *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, which rivals the famous chorus from *Antigone*.

Then the Supreme Maker decreed that unto Man, on whom he could bestow naught singular, should belong in common whatsoever had been given to his other creatures. Therefore he took man, made in his own individual image, and having placed him in the center of the world, spake to him thus: "Neither a fixed abode, nor a form in thine own likeness, nor any gift peculiar to thyself alone, have we given thee, O Adam, in order that what abode, what likeness, what gifts thou shalt choose, may be thine to have and to possess. The nature allotted to all other creatures, within laws appointed by ourselves, restrains them. Thou, restrained by no narrow bonds, according to thy own free will, in whose power I have placed thee, shalt define thy nature for thyself. I have set thee midmost the world, that hence

thou mightest the more conveniently survey whatsoever is in the world. Nor have we made thee either heavenly or earthly, mortal or immortal, to the end that thou, being, as it were, thy own free maker and moulder, shouldst fashion thyself in what form may like thee best. Thou shalt have power to decline unto the lower or brute creatures. Thou shalt have power to be reborn unto the higher, or divine, according to the sentence of thy intellect." Thus to Man, at his birth, the Father gave seeds of all variety and germs of every form of life.

Upon the monk broke the full fury of the onslaught. From the earliest literature of the Middle Ages his failure to attain his professed purity had, of course, made his backslidings seem only the more brute-like; and now that he too felt the urge of the day and abandoned himself to the frank sensuality of Boccaccio's friars or to the noble cultivation of the humanist, the rapier thrusts of an Erasmus grew only the more bitter. He knew himself that not his attainment, but his very ideal, had been discredited. Keenest and most daring of all the Italians, Lorenzo Valla, puncturer of the forged *Donation of Constantine* on which the papacy rested its legal claim to temporal sovereignty, and hard-headed critic of the Latin Vulgate Bible, in his work on *The Monastic Life* denies all value to asceticism and "holiness," and in his treatise *On Pleasure* sympathizes with the Epicurean who places the highest good in tranquil pleasure, declares that the prostitute is better than the nun in that she makes men happy while the nun lives in shameful and futile celibacy, and calls it irrational to die for one's country or for any other ideal. Even his Christian only postpones happiness to another life. In the Teutonic lands, where monasticism had never been so popular as in the South, many followed Erasmus's lead in extolling the sanctity and chastity of married love, and placing the life of the true Christian in the world. To them contemplation was idleness and solitude mere selfishness.

THE HUMANISTIC SPIRIT

In the South this revulsion inspired a return at times to an almost pure paganism. Three famous aphorisms attributed to Italians well express this spirit. "You follow infinite objects; I follow the finite," said Cosimo de' Medici; "you place your ladders in the heavens, I on earth, that I may not seek so high or fall so low." "If we are not ourselves pious," said Pope Julius II, "why should we prevent other people from being so?" "Let us enjoy the papacy," said Medicean Leo X, "now that God has given it to us." Italian art well exemplifies the perfect blending of the Christian and the pagan. God or angel, virgin or boy, Cupid or Saint Sebastian, pierced with his own arrows, Saint John the Baptist or Dionysius—who can tell which was in the minds of the Florentines who painted so exquisitely Madonna and Venus alike? Under

the great Renaissance popes, before the Catholic reformation drove Rome with the North back to the Middle Ages, it almost seemed that the new learning, the new art, and the new love of the pulse of life were to be made Christian and assimilated into an even more magnificent synthesis than the great thirteenth century had achieved. Who does not know the legend of Pope Alexander Borgia, reveling in his marvelous chambers in the Vatican, all sprinkled by Pinturicchio with the blue and rose and gold pageantry of Italian life masquerading as holy saints and antique goddesses, the madonna and saints upon the wall, Isis and Osiris on the ceiling? Here he dwelt tasting of every joy with *La Bella Giulia* and his adored children the duke of Gandia, the idolized Cesare Borgia, and the fair Lucrezia; here, the story goes, he celebrated many a pagan rite on holy feast-days.

The Italians revolted from the Christian ethic to a sheer delight in the million forms of beauty, and cultivated every natural impulse into its appropriate fine art. With the Venetian colorists they heaped up the sumptuous banquet with strange fruits brought by argosies from the Levant, and dined in shimmering silk and ermine against a background of marble palace and wave-lapped gardens, stilling mind and spirit that every sense might lie the more open to the gorgeous sunset splendor of the Adriatic lagoons. They ceaselessly studied with Leonardo, not the surface, but the soul of things, seeking by every art and every science to lay bare the Mona Lisa smile of life. They were content to rest in the tender form and softened color in which simple, soulful Raphael bathed the commonest objects and figures, basking forever in the clear calm sunshine of a summer's afternoon. Or they deliberately provoked with Michelangelo the stark beauty of the strong man in the throes of passion, stopping, like the bravo-goldsmit Benvenuto Cellini, at no crime or madness that in the supreme moment they might thrill with the ecstasy of struggle and discern the lineaments of terror.

But the Northern peoples found more in life than beauty, however tragic; nor were they ever able to transmute each gesture into a picture. Great, sprawling, multitudinous Rabelais, monk and wise physician, grasping with both hands the overflowing fullness of all life from the gutter to the stars, his crammed belly ever shaking with peals of whole-souled laughter, pouring out an unending stream of filthy vituperation upon all who would rob him of a single morsel, however unappetizing—this soul of the ruder and less graceful North devoured the world with no sense of discrimination, no delicacy of nose and palate, and is saved only by his naïve gusto and hearty enjoyment from the sea of mud in which, boy-like, he delights to play. At last Saint Anthony was revenged! Gargantua, his hero, is saved from the monkly stupid-

ity concealed under logic-chopping, to learn all arts, all languages, all sciences, all sports—every scrap of knowledge that Rabelais's keen eye had ferreted out. But most characteristic of all is the new abbey of Theleme, built by Gargantua as a reward for the help of a lusty monk. To the last detail it is the Renaissance negation of all that Cîteaux or Clairvaux had stood for.

There shall be no wall, no clock summoning to duties, no monks or nuns admitted; none but fair women and handsome men are to be allowed, living together in pleasant companionship. There shall be no compulsion to stay; and in place of the monastic vows, every one may marry, and all should be rich and live at liberty. The abbey itself is to be the dream of a Renaissance despot, a veritable Chambord or Blois, with alabaster fountains, courts, picture-galleries, and libraries stocked with books in every tongue. Over the gates is a long inscription excluding all bigots, hypocrites, dissemblers, attorneys, barristers, usurers, thieves, liars, drunkards, and cannibals, and inviting all noble blades and brisk and handsome people, faithful expounders of the Scriptures, and lovely ladies, stately, proper, fair, and mirthful.

All their life was spent not in laws, statutes, or rules, but according to their own free will and pleasure. They rose out of their beds when they thought good; they did eat, drink, labour, sleep, when they had a mind to it, and were disposed for it. None did awake them, none did offer to constrain them to eat, drink, nor to do any other thing; for so had Gargantua established it. In all their Rule and strictest tie of their order there was but this one clause to be observed, *Do what thou wilt*. Because men that are free, well-born, well-bred, and conversant in honest companions, have naturally an instinct and spur that prompteth them unto virtuous actions, and withdraws them from vice, which is called honor. Those same men, when by base subjection and constraint they are brought under and kept down, turn aside from that noble disposition by which they formerly were inclined to virtue, to shake off and break that bond of servitude wherein they are so tyrannously enslaved; for it is agreeable with the nature of man to long after things forbidden and to desire what is denied us.

The very spirit of the Renaissance revolt is in the passage where we are bidden to flee from

that rabble of squint-minded fellows, dissembling and counterfeit saints, demure lookers, hypocrites, pretended zealots, tough friars, buskin monks, and other such sect of men who disguise themselves like maskers to deceive the world. . . . Fly from these men, abhor and hate them as much as I do, and upon my faith you will find yourself the better for it. And if you desire to be good Pantagruelists, that is, to live in peace, joy, health, making yourselves always merry, never trust those men that always peep out through a little hole.

Akin to the Rabelaisian gusto in life high and low are those canvases painted to adorn the homes of solid Flemish merchants, true revelations of

the heart of the bourgeois. Riotous tavern rooms, and drunken and obscene festivals, men caught in the performance of the various bodily functions, mingled with the rollicking dance or the skating party, and the satin refinements of middle-class interiors, with their cards, their singers and players, their wooings—rich, comfort-loving Flanders and staider Holland loved the life they saw about them, even when family pride dictated yards of somber and beruffed merchant dignitaries. Gargantuan, indeed, are those sprawling acres of red and yellow Rubens crammed with nude and corpulent Flemish beauties striving desperately to force their peasant strength to appear voluptuous; compared with the grossest abandonment of Venetian Tintoretto or Veronese, they betray the telltale marks of the *nouveau-riche* aping the grace of wealth well-borne that is bred of long traditions of luxury. But in Holland, in the spotless neatness of a servant in the courtyard or a housewife busied about her tasks, in Vermeer and de Hooch, appears that sense of the dignity of thrift and industry, of Luther's chambermaid serving God more truly than any ascetic nun, that tells us that the Renaissance here in the hard-working North has passed into the more Puritan ethic of middle-class virtue. German humanism, too, always prone to forget the end of the enrichment of life in the harsh and crabbed means, delighting in all the minutiae of the apparatus, finds in the inexhaustible profusion of Albrecht Dürer its appropriate expression. For it there is little of sensuous beauty; but the rude, stark outlines of life itself, the literal-minded dwelling on the last detail of the imaginative vision, the intense seriousness of the preoccupation with the furniture of practical life, whether in the creased strength of those faces of his merchant friends—"I think the more exact and like a man a picture is the better the work," he said—or in the sharp and angular multiplication of his apocalyptic allegories where flame grows in real pillars and the Lamb has in truth seven eyes and seven horns—this explains why the same forces that gave Italy her painters gave Germany her Luther. Dürer, too, is democratic; not content with serving the high-born despot or merchant prince, as the Italians were, he delighted in spreading himself far and wide in woodcuts, and German engraving joined the German printing-press in bringing the Protestant version of the Bible into every household.

The new appreciation of human life, however, gave the North more than Rabelaisian rioting and German patient seriousness; one can rejoice in the play of light upon the surfaces of things and yet discriminate the shadows; one can accord the appetites their full due and still find in the soul of man, its surge of passion and the wonder, the glory of its infinite longing, the utmost of humanity. Dutch Rembrandt knew well how to see life objectively in its

beauty and fullness, and yet, by the inevitable darkness in which light is set, point to the mystery of inward unseen things and unexplored continents of the spirit. There is in him a balance and restraint and a hint that the half is not told, that contrasts alike with the finitude of perfect beauty in the Italians, and the monotonous repetition, all on one level, like the endless but flat ocean, of the Rabelaisian Flemings. In these respects he is of kindred spirit to the great Elizabethan poets and dramatists, just as Holland is of all lands most like England. The canvas of Shakespeare is as broad as that of Rabelais, and infinitely deeper; he need not pour himself out in an endless stream, because his world is peopled with an endless variety of finite figures. With him restraint and reserve betoken a power incalculably greater than Rabelais's seemingly inexhaustible profusion. Before us he sends every sort and condition of man, save, significantly enough, the saint, each moving by inward vitality, characters strong and rich yet living in perfect definiteness; in language, too, his poetry has a wealth of robust life without the bombastic lordliness of most of his contemporaries. Throughout there is the intense love of this mortal flesh; the very essence of the new valuation of life is summed up in *Measure for Measure*, where to the Duke's medieval reflections on the nothingness of this life, Claudio in prison can answer only, "It is a fearful thing to die." It is significant, too, of the humanistic spirit that Shakespeare's characters struggle, not with any limited ideas or philosophies of his own age, but with the universal forces of human nature that transcend all particular intellectual formulation; they live by their pure humanity, oblivious to the abstract problems of the succeeding age, the theological conflicts of the era of Milton, or the scientific controversies of that of Voltaire. Humanism had an intensely practical interest in the forces within human nature, and bothered little with man's beliefs about the larger setting of his life; it was far more anthropocentric than the thirteenth century, whose chief concern was God, or the eighteenth, whose problems lay in Nature.

Yet perhaps Shakespeare was too much the artist, too sympathetic with the Italian spirit to express truly every side of English aspiration. There is an infinite yearning after the stars, far sweeter than all possible attainment, that lies deep in the soul of the English and the Germans, the Faust-spirit in man thirsting for endless knowledge and power rather than finite beauty; and to the Elizabethans it was given to clothe this spirit in poetry. This romanticism, so alien to the ancient world and so incomprehensible to the Latin mind, which prefers the clear, unclouded survey of a modest segment of life to the dreaming adventure in the realms that are not as yet, the methodical cultivation of the *rentier* of modest but secure income to the

blind and ceaseless struggle after power over men and things, touched every nation in the Renaissance, but it took root and flowered in England most of all. Christopher Marlowe, Cambridge scholar, wild and immoderate, fittingly killed in a tavern brawl, in magnificent and bombastic verses pours out this love of something in life more than life.

Our souls whose faculties can comprehend the world,
And measure every wandering planet's course,
Still climbing after knowledge infinite
And always moving as the restless spheres—

these souls speak in Marlowe. Tamburlaine the world conqueror, boundless in his ambition for power, Barabbas the Jew insatiable for money, Doctor Faustus, that consummate expression of this aspect of the new life, who sold his soul to the Devil in return for the chance to know everything, do everything, feel everything: these men are filled with an eternal dissatisfaction and an everlasting craving for some great vague thing that when grasped reveals itself as power. Not science, not wisdom, not the inward glory of the understanding mind—for this the Renaissance cared far less than did the thirteenth century, carelessly appropriating new worlds which it never bothered to see as they were—but that enhancement of personality that comes with power: it is for this that Faustus is groping.

Philosophy is odious and obscure;
Both law and physic are for petty wits;
Divinity is basest of the three . . .
'Tis magic, magic, that hath ravished me.

'Tis magic, indeed, that ravished the age, the magic that abandons understanding to gain power. The power comes easily, but without understanding it is soon squandered in the petty childishness of Faustus's desires; he has lost his soul for mere voluptuousness. The barbarian North has rarely paused in this yearning for power to question, To what end? It is not too much to see in Francis Bacon, that prophet of the fruits of science who blindly opposed the scientific discoveries of his own day, who knew that knowledge was the power to effect all things possible and fell for lack of common honesty, the very epitome of the Faustus spirit in which the modern world has wasted its boundless gifts of Nature's secrets. Our science has indeed been too often a mere magic, a black magic that brings destruction; we know the secret of the atoms—and invent torpedoes and poison gases. And yet—back of all this Baconian thirst for power that leads to the dull degradation of Manchester and the imperialistic massacres of Amritsar, there is an inner striving for a something beyond that counts these products as mere baubles after all.

The monk was gone, and his striving for a perfection beyond life gave way to a striving for a fullness of life. It is for others to decide whether this was an advance; we can only record, and murmur with Bruno, most Elizabethan of Italians, "Even if the longed-for goal be never reached, even though the violence of the striving consume the soul utterly, yet is it enough that it should burn so nobly."

THE DIVERGING STREAMS OF HUMANISM

It is thus apparent that we should speak of many different aspects of the new spirit rather than of a single homogeneous humanistic urge. The rising tides of a concern with man's life in this world, which did not so much offer a new answer to the old problem of supernatural salvation as push it more and more into the background, took various forms in various minds. These differences in the incidence of the humanistic spirit, most important of which were the divergencies between the South and the North, were one of the earliest indications of the newer nationalistic forms in which European life was to flow. Rooted in diverse traditions and owing perhaps something to the ancient differences of the Latin and barbarian stocks, they certainly took shape chiefly because of the diverging economic pursuits and natural conditions in Italy and Germany. Superficially Italian humanism was far more of a break with the past; the North seemed to keep more of the older spirit. Yet it was the North that felt the impulse of the forces that were to dominate the new age; the North broke from the Church, and turned to commerce, to industry, and to science, while Italy burnt itself out in glorious extravagance and soon returned to agriculture and the spirit of medieval life.

Life offered to the Italian humanist essentially enjoyment and creation; to the German, labor and self-discipline. For the former, the Christian scheme gave way to a Greek morality, in which life was an art, freed from all sense of obligation. Religious interest gave him little concern, unless we can speak of a religion of beauty. His ideal was the universal man, the completely rounded personality of a Leonardo; he strove to absorb everything, and his culture became syncretistic, retaining all the conflicting elements of the Greeks, the Romans, and the Christians, and reconciling them in a universal symbolism. Zeus, Jupiter, God—all meant the same reality. Such an ideal of necessity remained aristocratic, with little rootage in popular feeling; it produced a cosmopolitan and artistic upper class, which easily gave way before the onslaught of the Counter-Reformation. The German turned rather to a Roman morality; life was a Stoic discipline, a task and a calling. He remained strongly religious, though his obligations became ethical rather than supernatural. He

was devoted to education and learning rather than to art and beauty. Democratic rather than aristocratic, he sought his ideal as a member of an ordered society rather than as an independent personality; before his eyes hovered a new society of brotherly work rather than of splendid gods. More literal-minded than the Italian, he could not combine diverse elements and see the universal in the multifarious symbols; there is a vast difference between the imagination of the great Italian painters and Dürer, the Dutch, and the Flemings. Hence he was led to break with the past rather than to reinterpret it; he became the heretic of the Reformation, not the modernistic and indifferent Medicane. Indeed, the later divergency between the Catholics and the Protestants is already at hand in the diverse forms which the humanistic urge took in the South and the North. The causes of these differences are obscure; fundamental was the fact that commerce was shifting to the North and creating there a new middle class, while the more developed South had lost its commercial urge and was living on its capital.

The Northern humanists passed by easy stages from the medieval faith to an enlightened and urbane cosmopolitanism. The first of the Germans, Rudolf Agricola, Rudolf von Langen, and Alexander Hegius, rector of the famous school at Deventer, were pupils of Thomas à Kempis, famous mystic and author of the *Imitation of Christ*; touched by the Italian learning, they abandoned scholasticism and worked for educational reform without criticizing the system of the Church. To them succeeded men like Reuchlin and Erasmus, whose learning had freed them from the medieval world view at the same time they sought to preserve its institutions through drastic reform and modification. More radical, if less sagacious and prudent, were the younger men like Crotus Rubianus and Ulrich von Hutten, whose rebellion led naturally to the Lutheran revolt.

THE MODERNITY AND THE TRAGEDY OF ERASMUS

To the modern mind it is the second group, above all Erasmus, who stood for those ideals with which it has the most sympathy, ideals which, submerged by the Reformation for two hundred years, finally flowered in the naturalism and humanitarianism of the eighteenth century. Erasmus was surely the incarnation of the ideal humanist, in his faults as well as his virtues. His narrow interests reflect the limitations of the humanistic attitude, and explain its impotence before the deeper forces of the age. Caring naught for the marvelous art of his generation, unconcerned with the new world opening before men's eyes, bitterly hostile to a scientific interest as turning men's minds from the human problems of morality, he typifies the humanism that worshiped

Roman Cicero rather than the greater Greeks. Nor does he stand out for any original thought, any great new discovery; the best of the past, not the growing future, was his concern. Even in character and temper of mind he stands rather for tolerance, for conciliation and mediation, than for a forceful and courageous facing of new issues. He remained a witty, urbane, and charming conservative; he had not the strength or the convictions to take his place in the van as a pioneer of the new age. These defects must be remembered when we regret that his spirit could not have prevailed rather than Luther's. Consummate in destroying old prejudices and overthrowing the medieval world, he had nothing to offer in its place save a rather negative liberality of mind; and the world was sorely in need of something to take the place of the old. He lived too soon to see that to science belonged the future; and without the sure support of science and its burning faith, the great qualities of his attitude could not prevail. Not until they were firmly allied with the new scientific spirit could naturalism and humanitarianism such as his spread mightily.

Yet his qualities were great, indeed, and shine all the more by contrast with the turbulent fanaticisms from which he shrank, but whose deep passions he was powerless to illuminate with his own reasonableness. The most civilized man of his age, he had an abiding faith that man was destined to be a rational animal and a shrewd vision that told him he has missed his vocation. He was at home in the Augustan age, in the circle of the polished Cicero or the cultivated Horace; and after converse with these friends he found the ruder society of Rotterdam or London or Basel a subject at times for intellectual amusement, at times for condescending pity, and at times for burning indignation. Too keenly alive to the fruits of human folly to tolerate it with the resignation of a Montaigne, too intensely serious in his moral fervor to accept it as inevitable with Spinoza, he spent his great gifts of irony and satire in the hopeless attempt to make sweetness and light prevail against the superstitions of tradition and the eternal passions. A liberal adrift in a sea of warring fanatics, he found his exposure of the irrational side of medieval life popular because men had outgrown it; but his own remedy of the wisdom of the schools of antiquity, above all his rationalized Christian ethics, fell on deaf ears. He prided himself on being the Christianizer of the Renaissance and the humanizer of Christianity; he saw in Jesus an enlightened moral teacher and in "the philosophy of Christ" the life of reason warmed by benevolent love. He sought to wean men away from the mysteries of faith and attach their piety to the sureties of a civilized culture. For him the gospel and the Greeks merged into a single undogmatic religion of simple morality. "When I read certain passages of these great men," he wrote of the Greeks, "I can

hardly refrain from saying, ‘Saint Socrates, pray for me.’ ” “Their philosophy lies rather in the affections than in syllogisms; it is a life more than a debate, an inspiration rather than a discipline; a transformation rather than a reasoning. What else, pray, is the philosophy of Christ?”

With such ideals he found plenty about him to castigate. When he held up to laughter the follies of the monk, of the scholastic doctors, of ceremonial formalism, he won the plaudits of those who felt these passing features of the medieval world anomalous in the new age; and when he exalted the simple virtues of the home and business, he was expressing what all men felt. But when he held the rod of reason up to the new irrationalism of the Reformers and of the rising military nationalism, he found that men discard old superstitions only to welcome new. They might abandon medievalism, but that made them no readier to follow the philosophy of Christ or the life of reason. Erasmus ended his life, as humanism in the narrower sense died out, rejected alike by the priests of the old and the prophets of the new. Not until Voltaire did another cosmopolitan appear who so filled the European stage and so mightily battled against superstition and cruelty and dogmatism, and when Voltaire took up the pen of Erasmus he had what the humanism of the Renaissance never enjoyed, the mighty ally of science.

THE IDEAL OF THE GENTLEMAN

We have tried to gain a sense of the new interests and aspirations that, vague, complex, and indefinite as they are, yet form the confused goal that modern man has set himself. In this time of renewed delight in human life there were gradually formulated two more definite ideals that to this day claim a primary allegiance in our civilization. They are the figure of the gentleman and the picture of the industrious, prosperous commercial society. They are complementary class ideals; the state must be industrious if individuals can hope to flourish as gentlemen. The one is pagan and aristocratic and came from Italy; the other is Protestant and industrial and was made in Germany. . . .

The gentleman was the composite product of the courtly knight of idealized chivalry and the humanistic, artistic graces of the commercial towns. When the feudal lord left his rural isolation he attached himself to the circle of some powerful prince, who had attracted to his own luxurious company a brilliant court. The fascination of an intense social life and the richer revenues that relieved him of remunerative pillaging and foraying drew him irresistibly to his fellows; he was still the courteous knight, but he had laid down the cross to take up the new beauty of human life. This happened first in Italy because the towns there grew wealthy first, and because the Italian nobility first gave

way to strong princes who gained power by what they were rather than by what their ancestors had been. At the courts of the great captains and adventurers who grew rich through fighting commercial wars for the merchants who were too busy to bother governing themselves, of the Visconti and the Sforza who ruled Milan, the Malatesta of Rimini, the Gonzaga of Mantua, the Este of Ferrara, and all the rest, or in the circles of the merchant princes who directly ruled more commercial Venice and Florence, the lesser nobles mingled with the artists sprung from the people and assimilated genius and skill as they imparted the graces of gentility. In Italy gentle birth and wealth and individual attainment lived on equal terms; to shine there required a personal brilliance which almost out-weighed all else. Thus was created a new type, the "universal man," the all-sided man, the well-rounded personality, who added to the perfect exercise of every physical power a universal learning and a real proficiency in many differing arts. It was the very antithesis of the specialist, the professional, and yet it meant vastly more than the mere dilettante. In Italy the greatest examples of this "uomo universale" were the artist-scholars, men like Michelangelo, or, greatest of all, Leonardo, painters, sculptors, architects, poets, engineers, and thinkers. Typical is Alberti, marvelously dexterous in physical exercises, perfect in archery and riding, master of arms and of music, painter, Latin stylist, whose health broke down at twenty-four from overstudy of law and who turned for repose to physics, mathematics, the crafts, and building churches and temples. In the North, where agriculture was supreme and feudalism lingered on, the universal man was more apt to be the courtier, primarily a soldier and statesman who added thereto all things else. That chevalier "without fear and without reproach," Bayard, was the model of the French court of the Renaissance patron Francis I, while Sir Philip Sidney, idol of the English people, warrior, poet, and truly noble soul, who gave his flask of water to a common soldier as he lay dying on the field of Zutphen, added a sincerity and a romantic English patriotism. The type lives on in the cultivated gentlemen of England's disappearing governing class, like Lord Balfour, equally agile at tennis and at skeptical and urbane conservatism; but the ideal in its outlines is still the aim of every liberal education.

Baldassare Castiglione, himself a perfect exemplar, reported in *The Book of the Courtier* the conversations in the hall of the Duke of Urbino in which the perfect courtier was defined. Translated into many tongues, this code of etiquette carried the Italian graces into the ruder courts of the North; all Elizabethan England went to school to it. Gentle birth is an advantage, as predisposing to the gentle heart; the leisure of riches is essential. The Courtier must be skilled in arms and manly exercises, with grace rather than mere

strength; he must be a poet and a musician and an accomplished linguist. Dignity and proud humility must clothe him, loyalty and true friendship must be his. At his side stands the lady, who has stepped down from her chivalric pedestal to become the true companion of the courtier, his equal in freedom and in education—there appears the long procession of Shakespeare's noble women. What inspiration the knight had found in the service and love of God is to be his in the spiritualized and mystic love that, starting with perfect friendship, aspires to the stars.

THE NEW ETHIC OF INDUSTRY AND THRIFT

This ideal of individual perfection is of necessity aristocratic and exclusive: it presupposes peasants and craftsmen to make it possible. In Holland and in Germany there grew up the ideal of a society that could support such gods.

This new conception of the dignity of a human society in which the walks of life are intrinsically good, and industry, thrift, and productive labor are elevated into the cardinal virtues, though it was best formulated by Luther, really owes little save in a negative way to the Protestant revolt. It is the natural fruit of the marriage of the medieval craft society interpreted in the spirit of restrained sobriety native to the Germans, and the increasing complexity and wealth of economic life. The heart of the North lay in its daily business, and as that grew in importance it cared less and less for monkish asceticism and the control of a spiritual power. It came more and more to love prosperity and success, and to think of solitude as selfish, contemplation idleness, poverty a punishment, and married and industrial life as truly godly. In so far as there is a causal connection, it was this spirit which at bottom created the indifference and hostility to the Catholic sacramental and financial systems that broke out in open religious and political revolt. The Protestant Reformation, in the hands of Luther and his fellows, was in no sense a moral movement seeking to raise the moral tone of society; indeed, ethically its first results were a distinct degradation and sordidness. It was not till the second generation that the fierce passion of Calvin for holiness kindled the consuming flames of Puritanism. The humanists like Erasmus, the true reformers of Christian life and apostles of simple gospel virtue, were swept aside by quite different forces. It mattered little whether the Catholic system were well or ill administered; the important thing was that it was useless and costly.

The significance of Luther's ideas we shall examine later; it is enough to point out here that his religious beliefs were a medieval reaction back to the literal details of the Christian drama, above all to a sense of the overwhelming need of salvation, tempered by his own intense experience that the

all-important personal salvation from the wrath of God comes in a direct and mystical relation between God and man without the intermediary of any external church or priest or sacrament whatsoever. When once faith in the forgiving love of God in Christ has freed man from all fear of the wrath to come, he is already saved; he need do nothing more nor concern himself in the slightest with any part of the apparatus of penance and monkly austerity and ascetic denial for the sake of winning his way to some future salvation. Thus at one stroke the whole necessity for regarding the Christian way of life developed by the saints and the monasteries, as in any way essential for the attainment of either present peace of mind or future bliss, is swept away. This does not mean that the nerve of morality is cut; it means only that its whole entanglement with supernatural beliefs and magic practices, the fear of Hell and the taking of the sacraments, has gone by the board, and that in its place the way is left open for a thoroughly naturalistic ideal here in this world. Thus the Protestants who believed that salvation was an entirely unmoral and purely religious thing, in no wise concerned with the ethical perfecting of man's character—in other words, that it was the result of faith and not of good works—found the old ascetic, dualistic ideal of Christianity gone, and the place left open for whatsoever human life they deemed most fit. Protestants were, indeed, as free to give themselves to the new ideal of a dignified and worthy human life in a natural setting as if they had lost all belief in a God or a hereafter. Religion became a special thing apart, not a spirit filling the whole of life, a matter, it soon came naturally enough to be for many, for Sunday observance only, while the week-day was given over to seeking success and prosperity.

But this last is the decay of Protestantism, and no more its essence than cynical formalism is truly Catholicism. It is sometimes a problem, for those who can conceive of virtue only as enforced by the policeman, how it was that Lutherans and Calvinists so often led lives of such singular and exalted purity when they were convinced that this conduct made not one whit of difference, and that they were saved or damned by a pure act of faith over which they even had no control, since faith itself came from God and not man. The answer is that these men really believed in God, believed that morality was supreme in the universe; and they served God's goodness, not for any selfish end of escaping Hell or gaining Heaven, but for pure love of his nature. . . .

. . . If a man walks uprightly in love and mercy, that is a sign, and the only sign, that he is saved, that he has a proper faith in God. With such a faith his life will naturally and freely flower in moral virtue. Naturally such com-

plete freedom left to the believer is dangerous, for, being released from the need of obeying any moral law, he can give any content to his life without fear of Hell. Hence while Luther confidently refused to abridge this Christian freedom, Calvin and his followers timidly searched the letter of the Scriptures for prescriptions as to man's duties, and converted the free and natural ideal of the German into Puritan theocracy. Hence, also, the ease with which the Protestant turned to what attracted him most, preoccupation with material welfare. And thus, in spite of the fact that the Reformation was in many respects religiously a renewed intensification of medieval beliefs, it left the way open morally to a thoroughly worldly social ideal of labor and commercial gain. There was every reason for the middle class to welcome Protestantism, and for the growing commercial world of the North to feel at home in it.

Luther himself put this content into the life his free Christian should lead. Since no special religious practices are necessary, all callings, even the most secular and humble, are equally sacred, and God can be best served in the ties of family and business, by doing the daily task faithfully and joyfully with trust in God and devotion to his will.

What you do in your house is worth as much as if you did it up in heaven for our Lord God. For what we do in our calling here on earth in accordance with his word and command he counts as if it were done in heaven for him. It looks like a great thing when a monk renounces everything and goes into a cloister, carries on a life of asceticism, fasts, watches, and prays. . . . On the other hand, it looks like a small thing when a maid cooks and cleans and does other housework. But because God's command is there, even such a small work must be praised as a service of God far surpassing the holiness and asceticism of all the monks and nuns. For here there is no command of God. But there God's command is fulfilled, that one should honor father and mother and help in the care of the home. . . . Thus it is impossible that he should take his ease in this life, and not work for the good of his neighbors, since he must needs speak, act and converse among men. . . . It is the part of a Christian to take care of his own body for the very purpose that by its soundness and well-being he may be enabled to labor, and to acquire and preserve property, for the aid of those who are in want. . . . Here is the truly Christian life, here is faith really working by love, when a man applies himself with joy and love to the works of that freest servitude in which he serves others voluntarily for naught, himself abundantly satisfied in the fulness and riches of his own faith.

There is here a mixture of the medieval ideal of service and the new ideal of work and property-seeking. Since the very core of Luther's teaching was the liberation of man's spirit from religious fears to live what life God in his goodness should prompt him to, sublime confidence in God's love and complete trust in human nature perfected by faith, it was only to be expected that

his followers should increasingly devote themselves to the economic activities that seemed to them good. Thus industry and thrift and saving and hard labor for well-earned gain flourished on Protestant soil, and the God-fearing business man took his place with the beauty-loving artist and the resplendent courtier as types of the modern preoccupation with the natural man in his natural setting, and Saint Bernard was left in his cell to thunder and adore alone and Saint Francis in his Umbrian fields to sing unheard.

Chapter VII

THE REFORMATION AND NATIONAL CHURCHES



I. THE PROTESTANT REVOLT

THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION

THE SPIRIT of restlessness and resentment within the Roman Catholic Church in the later Middle Ages came to a head in an open secession which ran its course between 1517 and 1648. This movement is usually called the Protestant Reformation and is also known as the Protestant Revolution. Catholic scholars usually prefer the term "Revolution" because the word "Reformation" implies that the Protestants actually reformed or improved the Catholic religious system of the Middle Ages. This, of course, the Catholics are not willing to admit. The fact is that the movement started as a reformation within the Church and ended in a revolution and secession from the Church. This latter development was inevitably produced as a joint result of the fiery and violent character of Luther and his tactics and of the obstinacy and stupidity of the Catholic leaders in resisting more moderate reform proposals.

It has been assumed by many that the Renaissance produced the Reformation. But it seems that this is true only in the sense of a somewhat ironical remark once made by Professor Robinson to the effect that the mythical Renaissance which exists in the mind of old-fashioned historians may have caused the mythical Reformation which they also envisage. Between actual Humanism and literal Protestantism there was little real intellectual affinity or genetic relationship. Humanism meant in its intellectual aspects a secular cultivation of pagan learning. The Protestant revolt promoted theological

This chapter consists of material by three different authors. Sections 1 and 4 are from *The History of Western Civilization* (Vol. I, pp. 847-70; New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935), by Harry Elmer Barnes, with the collaboration of Henry David. Section 2, designed especially for the present volume, was written for its first edition by Herbert W. Schneider. Sections 3 and 5 are from *European History 1500-1815* (pp. 167-86; New York, American Book Co., 1940), by Mitchell B. Garrett.

controversies over Christian doctrine. The most discernible relationship between the two lay in the fact that the scholarly training obtained by some Protestant Humanists in their classical studies later aided them as religious students and controversialists. In addition, the secular individualism of the Renaissance helped on the religious individualism of Protestantism. With most other phases of Protestantism, Humanism had little if any connection.

If any of the Protestant reformers derived theological inspiration from the Humanists, it was from the incidental piety and Christianity of these scholars and not from their Humanism. If Luther was impelled to ecclesiastical and doctrinal reform by his study of Erasmus's writings, it was due to the ideas of Erasmus the Christian and not to those of Erasmus the Humanist. The exuberance of Erasmus over the writings and doctrines of Cicero could never have been the starting-point for the theological views and intellectual attitudes of Luther, Calvin, Knox, or Jonathan Edwards. Cicero's beautiful little motto "We who search for hypotheses are prepared both to refute without prejudice and to be refuted without resentment" could hardly have been the inspiration from which Calvin derived his canons of urbanity, as exemplified in his burning of Servetus at the stake after their verbal tilt over the nature of the Trinity.

The important point is that, strictly speaking, Humanism on the one hand, and Lutheranism and Calvinism on the other, were fundamentally opposed. Humanism was at least incidentally a moderate revolt against the supernaturalism and otherworldliness of Patristic and Scholastic Christianity. The Protestant revolt brought with it an all-pervading revival of even grosser forms of supernaturalism, diabolism, miracle-mongering, witchcraft, and other manifestations of this general cultural complex. It is true, of course, that many Humanists were pre-Reformation critics of the ecclesiastical abuses, but they were loyal Catholics, with few exceptions, and merely wished for reform within the Church. Humanism may have promoted criticism of the Renaissance Church, but it certainly did not intentionally promote the spirit of Protestantism. Perhaps the most plausible of the indirect influences of the Renaissance on the Reformation lay in the stimulus that the former gave to the spirit of individualism. But individuality expressed itself quite differently in Humanism and in art from the manner in which it asserted itself in Protestantism. Moreover, the cult of humanity and beauty that Renaissance individualism promoted was suppressed once more by supernaturalism under the reign of Protestantism.

In short, the Renaissance and the Reformation were highly unlike in general cultural interests and intellectual outlook. We may agree with Erasmus's

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observation that if Luther hatched the egg that he (Erasmus) had laid, it was quite a different bird from that which Erasmus had intended it to be.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROTESTANT REVOLT

Like all great historic movements, the Protestant revolt, or the Reformation, which disrupted the Catholic Church in the West and led to the appearance of national or territorial churches and ultimately of a multiplicity of Christian sects, was the product of a complexity of factors. It was in no sense, whether in its causes, in the manner in which it expressed itself, or in its consequences, purely a religious movement. Nor must it be viewed as the result of unique conditions that were peculiar to Europe at the very close of the fifteenth century and the first quarter of the sixteenth. For the Protestant revolt was, in some aspects at least, simply the culmination of truly medieval tendencies and forces. Even Luther, whose historic rôle was that of the detonator of the movement, recognized "that the Reformation was no accident, depending on his own personal intervention, but was inevitable and in progress when he began to preach." The view that the Reformation cannot be correctly regarded as a religious movement pure and simple is well expressed by the great American Church historian H. C. Lea who writes:

In the curious theocracy which dominated the Middle Ages, secular and spiritual interests became so inextricably intermingled that it is impossible wholly to disentangle them; but the motives, both remote and proximate, which led to the Lutheran revolt were largely secular rather than spiritual. . . . [We] may dismiss the religious changes incident to the Reformation with the remark that they were not the object sought but the means for attaining that object.

Viewed in its spiritual phases, the Protestant revolt meant roughly the acceptance of a new Christian theology and the rejection of the Catholic Church as the sole instrument of salvation. In its more significant nonspiritual aspects, the movement appears primarily (1) as the culmination of a long-existing critical attitude toward the tremendous material wealth of the Church and the economic advantages it enjoyed and (2) as a decisive manifestation of the clash between the national state and medieval religious institutions. The importance of the last point cannot be overemphasized, and James Harvey Robinson is fully justified in writing: "The Reformation was . . . essentially a stage in the disengaging of the modern state from that medieval, international ecclesiastical state [that is, the Catholic Church] which had its beginnings in the *ecclesia* of the Acts of the Apostles."

To understand the causes of the Protestant revolt it is necessary to survey the Catholic Church as a secular institution and as a spiritual agency, the

ideals and abuses of the Church, the non-Protestant critics and reformers either of the Church or of Church doctrine, the points of conflict between the national state or secular governments in general and the Church, the economic nature and temper of the age, and the particular local conditions that obtained in the Germanies, where the movement, on the surface at least, first got under way. . . .

The Catholic Church . . . had become by the very height of the Middle Ages an institution with such imposing secular powers that it can best be described as an international state. It had a monarch in the pope and a bureaucracy in its hierarchy of officials. It possessed its legislative assemblies. It had its own laws and its officials who administered them. It was able to coerce and compel obedience to its laws, had its prisons for punishment, and pronounced death sentences. It was a great landowner, and its wealth was not limited to land alone. Its income came from contributions that were not voluntary in nature. It dealt with secular governments as one sovereign power does with another. It treated principalities and even kingdoms as fiefs. It claimed that the power of the pope, as the representative of God on earth, was without limit. Royal or civil authority was thus subject to papal control. "It is," writes Maitland, "no voluntary society; if people are not born into it they are baptized into it when they cannot help themselves." The Church, in short, not only performed many of the functions of a modern state, but it possessed powers which made it a superstate as well.

As long as the secular authorities were relatively weak because of the political decentralization under feudalism, the clash between them and the Holy See, with its claims of unlimited jurisdiction over the temporal powers, did not assume final form. But with the development of the modern national state and the general consolidation of secular authority, even when the national monarchy did not result, the friction between church and state took on a sharper and more critical form. The basic issue between the two was the question of whether there was to be a divided sovereignty within the state. Was the secular ruler to share his sovereign power with the Church by permitting the latter to interfere in the internal affairs of the state? To this question even the most pious of rulers gave an emphatic "No" in answer. In addition to this fundamental problem, there were three secondary points of friction between church and state: (1) The conflict over jurisdiction between secular and ecclesiastical courts and the extent to which the Roman curia could hear appealed cases; (2) the question of whether the property of the clergy was subject to taxation by the national monarch; and (3) the problem of the control of ecclesiastical patronage. With reference to the last it should be

remembered that the papacy laid claim to the right to appoint the new occupants to vacant bishoprics and other posts in complete disregard of the nominations of the royal rulers or of lay patrons and founders. This, of course, threatened the authority of the crown, and made it difficult to have the friends and supporters of the ruler in these important posts. Further, since the papacy came to establish a scale of prices for those offices, from which it secured considerable revenue, the payment of such sums of money by the nominees served to drain the realms of the rulers of a good deal of wealth.

Signal proof of the growth of national sentiment and of the increasing strength of the national rulers is found in the extent to which the universal Church became nationalized *before* 1500. Before Luther appeared on the scene there were national churches. In England, for example, between the end of the thirteenth century and the close of the fourteenth the withdrawal of land from civil jurisdiction by handing it over to the Church was forbidden, the pope could not appoint nominees to English benefices, Englishmen could not appeal from their own courts to Rome, and papal bulls and edicts could not be published without the permission of the crown. In the case of France, the pope by the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges in 1438 was almost stripped of power over appointments, the raising of revenues, and jurisdiction. A Church council was declared to be supreme over the pope. Even with the retraction of the last assertion with the Concordat of Bologna of 1516, which was a compromise between the Roman curia and France, "almost the whole power of appointment, of jurisdiction, and taxation was put into the royal hands." Similar gains were made by the Spanish crown. Even in Italy, where no national unity existed, a Marsiglio of Padua demanded the extension of the power of civil government at the expense of the papacy. In the German states, where there was present a definite national consciousness, but no central government, individual rulers and free cities won the same powers as those exercised by the national monarchs. A strong imperial antipapal (and even anti-clerical) tradition expressed itself in the list of grievances and protests—*Gravamina*, they were called—that were drawn up by the imperial diets from about the middle of the fifteenth century onward. It is not without significance that Charles V, later the vigorous opponent of the Protestant movement, declared when he ascended the imperial throne in 1519 that no German would be handed over for trial in Rome without being tried first in Germany, a policy that accounts for Luther's trial in his native land. In short, the national and other secular rulers before the actual outbreak of the Protestant revolt had successfully contested the claim of unlimited power of the papacy, had gained extensive control over patronage and taxation, had cut down the juris-

diction of the ecclesiastical courts, and were in a position to prohibit the publication of papal edicts and decrees and the entrance of papal legates within their realms. A major reason why the Protestant revolt broke out first in the Germanies was that the decentralized political power there had not been strong enough to curb the pretensions and exactions of the Church as successfully as had the stronger national monarchies. Hence the ecclesiastical abuses were more numerous and flagrant there than in the more centralized national states.

The Church also suffered assault because of its quasi-mechanical theory of salvation and because of certain abuses that were long present within its body. It will be recalled that the Church held that salvation was possible only through certain rites known as sacraments administered, with the exception of baptism, only by the clergy.¹ Members of the clergy had special powers differentiating themselves from laymen, and the Church served as the necessary intermediary between man and God. Further, the moral character of individual members of the clergy in no way affected, it was claimed, their unique spiritual power. Only through the Church could a man be saved.

The abuses from which the Church suffered have long been recognized as a factor in preparing the way for the Reformation. But it is easy to overdo a picture of the corruption and depravity of the Church, and to forget that these were not so much a fundamental cause of the movement of revolt as they were a welcome means of providing powerful weapons with which to attack the Church. Broadly speaking, the corruption of the Church arose either in connection with financial matters or from the immoral lives of clerics entirely apart from money matters. The incredibly low moral standards of the Renaissance popes need no description. It is sufficient to note that their mode of life, with some exceptions, was a constant repudiation of every Christian ideal, and that with Pope Alexander VI (1492-1503) evil and crime became a skillful art. In general, however, it is very probable that the moral tone of the Catholic clergy as a whole was no worse at the opening of the sixteenth century than it had been for many years.

The most common financial abuses of the period involved the sale of offices, known as simony, of justice, of pardons, and of dispensations, and the charging of high fees for the administration of the sacraments. Sinecures were created and sold. The papacy collected huge sums from the clergy in the form of annates and the *servitiae*. Offices were often not filled on the death of their occupants, and the papacy collected the incomes connected with them. The financial difficulties of the papacy led to the wide sale of

¹ The Catholics, of course, did not ignore faith, but they held that faith alone could not save.

indulgences, which provided a rich source of revenue. By the indulgence, which originated in connection with the Crusades, the pope remitted, both for this earth and for Purgatory, the temporal penalties of sin. By the fourteenth century an indulgence was granted for a money payment, and in the next century the remission of penalties in purgatory was extended to the dead. Naturally the sale of indulgences became an active business for the purpose of papal revenues. It was the sale of indulgences that so aroused Luther, and the circumstances surrounding their sale in Germany at that particular time are worth noting, for they give a penetrating insight into the economic evils of the Church. Albert of Brandenburg bought the archbishopric of Mainz from the pope for the sum of 30,000 ducats,² which sum he borrowed from the Fuggers, the great banking house of the age. In order to repay the loan, he then secured from the pope in 1517 for 10,000 ducats a monopoly on the sale of indulgences in certain German regions, including Thuringia and Saxony. It is not without significance that the salesman of indulgences for the archbishop, Johann Tetzel, was accompanied by a representative of the Fuggers.

On the grounds of its corruption, its worldliness, the immorality of its clergy, its theory of salvation, and the papal claims to absolute temporal and spiritual power, the Church had been long under fire. Among its critics on one or more of these points there may be mentioned the Albigenses and the Waldenses, Wycliffe, the Lollards and Huss, a large group of Humanists, among whom Lorenzo Valla, Pico della Mirandola, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, John Colet, John Reuchlin, Ulrich von Hutten, and Erasmus were, on one score or another, notable.

Also to be considered among the critics of the Church, but not falling into any of these groups, are a number of German mystics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries whose ideas profoundly influenced Luther and who, as Preserved Smith remarks, made an early effort "to transcend the economy of salvation offered by the church." Johannes (Meister) Eckhart (1260-1327) and his two disciples, Heinrich Suso (1300-66) and Johann Tauler (about 1300-61), were the most important among the mystics. Their most important contribution was their rejection of a mechanical scheme of salvation through sacraments and their insistence upon a personal one. In their view, there could be no intermediary between the believer and God. They advanced the idea of the union of the soul with the Deity, spoke of immediate communion with God through prayer, and emphasized a transcendental love of God. They desired, as it were, to be "lost in God." Such

² The ducat was worth \$2.25 at a time when that sum had much greater purchasing power than today.

religious mysticism was an extremely individual matter, and while there were groups of mystics who gathered in praying circles, it could never create a mass movement. Other regions aside from Germany produced mystics, too, and the general tendency was manifested in such religious works as *The German Theology* and the *Imitation of Christ* of Thomas à Kempis. It may be observed, in this connection, that the fifteenth century and the early sixteenth were marked by growing religious devotion and piety that implied a simplification of, and heightened emotionalism in, religious experience, and was expressed not only in individuals but in the masses. It need hardly be added that the Reformation period was a religious and not irreligious age.

It was remarked earlier that the economic nature and spirit of the period provide a key to the understanding of the Lutheran revolt. This is true in a number of respects. The major economic changes of the last centuries of the Middle Ages, and later the consequences of the oversea expansion, served to remake Europe economically. A monetary economy and the first stages of a capitalist economy appeared. An urban middle class with ideals and interests which clashed with those of the medieval Church was produced. The growing complexity of economic life and its constantly expanding scope burst through the ideological structure erected by the Schoolmen. Between the growing acquisitive spirit of the age and Church law and ideals, though not Church practice, there was sharp antagonism. The middle class, for example, was opposed to the stand of the Church on interest; it cried out against the movement of wealth across the Alps into Italy in the form of taxes and payments for offices; and it was willing to support the national monarchs or secular rulers in their struggle with the Church. It also looked with great disfavor upon the wealth of the Church and its economic privileges and advantages, which were not open to other men. Both the middle class and lay princes cast envious eyes upon wealth.

Especially in Germany can these elements of discontent be observed. There, likewise, the petty nobility, the knights, were adversely affected by the changing social and economic conditions, and were faced with extinction. Further, their main activity, private warfare, was declared illegal in 1495. It is no wonder that they saw in the possible expropriation of Church lands a way out of their unfortunate position. If one turns to the towns, countless evidences of discontent with the Church and monastic institutions are easily found. The vast amount of capital that was stored in the landed wealth of the Church was needed in a more liquid form for the further expansion of commercial enterprise. Through its heavy taxation and the placing of the revenues in fields that were relatively nonproductive, the Church prevented, in part, the expansion of credit that was so necessary. There were other

grievances too. The monastic orders and the clergy in general claimed immunity from taxation of their property, manufactured goods, and foodstuffs; while, of course, the town governments insisted that they were liable to taxation. The towns were also bitterly opposed to mortmain, which, if carried far enough, could be ruinous to urban finances.

No less discontented were the people of the country, though they directed their protests only in part against the Church. They railed against their secular and clerical feudal overlords. From the close of the fourteenth century on, the peasantry was objecting to the extortions of the clergy, and spoke of the clergy in the sharpest tones. There was no irreligion present in all of this, as the strong emotional religious coloring of the peasant movements of the fifteenth century indicates. Between 1493 and the outbreak of the Lutheran revolt, the peasants (occasionally joined by others) were in almost continuous revolt. These social movements, to which the name *Bundschuh* is applied, were by no means produced by clerical tithes, fines, and other exactions alone. The basic cause appears to have been the disastrous consequences for the peasantry of the attempts of the lay and ecclesiastical lords to reenforce their customary rights, to broaden manorial administration, and to create large estates by encroaching upon the common lands. This occurred especially in southern Germany and in Switzerland. At the same time, the introduction of Roman law placed an instrument of oppression in the hands of the lords because it could be utilized to attack the common lands. The growing importance of the infantry, made up of peasant or artisan soldiers, which forecast the disappearance of the old mounted feudal army, probably served to make the peasants less submissive to their lords. Further, the period from 1490 to 1510 saw no less than eight very poor crop years, thus increasing the misery of the peasants.

There is much validity in Thomas M. Lindsay's description of the German scene at the opening of the sixteenth century as one of "seething discontent and full of bitter class hatreds. . . . It was into this mass of seething discontent," he writes, "that the spark of religious protest fell—the one thing needed to fire the train and kindle the social conflagration. This was the society to which Luther spoke, and its discontent was the sounding-board which made his words reverberate."

ON THE EVE OF REVOLT

The outbreak of the Protestant revolt must also be studied in the light of the particular religious conditions of the fifteenth century and the early sixteenth. The "pomp and ceremony" of the Catholic Church had increased

with the growing wealth and worldliness of the Renaissance period. Its rites and liturgy were more emphasized and its ceremonies became more elaborate and ostentatious. Pilgrimages to holy places were encouraged and celebrated in striking and dramatic fashion. A wave of church-building swept over western Europe, thus increasing ecclesiastical beauty and display. A greatly increased interest arose in the collection and adoration of various relics associated with New Testament figures and medieval saints. It was believed that by rites, ceremonies, pilgrimages, church-building, and the veneration of relics the faithful Christian could build up a treasury of good works which would redound to his spiritual benefit and well-being.

The veneration of sacred relics, especially by the pre-Reformation Catholics, requires some special attention. It was one of the practices most attacked by reformers and one of the chief items in Catholic Christianity that was rejected by the Protestants. The practice also throws interesting light on the intellectual atmosphere of the period. In addition to the larger magic involved in the very nature of the Catholic Church and its sacramental system, there went the lesser magic, in the form of the veneration and exploitation of holy relics for the purpose of increasing one's luck and good fortune. The greater and lesser magic were, of course, inseparably linked in the fact that no mass could be said except over an altar stone, which often contained a relic. Kirby Page thus describes this devotion to relics by the Catholics:

The relics of Christ and the martyrs were thought to possess divine virtue. Pieces of wood from the Holy Cross were the most highly treasured of all relics. Healing and protective power were supposed to reside in every particle of a saint's body, the hair and teeth being especially efficacious. The relics of St. Gratus were given credit for extinguishing a forest fire in 1542. Valuable relics became a source of great income to a church. For centuries the craze for relics was so great that innumerable frauds were perpetrated. At present there are fifty-six fingers of St. Peter the Dominican in the churches of Europe, twenty-six heads of St. Juliene, thirty bodies of St. George, twelve heads of St. John the Baptist, seventy veils of the Virgin Mary, as well as many tears and footprints of Jesus.

In his authoritative *The Age of the Reformation* Preserved Smith thus describes the nature of the esteem for relics by the Church:

The passion for the relics of the saints led to an enormous traffic in spurious articles. There appeared to be enough of the wood of the true cross, said Erasmus, to make a ship; there were exhibited five shin-bones of the ass on which Christ rode, whole bottles of the Virgin's milk, and several complete bits of skin saved from the circumcision of Jesus.

Even more impressive was the collection of the archbishop of Mainz, who possessed, among other things, "a fair piece of Moses's left horn, a whole pound

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of the wind that blew for Elijah in the cave on Mount Horeb, and two feathers and an egg of the Holy Ghost." One of the great European shrines was that at Trèves where the shirt of Christ was on exhibition. At Loreto in Italy might be seen the sacred house in which the Virgin is supposed to have lived. It is said to have come from Palestine to Italy in three leaps. The body of St. James is located in Compostella in Spain. It proceeded across the sea from Judea to Spain in a stone sarcophagus under its own power.

As a result of the heavy expense that the new surge of ecclesiastical display and church-building necessitated, the financial burdens imposed by the Church upon the laity became unusually burdensome. In addition to the ordinary taxes and levies, there was a marked increase in the sale of indulgences, regarded by many as a special abuse in Church finance. Particularly was this true in the latter part of the fifteenth century when the practice of selling indulgences for the dead widely prevailed. Also, at this time, as a result of the Conciliar Movement and other controversies of the period, the Scholastic theology of the Catholic Church was elaborated and became even more complicated and technical. Moreover, as we have seen, the immoralities of some of the Renaissance popes were shocking, rivaling those of the decadent Roman emperors. Immorality was also rife among many of the lesser clergy at the time.

To many Catholics of this period these developments seemed deplorable. Ascetic and mystical characters recoiled from the growing worldliness of the Renaissance Church. Some repudiated the doctrine of salvation through good works, which was associated with the doctrine of the Apostle James, and turned to St. Paul's defense of justification by faith. The German Humanists, who cultivated classical and biblical scholarship, developed an antipathy toward the fine-spun Scholastic theology of the Catholic Church. Both the secular princes and their subjects deeply resented the additional burdens imposed upon them as the result of growing ecclesiastical expenditures. They were particularly enraged over the abuses connected with the sale of indulgences for the dead, which the Church now furthered in order to raise the funds needed for its increased outlays. With the growth of commerce and business enterprise following the middle of the fifteenth century the increasingly powerful merchant class was irritated by the restrictions upon their complete economic freedom embodied in the doctrines of the Church and in the tenets of the canon law on economic matters. For these and other lesser reasons any vigorous movement of protest against conditions existing in the Roman Catholic Church about the year 1500 was likely to receive enthusiastic support from large numbers, particularly in northern Europe.

At first the criticism of the Church was carried on primarily by devout Catholics who thought of nothing more than inducing the Church of its own accord to eliminate what they regarded as its major defects. They did not in any way countenance the suggestion of violent action against the mother Church. Chief among this school of thought was the great German scholar and Humanist Erasmus, whose contributions to Humanism we have already mentioned. In his *Handbook of the Christian Knight* (1503) he drew a sharp contrast between spiritual and institutional Christianity, the former resting upon sincere personal piety, devotion, and altruism, and the latter upon a multitude of formal and external rites and ceremonies. The more famous *In Praise of Folly* (1511) was an urbane and gentle, but very telling, satire upon the superstitions of the Catholic masses and the pedantry of the Catholic scholars. In his *Familiar Colloquies* (1518), he made the superstitions, quasi-paganism, and pedantry of Renaissance Catholicism ridiculous simply by calmly describing it. It was his main thesis that the "yoke of Christ" had been made heavy by man simply because of the formalism, ritualism, organization, and intolerance that had been built up around the purely spiritual message of Christ, who had "commanded us nothing save love for one another."

MARTIN LUTHER AND THE SECESSION FROM THE CHURCH OF ROME

The movement of overt revolution within the Catholic Church was brought to a head by the policies of a German friar, Martin Luther, who was born in the year 1483. As a result of a prolonged and almost morbid religious experience he became convinced that the Catholic Church was wrong in its emphasis upon the possibility of achieving salvation through good works. He became an enthusiastic supporter of the Pauline doctrine that salvation should be secured primarily through the exercise of faith. In the year 1508 he became a professor in the new University of Wittenberg, which had been established by the Elector Frederick the Wise of Saxony. In his teachings here he openly attacked the Scholastic theology and espoused the doctrine of justification by faith. He did not, however, in his early days even remotely contemplate leading a violent revolution against the Church of Rome. His movement developed into a revolution through the inevitable trend of circumstances and the character of the leading personalities involved.

The spark that set off the Protestant Revolution came in October, 1517, when a special drive for the sale of indulgences began to draw near Wittenberg. In protest, Luther nailed some ninety-five theses on the church door in Wittenberg. These were originally designed by Luther merely to provoke

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scholarly discussion as to the validity of indulgences. But the psychology of the time was such as to lead to violent popular excitement. Luther soon found that he had a movement on his hands that grew by leaps and bounds until it could seemingly be settled only by open secession from Rome. In the summer of 1519 Luther engaged in a memorable debate with a Catholic theologian by the name of Eck in the important German intellectual center of Leipzig. Here he was forced to admit the broad similarity of his views to those of the reformer Johann Huss, who had been condemned by the Council of Constance a century earlier. From this time, Luther's theological radicalism became more frank and pronounced and his attitude more compatible with open revolt against the Church. In 1520 he encouraged a German nationalistic rebellion against the Church by an appeal to the German nobility and princes, urging them to purge the Church because of the failure of the latter voluntarily to undertake reform measures. In retaliation, the Church excommunicated him in the autumn of 1520. The young Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, summoned Luther to appear before him at the Diet of Worms. Luther was defiant when he faced the Diet, and the emperor was compelled to declare him an outlaw before both Church and state. As Luther left the Diet of Worms early in 1521 he was seized by the soldiers of the friendly Elector Frederick of Saxony and taken to the impregnable castle of the Wartburg, where he was protected for ten months against representatives of either the Church or the emperor. While at the Wartburg Luther devoted himself to a German translation of the Bible. This helped to give his movement national support among the Germans, for it was the first important book to appear in the modern German language.

One might well ask why Luther succeeded where Huss had failed a century earlier. The answer is to be found in the changed conditions of the first quarter of the sixteenth century. The abuses of the Church had become more apparent in the century since Huss, and the financial burdens imposed by the Church had become heavier. Likewise, the forces and tendencies likely to find the Lutheran movement congenial to their personal tastes or material interests had become far more prominent and better integrated. German nationalism had become more pronounced and this encouraged the German princes to seek relief from the financial exploitation of the great international ecclesiastical state, the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, the middle-class merchants and business men had become more numerous and powerful and their policies were more articulate. They welcomed anything that promised relief from the restrictions and limitations imposed upon their practices by the more social-minded Catholic economic doctrines. Especially did they ap-

prove of an opportunity to cloak their economic aspirations under the guise of a great moral and religious revolt. Therefore instead of following Huss to the martyr's grave, Luther became a German national hero and was the first man to succeed in effecting a decisive split in Western Christendom.

War broke out between the Catholics and the Protestants in 1522 when one of Luther's secular supporters, Franz von Sickingen, attacked the archbishop of Trèves. In the light of the motives and ambitions involved, it was certain that the religious wars would never cease until the revolting princes secured the right to control the religious life of their principalities. The first notable success they gained came in 1526, when the Diet of Speyer temporarily conceded to each ruler the right to decide the religion of his subjects. A more notable victory came in the religious Peace of Augsburg in 1555. This confirmed the right of each ruler to determine the religion of his state under the famous formula *cuius regio, eius religio*, which means that he who rules a principality shall control the religion thereof. But the princes were not satisfied until they gained complete national sovereignty. This was not achieved until the conclusion of a long series of bloody religious wars. Finally, at the end of the worst of them all, the Thirty Years War, the Treaty of Westphalia definitely introduced the principle of unlimited national sovereignty into European public law in 1648.

The Protestant revolt quickly spread beyond Germany. In other areas its leaders might differ in matters of detail from Luther's doctrines, but they espoused the same general movement of national independence, justification by faith, and individualism in worship. John Calvin and Huldreich Zwingli led the Protestant revolt in Switzerland. In England the Protestants found a powerful ally in King Henry VIII. Henry had little sympathy with Luther and once expressed a desire to hang him in person. But Henry ardently desired to divorce his Catholic wife, Catharine of Aragon, aunt of the powerful Emperor Charles V. Blocked by the Church from obtaining his divorce as a Catholic, he ordered the secession of the Church of England from the Church of Rome and set up an independent national ecclesiastical organization. The struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism in England went on with varying fortunes until, in 1689, the English people summoned a Protestant prince, William of Orange, to rule over them. From that time onward it was apparent that England would remain permanently a Protestant state. In Scotland Protestant doctrines were more warmly espoused than in England. In the former country the Protestants were led by vigorous theological fanatics like John Knox. Indeed, it was the Protestant enthusiasm of Scotland that

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played a crucial part in helping the radical Protestants of England to win a final and decisive victory over the English Anglicans and Catholics in the seventeenth century.

It was only natural that the aggressive attack against the Roman Catholic Church launched by Luther should produce a vigorous defense reaction within the Catholic Church itself. This movement we know of in history as the Catholic Counter-Reformation. The ancient dogmas of the Church were revived and reaffirmed and their validity decisively proclaimed. This tightening-up of Catholic dogmas was achieved and approved at the famous Council of Trent, in session from 1545 until 1563. A belligerent and aggressive Catholic order devoted to controverting Protestantism and preventing its spread appeared in the Society of Jesus, whose numbers were commonly known as Jesuits. The order was created and built up by an enthusiastic Spanish Catholic, Ignatius Loyola, in the years following 1538. A vigorous royal protagonist of Catholicism was found in King Philip II of Spain, the son of the Emperor Charles V. As a result of theological determination, the aggressive work of the Jesuits, and the devotion of Philip II, further progress of the Protestant Revolution was checked. Protestantism held its own in Germany, Bohemia, Switzerland, the Scandinavian states, and Great Britain. It also made certain headway in parts of France. But it failed to make significant inroads in either southern or eastern Europe.

2. RADICAL PROTESTANTISM AND PIETISM

From the beginning of Christianity a number of mystics and ascetics sought salvation in solitude. But the Church sooner or later managed to make societies even for these unsociable Christians. The individualism implicit in mysticism was usually tolerated by the Church as long as it did not involve the separation of the mystics from the Church. For this reason medieval pietism, though it was often intensely individualistic, was regarded as a systematic exercise in saintliness rather than as a heretical doctrine. Though Luther proclaimed the gospel of "Christian liberty" and though the doctrine that each person can receive the grace of God directly through faith without benefit of clergy was a cornerstone of Reformation theology, the ecclesiastical implications of such individualistic theology were not fully realized until a century or two later. The leaders of Protestantism and reformers within the Catholic Church alike took some sort of organic unity among Christians, some kind of church, for granted. The most common belief among Christians was that they form some sort of society. The chief issues of religious

strife during the sixteenth century concerned the precise nature and mode of government of these societies.

In the sixteenth century, however, many of the most pious Christians became most critical of the Church. Especially was this true in the northern countries, where pietism became an increasing threat to the authority of the Church; when this kind of piety led to the formation of lay "societies," the churches, both Catholic and Protestant, began to suspect subversive aims.

The first notable outbreak of anti-ecclesiastical pietism came from the Anabaptists (rebaptisers). Their aim was to get rid of all human authorities and to govern themselves according to the inspiration and guidance which each derived from the Bible. The church, according to them, is a loosely organized body of the regenerate without governmental functions. Baptism is the symbol of regeneration and can be administered only to adults who have consciously experienced and testified to their conversion. Such a body of saints governed directly by the "Word of God" had no connection with the state whatsoever. The early Anabaptists, as distinguished from the later and more conservative Baptists, revolted against secular as well as religious authority. Several of their leaders were devout anarchists and antinomians, believing that the regenerate are no longer in need of human laws. In Germany Thomas Münzer, a priest who had rebelled with Luther against the Church, took part in the Peasants' Revolt of 1525 and was executed by a Lutheran prince. In the Netherlands John of Leiden, a visionary tailor, preached a "new dispensation," practiced polygamy, and during 1536 governed (with the aid of a fanatic band of revolutionaries) the city of Münster, which he regarded as the Zion of which he was the new prophet; he was executed by order of the Catholic bishop who recaptured the city. Another Dutchman, less militant and fanatic, Menno Simons, took up the cause of the Anabaptists in 1536, condemned war, oaths, church establishments, and infant baptism. In Moravia a group of pietist Bohemians formed the *Unitas Fratrum*, a "unity of brothers" based on similar principles. In Germany there were The Brethren of the Free Spirit, The United Brethren, and other groups, most of whom hoped to organize separate holy communities independent of both church and state. In England among the Levelers arose Seekers who repudiated all existing authorities and waited for a new prophet. Here too began the Society of Friends (Quakers), who prophesied doom for all human authorities, renounced war, repudiated a professional clergy and even the preaching of the Gospel, and worshipped in silence, guided by the inner voice of the Spirit. Of these groups the Quakers, the Mennonites (followers of Menno Simons), and the Moravians actually succeeded in founding independent societies in America after

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they had been exiled from Europe. The terrible religious wars of the seventeenth century caused the rapid growth of pacifism; on the other hand they led to a general reaction against the extreme anarchistic and revolutionary forms of Anabaptism and antinomianism.

The English Baptists who arose toward the end of the sixteenth century repudiated the social radicalism of the earlier continental movements and were content to insist on separation of church and state and on democracy within the church. Their most noted leader was John Bunyan. As late as 1664 six Baptists were executed in England as dangerous to the state; and at about the same time the Baptist and Seeker, Roger Williams, was exiled from Massachusetts and founded Rhode Island without establishing any church whatsoever and with almost complete religious toleration. Such a society was looked upon with horror by its Puritan neighbors as a moral chaos, and Cotton Mather wrote, "If any man has lost his religion, he can find it in Rhode Island." It is important to note that though the Baptists believe in political toleration of sects, they practice "close communion," i.e., they admit only the regenerate to communion. In general, the pietist sects which most emphasized separation of church and state were most exclusive religiously and were quite hostile to the type of tolerant religion preached by deists and rationalists.

Pietist movements, meanwhile, were taking place in the Catholic Church: the so-called Counter-Reformation took one direction among the educated middle classes and another among the workers and peasants. In the monasteries individual piety continued to take the form of mysticism. But sixteenth-century mystics like the Spanish Teresa and St. John of the Cross were reformers as well, and they stimulated an emotional type of mystic love significantly different from the ascetic discipline of ancient and medieval mysticism. Out of the monastic devotions grew cults, the cult of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and of The Most Pure Heart of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which became increasingly popular with the laity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Sentimental images and crucifixes became popular. The shrines and feasts for private devotion were multiplied. In general the emotional appeal of the Church was heightened, and Catholicism became increasingly evangelical.

3. RELIGIOUS REVOLT AND REFORMATION IN ENGLAND

In England, in contrast to what occurred elsewhere, the king took the initiative in the revolt from Rome. Quarreling with the pope who refused

to annul his marriage with Catherine of Aragon, King Henry VIII severed the bonds that united the English Church with the Roman, and assumed for himself supreme authority in ecclesiastical matters within his island kingdom. That the majority of the English people docilely followed the king's lead indicates that the majority were already predisposed toward change and therefore not afraid of the pope's displeasure. Seeking the reasons for this predisposition on the part of the people, historians usually point to three strong influences that were operating concurrently at the time; to wit, anti-clericalism, humanism, and nationalism. Thus pretty much the same influences that were working for change in Germany were working for change in England. It happened that an Augustinian monk sounded the trumpet call in Germany and gathered around himself the forces of discontent, while in England the king himself took the lead because a breach with Rome became necessary to his designs. Neither monk nor king could have succeeded if public sentiment had not been favorable.

Upon his accession in 1509, Henry VIII had married his brother's widow, Catherine of Aragon. Such a union was branded by the Church as mortal sin. Whether the pope could grant a dispensation in such a case was a moot question, but Pope Julius II had granted one for this marriage.

The first four children of the marriage were born dead or died shortly after birth. The fifth, a frail little girl named Mary, survived. The sixth and last was stillborn. Was the curse of God upon the marriage? The Tudor dynasty was not so firmly seated on the throne that it could look forward without uneasiness to a disputed succession. Henry VIII sorely needed a male heir.

The shortest way out of the difficulty would have been to get the pope to annul the marriage on the ground that it had been contracted in violation of divine law, which papal dispensations could not set aside. But unfortunately for Henry the city of Rome had just been sacked by the troops of Charles V, and the pope, Clement VII, was in the emperor's power. Naturally Charles V, who was a nephew of Catherine of Aragon, objected to the annulment of his aunt's marriage, and the pope had to hedge and procrastinate in an endeavor to keep on good terms with both king and emperor. While waiting for the papal decision, Henry fell passionately in love with Anne Boleyn. However genuine may have been his original scruples concerning his union with his brother's widow, Henry's consuming desire now was to obtain ecclesiastical sanction for his union with Anne Boleyn. Becoming suspicious that Cardinal Wolsey was not doing all in his power to have the matter settled, Henry dismissed that great minister in 1529 and assumed personal

direction of the government. Thenceforth the passionate king was his own prime minister.

Though Henry was at heart a ruthless despot, ever ready to sacrifice loyal ministers and old friends whom he suspected of opposing his designs, he was too shrewd to flout the established traditions of the realm. Whatever ecclesiastical changes he desired to make in England would have to be approved by Parliament in order to be constitutional. Accordingly, he called for a meeting of that body in November, 1529. The elections were free from royal pressure, or nearly so; but sentiment in England had long been anti-clerical. When Parliament assembled, therefore, the majority of the members were predisposed to follow the king. Thus Henry, who, like all the other Tudor sovereigns, had a genius for knowing what his people wanted, realized that he had the force of national sentiment behind him and might safely go far.

The Parliament which met in 1529 sat in successive sessions for seven years. Its most important acts were those directed against the authority of the pope over the Church in England. By two Acts of Annates, all money payments from the English clergy to the pope were cut off. An Act of Appeals forbade for the future any appeals from the church courts in England to the papal court. Still another act put the nomination of bishops into the king's hands and forbade any communication with the pope. The king now allowed his "divorce affair" to go to court. Archbishop Cranmer, newly appointed to the see of Canterbury, held that Henry, having never been lawfully married to Catherine of Aragon, was free to marry Anne Boleyn. This decision was naturally resented by the pope, who hurled a bull of excommunication at Henry and invited all Christian princes to execute the sentence by force of arms. Parliament now proceeded to complete the separation of the English Church from the Roman. An Act of Supremacy, passed in 1535, declared Henry to be the "Supreme Head on earth of the Church of England," and conferred on him the same power to regulate the Church of England that he already had to regulate civil affairs. Thus one by one the bonds which had united the Church of England to the papal see were severed, until no connection at all remained. The English Church had become not only a national church, but a national church very largely under the control of the king.

To carry out the many duties of his new ecclesiastical office, the king needed an efficient assistant. Such an assistant was found in Thomas Cromwell, an ambitious layman, whom Henry appointed vicar-general in ecclesiastical affairs. The first important move of the vicar-general was to inspect the English monasteries. Henry and Cromwell shared the general feeling of contempt

for the monasteries, and feared their devotion to the pope and their opposition to the new regime. In addition there was the fact that the monasteries possessed a vast amount of property, principally in lands and buildings, which the king coveted. The inspection began in 1535 and continued for several months, with the result that sufficient evidence of corruption was found, so it was asserted, to warrant drastic action. In 1536 Parliament was induced to suppress more than three hundred of the smaller houses and to give all their possessions to the king. Something like a panic now followed in the English monastic world. One after another the larger monasteries surrendered their possessions to the king and disbanded. By 1540 monasticism had disappeared from England. Nearly six hundred institutions harboring more than 8,000 monks and nuns had ceased to exist. With the monasteries went also the many shrines, relics, and wonder-working images to which pilgrimages had been made for centuries, and their ornaments and treasures were seized by the government. The bones of St. Thomas à Becket at Canterbury, so graphically described by Erasmus a few years earlier, were burned and scattered. Pilgrimages to shrines were for the future forbidden, on the ground that they were superstitious and disorderly.

The dissolution of the monasteries was an innovation of capital importance. Vast estates variously estimated at one fifth or even one third of the land of England were transferred to the crown. Some of the spoils were used by the king to endow university professorships, to found schools and build colleges, to improve fortifications, and to pension homeless monks and nuns; but most of the monastic lands passed by royal transfer to a new aristocracy recruited from the merchant classes, which would be vitally interested in upholding the new regime.

It was never Henry's intention to change the doctrine of the English Church, but merely to sweep away the abuses that had crept into it. The trouble was that no general agreement could be reached as to the extent of the desired reforms. Roughly speaking, four opinions prevailed among as many groups: (1) The patriotic but conservative common people were glad to see the king take over the administration of the church and rid the people of ecclesiastical oppression, but they did not care for any essential change in doctrine. (2) The orthodox Catholics, especially numerous in the rural counties of northern England, regarded the breach with Rome as sacrilegious and stoutly refused to acknowledge the king's spiritual supremacy. (3) The Lutheran group, led by Cranmer, Cromwell, Latimer, Fox, Ridley, and others, found a following among the merchants and artisans of London and vicinity. This group might be called the active and intelligent minority of the English

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people. (4) The Anabaptists, or "lunatic fringe," were greatly feared as communists and levelers.

During the period 1529-39, Henry allowed himself to be influenced by the Lutheran group; but this group strained the bow to the breaking point, as it were, when it brought to England, as the Bluebeard King's fourth wife, Anne of Cleves, sister-in-law of Elector John Frederick of Saxony. When Anne arrived in England, Henry experienced a sudden revulsion of feeling and sent Cromwell to the block. He then burned three other Lutherans at the stake by way of emphasizing his change of views. When the papal supporters took heart again and began to hope for a restoration of the old faith, he tortured and beheaded three of their leaders for denying his spiritual supremacy. All this meant, when analyzed fundamentally, that Henry had discovered where he really belonged—to that patriotic but conservative party which desired to be rid of ecclesiastical oppression without essential change of doctrine.

At the end of Henry's reign, in 1547, he was convinced that he had done nothing to alter the ancient and historical faith of the English Church. Nevertheless, he had unwittingly accomplished the first part of a religious revolution. (1) He had established a national church free from the dominion of the pope and had subordinated that church to the state. (2) He had dissolved the monasteries in England and, with the monastic lands, had endowed a new landed gentry, interested in upholding the separation from Rome. Moreover, under Cranmer's influence as archbishop of Canterbury, (3) English had replaced Latin in certain parts of the church services, and an English version of the Bible had been placed in each parish church for the edification of the people.

There was so much confusion about the legitimacy of Henry's children that Parliament passed an act giving him the right to provide by will for the succession. Accordingly he left instructions that Edward, the son of his third wife, should succeed and pass the crown to his children, if he should have any. In default of heirs, Edward's successor should be Mary, daughter of Catherine of Aragon. If Mary should die childless, the crown should go to Elizabeth, daughter of Anne Boleyn. As it turned out, each of Henry's children reigned in succession and died without heirs.

With the accession of Edward VI, in 1547, the Lutheran group regained ascendancy in the government and introduced further changes in creed and liturgy. Conservative bishops who expressed disapproval were replaced by advanced reformers. Englishmen who had fled to the Continent to escape persecution under Henry came hurrying back, bringing in their train Lutherans from Germany and Calvinists from Geneva. There was a babel of

controversy over points of theology, while each parish took unto itself the right to adopt such forms of worship as it pleased. Partly by voluntary action of the various parishes, partly by government command, images, crucifixes, stained glass windows, etc., were removed from the churches. The use of holy water was given up, and clergymen abandoned the use of colored robes at the services, and sometimes even discarded their surplices. But evidence shows that these changes were more popular in the towns than in the country districts.

Officially the next important step was the celebration of all church services in English instead of Latin. This was accomplished by means of a prayer book, commonly called the *First Prayer Book of King Edward VI*, which was prepared by Thomas Cranmer, the archbishop of Canterbury. Although it is for the most part an English version of the old Latin ritual, the sonorous and solemn music of its language makes it a literary production of no mean merit. Doctrinally it is a compromise, partly Catholic, partly Lutheran, and partly Calvinist. The giving and receiving of the bread is called the communion of the body of Christ; of the wine, the communion of the blood of Christ. A Catholic was free to interpret this, if he would, as transubstantiation; a Lutheran, as consubstantiation; while a Calvinist could insist that only the spiritual presence of Christ was meant. So all parties could use the prayer book without offense to their consciences. An Act of Uniformity, the first and mildest of the statutes which bear that name, made the use of the prayer book in the church services compulsory for the clergy, under penalty of deprivation of benefice.

In 1549 there was a struggle in the royal council which resulted in the seizure of power by a still more radical group; but the forces that brought about this change of government were not so much religious as social and political. For a generation or more a movement had been going on in England tending toward the breakup of the old manorial system of landholding and the substitution of modern land tenure. The old manorial lords had wanted, primarily, services from their tenants; but now land was falling more and more into the possession of the commercial classes, who wanted, primarily, financial returns. Financial returns could best be procured by raising sheep or by improved methods of farming; so, many a manor was fenced in by its new owner and the now useless tenants evicted. Riots followed, of course, and a great deal of confusion. In the royal council the new commercial landowners were represented by a faction which demanded the ruthless suppression of the riotous peasants, and carried their point by driving their opponents from power.

The religious changes were now carried much further than ever before in the direction of extreme Protestantism. A revised edition of the prayer book was issued, which left little of the Mass and nothing of auricular confession or other "popish" practices. Though Holy Communion was still to be received kneeling, this posture was not to be interpreted as adoration of the bread and wine. The robes of the officiating clergy were made much simpler, and preaching became an essential part of the service. A second Act of Uniformity made the use of the revised prayer book compulsory for the laity as well as the clergy. Anyone neglecting to attend the established church services on Sunday and holydays of obligation was liable to excommunication, and the penalty for attending any other form of service was six months' imprisonment for the first offense, a year for the second, and life for the third. Cranmer, who had been in charge of the work of revision, also drew up a series of forty-two articles defining the faith, which were sanctioned by the royal council and promulgated as the religious creed of the English Church.

With the accession of Mary in 1553, a complete reaction set in. It was Mary's consuming desire to bring the English Church and nation back into the Catholic fold—to undo the work of her reprobate father and especially of her half brother, Edward VI. Under her protection and encouragement, therefore, the old Catholic form of worship was quickly restored in the churches, and the married clergy quietly put away their wives. Extreme Protestant reformers either went into voluntary exile or were shut up in prison on various charges. When Parliament met—a newly elected Parliament, of course—a general repeal act was passed by which the religious changes introduced during the reign of Edward VI were abrogated. That was as far as Parliament and the nation desired to go. Abrogation of the changes made by Henry VIII would entail the restoration not only of the papal supremacy but also of the vast lands confiscated by the king when the monasteries were dissolved. Not only religious interests but property interests were at stake. Parliament was willing that heretics might be thrown into the flames, but not the title deeds to monastic lands.

In the end, Mary was obliged to accept a compromise: papal supremacy was restored, but not the monastic lands. Cardinal Pole, an Englishman of noble blood who had been residing at Rome, was dispatched to England as papal legate to receive that disobedient nation back into the Catholic fold. In a very impressive ceremony the two houses of Parliament, for themselves and the whole nation, formally begged forgiveness for their disobedience and knelt while Cardinal Pole pronounced the solemn words of absolution. Parliament then repealed all the antipapal laws passed since 1529. The Eng-

lish Church was now, save for the alienation of the monastic lands, what it had been when Henry VIII began to reign.

But it was one thing to declare that all should be as of old; it was quite another thing to make everybody believe as formerly. There were many individuals, especially in the southern counties near London, who had become convinced and earnest Protestants. Some of these had held high positions in church and state, notably Archbishop Cranmer, and Bishops Latimer, Ridley, and Hooper. A commission of visitation, sent out by the government to check up on the orthodoxy of both priests and laymen, soon had the prisons full of these dissenters. A long succession of martyrdoms followed, the list of executions numbering very nearly three hundred. It is worthy of note, however, that most of them took place within a radius of a hundred miles of London—an urban and commercial area.

Queen Mary died in 1558 of a broken heart, so it was said, and was succeeded by Elizabeth, daughter of Anne Boleyn. Two months after the accession of the new queen, Parliament met and, by a series of laws, established what was called the Religious Settlement. Very characteristically of the English policy, this settlement was neither Protestant nor Catholic. In all matters of church government the system of Henry VIII was restored, but in matters of doctrine and ceremonial there was a return to the reign of Edward VI. Thus England was to pursue a middle course. By an Act of Uniformity, the third of its kind, everyone, clergy and laity alike, was required to attend the religious services established by law, under penalty of a shilling for each absence. To see that the law was enforced, Elizabeth appointed commissioners from time to time, who eventually came to form the Court of High Commission. For the church services a prayer book was needed. This need was supplied by taking part from the first, and part from the second, prayer book of Edward VI. All the controversial points were covered by vague and sonorous phraseology which might be interpreted to suit one's conscience. Except for the few extremists, the prayer book was broad enough for all. Finally, the faith of the Church was defined by taking the forty-two articles of Edward VI and reducing them to thirty-nine. By 1563 the religious settlement was complete and has remained essentially unchanged to the present day.

This middle position of the English Church, though apparently satisfactory enough to the majority of the nation, caused deep dissatisfaction to those who were at the two extremes in religious matters. On the one hand were the orthodox Catholics, especially numerous among the nobles and gentry of the rural districts, who desired to continue Mary's settlement of the Church. At

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the other extreme were the "Puritans," especially numerous among the middle classes of the towns, who constantly expressed a desire for a "purer" form of worship than that of the established Church; to their way of thinking, nothing should be in the prayer book that was not warranted by the Scriptures. Although the vibrant nationalism of the reign, which manifested itself in an ardent attachment to the "virgin queen," tended more and more to overshadow the religious issue, constant vigilance and at times vigorous measures were necessary to keep Catholics and Puritans in hand and to maintain the religious settlement intact.

4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION

RELIGIOUS CHANGES UNDER PROTESTANTISM

We may now briefly survey the actual changes brought by the Protestants into the Christian doctrines and practices. In the first place, they stamped out what they regarded as the leading aspects of ecclesiastical corruption, and they suppressed completely the sale of indulgences. They worked for a simpler and more direct form of worship. Particularly did they attack those phases of Catholic worship and ritual which were based upon the doctrine of salvation by good works.³ They abolished the veneration of relics, the adoration of images, and the practice of making pilgrimages to holy places. They profoundly modified the central Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation in the sacrament of the mass. They denied the miraculous transformation of the bread and wine into the actual body and blood of Jesus, though the Lutherans accepted "consubstantiation" or the "corporeal presence." The Bible, rather than the dogmas of the Church Fathers and the Catholic theologians, became the guide to the Protestant Christian in his religious devotions. The Protestants further denied the necessity of a mediating priesthood to bring the believer into contact with God. They contended that the Christian could secure God's attention directly through personal meditation and prayer. This led them to lay special emphasis upon the importance of the individual conscience in matters religious. Of course, the degree to which Protestantism differed, even in matters religious, from the parent Catholic Church depended greatly upon the particular Protestant sect. With the early Lutherans and the Anglicans the divergence from Catholicism in worship was relatively slight—in spite of doctrinal divergences. On the other hand, with the rise of the more radical religious groups, such as the Anabaptists and the later evangelical

³ The Protestants, while not deplored certain good works, insisted that salvation can be gained by faith *alone*.

sects, there was an almost complete abandonment of the old Catholic rites and practices.

Nevertheless, as the great German theological writer Ernst Troeltsch has made very clear, the fundamental religious differences between the Catholics and even the more radical religious groups were relatively slight. This is a fact which has commonly been overlooked in the fierce partisanship that has characterized the controversies between Catholics and Protestants. Both Catholics and orthodox Protestants fully accepted the whole body of the Christian epic as developed in the Old and New Testaments. To both of them the Bible was the central sacred book of their religion. Catholics and Protestants alike were primarily concerned with making a proper adjustment to the supernatural world and with securing the salvation of the individual soul in the world to come. The medieval doctrines of heaven and hell were continued with no marked change by all Protestants. To Luther in particular the Devil and his hosts were real beings to be feared in everyday life. The evangelical divines of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Protestantism tended to lay more stress upon the horrors of hell and the dangers of damnation than Catholic theologians of pre-Reformation days. Moreover, the Protestants were just as alert and severe in their denunciation of skeptics and freethinkers as were the Catholics. It is no exaggeration to say that upon at least 95 per cent of all matters of strictly religious import Catholics and Protestants were at one and were equally antagonistic to the inroads of theological liberalism and of skepticism.

Some Protestants have taken great pride in the elimination of many alleged idolatrous practices of the Catholics—an elimination effected by the Reformation. But their exultation rests upon dubious foundations. By these changes they enormously weakened the emotional power of the Church and took from it one of its most potent appeals: its visual and auricular imagery. The rich emotion-bearing ritual and liturgy of the Catholic Church was far better calculated to attract and hold the mass of faithful believers than was the metaphysical dogmatism of Calvin or the vocal emotionalism of other Protestant cults. . . .

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES PROMOTED BY PROTESTANTISM

In the field of politics and economics, however, the age of the Protestant revolt brought far-reaching changes into European civilization. Protestantism strongly encouraged the spirit and practices of nationalism. While the Catholic Church had not hesitated to utilize the power of friendly princes, it had very generally favored the idea of political as well as religious unity in Chris-

tendom. Whatever its practices in detail, at least in theory it had supported the international point of view. Protestantism turned to the other extreme and promoted the practices and doctrines associated with national independence and the sovereignty of the political state. In the earlier Protestant days this tendency often went to the extreme of clothing the ruler with semidivine powers. It lent decisive aid to the further development of the doctrine of the divine right of kings. The Protestants did not, of course, originate the doctrine of the divine right of kings. Kings had long been anointed by ecclesiastics, and the classic exposition of divine right was written by Bishop Bossuet, a leading Catholic publicist. There was also a trend toward the establishment of the supremacy of the state over the church, which in its extreme form is known as Erastianism. This, of course, was the very opposite of the medieval theocratic idea of the ultimate supremacy of church over state. While at first Protestantism decidedly strengthened royal absolutism, in a later period it helped along the movement toward representative government. It found its main strength in the seventeenth century in the support of the merchant and business classes. These latter groups desired to set up parliamentary supremacy over kings, who were interfering with their business practices as much as the Church had in the Middle Ages. . . .

Protestantism likewise promoted profound economic transformations. In the first place, the Protestants wiped out all financial obligations to the Church of Rome and freed themselves from this colossal financial burden of a thousand years' standing. Gradually but certainly they also broke down the medieval Catholic economic doctrines that had stressed social considerations and limitations in the acquisition and use of wealth. Protestantism, especially Calvinism, decisively encouraged individualism in economics as well as in religion. It promoted the spirit of thrift and economic ambition, the acquisition of wealth through shrewd dealings, and increased freedom in all forms of economic operations. The modern theory and practice of "business enterprise" found a powerful initial support in Protestant morality and economic doctrine. This helped along the rise of the new bourgeoisie or middle class.

Looking at the matter in the broad perspective of the history of civilization, the most important contribution of the Protestant revolt to economic theory and practice was the sanction and respect it gave the profit-seeking motive in man. Not since the period of oriental antiquity had the acquisitive instinct been so frankly blessed. . . . [The] Greeks looked down upon economic life when compared to the glories of philosophy, art, and athletics, and . . . , in the scale of economic activities, they rated commerce much lower than landholding—one step above brigandage. The Romans had this same general

outlook. Social respectability of the highest order was associated with agriculture and the cultivation of rural estates. . . .

The medieval Christians brought a revolution in human attitudes toward work and industry by upholding the worthy character of manual labor and especially blessing competent craftsmanship. The skilled worker was no longer contemptible. But the medieval Church emphasized the penitential nature of work, looked askance upon the profit system, and tried to eliminate from trade those things which would today be regarded as the very essence of shrewd business—selling at a profit with no social service, cornering the market, monopolizing products, and interest-taking as a normal procedure. Christians involved in medieval trade may have engaged to some degree in all these prohibited practices, but the Church never formally gave its approval to such conduct. The Protestant revolt fully removed the stigma from personal enrichment through commercial pursuits, glorified trade and monetary profits, and laid the foundations for our present near-deification of the business man. The prevailing individualism and the lax hand of a divided Church also promoted these developments.

One of the major influences exerted by Protestantism upon economic life and ideas was the impulse it gave to thrift, frugality, and the virtues of hard manual work. This particular impetus came especially from Calvin and his followers. They lifted from work the taint of servility which had been associated with it in classical times and the penitential coloring attached to it in medieval Catholicism. Calvin vigorously condemned idleness: "For nothing is more unseemly than a man that is idle and good for nothing—who profits neither himself nor others, and seems born only to eat and drink. . . . It is certain that idleness and indolence are accursed of God." He held up to contempt "idle bellies that chirp sweetly in the shade." Calvin himself apparently approved of work as a preventive of sin and corporeal indulgence quite as much as a means to economic accumulation. But the economic contributions of laboriousness were stressed by many of his disciples. It is chiefly from this source that there sprang that persistent tradition of the moral and economic blessings of exacting industry which pervaded modern times. When the bourgeoisie later became wealthy, they conveniently found that work was a virtue chiefly for the employee class.

The rigorous code of private ethics developed by the Puritans was in part an overcompensation for their primary absorption in the week-day processes of material gain in such dubious pursuits as piracy, freebooting, the slave trade, and the rum trade. Ostentatious moral purity and rigorous observance of Sunday worship and other ecclesiastical duties helped to keep their con-

sciences clear and to give them a feeling of piety, self-sufficiency, and reputation. There was thus reestablished that intimate association between religion and business enterprise which had characterized the civilization of ancient Mesopotamia.

Perhaps the most discriminating assessment of the relationship between Protestantism and modern capitalism is the following from the pen of the late Professor Troeltsch, in which he clearly distinguishes between the ideas of Luther and Calvin.

Things are not simple in this matter and many errors are in circulation. Thus when Luther calls men to be "diligent in their calling,"⁴ it is viewed as a Christian justification for profit-seeking, which will have received a great impetus from this justification. In taking this view one forgets that this vocation-doctrine had already been Catholic doctrine for a long time under the guise of the graded contribution of all workers to the purposes of society imposed by the law of nature. For Luther only the monastic limitations dropped away, and this strengthened the secularizing of princely property and the rational economic policy of governments. Above all it is forgotten that the Protestant idea of a "calling" in the Lutheran sense corresponds closely to a conservative, class-organized society. It kept each man in his class and bade him expect only protection of life and a minimum subsistence from the authorities, while suffering with patience the unrighteousness of the world. It is the same traditional attitude toward life that Catholicism prescribed. It is least of all a spur to the upward movement of modern economic life.

Quite in harmony with this is Luther's economic ideal, orientated from an agrarian and craft standpoint. He continued the canonical prohibition of interest. Indeed he warred upon money and banking and wholesale business as passionately as any medieval author. Of course this teaching could not be carried out in practice and under his successors his precepts were much modified. But the Lutheran piety did not contain an impulse to industrial development. The economic effects of Lutheranism extended only to the strengthening of the power of the princes (and thereby indirectly of mercantilism) and to the bringing up of an humble and patient working class, well suited to work upon landed estates. At the beginning of the nineteenth century it still could deliver to the nascent industrialism an unresisting labor-material. The actually greater economic development of the Protestant portions of Germany must at root have other than religious sources. They can only have been helped along by the Lutheran ethics of industriousness, diligence, and thrift, by the individualism which Luther made more conscious of itself, by the increased zeal for popular education.

On the other hand, Calvinism has much greater importance in this matter. Here, as in politics, it is a force standing closer to modern life. Calvin and his successors discarded the canonical prohibition of interest and the associated difficulties of profitmaking. With the help of the *Vénérable Compagnie* Geneva founded a bank

⁴ The English Bible reads "business" here where Luther read *Beruf*, that is, "calling" or "vocation" in original meaning, with both an internal and an external application. This difference illustrates the point Troeltsch is trying to make.

and conducted industries. Calvinistic countries and settlements everywhere show the expansion of industrialism and capitalism. But the real significance of Calvinism for modern economic development, culminating in our present all-embracing system of capitalism, lies much deeper. This has recently been demonstrated by Max Weber, who attacking the great problem of present economic history—that of the nature and origin of capitalism—has raised the question of the intellectual, ethical, and philosophical presuppositions of the system. Without a certain intellectual basis such a system cannot achieve mastery. Or as Sombart expresses it, in dealing with the same problem: The great mass of those who carry it on, and especially its founders, must have a certain economic attitude as well as external stimuli, compulsions, and drives. From the capitalistic system there is to be distinguished the “capitalistic spirit” without which the former would never have attained its power over the mind. For to the natural drive to enjoyment and rest, to the procuring of the bare means of subsistence, this spirit opposes restlessness and limitlessness, makes labor and income end in themselves and men to be slaves of work for its own sake. It brings all life and conduct into an absolute, rationally systematic reckoning, combines all means, employs every minute, turns every power to account, and in league with scientific technique gives to life the thorough, abstract exactness of a balance sheet.

This spirit, according to Weber, did not come of itself with industrial inventions, the discoveries, and profits of trade. It did not develop in the money economy of the later Middle Ages, in the capitalism of the Renaissance, and in Spanish colonization, for here it had to fight and conclude compromises with a counteracting spirit, the Catholic-nurtured conscience. Hence he has formed the conjecture, in view of the fact that capitalism did flower upon Calvinistic soil, that the Calvinist religio-ethical spirit was of special importance for the development of this capitalistic spirit. With penetrating scrutiny he shows how it is precisely the Calvinistic asceticism which produced not so much capitalism as its prerequisite spirit, and formed the basis upon which its unnatural expansion took place. This, of course, does not gainsay that this power extended to men who had absolutely nothing to do with Calvinism. Other psychological influences are not to be excluded, among which Weber has mentioned Judaism above all. Sombart has affirmed a close intellectual kinship between the Jewish and Calvinistic economic attitudes. Yet for the industrial capitalism of the middle classes Calvinism was the real parent. The self-abandonment to work and acquisition, which is the involuntary and unconscious asceticism of the modern man, is the child of the conscious and religiously grounded worldly asceticism of the Calvinists. Not transcending the world, but working in it without deifying it, without love for the world, their attitude towards their calling produced a restless, systematically disciplined diligence, in which work was sought for the sake of work, for the mortification of the flesh, and in which the produce of labor was not used for enjoyment and consumption but steadily to make more work, for an ever new turnover of capital. The aggressively active ethics of the predestination dogma impelled the “elect” to the full exercise of their God-given powers, made them certain of their election by this evidence of it; thus their labor became rational and systematic. Their asceticism broke the impulse to rest and satisfaction, and founded the mastery of labor over man. And since the produce of

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their labor was in no form an object in itself, since all beyond a mean minimum of existence was to be used for further realization and a larger turnover, the limitlessness and endlessness of work was established. On the basis of this economic attitude the early capitalism of the Huguenots, the Dutch, the English, and Americans arose, and it is yet visibly associated with it in America and Scotland and among English Dissenters in the period of "high capitalism." The various pietistic and Anabaptist groups influenced by Calvinism have nurtured the same attitude.

Weber's demonstration is in my judgment successful, although one may perhaps emphasize more strongly that this special sort of reformed asceticism was supported by the particular conditions of business life in western Europe, and especially by the exclusion of the Dissenters from the state and from political culture. In like manner the traditional position of Lutheranism was supported by the economic decline of Germany due to the Thirty Years War. It is, however, clear that the contribution of Protestantism to modern economic development is not due to Protestantism as a whole, but to Calvinism, Pietism, and the sects, and even in their case it is indirect and was not intentional.

► The present tremendous, even terrifying, expansion of capitalism with its accountancy and soullessness, with its devotion to gain for the sake of gain, with its hard and brutal competitive struggle, its agonizing need of victory, and its triumphant joy in the world-domination of the business man, has broken away completely from its old ethical foundation, and has become a power directly antagonistic to genuine Calvinism and Protestantism. Where it no longer labors for asceticism to the glory of God, but for winning power to the glory of men, it has no more in common with Protestantism than the strongly individualistic spirit without the counterpart of the old Calvinistic social and religious spirit. It has been the lot of the this-worldly Protestant asceticism that it valued life and labor in the world, without ascribing to them a real internal ethical value. In the this-worldly asceticism lay a contradiction between world and heaven, and in the contradiction the world proved the stronger. Hence the ethical theories which underlie the present capitalistic ordering of life have fallen into the hands of a religiously indifferent utilitarianism. Protestantism has afforded no solution to the major ethical problem which confronted it; although it is significant that precisely where capitalistic development reached its earliest peak, in England, the counterattack of Christian Socialism began.

One contribution of the Protestant revolt to the rise of capitalism that is not a matter of debatable theory is to be found in the extensive confiscation of Church property. This enriched both the state and the private individuals who obtained slices of such former ecclesiastical holdings. Many of the early plutocrats in the English woolen industry of early modern times, for example, got a substantial start from confiscated monastic lands and wealth. . . .

INTELLECTUAL ASPECTS OF PROTESTANTISM

Intellectually speaking, the Reformation was most decidedly backward-looking. Theologically it admittedly went back to the apostolic age. Luther de-

nounced the universities, designated Reason as the Devil's most seductive harlot, whose neck Faith could easily wring, was credulous of devils and of miracles, and was the first important European openly to condemn the Copernican theory. His ground for opposing the latter theory was its preposterousness in the light of the fact that "in the day when Jehovah delivered up the Amorites before the children of Israel Joshua said in the sight of Israel, 'Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon,' and the sun stood still and the moon stayed until the nation avenged themselves of their enemies." Religious bias prevented many Protestant countries from accepting the improved Gregorian calendar—the product of a papal court—for many years. England held out against it until 1752. Philipp Melanchthon, perhaps the greatest scholar in German Protestantism, said that the burning of Servetus by Calvin because of a slight difference of opinion over the nature of the Trinity was "a pious and memorable example for all posterity."

The Calvinistic anthropology, with its morbid conception of human treason before God and its predestinarian theology, was intellectually depressing and discouraging to human effort. And no person could be less sympathetic with science and critical philosophy than an earnest fanatic like Knox. Further, the Protestant emphasis on the infallible nature of the Bible was in some ways more dangerous and obstructive to progressive thought and scientific advance than the Catholic dogma of an infallible Church that might, in theory at least, periodically alter its tenets. The Protestants revived an interest in the Old Testament, with all the primitive beliefs in its earlier sections. This served well as a basis for the sabbatarian excesses of the Puritans. They paid little or no attention at first to the noble social passion of Amos and other great Jewish prophets. They were more concerned with primitive passages justifying severe and austere practices and punishments.

Probably no one has more sagaciously summarized the necessary and desirable qualifications upon exuberance over the progressive intellectual tone of Protestantism than has Professor Robinson:

The defection of the Protestants from the Roman Catholic Church is not connected with any decisive intellectual revision. Such ardent emphasis has been constantly placed upon the differences between Protestantism and Catholicism by representatives of both parties that the close intellectual resemblance of the two systems, indeed their identity in nine parts out of ten, has tended to escape us. The early Protestants, of course, accepted, as did the Catholics, the whole patristic outlook on the world; their historical perspective was similar, their notions of the origin of man, of the Bible, with its types, prophecies, and miracles, of heaven and hell, of demons and angels, are all identical. To the early Protestants, as to Catholics, he who would be saved must accept the doctrine of the triune God and must

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be ever on his guard against the whisperings of reason and the innovations suggested by scientific advance. Luther and Melanchthon denounced Copernicus in the name of the Bible. Melanchthon re-edited, with enthusiastic approval, Ptolemy's astrology. Luther made repeated and bitter attacks on reason; in whose eyes he freely confessed the presuppositions of Christianity to be absurd. Calvin gloried in man's initial and inherent moral impotency; and the doctrine of predestination seemed calculated to paralyze all human effort.

The Protestants did not know any more about nature than their Catholic enemies; they were just as completely victimized by the demonology of Witchcraft. The Protestant Revolt was not begotten of added scientific knowledge nor did it owe its success to any considerable confidence in criticism. As Gibbon pointed out, the loss of one conspicuous mystery—that of transubstantiation—"was amply compensated by the stupendous doctrines of original sin, redemption, faith, grace, and predestination" which the Protestants strained from the epistles of St. Paul. Early Protestantism is, from an intellectual standpoint, essentially a phase of medieval religious history.

By all odds the major contribution to intellectual progress that can be ascribed to Protestantism was its aid in increasing the difficulty of carrying out ecclesiastical repression of intellectual freedom. This was foreseen and deplored by the great Catholic writer Bossuet. As he clearly pointed out, once the unity of Christendom had been broken by the Protestants, there was no reason why the process should not go on indefinitely and lead to the multiplication of innumerable Protestant sects. In thus rendering ecclesiastical interference with thought less unified and effective Protestantism aided, though quite unintentionally, in advancing intellectual progress. As the famous historian Edward Gibbon once observed: "The chain of authority was broken, which restrains the bigot from thinking as he pleases and the slave from speaking as he thinks; the popes, fathers, and councils were no longer the supreme and infallible judges of the world." Radical religious sects like the Anabaptists both preached and practiced toleration, and the very multiplicity of sects in Protestantism was a powerful factor in bringing about eventual toleration.

In a minor sense Calvinism and Puritanism, with their emphasis on the God-given character of money-making, may be said to have promoted indirectly those phases of applied science which have been closely related to modern industry and the practical applications of the "theory of business enterprise."

If art be considered, as it fittingly may, as a phase of intellectual expression, then the Protestant revolt exerted another negative influence. Its attitude toward art was certainly far less favorable and stimulating than that of Renaissance Catholicism. This was true not only of plastic and chromatic art, but also of literature and the theater. The zeal of the Protestants in theology

and religious controversy diverted intellectual and literary effort from books written primarily for the purpose of literary expression or esthetic pleasure. The opposition of puritanically inclined Protestants to the theater has continued to our own day. For some centuries in early modern times it was a very potent obstacle to the writing of drama and the performance of plays.

The intellectual reaction of the Protestant revolt on Catholicism was more disastrous than its effect upon the followers of Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, and Knox. The cultural decline that came with the Catholic defense-reaction in the Counter-Reformation can best be gauged and measured by the contrast between a typical early Reformation Catholic like Erasmus and the most characteristic figure in Counter-Reformation Catholicism, Ignatius Loyola. While no movement founded by an Erasmus could have produced a Voltaire, as the most cursory comparison of the *Adages* of the former with the *Philosophical Dictionary* of the latter will readily demonstrate, neither would it have led logically to the creation of the Jesuit Order.

The Church had been growing more tolerant and more appreciative of secular learning when it was put on the defensive by the Protestant assaults. It then felt it necessary to recover, revivify, and defend vigorously many archaic dogmas that had been allowed to lapse in part. It was forced to uphold as extreme a supernaturalism as that propounded by any Protestant fanatic. When the Protestants subjected Catholicism to bitter and burning criticism, it was only natural that the Catholics should react in a manner appropriate to the attacks made upon them. Fierce theological intolerance once more became a major intellectual virtue in the Catholic Church. The urbanity of Humanist Catholicism disappeared from the European intellectual scene. Never again did there appear at Rome a mental atmosphere comparable to that which existed under Aeneas Sylvius and the Renaissance popes.

THE WITCHCRAFT EPIDEMIC

One of the most deplorable intellectual results of the Protestant revolt and the Catholic Counter-Reformation was the witchcraft mania and delusion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This epidemic was one of the most horrible episodes in the history of human superstition and organized cruelty. While the belief in witches had existed throughout the Middle Ages, it was the bigotry and emotional fervor provoked by the religious controversies of the sixteenth century that prepared the ground for the growth of a veritable epidemic of superstition and persecution.

A witch was a person who had deliberately sold himself or herself into

the service of the Devil. The witch served the Devil as devoutly as the Christian served God. Most of the ill luck, suffering, and disasters that came to people were attributed to the malevolent intervention of the Devil. Hence the fierceness with which men turned upon their human brethren whom they believed to be secretly in the pay of the Devil. Moreover, since witches were supposed to have carnal intercourse with demons, the purist sentiments of the age led to a desire to crush out this particular odious form of sexual immorality. Witches were charged with bringing every kind of misfortune to man—disease and epidemics; droughts, infertility of soil; animal and human fits and spasms; infidelity, plottings, disloyalty, rebellion, and the like.

An early step in the witchcraft mania was taken in December, 1484, when Pope Innocent VIII launched against the Devil and his human servants the famous bull *Summis desiderantes*. In the more than two centuries that separated the papal bull of 1484 from Cotton Mather and the Salem trials in the American colonies, it is estimated that a quarter of a million persons were put to death for witchcraft—that is, they died under torture or were put to death after confession. In addition, many millions led a life full of mortal fear and mental insecurity lest they be accused and fall victims to the hideous tortures. One reason for the amazing spread of the mania was that once a person was accused of witchcraft there was little chance of escape. If one confessed under torture, he was put to death. Otherwise, he died under torture. Very few survived torture to convince their judges that they were innocent. The tortures employed were sufficiently ingenious and terrible to make one almost ashamed of belonging to the human race. . . .

It is often thought that only the lesser, meaner, and more credulous minds of this age took any stock in the witchcraft hypothesis. This, unfortunately, was not the case. Some of the most learned men of the period defended the witchcraft thesis with a zeal approaching ferocity. This was true of even some who were given to skepticism on general philosophical questions. Jean Bodin was one of the outstanding French scholars of the sixteenth century, a leading political scientist of early modern times, and a broad-minded historian. Yet his *Demonology* (1581) was a thorough defense of the superstition and a vicious attack on Dr. Weyer's able exposure of the delusion. Joseph Glanvil was one of the fathers of English skepticism and free thought, but his *Saducismus Triumphatus* (1681) was, in the words of Lecky, "probably the ablest book ever written in defense of the superstition." It was a thorough and comprehensive justification of witchcraft. Equally positive on this point was the work of the eminent Protestant divine Richard Baxter. Even in our own day scholars have mildly supported the delusion. A very learned Anglican

divine, Montague Summers, wrote two large books on the subject in the 1920's and seemed to credit the reality of witches and witchcraft.

The end of the witchcraft epidemic came with the approach of the eighteenth century for numerous reasons, among them being: (1) Its very fury tended to exhaust the movement; (2) science undermined its premises; (3) critical writers ridiculed the beliefs and practices; and (4) the Commercial Revolution and other secular influences diverted attention from this crude manifestation of primordial superstition.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROTESTANTISM

In a broad way, the contributions of Protestantism to modern civilization—for both good and evil—may be summarized about as follows. In the field of religion it revived the Bible and made it more important in Christian teachings than the doctrines of the theologians. It broke down the great ecclesiastical state of the Middle Ages and weakened external authority in religious beliefs and rites. It promoted sectarianism and denominationalism, and helped on freedom and diversity in religious doctrine. Among the Deists and in our own day, it encouraged liberal Christians to distinguish between the teachings of Jesus and Catholic Christianity. This has directed attention to the doctrines of Christ rather than to the interpretations by theologians from Paul and Augustine to Aquinas. Protestantism notably stimulated individualism in religion, both in interpreting the Scriptures and in worshiping God directly. It weakened the element of institutionalism and organization in religion and increased the factor of spirituality in worship. It turned away from justification by "good works" and the sacramental system to justification by faith. Socially, it was a bourgeois revolt against the dominion of the first and second estates—the clergy and the nobility. It also repudiated monasticism and withdrawal from the world. It encouraged the ethics of capitalism, freedom, competition, and anarchy in business. It promoted sharp dealing in economic affairs for the purpose of private profit, with little thought of social welfare. In our day, radical Protestants have in part compensated for this by laying emphasis upon the alleged anticapitalistic sayings of Jesus and by bitterly assaulting the capitalistic theory of business enterprise and speculative finance. The position of women was modified by Protestantism toward greater freedom. Protestantism has given to women more discretion as to the number of children they will bear, and more independence in their social relations. It has certainly helped along the sexual, social, and political emancipation of women, but Protestant doctrines and practices have also probably served to increase divorce and family disintegration. Fundamentalist

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Protestants have, however, been as intolerant of unconventional sex behavior as Catholics. In the field of charity and relief Protestantism has laid more stress on preventive measures and less on amelioration. It has helped to secularize education and to remove it from ecclesiastical dominion. Finally, it has greatly stimulated the growth of nationalism, representative government, and democracy in politics, even though in the first centuries of Protestantism much support was given to royal absolutism.

5. THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION

At the opening of the sixteenth century the need for reform and a spiritual regeneration of the Catholic Church was recognized as urgent by all thoughtful men throughout western Europe; but not much was done about it. A great number of the discontented eventually followed Luther into schism and heresy; but many earnest and devout men were shocked at the thought of schism and heresy, and believed it possible to reform clerical morality and revive the spirit of piety within the framework of the old church. These started a movement for a genuine Catholic reformation, uncontaminated with heresy. So successful were their efforts that, fifty years after Luther tacked his ninety-five theses to the church door at Wittenberg, the rising tide of Protestantism was checked and then gradually turned back. It is the purpose of this [section] to indicate the steps by which this dramatic success was attained.

In the later years of Pope Leo X (1513-21), a group of some fifty or sixty devout churchmen and pious laymen formed at Rome a loosely organized society, aristocratic in character, known as the Oratory of Divine Love. They met for prayer and meditation in a little church on the right bank of the Tiber, and dedicated their lives to the work of religious reform. The sack of Rome by imperialist troops in 1527 dispersed the society; but after a short time many of the members met again at Venice, where they found new recruits; others went elsewhere and formed kindred societies. Wherever they foregathered they were all animated by the same purpose and inspired by the same hopes—to reform the Catholic Church and revive the spirit of piety among both the clergy and the laity without resorting to schism and heresy.

Meanwhile a revival of religious life was revealing itself in the awakening of the old monastic orders in Italy and in the formation of new ones. For influence on the life of the common people, the most important was the order of Capuchins, which issued from the bosom of the decaying Franciscan order. The story goes that an ignorant Franciscan brother named Matteo

was vouchsafed a vision in which St. Francis of Assisi appeared to him wearing a cowl with its peak pointed and not rounded, as the fashion among the monks then was. The message brought by the saint to this humble brother was that the members of his order should obey his rules "to the letter, to the letter, to the letter." Matteo for one resolved to obey. Throwing away his rounded cowl, he donned one with a pointed peak, and would wear no other. His brethren remonstrated with him about it and even belabored him with their fists, but to no purpose. Matteo would rather die than wear the rounded cowl which he believed had never been hallowed by St. Francis. To escape from his persecutors, he ran away and found an asylum in Camerino, where, under the protection of the duchess of that petty principality, he could wear his pointed cowl (*cappuccio*) in peace. Here he worked unselfishly among the plague-stricken peasantry, caring for the sick, burying the dead, and preaching repentance to all. Other Franciscans who were discontented with the lax discipline and moral corruption of the mother society flocked to Camerino, donned the pointed cowl, and joined Matteo in the work of charity and religious revival. Thus there came into being a new order of monks called Capuchins (from *cappuccio*), who, like St. Francis, went about the villages preaching repentance to the masses, comforting the poor and disinherited, and administering the sacraments to the sick and dying. No group of reformers did more to bring about a religious revival in Italy than these kindly enthusiasts, whose pointed cowls soon became familiar sights in every village and market place.

In contrast to the Capuchins, who labored exclusively among the poor and ignorant, was the aristocratic order of Theatines, founded by Bishop Caraffa in 1524. This order spoke to the educated and strove by precept and example to incite the secular clergy to better living. The Theatines were bound by the three monastic vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity, but they performed the duties of secular priests. They were selected with great care and their number was strictly limited, for they were to form a *corps d'élite* in each diocese and be to the bishop what a staff is to a general. Early and late they labored to eradicate idleness, ignorance, inefficiency, and corruption among the secular clergy, and to inculcate an uncompromising orthodoxy. The order spread rapidly throughout Italy and inspired many imitators.

With the accession of Paul III in 1534, the Catholic reformers began to receive some cooperation from the papacy. Paul soon raised several of the most distinguished leaders of the reform party to the cardinalate and announced his purpose to investigate conditions in the Church with a view to the eradication of abuses. In 1537 a commission of nine cardinals, the majority

of whom were avowed reformers, submitted a report which revealed so many scandals in the *Curia* and throughout the government of the Church that the report was suppressed lest it give aid and comfort to the Protestants; but, despite precautions, a copy of it reached Germany, where it was published with scoffing comments claiming that a papal commission itself had, by this report, justified all the German demands for reform.

About this time the Catholic reformers drifted apart into two fairly distinct groups over the policy to be pursued in regard to Protestantism. One group, best represented by the Venetian humanist and statesman Cardinal Contarini, hoped for reconciliation with the Protestants on the basis of practical reforms and a liberal interpretation of Catholic doctrine; the other group, typified by Cardinal Caraffa, while equally eager for reform of abuses and a revival of piety, sternly rejected the idea of any compromise in the matter of doctrine and ceremony, and favored the ruthless suppression of heresy.

In 1541 Cardinal Contarini crossed the Alps as papal legate to confer with the Protestant leaders in Germany with a view to compromise. During the preliminary conferences both sides made surprisingly liberal concessions, which caused great rejoicing among Contarini's friends in Italy and led to the most extravagant expectations; but when the deeper theological questions were broached, differences of opinion emerged which proved impossible to reconcile. The net result of the colloquy was the revelation that there were insuperable obstacles to the reunion of the two creeds. When Contarini returned to Italy he found that his influence was gone. Leadership of the reform movement now passed to Cardinal Caraffa, whose theology was strictly medieval.

The convocation of a general council to reform the long-standing abuses in the Church and to pave the way thereby for the healing of the schism had been urged by statesmen and scholars, nobles and burghers, bishops and parish priests, ever since the Diet of Worms in 1521. Nevertheless, a whole generation was allowed to pass before the council was convoked.

The reason for the delay was the persistent opposition of successive popes, who feared encroachment upon papal authority. At the councils of Constance (1414-18) and Basel (1431-49) the doctrine had been advanced that a council was superior in authority to the pope, and the pope did not care to have that question raised again. Finally, however, suspecting that if he delayed any longer Emperor Charles V might himself take the initiative, Paul III summoned a council to meet at Trent on March 15, 1545. It was the emperor's intention that the Protestants should send representatives; but they declined

to do so, knowing full well that they would be in a minority and constantly outvoted.

Delegates began to assemble at Trent around the day appointed, but months were allowed to pass before the council formally opened. This leisurely procedure was symptomatic of the history of the council. Its sessions were spread over a period of eighteen years, with long lapses between them, and during the same period there occurred the deaths of four popes. Most of the men present at the beginning of the first session were dead when the council closed.

Paul III did not attend in person, but was represented by three legates who were to preside over the sessions and to take care of the papal interests. The first important matter to come up for consideration concerned organization and procedure. Who should have the right to vote in the council? Should voting be by individuals or by nations? It was decided that only those who held a rank equivalent to, or higher than, that of bishop or head of a religious order should vote; that the voting should be by individuals; and that no absentee should be allowed to vote by proxy. This was a great victory for the papal party; for, by reason of the proximity of Trent to Italy, the pope could easily pack the council with Italian bishops and thus carry or defeat measures in accordance with papal interests.

Naturally this victory was not won without a struggle; but the emperor, who was the chief opponent of the papal party, was not at this juncture ably seconded at Trent. His Spanish bishops found the journey long and hazardous, and had not arrived in numbers. From the Catholic territories in Germany had come only one bishop; from England, none. So, aside from a few eloquent protests from the imperial party, the Italian prelates had things their own way. The papal victory was made complete a little later when the right to initiate measures for discussion and decision was reserved exclusively to the three papal legates, who were in constant communication with Rome. Finally it was enacted that all important measures, especially those touching the reform of abuses, had to have the papal confirmation before being promulgated and put into effect.

Over the question whether definition of doctrine or reform of abuses should take precedence, feeling ran so high that the legates were obliged to yield to a compromise. It was agreed that doctrine and reform should be treated simultaneously by separate commissions and be brought before the council in alternation.

The first doctrinal decrees concerned the basis of authority. Over against

the Protestant position that the Bible is the sole authority for faith and practice, the council set up, as another basis of authority, the tradition in the keeping of the Church. The argument was that since the Holy Spirit abides perpetually in the Church, the tradition in the Church's keeping, in regard to matters of faith and practice, cannot be subject to error, and is of equal weight with the Bible. Then the supplementary question arose as to the authoritative Scriptural text. All through the Middle Ages St. Jerome's version, known as the Vulgate, had been so accepted; but lately scholars had found in it many flaws of translation. Nevertheless the council declared the Vulgate inspired and authoritative, and specifically included in it the Apocrypha, which the Protestants had rejected as spurious.

In alternation with doctrinal definition came the discussion of reform, but there was little disposition to attack the really crying abuses of the Church. After passing a few unimportant decrees concerning preaching and episcopal jurisdiction over the regular clergy, the council took up the thorny question of justification by faith, Luther's basic doctrine. The emperor, hoping still to conciliate the Protestants and lure them back into the fold, wished to postpone discussion of this fundamental question; but the papal legates, who were in constant communication with Rome, did not conceal their opinion that a sharp line of demarcation should be drawn between the true and the false religion. More Italian bishops were rushed up to Trent to cope with the situation, and the emperor's wishes were speedily overruled; but violent scenes ensued, in which right reverend fathers wrathfully tore at each other's beards. The council decreed that the seven sacraments were indispensable to salvation. Since the sacraments could be administered only by duly ordained priests, the dependence of the laity on the priesthood was thus confirmed and made final.

The council had now condemned the primary errors of Protestantism, and appeared to the pope ready for dissolution. But the hopes of the emperor had not been fulfilled. The reform of abuses had not been thoroughly dealt with, and the prospect of reconciliation with the Protestants seemed more remote than ever. Might not the emperor, just then victorious over the Schmalkaldic League, go in person to Trent and insist on having his wishes carried out? The pope was saved from this embarrassment by the appearance at Trent of the spotted fever. Under pretext that the health of the reverend fathers was endangered, he removed the council to Bologna in Italy, where it remained in nominal session for two years more. What might have happened if Paul III had not then died, we can only surmise. The new pope, Julius III, quite unexpectedly yielded to the emperor's demands and sent the council back

to Trent, where it renewed its deliberations in 1551. Whatever had been done at Bologna was ignored.

At this second meeting of the Council of Trent (1551-52) the emperor pressed his demand for a reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants, and at his suggestion several Protestant delegates appeared there with a confession of faith; but before anything of importance could be accomplished, the revolt of Maurice of Saxony gave the pope an excellent pretext for the suspension of the deliberations.

The Truce of Passau (1552), confirmed by the Peace of Augsburg (1555), gave legal recognition to Lutheranism. The unity of the Church was now definitely destroyed. What was the need of further efforts at conciliation and compromise? The abdication of the emperor at this juncture seemed to put an end to the conciliar movement.

But the work of the council was not yet finished. From orthodox Catholic princes came the demand for a further reform of abuses and a stricter definition of doctrine. Philip II of Spain and Ferdinand of Austria both desired to see the relation of the bishops to the pope defined and regulated. France and the Catholic princes of Germany desired many reforms, such as Mass in the vernacular, Communion in both kinds, revision of the service books, abolition of compulsory celibacy for the clergy, residence of bishops in their respective dioceses, abolition of papal dispensations, limitation of the pope's power of excommunication. The council, therefore, was continued on the narrower basis of strictly Catholic reform. There was no longer any question of reconciliation with the Protestants.

In 1562-63 the third and last meeting of the council took place at Trent. No sooner was organization completed than the papal and episcopal parties clashed. The episcopal party, led by the Spanish prelates, asserted that the authority of the bishops is derived directly from Christ and not from the pope. This contention, if successful, would have completely changed the character of the Church government and reduced the pope to the level of other bishops. For ten months the matter was bitterly disputed, and in the end it was decided in favor of the pope. Bitter, too, were the debates over the question of Communion in both kinds. Should the wine as well as the bread be given to the laity in the sacrament of Communion? Italy and Spain opposed the concession, while France and Germany favored it. In the end, the answer was negative. The same fate ultimately befell most of the other items in the Franco-German demands. These radical projects were all abhorrent to the Spaniards and Italians, who, although eager for the reform of discipline in the Church, were opposed to changes in doctrine and ceremony.

At last the work was done. Though the distinction is not always apparent on the surface, the enactments of the council may be divided into two categories: (1) the "canons," which relate to doctrine; and (2) the "decrees," which relate to discipline. The canons, immediately upon their promulgation by the pope, became binding upon every member of the Catholic Church. Whoever refused to accept them was heretic and subject to excommunication. But discipline varies with time and place. Whoever refused to accept the decrees was regarded by the pope as disloyal, but was not necessarily a heretic. A prince like the king of France, for instance, might ignore the decrees, but he was not at liberty to ignore the canons. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that no attempt was made to define all the doctrines of the Church, but only those questioned by the Protestants. And the decrees by no means dealt with all the disciplinary abuses. No reform of the *Curia*, for instance, was attempted. That task was left to the discretion of the pope.

Briefly analyzed, *The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, which fill a stout volume, declare that Catholic faith and practice are based on tradition as well as on the Bible, and that the interpretation of the Bible belongs exclusively to the Church. The Protestant doctrine of grace and justification by faith is condemned, and the seven sacraments are declared indispensable to salvation. The belief in purgatory is confirmed, the worship of saints is sanctioned, and the use of images and relics is commended. The theory of indulgence, which started the Lutheran revolt, is confirmed, though no payment is to be allowed for granting indulgences or for administering the sacraments. The pope is recognized as the supreme head of the Church, and all bishops are to swear obedience to him. The evils of the benefice system (*i.e.*, trafficking in Church positions) are condemned, bishops are required to reside in their respective dioceses, and a seminary is to be established in each diocese for the proper education and training of priests.

Having thus defined her disputed doctrines and eradicated many of the tares sown by her worldly-minded clergy, the Catholic Church resumed her old self-assurance. Though the area of Catholic control was much smaller than formerly, what remained was subject to the direction of a single head, whereas the forces of Protestantism were divided. A succession of reforming popes slowly cleansed the papal *Curia* of corruption, and a new spirit was gradually infused into the body of the clergy from the cardinals down to the village priests. Instead of standing on the defensive, the Church now began a vigorous campaign against heresy through such agencies as the Inquisition, the Index, and the Jesuits.

The Inquisition, as a special court for the investigation and suppression of heresy, was in use throughout the Middle Ages; but it did not assume its severest form until late in the fifteenth century, when Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain petitioned the pope for authorization to establish a special Inquisition in their territories. Their petition was granted, and the Holy Office, as it was called, began to function in 1480. Some idea of its effectiveness may be had from the following statement: "When Adrian of Utrecht, afterwards the pope, was Inquisitor General 1516-22, 1,620 persons were burned alive, 560 in effigy, and 21,845 were sentenced to penance or other lighter punishments."

The success of the Spanish Inquisition induced Paul III in 1542 to reorganize the papal Inquisition in Italy on the Spanish model. The new institution began its work at once with the Papal States, and was introduced after some negotiations into most of the Italian principalities. The Holy Office, however, never exhibited the same murderous activity in Italy as it did in Spain, although the records and contemporary witnesses recount continuous trials and burnings at Rome and other places. Protestant congregations which had been formed at Bologna, Ferrara, Lucca, Modena, Naples, Siena, Venice, and Vicenza were broken up and dispersed. In consequence, Protestantism failed to obtain any substantial footing in Italy.

Another way to combat heresy was to destroy ideas. Ever since the invention of printing (about 1450), archbishops, bishops, universities, and national governments, each within the limits of his or its jurisdiction, had sought to supervise the publication of books. In the course of time numerous lists of prohibited books had been drawn up by local authorities, and the need became evident for a single authoritative list applicable to all Catholic lands. This need was met in 1564, when a commission appointed by the Council of Trent brought out the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*.⁵ In order to keep the list up to date, continual revision was of course necessary. To insure this, Pius V appointed a special board, called the Congregation of the Index, which has lasted up to the present day and has prepared more than forty lists of books which Catholics are directed not to read. Although the *Index* had small effect north of the Alps, in Italy and Spain its work was so thoroughly done that many books disappeared entirely. In Spain, officials were stationed at the seaports to board incoming ships and examine the cargo—even the water casks, chests, and sailors' berths—for heretical literature. Should anyone be discovered attempting to bring in forbidden books, he was promptly sent before the Inquisition and tried for heresy.

⁵ [Index of Prohibited Books.]

In the struggle against heresy, however, the Catholic Church was not dependent on agencies of repression alone. In the newly organized Society of Jesus she found an effective agency of propaganda and proselytism.

The founder of the Society of Jesus was Ignatius Loyola, a Spanish nobleman. In his youth Loyola had served as a page at the court of Ferdinand of Aragon, and on reaching manhood he became a soldier. At the battle of Pampeluna (or Pamplona) in 1521, his leg had been crushed by a cannon ball. For months he lay on his bed of pain, trying to heal his shattered limb; but he became convinced that his fighting days were over. He could never ride a war horse again.

To while away the long hours of convalescence, he read legends of saints and a life of Christ, and his imagination took fire at the prospect that opened before him. What if he should become a saint like St. Francis or St. Dominic, or even greater than either? As he pondered over this possibility, the thought came to him that he could never hope to become a saint unless he lived near to God; so, like Martin Luther, he resolved to become a monk and work his way to sainthood by means of asceticism. Donning a hermit's robe, he entered a Dominican monastery at Manresa.

Then followed a religious experience similar to Luther's at Erfurt. Loyola wearied his religious guides by his frequent confessions, but got no relief for his conscience. To make his penitence thorough, he even wrote out his confessions so that he could see his sins staring at him from the written page. He prayed seven times and scourged himself three times every day, but found no peace. At last, in despair, he threw himself on the mercy of God. This was the crisis. He ceased to worry about his sins and began to wonder how he might serve God. From his deep meditations on this subject originated that peculiar conception of service which is associated with his name.

So rigorous was Loyola's asceticism that at times he was vouchsafed visions. He discovered that, after he had fasted and prayed, and concentrated his faculties in one prolonged gaze, he could *see* the miracle of transubstantiation taking place—Christ in the form of a white ray entering the consecrated bread and wine changing them into the body and the blood. In the same way he could (1) visualize the Holy Trinity and hear God's voice, and (2) feel the flames of hell and smell the sulphur fumes, and (3) witness the birth of Christ in the manger at Bethlehem. These visions and experiences so fascinated him that he began to write them down for his own satisfaction and edification. By studying them carefully, and by observing his moods and physical condition when they appeared, he learned how to reproduce them when wanted. At first his experiments were crude, but in the course of time

he perfected a series of "Spiritual Exercises" which could be depended on to produce these moments of exaltation and ecstasy.

After spending about a year in the monastery at Manresa, Loyola wandered away to the Holy Land; but the head of the Franciscan order at Jerusalem, alarmed at his strange behavior, sent him back home. Then he wandered from one Spanish university to another, ostensibly studying theology but really devoting his time to the promotion of his "Spiritual Exercises." On two occasions he narrowly missed condemnation for heresy because he claimed that men could talk directly with God. Arriving finally at the University of Paris, he gradually drew around him a carefully selected band of disciples who took the "Exercises" and became enthusiastic converts. One day in 1534 Loyola led his disciples to a little church on top of the Butte Montmartre, just outside the limits of Paris, where they took a solemn vow to leave family and property and to work together for the regeneration of the Church. Then the friends parted, to meet again at Venice for a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

The projected pilgrimage had to be abandoned because of a war between Venice and the Turks, but for two or three years the little group found plenty to do in Italy. Refusing Cardinal Caraffa's invitation to join the Theatines, they clung together and spent their time in preaching, doing charity work, and laying plans for the future. In 1538 Loyola submitted to Paul III a plan for the organization of a new religious order to be called the Society of Jesus. It was not to be like any other religious order. The members were not to withdraw from the world, as did the Benedictines; nor were they to devote their energies primarily to preaching, as did the Dominicans; nor yet were they to be engaged primarily in charity, as were the Franciscans. The Society of Jesus was to be a flying squadron of spiritual militia, carefully selected and highly disciplined, ready to move instantly at the word of command and to fight with every spiritual weapon at their disposal in defense of the papacy and the orthodox faith.

The pope hesitated to sanction the organization of such an unusual company, but was prevailed upon to do so in 1540, and the Jesuit Society entered upon its notable career. The original "companions" (*socii*, members of a *societas*), now nine in number, chose Loyola as their "general" and took solemn vows to obey him in all things.

The new society became famous at once, and scores pressed forward to join it. Loyola was not opposed to making use of all who came, but he saw the necessity of restricting leadership to a few carefully chosen and thoroughly trained men—men of a certain type and temperament. So he began and

slowly worked out regulations for the selection, grading, and training of the membership.

On presenting himself for membership, a candidate was put through the "Spiritual Exercises," or military drill for the soul, which usually required about twenty-five days. Beginning with detailed meditation on sin, and prolonged until the candidate could see the flames of hell, smell the sulphur, hear the shrieks of the damned, and taste the salt tears, the "Exercises" concluded with the *colloquia*, or ecstatic converse with God. After a novice had taken this drill about twice, he was a changed man, and the director of the "Exercises" was ready to assign him to his appropriate place of service.

Two avenues of service were open, the secular and the spiritual. Those who were assigned to the secular service were called lay coadjutors, and took the simple vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity. To them were entrusted the administration of the property of the society, the distribution of alms, and such menial duties as cooking, gardening, and so forth. If, however, the candidate was fitted to become a spiritual coadjutor, he was classified as a "scholastic" and required to enter upon further tests, which lasted from two to fifteen years. During this period of probation the candidate studied languages, science, philosophy, and theology, and took the "Spiritual Exercises" at intervals, developing finally into a pliant agent ready to carry out instantly the commands of his superiors. By the end of the period, he was to have no will of his own, but be simply a staff in the hands of those above him. If he were commanded to call black white, he was to obey.

The highest rank in the society was the "professed of the four vows." These were not very numerous, never more than fifty or sixty, and formed an inner and privileged circle. It was from this circle that the highest officials of the society were chosen, and, whenever necessary, the members of this group met in the "general congregation" to elect the "general." The fourth vow was that of special obedience to the pope.

It was the dream of Loyola to organize a thoroughly disciplined company of spiritual soldiers capable of moving quickly and effectively against the foes of the Church. To this end, he had no need of asceticism or overmuch piety. A Jesuit had to be adaptable, versatile, and ingratiating, in order to win men over and use them for God's glory. For leadership, young men of the aristocratic or governing class were preferred, for these would be more likely to know the ways of the world and ingratiate themselves with influential personages.

The Society of Jesus, thus organized and disciplined, performed a notable service for the Catholic Church. Jesuits became the most eloquent preachers

of the time, and multitudes flocked to hear them. Moreover, their services cost nothing. Even the boxes for voluntary offerings were removed from the vestibules of the churches when Jesuits officiated. By means of the confessional they gained the confidence of princes and thus directed the policies of government from behind the scenes. As teachers, they sought to win over the rising generation to their cause, especially the sons of the ruling classes. Gradually they developed a system of education superior to any that had ever before existed. The location of their schools was always a matter of strategy, and the decision was made with the greatest care. As missionaries, they were to be found, in less than two decades, in almost every country in Europe and in such distant regions as India, China, Japan, and Brazil. Their activity was so great that they seemed many times more numerous than they actually were. Using the German College which they founded at Rome as a training school for the enterprise, they sent missionaries to Germany and soon gained firm footholds in the universities of Ingolstadt, Vienna, and Cologne. From these points of vantage they operated in all directions to eradicate heresy in Austria, Hungary, Poland, south Germany, and Belgium. Largely through their efforts the tide of Protestantism was rolled back from these countries and the orthodox faith reestablished.

Thus, by the end of the sixteenth century, Catholicism was victorious all along the line in Europe and was turning the flank of Protestantism in the lands beyond the seas. But these victories were not won without actual bloodshed. Before the century closed, France and the Netherlands were devastated by a long series of religious wars, and the first half of the seventeenth century witnessed the terrible Thirty Years War in Germany and a politico-religious war of no mean consequence in England. In the name of the Prince of Peace, creed rose against creed in the bloody battle for supremacy.

Chapter VIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SCIENCE



INTRODUCTION

WE HAVE THUS FAR been surveying the transformation of medieval society as a complex of economic and political changes, and we have in particular noted the effects of the increase in trade and commerce upon a culture based primarily on an agricultural economy. We have also seen in what way and to what extent the literary humanism of the Renaissance, taking its inspiration from the rediscovered ancient Greek and Roman writings, helped to weaken the spiritual ideals of medieval Christianity. We must now outline the profound intellectual changes brought about by the development of experimental mathematical science during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The intellectual revolution produced by the rise of modern science consisted not only in altering radically men's conceptions of the universe and their place in it. It also involved the erection of a fresh ideal of knowledge, and ultimately the construction of new instruments, both physical and intellectual, for transforming the physical and social environment. The rise of modern science was no less potent as an agent which helped to dissolve the medieval synthesis than was the commercial civilization which replaced the medieval agricultural economy.

We will appreciate the revolutionary significance of modern science more fully, however, if we first note some of the distinctive assumptions of medieval science—assumptions against which an experimentally based mathematical science had to contend.

Medieval Science. Medieval science was in the main ancillary to a theology which placed greater value on the salvation of man's soul than on man's ability to discover the physical conditions for the order of events. The primary con-

This chapter, designed especially for the present volume, was written for its first edition by Ernest Nagel.

cern of medieval thinkers was to understand the order of existence as illustrating the divine goodness and to see how that order ministered to man's spiritual needs. On the other hand, how man's salvation was to be achieved, and in what way the facts of the universe testified to the possibility of that salvation, were questions regarded as definitely settled by a fixed and complete doctrine.

The fundamental premises of this doctrine were believed to be supplied either by divine revelation, or by a number of selected authorities—the Bible and its interpretation by the Church Fathers, and eventually also Aristotle, after his writings were absorbed into the fabric of Christian thought. The physical and cosmological ideas of the medievals thus consisted of a fusion of Christian theology and Greek science. Although the medievals frequently exhibited a genuine interest in the observable facts of nature, such facts served them in the main as illustrations and confirmations of principles held antecedently on other grounds. The materials of observation were therefore not used systematically for making new discoveries or for putting old beliefs to a crucial test; and in consequence the modern conception of experimental inquiry was almost entirely lacking.

The Medieval Intellectual Processes. The intellectual method of the medievals was controlled by a characteristic way of analyzing the objects of their experience. If we should ask a contemporary student trained in modern science what it is that makes a given object, a hen's egg for example, behave the way it does, and why it exhibits certain traits, his answer would undoubtedly be formulated in terms of measurable physical and chemical interactions. A medieval scientist, on the other hand, would reply differently. He would in all likelihood invoke certain "powers" resident in the object, such as the power of developing into a chick; and these powers would be conceived as consequences of the inherent "nature" or "form" of the object. Just as all the properties of a circle follow from its definition, or "essence," so all the distinctive traits of things were regarded as the necessary implications of the "forms" which permeate their matter. This distinction between the "form" and "matter" of things played a central role in medieval thought.

Every object in nature was interpreted as having a "matter" and a "form." Matter, considered by itself, was taken to be something incomplete and intellectually opaque, and only the "forms" of things were regarded as knowable and as capable of being formulated in language. Knowing adequately what a thing is, meant knowing what its distinctive "form" is; and knowing what the "form" of a thing is, meant knowing what are the natural realizations of that thing's inherent powers. Thus, to know what a hen's egg is, was equiva-


lent to knowing its natural eventuation or proper end. Accordingly, medieval science was concerned with ascertaining the objectives toward which things could be viewed as striving, and not with discovering the physical conditions or causes of their behavior. "Final causes," "ends," or "purposes," were the primary principles of its explanations; and an approach to the study of nature which substituted mathematical principles of invariable sequence for final causes was thus at intellectual antipodes to the science of the Middle Ages.

The Medieval Moral Interpretation of the Universe. This fundamental distinction between the "matter" and the "form" of things was coupled with a moral interpretation of the universe derived in part from neo-Platonic sources. According to this interpretation, the perfection of a thing consists in its being intelligible and luminous to the intellect, so that the rank of an object in the scale of perfection depends on the thoroughness with which its "matter" is permeated by intelligible "form." This interpretation was in turn based on the view that the world was created by a perfect God as a manifestation of His goodness. However, all created things possess some "matter" which is recalcitrant to the entrance of intelligible "form," and in general a thing is less perfect according as it is more removed from the divine perfection.

The world was therefore conceived as a hierarchical order of beings differing radically in their degree of perfection, each endowed with a "form" or "essence" determining its place in the hierarchical series. One such series is illustrated by the sequence: God, the angels, man, animals, plants, minerals; and analogous hierarchical orders were believed to be exhibited in the rankings of ecclesiastical, political, and economic dignitaries. It was consistent with these assumptions to believe that things were not to be analyzed in quantitative terms, since the reasons for the behavior of things were to be sought in the kind and the perfection of the "form" they embodied and not in their material organization. Accordingly, the heavens and the earth were regarded as qualitatively different and as made of a different stuff. Celestial bodies, it was supposed, are incorruptible and their motions are inherently circular and uniform, while terrestrial objects are subject to change and their natural motions are rectilinear and variable. In brief, the conception of a universal law to which both celestial and terrestrial bodies conform was foreign to the medieval outlook.

The Medieval Logic. If we bear these cosmological assumptions in mind, it will not be surprising to find that the intellectual tool of medieval science was primarily the logic of hierarchical classification. For, in the light of these assumptions, the central problem of inquiry was to determine for a given object what essential "form" it possessed and under what type or genus of

being that "form" was to be subsumed. Thus, one systematic classification of the various types of being was formulated with the help of a simple logical device. The analysis began with Substance, the most inclusive type of being. It then distinguished two kinds of substances, the Corporeal (that is, those which have a body) and the Incorporeal. It next divides bodies into two distinctive kinds, the Animate (or Living things) and the Inanimate. Living things were then further distinguished into those which were Sensitive (the Animals) and the Insensitive. Animals were next divided into those which were Rational (Man) and those which were Irrational. And finally men were distinguished by the individual traits of Socrates, Plato, and so on.



The foregoing arrangement of these distinctions, known as the Tree of Porphyry, makes evident at once the relations of various types of being. It shows, for example, that Socrates is a man, that man is a rational animal, that an animal is a sensitive living thing, and that a living thing is a corporeal substance.

Let us consider Porphyry's Tree a bit further. It shows that man is a rational animal, and that Socrates is a man. What then is Socrates? The answer is obvious, and is perhaps even more obvious if we arrange these propositions in the following order:

Man is a rational animal.

Socrates is a man.

For we can directly conclude from them the consequence:

Socrates is a rational animal.

This analysis illustrates the logical structure known as the syllogism. The syllogism then is a series of three propositions, two of which are the premises, the third being the conclusion necessarily implied by them. It is evident that if the premises of a syllogism are once granted, the conclusion can be obtained logically (or dialectically) from them, without making any use of experiment or observation. Consequently, if we recall that for the medieval thinkers the ultimate premises of their beliefs were accepted as final and complete, the central task of their science could only be that of making explicit by syllogistic reasoning the various consequences entailed by them.

Their writings were in fact replete with syllogistic deductions, which effected a remarkably impressive unification of their beliefs. They succeeded in exhibiting the implied meanings of their convictions, they showed upon what authoritative premises various individual items of belief depended, and by ingenious interpretations and distinctions they brought order and a large measure of consistency into their authorities. Nevertheless, the logical integrations which they effected were in the end primarily systems of classification, in which various distinctions were subsumed under appropriate headings. Their procedure, while irreproachable as formal logic, tended to assume that the causes of things could be ascertained by logical analysis alone. And in this procedure the quantitative determination of the interactions of things was largely irrelevant. It is with the victorious emergence of just such a quantitative, relational approach to the study of nature that we shall be concerned in what follows.

The Rise of Experimental Science. The rise of an experimentally based mathematical science of nature helped to destroy the medieval cultural pattern. But it also became a factor of paramount importance in the subsequent institutional reorganization of Europe. In the first place, once the ancient certainties had been discredited, an authoritative method of inquiry was needed with which to discover as well as defend against traditional critics the mathematical interpretation of nature. The new science, fortified by its brilliant successes in physics and astronomy, gradually perfected its principles of logic; and the methods of the mathematical sciences of nature came to be looked upon as norms for conducting inquiries into all matters pertaining to politics, economics, and morals. In this way the authority over men's beliefs concerning

nature and society, heretofore exercised by institutionalized religion, was gradually transferred to the methods of the new sciences.

In the second place, while the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake was a highly prized way of life, the new experimentally controlled study of nature had practical fruits as well. Men learned how to do familiar things more efficiently than before and how to achieve a control over natural forces where previously blind routine and chance had been the order of the day. New inventions and new technologies were the most obvious and easily understood benefits of the developing sciences; and navigation, mining, medicine, and the military and industrial arts were gradually transformed. Thus, the new sciences provided the knowledge required for organizing an expanding economy, while at the same time the needs of society served as stimuli for scientific research. In this way modern science became an institution integral to modern society: it became an honored profession, sustained and encouraged by men and communities who would have at best exhibited only a mild interest in the more speculative aspects of disinterested research. In a word, therefore, many of the characteristic features of our own society are the products of the modes of thinking instituted during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The labors of the pioneers of modern science had as their direct fruits the establishment of mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology, in something like their present form. The achievements of these men did not always receive immediate public recognition and had little effect upon the minds of the great mass of their contemporaries. In a limited space it would not be possible to do more than catalogue the principal contributions to knowledge made in this period. Nevertheless, the student should bear in mind the tremendous expansion of the intellectual and physical horizon which was produced by an impressive series of great and minor students of nature. Thus, the circulation of the blood was discovered by William Harvey (1578-1657); William Gilbert (1540-1603) conducted researches in magnetism; experiments in chemistry and gaseous pressures were made by Robert Boyle (1627-91) and others; Marcello Malpighi (1628-94) and Antony Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) made microscopic analysis of living organisms and so opened up new fields of research; and Thomas Sydenham (1624-89) reconstructed medical theory and practice. Some of these achievements were spectacular and impressed their contemporaries as having revolutionary significance. Others had to pass through a period of incubation and development before their full import was perceived. In any event, however, the sheer mass of new information which became accessible, the bold challenges which were re-

peatedly given to views sanctified by tradition, acted as an exciting stimulus for the radical revaluation of men's attitudes toward nature and society.

In what follows we shall concentrate exclusively upon the dramatic development of modern astronomy and mechanics. We shall restrict ourselves to understanding the innovations of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, and their significance in changing the medieval world-outlook. We shall attempt to understand the essential features of the method of mathematical natural science. And finally, we shall indicate what promise the new science held for its contemporaries, and what steps were taken to realize it by institutionalizing scientific research.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN SCIENCE

The causes which produced the rise of modern science are complex, and cannot here be discussed in detail. It will be well to dismiss at once two rather widely held misconceptions concerning its origins. Medieval science was overthrown, it is sometimes stated, when Galileo simultaneously dropped a one-pound and a hundred-pound cannon ball from the top of the Tower of Pisa. For in showing that the balls did not acquire speeds proportional to their weights, but struck the ground together, he refuted the Aristotelian scholastics and inaugurated experimental science. Again, it is often held that it was the enthusiasm for classical learning by the literary humanists of the Renaissance which shook off the dead hand of uncritical tradition and encouraged the independent exploration of nature.

The actual history, however, is quite different. There is in fact no evidence that Galileo ever performed the experiment so frequently attributed to him; and, as we shall see, the conception of an experimentally controlled inquiry into nature was a slow growth, not a bolt out of the blue, which owed much to ancient and medieval scholars. Furthermore, literary humanists such as Petrarch had only disdain for the patient experimentation and the use of quantitative methods which characterize modern physics. Indeed, the fashion of holding in contempt the study of nature, which the humanists fostered, even when they ridiculed the aridity of scholastic philosophy, is perhaps one reason why the high tide of scientific discovery did not set in until the seventeenth century. The following points concerning the origins of modern science should be noted.

A fairly continuous tradition of an experimentally controlled mathematical science of nature can be traced from ancient times up to the sixteenth century, a tradition with firm roots in the medieval culture of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. This tradition was conveyed to Western Europe by

Mohammedan scholars, after a high type of civilization was established in Spain by the Moors in the tenth century. The Arabic followers of Mohammed, though no profound scientific innovators, had the gift of absorbing and applying the intellectual achievements of the Greek and Hindu cultures with which they came into contact; and they knew the great mathematical, physical, and biological treatises of these peoples in Arabic version.

These writings were gradually translated into Latin, and by the end of the twelfth century Christian Europe had available in this form the medical and anatomical works of Hippocrates and Galen, Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*, Ptolemy's *Almagest* (the great astronomical classic of antiquity), and various Hindu writings on algebra. Under the inspiration of Graeco-Arabic conceptions, medical schools were established in southern Italy in that century; and the next century saw the founding of similarly inspired schools in other parts of Europe—at Oxford, Paris, Padua, and elsewhere—which specialized in the study of mathematical physics and medicine.

It is true that many of the investigators at these places, such as Roger Bacon (1214-94), had no clear conceptions concerning experimental-mathematical methods; and their physics was often only a mixture of the number-mysticism they acquired from neo-Platonism and an uncritical acceptance of unverified common beliefs. Nevertheless, they were often remarkable prophets of the coming experimental sciences, and they encouraged the view that mathematics is the language in which the book of nature is written. By the end of the fifteenth century, however, a notable series of students at various centers of learning—Robert Grosseteste, William Ockham, John Buridan, Nicolas Oresme, Nicolas Cusanus, and many others—had anticipated ideas in mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, and optics which were not successfully exploited until one or two hundred years later.

When Galileo's scientific career began, the revival of Alexandrian mathematical science was in full swing; the writings of Archimedes, Apollonius, and other Alexandrian Greeks inspired a critical reconsideration and reconstruction of Aristotelian physics, and a number of scientists in Italy were busy with the theory of projectiles and the principles of dynamics.

The urban civilization which began to develop by the twelfth century provided incentives for travel and exploration, as well as the wealth and leisure for the theoretical study of nature. Contact with new peoples and new continents inevitably loosened the binding force of medieval ideas. And however devoutly the traders and merchants might profess their Christianity, the restricting habits engendered by parochial religious practices could not long withstand the requirements of success in commerce.

Moreover, the expanding commercial economy made increasingly large demands upon crafts and techniques, and offered substantial rewards for practical innovations. Thus, commerce required better methods of navigation, and successful navigation depended on improved astronomical knowledge; the latter in turn required more careful observations of the celestial bodies and more reliable tables of stellar positions. Again, new instruments of warfare set new problems in military fortifications and gunnery—problems which could ultimately be solved only by a comprehensive theory of mechanics. Moreover, men and communities, enriched by the expanding economy, patronized or encouraged the creation of paintings, sculptures, works of architecture and of civil engineering; and the force of competition led practitioners of these various arts to improve their skills by a study of human anatomy, perspective, and mechanics. Nor must we overlook the stimuli to anatomical and physiological research when an increasing population made the problems of health and medicine loom larger than ever before.

The study of nature was therefore almost from the outset more than a purely theoretical enterprise. And it is noteworthy that efforts to establish a science of dynamics, which in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had received little recognition from the general community and which lapsed with the death of talented amateurs, by the end of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were publicly encouraged because of the economic, military, medical, and artistic needs of society.

The social demands upon the natural sciences placed a premium upon results which were practically applicable and which provided reliable control over the physical environment. Vague speculations and unverified conclusions could not resolve pressing technological issues; and it is not unlikely, therefore, that a partial reason why modern science became increasingly quantitative and precise is that it was expected to satisfy concrete, practical needs. A recent historian of the period, G. N. Clark, has stated his findings as follows:

Experimentation was taken over into science . . . not once and for all but by long-continued contact, from art, from mining, and from the skilled handicrafts in general. . . . Science took over from economic production more than its procedure; it caught also something of its spirit or temper. The scientists and the men of thought generally, who had been prone to elaboration for its own sake, to impressive mystifications, became, as we say, business-like. In their language and habits of thought they became precise, economical of effort. They fitted their means to their ends, and always kept a purpose in sight. In all this they resembled the men who were making or selling things for money; and this was due, at least partly, to the influence of such men. . . . If the search for perpetual motion and the philosopher's stone . . . was relinquished by the end of Newton's time for something better, it

was partly due to the positive practical spirit of the business man. Indeed, this spirit even helped science to hold fast that part of its method which seems at first sight most high and abstract—the mathematical part. It has long been recognized that the introduction of rational accounting in business in the later Middle Ages was another result of the habit of quantitative thinking which was married to experimentation in the work of Galileo and Newton. Science was applied in business; we must not forget that business was applied in science.

We must not, however, confuse the satisfactory solution of specific technological problems with the creation of a theoretical science of nature, even if the former may set the stage for the latter. The invention of new machines and the resolution of specific problems of practical life often occur without recognition of the general principles involved in either. Certainly for the men of the seventeenth century the construction of a genuine science of nature required the formulation of universal and systematically interconnected laws. Thus, for example, simply knowing how to bisect a given line with compass and ruler does not make a man a geometer. He is a geometer only when he recognizes the principles which control his construction and sees why, in terms of them, the two segments he obtains must be equal. Accordingly, the artisans and craftsmen of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were not theoretical physicists, however much their problems and techniques may have contributed toward Galileo's theoretical discussions. We must constantly bear in mind that the great achievement of these centuries was the discovery of fundamental modes of analysis and general principles of natural order, in terms of which the solutions to different special problems were systematically connected.

Nor must we make the mistake of supposing that the practical motive for scientific research is the exclusive or even the primary one. We have already noted the sustaining example of the Graeco-Alexandrian tradition of science as a factor in the emergence of a mathematical science of nature. We must also note that the medieval conception of a divinely ordered universe, and the medieval aspiration to know God, were no less powerful influences to that end. There can in fact be no question that the disinterested desire to know, the desire to find an intelligible order in nature simply for the delight of knowing it, was a motive in the lives of the investigators in this as in other periods. In this respect the pursuit of theoretical knowledge yields values akin to the values of religion and art. And we must not overlook the fact that the Aristotelian conception of the blessed life as the contemplation of nature's unalterable laws was an essential ingredient in the tradition absorbed by such men as Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. The search for a fixed and

necessary order of nature, though formulated with quantitative precision and elaborated with the techniques of mathematics, was understood by them as a search for the divine plan of the world, and in some cases at least the contemplation of that order was taken to be the contemplation of God Himself.

THE REVOLUTION IN ASTRONOMY

The Ptolemaic theory of the heavens was almost universally accepted for fourteen centuries. Copernicus's proposal in 1543 to abandon it in favor of an alternative theory, which seemed to run counter both to common sense and Scripture, was a revolutionary event. However, for about seventy years after the publication of his *De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium*,¹ the heliocentric interpretation of celestial motions met with no significant opposition from the Church; and only a few mathematicians and philosophers of the day understood its far-reaching significance.

The Ptolemaic Theory. A proper appreciation of Copernicus's scientific merits requires some familiarity with the geocentric theory of Ptolemy. We shall therefore first outline the essentials of the latter, and so place ourselves in the position to grasp the fundamentals of the mathematical interpretation of nature. We must begin by asking just what the problem of the astronomer is. Let us recall some familiar facts, most of which were well known to the ancient Chaldeans and Babylonians. The various bodies visible in the sky, such as the sun and the stars, seem to revolve regularly around the earth, and to rise in the east and set in the west. However, this gross regularity is complicated by a number of apparently irregular special motions. In the first place, the sun rises later and sets earlier in winter than in summer, and appears higher and farther north in the skies during the latter season than it does in the former. Also, the moon is sometimes invisible even in fair weather; it exhibits characteristic phases; and it rises at different hours of the day as it waxes and wanes. In the second place, the stars seem to be embedded in a vast sphere which, in addition to its daily rotation, completes another rotation once a year; for as the seasons change different stars are displayed at the same hour of the night. And in the third place, some of the stars, called the planets, seem to wander in the firmament and to occupy different positions with respect to the other stars which seem to be relatively fixed. Moreover, the planetary motions have a curious aspect. They appear to move rapidly forward at some times, at other times to be motionless, at still other times to have a retrograde motion, and finally to move forward again. Figure 1 represents this phenomenon for the planet Mars.

¹ *Concerning the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres.*




Figure 1

APPARENT PATH OF THE PLANET MARS AMONG THE FIXED STARS

These facts will suffice to state the astronomer's problem. As his very name suggests, the astronomer's task is to exhibit the complicated and seemingly irregular motions of the celestial bodies as illustrations of a fixed and simple law. He will therefore inquire, for example, whether the motions of Mars as they appear to the observer are its *real* motions. He will thus attempt "to save the appearances," to use a Platonic phrase, by discovering a simple pattern of uniform behavior, capable of being formulated mathematically, which will account for the apparently random wanderings of the planet.

Now the ancient Greeks succeeded in constructing a theory which introduced order and simplicity into their conception of the heavens. For various reasons they held that uniform circular motion is the most perfect and noble, and that the dignity of the heavens required celestial motions to be of this kind. According to Aristotle, moreover, consistent with his distinction between celestial and terrestrial "matter," the heavenly bodies are embedded in a series of incorruptible crystalline spheres having different radii, with the earth at their center and the stars in the outermost sphere. In the third century B.C., Aristarchus proposed a heliocentric theory of the heavens, but this idea was not developed until Copernicus exploited its possibilities. Meanwhile, it was the Alexandrian geometers who worked out the details of the geocentric theory, and it was Ptolemy's codification of it in the second century A.D. which became the standard astronomical treatise of Europe for the next fourteen hundred years.

Let us consider how the Ptolemaic theory was able "to save the appearances." Ptolemy assumed a fixed earth situated at the center of the universe, with the celestial bodies moving uniformly on circular orbits. However, he did not assume, as did Aristotle, that these bodies were carried along by *physical* spheres. And we must keep in mind that he offered his theory as the simplest geometrical representation of the celestial motions and not as a picture of the actual physical constitution of the world. He accounted for the curious

shuttling motion of the planets, such as Mars, by an ingenious mathematical device. He assumed that although Mars moves uniformly upon a circle, the center of this circle moves uniformly upon the circumference of another circle, the earth being near the center of the latter.

This is shown in Figure 2. The primary circle with the earth at or near its center is called the *deferent*; the circle upon which Mars moves and whose center moves on the circumference of the deferent is called an *epicycle*. A little reflection will show that by properly adjusting the radii of the deferent and epicycle and by assigning appropriate speeds to Mars and the center of the epicycle, the apparent motion of the planet can be obtained and calculated as the combined effect of the assumed real motions.




Figure 2

EPICYCLIC MOTION OF A PLANET

O is the center of the deferent, *E* the earth, *C* the center of the epicycle. Arrows indicate direction of motion along the circumference. When the planet is at *P*₁ its forward speed, as observed from *E*, is large, because it then has the combined speeds of *C* upon the deferent and of the planet itself upon the epicycle. When the planet is at *P*₂, and if we suppose that its speed along the circumference of the epicycle is greater than the speed of *C* on the deferent, it will appear to be moving backward. When the planet is near *P*₃ and *P*₄ it will appear to be motionless.

Ptolemy thus succeeded in "saving the appearances" on the supposition of fixed uniform circular motions for all the celestial bodies. However, in order to bring his calculations into agreement with the observed motions of these bodies, he frequently had to postulate supplementary epicycles: that is, circles with centers moving on other epicycles, and so on. As a more detailed account

of Ptolemy's system would show even more clearly, in spite of its initial simplicity its final form was quite complicated, and the mathematical computations required for working it were wearisome. By the time of Copernicus, seventy-nine epicycles were needed to account for the motions of the heavens.

Nevertheless, the Ptolemaic astronomy was a genuine scientific theory, which brought a variety of different phenomena under a common set of principles. It was a theory worked out with mathematical precision, adequate to the facts as then known. It is well to note, also, that Ptolemy was not a slave to unanalyzed observation or to the dictates of uncritical common sense. The explanation of planetary behavior, which his theory offered, required the assumption of epicyclic motions that were obviously not capable of direct observation and that demanded a disciplined mathematical imagination for their discovery. And whatever its weaknesses may have been, its great merit was that it exhibited the motions of the heavens as subject to a relatively simple and precise law.

Copernicus. We are now prepared to appreciate the significance of Copernicus's revolutionary proposal to base the theory of the heavens on the idea of a moving earth and a fixed sun. Copernicus had no fresh astronomical facts with which to dispute the correctness of the Ptolemaic system; and he himself noted that the latter was consistent with all the known observational data. He was, however, displeased with the mathematical complexity of that theory; and he was dissatisfied with the fact that so many unrelated epicycles had to be arbitrarily introduced into it if it was to be adequate to the data. A system of this sort seemed to him "neither sufficiently absolute nor sufficiently pleasing to the mind." Copernicus was thoroughly convinced that the order embodied in the heavens must be a simple and coherent order; and he believed therefore that only that theory could be the true one which organized the facts with the maximum of logical coherence. In his judgment the heliocentric theory met this condition while the geocentric theory did not. In the Dedication of the *De Revolutionibus* to Pope Paul III, he explained the grounds of his dissatisfaction with the astronomers who followed Ptolemy:

In determining the motions of the sun, moon, and of the other five planets, they fail to employ consistently one set of principles and hypotheses, but use methods of proof based only upon the apparent revolutions and motions. . . . Nor have they been able to discover or calculate from these various hypotheses which is the shape of the world and the fixed symmetry of its parts; but their procedure has been as if someone were to collect hands, feet, a head, and other members from various places, all very fine in themselves, but not proportionate to one body, and no single one corresponding in its turn to the others, so that a monster rather than a man would be formed from them. Thus in their process of demonstration which they term a

—“method,” they are found to have omitted something essential, or to have included something foreign and not pertaining to the matter in hand. This certainly would never have happened to them if they had followed fixed principles. . . .

Therefore, having turned over in my mind for a long time this uncertainty of the traditional mathematical methods of calculating the motions of the celestial bodies, I began to grow disgusted that no more consistent scheme of the movements of the mechanism of the universe, set up for our benefit by that best and most law-abiding Architect of all things, was agreed upon by philosophers who otherwise investigate so carefully the most minute details of this world. Wherefore I undertook the task of re-reading the books of all the philosophers I could get access to, to see whether anyone ever was of the opinion that the motions of the celestial bodies were other than those postulated by the men who taught mathematics in the schools. And I found first, indeed, in Cicero, that Hicetas perceived that the Earth moved; and afterward in Plutarch I found that some others were of this opinion. . . .

Taking this as a starting point, I began to consider the mobility of the Earth; and although the idea seemed absurd, yet because I knew that the liberty had been granted to others before me to postulate all sorts of little circles for explaining the phenomena of the stars, I thought I also might easily be permitted to try whether by postulating some motion of the Earth, more reliable conclusions could be reached regarding the revolution of the heavenly bodies, than those of my predecessors.

And so, after postulating movements, which, farther on in the book, I ascribe to the Earth, I have found by many and long observations that if the movements of the other planets are assumed for the circular motion of the Earth and are substituted for the revolution of each star, not only do their phenomena follow logically therefrom, but the relative positions and magnitudes both of the stars and all their orbits, and of the heavens themselves, become so closely related that in none of its parts can anything be changed without causing confusion in the other parts and in the whole universe. . . .

The chief technical innovation of Copernicus arose from his insight that the Ptolemaic device of distinct epicyclic motions for the several planets merely transferred to each of the planets separately the yearly revolution of the earth around the sun. Figure 3 will make clear in what way the apparent oscillatory motion of a planet can be explained on the hypothesis that both the earth and the planet revolve around the sun with unequal periods. Copernicus was thus able to effect an essential simplification of the theory of the heavens; and while he could not altogether dispense with epicycles, he reduced the number to thirty-four. (It is well to remember, however, that even on our present astronomical theory, the moon and the satellites of the other planets all take part in a type of epicyclic motion.)

But however much Copernicus differed from Ptolemy in the way he pro-

posed to "save the appearances," his reconstruction of astronomy was controlled by a number of assumptions which he shared with the latter.

Like Ptolemy he supposed the universe to be finite and enclosed in the sphere of the fixed stars, though he did believe the celestial distances to be much greater than the ancients had imagined. He accepted as axiomatic that the motions of the heavenly bodies are circular and uniform; and he main-




Figure 3

THE ORBITS OF THE EARTH AND AN EXTERIOR PLANET, AND THE APPARENT MOTION OF THE PLANET AS VIEWED FROM THE EARTH

$E_1, E_2, E_3, E_4, E_5, E_6$ represent successive positions of the earth on its orbit around the sun, while $P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5, P_6$ are the corresponding positions of the planet on its own orbit. The straight lines represent the lines of sight from the earth to the planet. At E_1 the planet will appear to the observer on the earth as situated at A_1 with respect to the fixed stars, and so on for the other positions of the earth. As the earth moves through the positions E_1, E_2, E_3 , the planet will appear to advance rapidly from A_1 to A_3 ; as the earth moves from E_3 to E_4 , the planet will appear to slacken its speed, then become almost stationary, and finally reverse the direction of its previous motion: as the earth moves from E_4 to E_5 , the planet will again appear to slacken its retrograde motion, become stationary, and then once more acquire its former forward speed.

tained that any deviation from such motions "must arise either from irregularity in the moving power, whether this be within the body or foreign to it, or from some inequality of the body in revolution. . . . Both of which things the intellect shrinks from in horror, it being unworthy to hold such a view about bodies which are constituted in the most perfect order."

Above all, Copernicus had a sturdy faith in the simplicity and rationality of the natural order. It was this faith that made it possible for him to advance a theory which not only went counter to ingrained tradition and the apparent reports of the senses, but even seemed to be in disagreement with critical observations. Thus, the phases which Venus must exhibit on the heliocentric theory were not observed until Galileo's telescope made them evident years later; and it was not until 1838 that Bessel was able to detect apparent shifts in the relative positions of the fixed stars as a consequence of the earth's annual circling of the sun.

As already noted, the publication of Copernicus's work produced no immediate changes in the general climate of opinion. Few of his contemporaries saw in it a threat to the dominant religious outlook. And most of these seemed to have been persuaded by a fraudulent preface supplied by Copernicus's editor that the book proposed, not a new theory concerning the physical constitution of the world, but merely a convenient device for simplifying astronomical computations. In the end, however, it became clear that Copernicus had made a serious breach in the medieval outlook. He successfully challenged the traditional dogma of a fixed earth; and by assigning to the latter a type of motion which had been reserved exclusively to the heavens, he contributed to breaking down the Aristotelian distinction between the terrestrial and the celestial. Copernicus made no commitments as to the character of the bodies which, together with the earth, circulated around the sun. But presently others, such as Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), used the heliocentric theory as a basis for preaching the doctrine of a plurality of worlds: of the planets inhabited by living creatures like man, and of other suns or stars accompanied by similarly inhabited planets. And so the Christian epic, which seemed to depend on the earth with its unique human inhabitants being at the center of the universe, appeared to many to have lost its universal meaning and validity. Bruno was burned at the stake for his heretical opinions. But the realization that human history is not the only drama in the cosmos, and that our parochial point of view is not the only possible one, was not so easily destroyed once it had achieved publicity.

Brahe and Kepler. The next important advance in theoretical astronomy was the direct outcome of improved observations on the celestial bodies. Tycho

Brahe (1546-1601), a Danish noble, constructed instruments which enabled him to record the positions of the planets with a precision hitherto unknown. Although his observations were carried out before the invention of the telescope, his practice of repeating his readings of the stellar positions and of continuing the study of a planet over many years enabled him to reduce his errors to not more than 1 to 2 minutes of an arc. (A minute is a unit of angular measure. One minute is the sixtieth part of a degree, and one degree is $1/360$ th part of the circumference of a circle.)

These data fortunately fell into the hands of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), a one-time assistant of Brahe. Kepler was an enthusiastic Copernican, in part because the sun was assigned the central position in the universe by that theory. For as the following quotation from one of his early writings will show, he had a mystic reverence for the sun and endowed it with divine qualities.

Of all the bodies in the universe the most excellent is the sun, whose whole essence is nothing else than the purest light, than which there is no greater star; which singly and alone is the producer, conserver, and warmer of all things; it is a fountain of light, rich in fruitful heat, most fair, limpid, and pure to the sight, the source of vision, portrayer of all colours, though himself empty of colour, called king of the planets for his motion which alone we should judge worthy of the Most High God, should He be pleased with a material domicile and choose a place in which to dwell with the blessed angels. . . . Since it does not benefit the first mover to be diffused throughout an orbit, but rather to proceed from one certain principle, and as it were, point, no part of the world, and no star, accounts itself worthy of such a great honour; hence by the highest right we return to the sun, who alone appears, by virtue of his dignity and power, suited for this motive duty and worthy to become the home of God Himself, not to say the first mover.

On the other hand, Kepler was also a painstaking astronomer, and he discovered that the positions of the planets as determined by Brahe's observations did not conform with their positions as calculated from the Copernican theory. He was an excellent mathematician, and he shared the neo-Platonic faith in nature as the embodiment of a simple mathematical order. He was to spend twenty-five years of indefatigable labor in determining the true orbits of the planets.

We may appreciate the curious mixture in Kepler of a superstitious number-mysticism, a high order of mathematical competence, and a scrupulous regard for the facts of observation, if we recite two incidents in his researches. One of his early discoveries, the glory of which he said he would not renounce "for the whole Electorate of Saxony," was an approximate but chimerical correspondence between the planetary orbits and the five regular solids. (In Kepler's day only five planets were known: Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter,

and Saturn. A regular solid is one in which all the angles and sides are equal. There is a proof in Euclid, which goes back to Plato's pupils, that only five such solids are possible.) He explained it as follows:

The Earth is the circle, the measure of all. Round it describe a dodecahedron [a twelve-sided regular solid], the circle including this will be Mars. Round Mars describe a tetrahedron [a four-sided regular solid], the circle including this will be Jupiter. Describe a cube around Jupiter, the circle including this will be Saturn. Then inscribe in the Earth an icosahedron [a twenty-sided regular solid], the circle inscribed in it will be Venus. Inscribe an octahedron in Venus, the circle inscribed in it will be Mercury.

He was overjoyed at his discovery. "The intense pleasure I have received from this discovery," he wrote at the time, "can never be told in words. I regretted no more the time wasted; I tired of no labor; I shunned no toil of reckoning, days and nights spent in calculation, until I could see whether my hypothesis would agree with the orbits of Copernicus or whether my joy was to vanish into air." However, that Kepler's construction was really quite fantastic is at once evident if we recall that it loses its entire point with the discovery of additional planets (for example, Uranus in 1781).

On the other hand, in his attempt to find a combination of circular motions which would yield the observed paths of the planets, Kepler at one time found a difference of only eight minutes of an arc between his calculations and Brahe's numerical data. But even this small discrepancy did not satisfy his standards of precision, for he declared:

Since the divine goodness has given to us in Tycho Brahe a most careful observer, from whose observations the error of 8' is shown in this calculation . . . it is right that we should with gratitude recognize and make use of this gift of God. . . . For if I could have treated 8' of longitude as negligible I should have already corrected sufficiently the hypothesis. But as they could not be neglected, these 8' alone have led the way toward the complete reformation of astronomy, and have made the subject-matter of a great part of this work.

Kepler worked for years on the assumption that the celestial motions are circular and uniform, without succeeding in finding orbits for the planets adequate to the facts. It finally occurred to him that perhaps these orbits are ovals and not circles; and since he was familiar with the theory of conic sections as worked out by Apollonius in the third century B.C., he decided to use the ellipse as the simplest type of oval curve for plotting the positions of the planet Mars. In 1609 he discovered what is known as Kepler's First Law: the planets move on elliptic orbits with the sun at one focus. He thus succeeded in "saving the appearances," but only at the price of surrendering

the axiom that celestial motions are circular, as well as the axiom that their speeds are uniform. However, in the same year he discovered his Second Law of planetary motion, which compensated him for the loss of the latter axiom. For he found that the line joining the sun and a planet sweeps out equal areas in equal times. This is illustrated in Figure 4.




Figure 4

KEPLER'S FIRST TWO LAWS OF PLANETARY MOTION

The sun is at the focus of the ellipse. The planet covers the distance from P_1 to P_2 , and from P_3 to P_4 , in equal times. These *distances* are not equal, for the planet moves more rapidly when it is nearer the sun than when it is farther away from it. But the *areas* swept out in equal times (indicated by the shadings) are equal. This is the meaning of Kepler's Second Law.

Ten years later, Kepler discovered his Third Law, which connects the period of one complete revolution of a planet with its average distance from the sun. One essential preliminary task for the subsequent Newtonian synthesis was now completed. Kepler's ecstasy knew no bounds:

What I prophesied two-and-twenty years ago, as soon as I discovered the five solids among the heavenly orbits—what I firmly believed long before I had seen Ptolemy's Harmonies—what I had promised my friends in the title of this book, which I named before I was sure of my discovery—what sixteen years ago I urged as a thing to be sought—that for which I joined Tycho Brahe, for which I settled in Prague, for which I have devoted the best part of my life to astronomical contemplations, at length I have brought to light, and recognized its truth beyond my most sanguine expectations. It is not eighteen months since I got the first glimpse of light, three months since the dawn, very few days since the unveiled sun, most admirable to gaze upon, burst upon me. Nothing holds me; I will indulge my sacred fury; I will triumph over mankind by the honest confession that I have stolen the golden vases of the Egyptians to build up a tabernacle for my God far away from the confines of Egypt. If you forgive me, I rejoice; if you are angry, I can bear it; the die is cast, the book is written, to be read either now or by posterity, I care not which; it may well wait a century for a reader, as God has waited six thousand years for an observer!

Kepler's technical contributions to natural science were far more original and profound than those made by Copernicus. He showed more clearly than the latter the power of daring mathematical analysis to exhibit the invariable order of the heavens. In spite of his mystical vagaries and his superstitious belief in the causal power of mathematical relations, he established the fruitfulness of scientific method—conceived as the use of carefully formulated hypotheses whose logically deduced consequences are to be verified by painstaking observation. His work made evident that the order of nature is not to be understood in terms of the place of things in a hierarchy of perfect beings; on the contrary, nature is to be understood as the embodiment of principles quantitatively expressed and mathematically elaborated. Indeed, Kepler firmly believed that only those properties and qualities of the world are real which can be determined quantitatively and whose mutual relations can be grasped with the certainty of mathematical truths.

Galileo. The *coup de grâce* to the medieval cosmology was supplied by Galileo Galilei's (1564–1642) telescopic demonstration of the validity of the heliocentric theory. A report reached him that a Dutch lens-maker had made distant objects more visible by combining two lenses; and he promptly constructed a telescope for himself which he turned upon the heavens. His observations, published in 1610 in his *Sidereal Messenger*, were startling. He established the fact that the moon had mountains whose heights he was able to calculate from the shadows they cast. He discovered Jupiter to have four satellites revolving around it, so that a small-scale model of the solar system was actually observable. He showed that Venus had phases as was to be expected on the Copernican theory, and that therefore the planet did not shine by its own light. He was able to establish that a new star which had suddenly appeared at the turn of the century must be situated in the region of the fixed stars. And he discovered dark spots or "blemishes" on the face of the sun, from whose motions he was able to conclude that the sun itself makes a monthly rotation on its axis.

The Copernican theory thus received a crucial observational confirmation, and it was no longer easy to regard it simply as a convenient mathematical device for facilitating computations. But above all, Galileo had removed almost the last ground from under the age-old belief that the heavens were perfect, immutable, and essentially different from earthly things. No wonder that dogmatic defenders of the Aristotelian physics were dismayed and resentful, and used every fantastic argument they could devise to disprove or minimize Galileo's findings. A prominent professor of philosophy presented his case against Galileo's discoveries as follows:

There are seven windows given to animals in the domicile of the head, through which the air is admitted to the tabernacle of the body, to enlighten, to warm, and to nourish it. What are these parts of the microcosmos? Two nostrils, two eyes, two ears, and a mouth. So in the heavens, as in a microcosmos, there are two favorable stars, two unpropitious, two luminaries, and Mercury undecided and indifferent. From this and many other similarities in nature, such as the seven metals, etc., which it were tedious to enumerate, we gather that the number of planets is necessarily seven. Moreover, these satellites of Jupiter are invisible to the naked eye, and therefore can exercise no influence on the earth, and therefore would be useless, and therefore do not exist. Besides, the Jews and other ancient nations, as well as modern Europeans, have adopted the division of the week into seven days, and have named them after the seven planets. Now, if we increase the number of the planets, this whole and beautiful system falls to the ground.

The founders of modern science clearly did not have a monopoly on number mysticism! Galileo wrote Kepler:

What would you say of the leading philosophers here to whom I have offered a thousand times of my own accord to show my studies, but who, with the lazy obstinacy of a serpent who has eaten his fill, have neither consented to look at the planets, or moon, or telescope? Verily, just as serpents close their ears, so do men close their eyes to the light of truth. To such people philosophy is a kind of book, like the Aeneid or the Odyssey, where the truth is to be sought, not in the universe or in nature, but (I use their own words) by comparing texts! . . .

Oh, my dear Kepler, how I wish that we could have one hearty laugh together! Here, at Padua, is the principal professor of philosophy whom I have repeatedly and urgently requested to look at the moon and planets through my glass, which he pertinaciously refuses to do. Why are you not here? What shouts of laughter we should have at this glorious folly! And to hear the professor of philosophy at Pisa labouring before the grand duke with logical arguments, as if with magical incantations, to charm the new planets out of the sky.

But the Church also took a hand in the controversy. The toleration it had shown for the new learning in the preceding centuries was being slowly dissipated by the threat to its authority which the Protestant Reformation represented. Copernicus's *De Revolutionibus* was placed on the Index in 1616, until it should be corrected so as to make the heliocentric theory appear simply as a convenient mathematical hypothesis; and Galileo was warned to teach the Copernican ideas only in this manner. In 1632 Galileo published his most important astronomical work, the *Dialogue on the Two Chief Systems of the World, the Ptolemaic and the Copernican*. Although he complied formally with the Church's instructions, his incomparable marshaling of the arguments for the new view and his devastating ridicule of the Aristotelian schoolmen deceived no one as to his genuine convictions. Personal resentments against Galileo by the reigning Pope Urban and other highly placed indi-

viduals doubtless played a role in the denouement. He was summoned to appear before the Inquisition in Rome, and after a long drawn-out hearing he was compelled to "abjure, curse, and detest" the Copernican doctrines as a heresy. The *Dialogue* and astronomical writings of Copernicus and Kepler were placed on the Index, from which they were not withdrawn until 1835.

THE REVOLUTION IN MECHANICS AND THE NEWTONIAN SYNTHESIS

Further advances in the mathematical interpretation of nature required the development of the theory of mechanics, and especially that portion of it (called dynamics) which treats of the motions of bodies. If the foregoing account of the establishment of the heliocentric theory has made no mention of the conditions or causes which maintain the planets in their orbits, the reason for the omission is simple. Neither Copernicus nor Kepler had ideas on this subject which were in advance of the traditional ones or which were other than crude and primitive. The foundations of dynamics were laid by Galileo, and his investigations in this domain constitute the chief ground for his fame; but the principles he discovered were not successfully applied to the motions of the heavens until Newton generalized and improved upon them.

Let us review the general outlook in science at the time Kepler finished his work. There was overwhelming evidence that astronomical phenomena embodied invariant laws, mathematical in character, but different from those regarded as valid by ancients and their medieval followers. A serious blow had been given to the Aristotelian view that celestial bodies are incorruptible and perfect, and to this extent at least the dogma of a qualitative difference between the heavens and the earth had been successfully challenged. Finally, a beginning had been made in establishing a method of inquiry which, dispensing with final causes as explanatory principles, combined the use of mathematical hypotheses with careful observation and experimentation.

On the other hand, terrestrial motions were in the main still not seen as embodiments of a mathematical necessity as rigorous as that which obtained in the heavens. In spite of Archimedes and his development of the science of statics (the theory of bodies in equilibrium), in spite of the practical achievements of artisans and engineers, and in spite of various familiar if superficial bits of knowledge concerning terrestrial motions, a quantitatively determinate science of such phenomena was at best still only a daring hope. Again, while the authority of medieval physics was becoming discredited, there was still no clear, generalized, and authoritative formulation of the method and objective of the new approach to the study of nature. Until these things were

accomplished—until the scope of mathematical, experimental techniques was enlarged to include terrestrial phenomena within the framework of a comprehensive philosophy of nature—the scientific revolution was not complete. We must now briefly outline the final steps in achieving this new philosophy.

Galileo's Dynamics. Although Galileo's *Dialogue* was placed on the Index and he was banished to a small country estate, he continued his scientific studies. In 1638 he published (at Leyden) the epoch-making *Dialogues and Mathematical Demonstrations Concerning Two New Sciences*, which contained the basis for all future work in dynamics. Its opening passage, with a reference to the famous Arsenal of Venice, recognizes Galileo's intellectual debt to the instrument-makers and practical mechanics of the Italian cities. But the central section of the book begins with a succinct summary of Galileo's achievements:

My purpose is to set forth a very new science dealing with a very ancient subject. There is, in nature, perhaps nothing older than motion, concerning which the books written by philosophers are neither few nor small; nevertheless I have discovered by experiment some properties of it which have not hitherto been either observed or demonstrated. Some superficial observations have been made, as for instance, that the free motion of a heavy falling body is continuously accelerated; but to just what extent this acceleration occurs has not yet been announced; for so far as I know, no one has yet pointed out that the distances traversed, during equal intervals of time, by a body falling from rest, stand to one another in the same ratio as the odd numbers beginning with unity.

It has been observed that missiles and projectiles describe a curved path of some sort; however, no one has pointed out the fact that this path is a parabola. But this and other facts, not few in number or less worth knowing, I have succeeded in proving; and what I consider more important, there have been opened up to this vast and most excellent science . . . ways and means by which other minds . . . will explore its remote corners.

With the details of Galileo's investigations we cannot concern ourselves; but one fundamental difference between his approach to the study of motion and that of Aristotle should be noted. According to the latter, a body in motion, whether it is moving uniformly or not, requires a continuously acting force if it is to remain in motion. Galileo rejected this mode of analysis. He maintained, on the contrary, that a body moving with constant speed along a straight line (that is, with a constant *velocity*) requires *no* force to sustain its motion; on the other hand, a force is required to produce any change in the velocity of a body, that is, any change in direction or rectilinear speed.

Galileo thus made the capital distinction between velocity and acceleration (as a change in velocity is called). He thereby became the discoverer of the principle of inertia, subsequently formulated by Newton as the first law of

motion: a body at rest or moving with a constant velocity will remain at rest or persevere in its state of motion unless acted upon by an external force. On Galileo's view, therefore, it was no longer "natural" for a moving body to seek a resting place; for a body once in motion along a straight line will "naturally" continue to move indefinitely in the same direction if no force comes to act on it. An immediate consequence of the principle of inertia is that a body moving along a circular orbit is undergoing acceleration, and must therefore be moving under the influence of some force. But the full import of this proposition for the theory of the heavens was not understood until Newton's work made it evident.

Galileo's dynamical researches thus showed that terrestrial motions were as amenable to quantitative study and mathematical analysis as were the celestial ones. They proved that a part of the cosmos, hitherto regarded as inferior and imperfect because it did not exhibit an invariable order, was in fact just as much subject to simple regularities and constant laws as were the heavens. To Galileo this was no surprising conclusion. For he shared with Kepler and his other scientific contemporaries the unquestioning faith in a thoroughly rational universe, capable of exploration in all its parts with the tools of mathematical analysis. He once formulated this faith in unmistakable words:

True philosophy expounds nature to us; but she can be understood only by him who has learned the speech and symbols in which she speaks to us. This speech is mathematics, and its symbols are mathematical figures. Philosophy is written in this greatest book, which continually stands open here to the eyes of all, but cannot be understood unless one first learns the language and characters in which it is written. This language is mathematics and the characters are triangles, circles and other mathematical figures.

And elsewhere he wrote:

Nature being inexorable and immutable, and never passing the bounds of the Laws assigned her, as one that nothing careth whether her abstruse reasons and methods of operating be, or be not exposed to the Capacity of Men; I conceive that that, concerning Natural Effects, which either Sensible Experience sets before our eyes, or Necessary Demonstrations do prove unto us, ought not, upon any account, to be called into question, much less condemned upon the testimony of Texts of Scripture, which may, under their words, couch Senses seemingly contrary thereto; In regard that every Expression of Scripture is not tied to so strict conditions, as every Effect of Nature: Nor doth God less admirably discover himself unto us in Nature's Sacred Dictions.

For Galileo, no less than for Kepler, the fundamental properties of the world were precisely those which can be explored mathematically.

It would therefore be a serious misunderstanding of Galileo's temper of mind to see him, as some have done, as an enthusiastic gatherer of indiscriminate facts and a contemner of rational, deductive methods. He once remarked that "ignorance had been the best teacher he ever had, since in order to be able to demonstrate to his opponents the truth of his conclusions, he had been forced to prove them by a variety of experiments, though to satisfy his own mind alone he had never felt it necessary to make any." And he preferred his demonstration of the paths of projectiles with the statement:

The knowledge of a single fact acquired through a discovery of its causes prepares the mind to understand and ascertain other facts without need of recourse to experiment, precisely as in the present case, where by argumentation alone the author proves with certainty that the maximum range occurs when the elevation is 45° . He thus demonstrates what has perhaps never been observed in experience, namely, that of other shots those which exceed or fall short of 45° by equal amounts have equal ranges.

On the other hand, as has already been seen, he did not neglect the role of observation in inquiry, and he did not believe that a purely logical argument, unsupported by experiment, could establish a truth of nature. Indeed, the cogency of Galileo's procedure resided both in the demonstrative force of his arguments and in the confirmation of his conclusions by experimentally determined facts. For Galileo the true method of science consisted in the proper marriage of mathematics and experiment. As he saw it, the order of nature is to be discovered not by blind reliance on unanalyzed experience nor by exclusive devotion to mathematical demonstration, but by interpreting sensible experience in terms of mathematical principles. He made his protagonist in the *Dialogue on the Two Chief Systems of the World* declare:

I cannot sufficiently admire the eminence of those men's wits that have received and held it to be true, and with the sprightliness of their judgments offered such violence to their own senses, as that they have been able to prefer that which their reason dictated to them, to that which sensible experiments represented most manifestly on the contrary. . . . I cannot find any bounds for my admiration, how that reason was able in Aristarchus and Copernicus, to commit such a rape upon their Senses, as in despight thereof, to make her self mistress of their credulity.

Galileo never formulated in detail the method which he believed yields authoritative knowledge of nature's order; but his accounts of the steps taken by him in arriving at his various conclusions illustrate clearly enough what he thought were its essentials. It has become customary to distinguish three such steps, labeled with his own names for them. 1. The *resolution* or *analysis* of the phenomenon studied must first be performed, in order to discover in

it the mathematical principle connecting its basic relevant features. Thus, the resolution of freely falling bodies finds in them the law of accelerated motion. 2. The consequences of the principle must be *demonstrated*. 3. These consequences must be tested by an appropriate *experiment*. These steps are clearly exemplified in the following crucial account by Galileo of the law of freely falling bodies:

A piece of wooden moulding or scantling, about 12 cubits long, half a cubit wide, and three finger-breadths thick, was taken; on its edge was cut a channel a little more than one finger in breadth; having made this groove thus straight, smooth, and polished, and having lined it with parchment, also as smooth and polished as possible, we rolled along it a hard, smooth, and very round bronze ball. Having placed this board in a sloping position, by lifting one end some one or two cubits above the other, we rolled the ball, as I was saying, along the channel, noting in a manner presently to be described, the time required to make the descent. We repeated this experiment more than once in order to measure the time with an accuracy such that the deviation between two observations never exceeded one-tenth of a pulse beat. Having performed this operation and having assured ourselves of its reliability, we now rolled the ball only one-quarter the length of the channel; and having measured the time of its descent we found it precisely one-half of the former. Next we tried other distances, comparing the time for the whole length with that for the half, or with that for two-thirds, or three-fourths, or indeed for any fraction; in such experiments, repeated a full hundred times, we always found that the spaces traversed were to each other as the squares of the times, and this was true for all inclinations of the plane, *i.e.*, of the channel, along which we rolled the ball. We also observed that the times of the descent, for various inclinations of the plane, bore to one another precisely that ratio which, as we shall see later, the author had predicted and demonstrated for them.

It must not be supposed that Galileo understood his method to be a blueprint for successful invention and discovery, as rules for infallibly hitting upon the truth. The conception of scientific method as a set of practical maxims which would achieve this latter end, was brought into prominence by Francis Bacon (1561–1626). Bacon was a lawyer, for a time Lord Chancellor of England, and a brilliant man of letters. He was filled with the vision of the power over nature which the new science could win for mankind, and he was an enthusiastic propagandist for systematic, cooperative research. We shall discuss this phase of his influence in greater detail presently. But he was no scientist in his own right; he rejected the Copernican theory as folly, and he made sport of the work of Galileo. Unlike the founders of modern natural science, he did not appreciate the role of mathematics in scientific research; and unlike them, also, he believed that simply by a patient gathering of facts the cause or principle involved in them could be sifted out automatically.

Accordingly, he had no sound understanding of the actual procedure of the new science, and, in spite of the popularity of his views on scientific method, the actual practice of scientists profited little from them. William Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, said of him: "He writes of science like a Lord Chancellor." It must nevertheless be added that through Bacon's great admirer, Robert Boyle, Bacon's ceaseless emphasis upon the need for basing the study of nature upon experiment became an essential part of the intellectual heritage of future investigators, and in particular of no less a man than Newton.

Descartes. However that may be, Galileo's mechanical researches and his conception of the requirements of natural science gave additional impetus to the final victorious emergence of the new world-view. There remained the task of stating in its full generality the hypothesis of a universal mechanics—applicable to all domains of existence, terrestrial and celestial, organic as well as inorganic—and of carrying through in detail the program of research which it entailed. Such a comprehensive philosophy for the mathematical interpretation of nature was supplied by René Descartes (1596–1650), while its detailed application to physics was successfully worked out by Isaac Newton (1642–1727).

Descartes was admirably equipped to be the grand philosopher of the new outlook. He was not only trained in the scholastic philosophy, and thus knew its limitations as well as its strength; he was also a distinguished contributor to mathematics and physics, and understood at first hand the implicit requirements and potential scope of the mathematical interpretation of nature. He developed and established, if he did not actually discover, the principles of analytical geometry—that is, of the systematic application of algebraic methods to the study of space. He made significant additions to optics. And he outlined a general theory of motions and sketched a system of the world, according to which all changes are the result of impacts between contiguous bodies. The planets were supposed to be carried around the sun, like straws in a whirlpool, by the vortex motions of the all-pervading matter in which they are imbedded.

The strength of Descartes's contemporary influence, however, was derived from his writings on the new method of science. They commanded a widespread respect, both from practicing scientists and educated laymen, in part because they seemed to be confirmed and supported by his concrete scientific contributions. Indeed, in his personal development, Descartes's conception of the true method of science arose directly out of his preoccupation with specific technical problems. He experienced an ecstatic vision in his twenty-fourth

year, in which the outlines of a universal mathematics appeared to him and which led him on to study the general problems of method. His first published work, the *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences* (1637), contained the essentials of his philosophy, and was supplemented by appendices aiming to show its application to physics and geometry.

Descartes's philosophy may be viewed as a passionate search for scientific certainty, a certainty which he found adequately realized only in arithmetic and geometry. According to him, these sciences alone "deal with an object so pure and uncomplicated that they need make no assumptions at all which experience renders uncertain, but wholly consist in the rational deduction of consequences." But if we ask why these sciences possess this excellence, Descartes's answer is that, in pursuing them, we begin with the intuition of things that are so simple and clear that no error can arise. Accordingly, the true method of the sciences must imitate mathematics. We much accept only that which is clear and distinct and evident; we must resolve every problem and every object into its simple components; and we must finally proceed deductively to build up a system of necessary truth. As Descartes himself put the matter:

It is possible to say that those propositions which are immediately deducted from first principles are known now by intuition, now by deduction, *i.e.*, in a way that differs according to our point of view. But the first principles themselves are given by intuition alone, while, on the contrary, the remote conclusions are furnished only by deduction.

These two methods are the most certain routes to knowledge, and the mind should admit no others. All the rest should be rejected as suspect of error and dangerous.

As a consequence, Descartes believed that the extensive or spatial qualities of objects are their fundamental ones; and he was confident that all other qualities can be reduced to combinations of these extensive traits. Thus he declared:

The Nature of body consists not in weight, nor in hardness, nor color and so on, but in extension alone.

Whatever you suppose color to be, you cannot deny that it is extended and in consequence possessed of figure. Is there then any disadvantage, if, while taking care not to admit any new entity uselessly, or rashly to imagine that it exists, and not denying indeed the beliefs of others concerning color, but merely abstracting from every other feature except that it possesses the nature of figure, we conceive the diversity existing between white, blue, and red, etc., as being like the difference between . . . similar figures? The same argument applies to all cases; for it is

certain that the infinitude of figures suffices to express all the differences in sensible things.

Since, therefore, all objects may be resolved into complexes of simple natures (such as figure, extension, and motion), and since these simples can be grasped by the intellect with complete clarity and certainty, a universal mathematics or mechanics, which would be applicable to everything without exception, is an obvious possibility. So at least Descartes believed:

As I considered the matter carefully it gradually came to light that all those matters only were referred to Mathematics in which order and measurement are investigated, and that it makes no difference whether it be in numbers, figures, stars, sounds, or any other object that the question of measurement arises. I saw consequently that there must be some general science to explain that element as a whole which gives rise to problems about order and measurement, restricted as these are to no special subject matter. This, I perceived, was called "Universal Mathematics" . . . because in this science is contained everything on account of which the others are called parts of Mathematics. We can see how much it excels in utility and simplicity the sciences subordinate to it, by the fact that it can deal with all the objects of which they have cognizance and many more besides. . . .

I do not accept or desire any other principle in Physics than in Geometry or abstract Mathematics, because all the phenomena of nature may be explained by their means, and sure demonstration can be given of them.

Spinoza. Descartes thus supplied the theoretical basis for extending the scope of the mathematical interpretation of nature. He viewed the world as a machine whose structure is knowable in mathematical terms; and he regarded even living bodies, including the human, as simply physical automata, capable of being exhaustively studied in terms of the methods of the new science. Descartes did indeed except God and the human soul from the dominion of a universal mechanism—exceptions, gratefully accepted by many of his contemporaries, which permitted the pursuit of natural science without fear of its encroachment upon matters of religion and morals. But followers of Descartes, such as Baruch Spinoza (1632-77), did not hesitate to apply the geometric method to the study of human passions. In his *Ethics*, in which the contemplation of nature's eternal order was identified with the love of God, Spinoza prefaced his demonstration of the nature of human emotions with the following observations:

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is determined solely by

himself. They attribute human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows is looked upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent men . . . , who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their restraint.

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he accomplished nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method as I employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.

Descartes's philosophy did not create a revolution in science, since it was in the main only an authoritative expression of the assumptions and implicit goals of many of its leaders. And although some of Descartes's specific scientific contributions acquired a permanent value, many of his physical speculations, such as the theory of vortex motions, were not developed rigorously by him, and were in fact soon found to be in serious disagreement with more careful investigations. Nevertheless, his writings had a profound influence upon his contemporaries and successors, and contributed enormously to the formation of the modern climate of opinion. They made popular the view, in a manner that was difficult to ignore or refute, that nature is to be

understood as a mechanical order and not in terms of final causes or criteria of perfection. And they standardized the notion—with profound consequences for the slowly emerging sciences dealing with biology, politics, and economics—that every adequate explanation must be framed in terms of simple, elementary properties, connected by self-evident laws.

Newton. The actual realization of Descartes's ideal of a universal mechanics, at least for the phenomena of physical motions, was the achievement of Isaac Newton (1642–1727). Newton's procedure was dominated by the Cartesian conception of the mathematical method as the rational way for studying nature, and it was also profoundly influenced by the Galileo-Bacon-Boyle view on the indispensable role of experiment in science. Building on the foundations laid by Galileo in dynamics, Newton constructed a cosmology, worked out with superb mathematical detail and verified in an abundance of empirical data, which established authoritatively the identity of the laws regulating both terrestrial and celestial motions. His *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*,² published in 1687, was genuinely epoch-making: it brought together into a unified system the labors of all preceding investigators in physics and astronomy; it wrecked beyond repair whatever intellectual props still remained for the medieval world-view; and it established the norms and directions of scientific inquiry for the next two centuries. The book went through three editions in Newton's lifetime, and found a host of popularizers not only in England, but also in France (where Voltaire made the Newtonian philosophy fashionable), Central Europe, and even in America. Pope's famous couplet expressed the sentiments of Newton's contemporaries:

Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in Night,
God said, Let Newton be, and all was light.

And a hundred years after the appearance of the *Principia*, Lagrange, himself a mathematician and physicist of the first rank, could still declare: "Newton was the greatest genius that ever existed, and the most fortunate, for we cannot find more than once a system of the world to establish."

A brief summary of some of Newton's achievements will give the measure of his intellectual stature. He formulated explicitly the principles of dynamics, and devised a general formula from which the law of accelerated motion, as discovered by Galileo, as well as Kepler's three laws of planetary motion were all necessary consequences. He showed, for example, that the moon's motion conforms to the same law of freely falling bodies, if the moon's distance from the earth is taken into consideration, which holds for bodies at the earth's surface. He thus advanced the conception of a universal gravitational force

* *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.*

acting between all material particles with an intensity inversely proportional to the square of their mutual distances. He concluded that such a force, emanating from the sun, is sufficient to keep the planets in their courses and to explain the motions of the comets, while such a force with its origin in a planet will account for the orbits of its satellites.

Moreover, in order to carry through his mathematical deductions, Newton invented the method of "fluxions" (his name for what is now called the differential calculus), perhaps the most remarkable tool ever devised for analyzing mathematically continuous changes of any conceivable type. He showed how to calculate the masses of the sun, planets, and satellites. He demonstrated the oblate shape of the earth before this shape was determined by geodetic measurements. He explained the precession of the equinoxes (that is, the slow conical motion of the earth's axis, illustrated by the circular path traced out by the earth's north pole among the fixed stars). And he accounted for the main features of the tides as consequences of the attractive force of the sun and moon exerted upon the waters of the earth. In brief, therefore, familiar as well as novel phenomena of the heavens and the earth fell into place within a unified system, whose various propositions were rigorously derived from a few physical principles taken as axioms. Newton's grand synthesis of physical knowledge proved concretely that the mechanism of the universe is thoroughly knowable, even if only experiments conducted on the surface of a minor planet were available for eliciting its mathematical principles.

Newton impressed his age not only by his specific additions to physical knowledge; his work was also construed as the model which sound investigation in every field ought to follow. He himself was conscious of the importance of a sound method of inquiry, and his technical writings are interspersed with many comments on its nature. "We offer this work as mathematical principles of philosophy," he said in the Preface to his *Principia*, "for all the difficulty of philosophy seems to consist in this—from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena." Indeed, this brief statement contains the essentials of his method as he understood it: to find by analysis the fundamental principles embodied in phenomena; to generalize these principles and mathematically to elaborate their consequences; and finally to exhibit the physical validity of these latter by an appeal to observation and experiment. In his own procedure and by his own account, Newton thus fused into an indissoluble unity both the mathematical and the experimental traditions of the new science.

That Newton saw clearly the necessity for an experimental foundation for

his work, without minimizing the claims of mathematical formulation and rigor, is evident from the *Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy* with which he began the third book of the *Principia*, as well as from other writings. Thus, in a retort to an attack by Robert Hooke on his theory of colors, Newton declared:

I said, indeed, that the science of colours was mathematical, and as certain as any other part of optics; but who knows not that optics, and many other mathematical sciences, depend as well on physical sciences, as on mathematical demonstration? And the absolute certainty of a science cannot exceed the certainty of its principles. Now the evidence, by which I asserted the propositions of colour, is in the next words expressed to be from experiments, and so but physical: whence the propositions themselves can be esteemed no more than physical principles of a science. And if those principles be such, that on them a mathematician may determine all the phaenomena of colours, that can be caused by refractions, and that by disputing or demonstrating after what manner, and how much, those refractions do separate or mingle the rays, in which several colours are originally inherent; I suppose the science of colours will be granted mathematical, and as certain as any part of optics. And that this may be done, I have good reason to believe, because ever since I became first acquainted with these principles, I have, with constant success in the events, made use of them for this purpose.

He was constantly warning his reader against the introduction into science of occult qualities and "hypotheses"—that is, of conjectural causes for phenomena, such as Descartes's vortices, which are not adequately based on observation. By hypotheses Newton meant propositions "assumed or supposed without any experimental proof." Thus in a letter to Cotes he wrote that

. . . [just] as in geometry, the word "hypothesis" is not taken in so large a sense as to include the axioms and postulates; so, in experimental philosophy, it is not to be taken in so large a sense as to include the first principles or axioms, which I call the laws of motion. These principles are deduced from phenomena and made general by induction, which is the highest evidence that a proposition can have in this philosophy. And the word "hypothesis" is here used by me to signify only such a proposition as is not a phenomenon nor deduced from any phenomena, but assumed or supposed—without any experimental proof.

Conceiving of hypotheses in this sense, Newton wrote in the General Scholium to the third book:

Hitherto we have explained the phaenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this power. This is certain, that it must proceed from a cause that penetrates to the very centres of the sun and the planets, without suffering the least diminution of its force; that operates not according to the quantity of the surfaces of the particles upon which it acts (as mechanical causes use to do), but according to the quantity of the solid matter

which they contain, and propagates its virtue on all sides to immense distances, decreasing always in the duplicate proportion of the distances. . . . But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phaenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phaenomena, is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from phaenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies, and the laws of motion and of gravitation, were discovered. And to us it is enough that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.

But perhaps the clearest expression of Newton's standpoint on questions of method is contained in the following quotations from his *Opticks*:

The Principles [such as gravity and cohesion] I consider not as Occult qualities, supposed to result from the specifick forms of Things, but as general Laws of Nature, by which the Things themselves are formd; their Truth appearing to us by Phaenomena, though their Causes be not yet discovered. For these are manifest Qualities, and their Causes only are occult. And the Aristotelians gave the Name of occult Qualities not to manifest Qualities, but to such Qualities only as they supposed to lie hid in Bodies, and to be the unknown Causes of manifest Effects: Such as would be the Causes of Gravity, and of magnetick and electrick Attractions, and of Fermentations, if we should suppose that these Forces or Actions arose from Qualities unknown to us, and incapable of being discovered and made manifest. Such occult Qualities put a stop to the Improvement of natural Philosophy, and therefore of late Years have been rejected. To tell us that every Species of Things is endowed with an occult specifick Quality by which it acts and produces manifest Effects, is to tell us nothing: But to derive two or three general Principles of Motion from Phaenomena, and afterward to tell us how the Properties and Actions of all corporeal Things follow from those manifest Principles, would be a very great step in Philosophy, though the Causes of those Principles were not yet discovered: And therefore, I scruple not to propose the Principles of Motion above mentioned, they being of very general Extent, and leave their Causes to be found out. . . .

As in Mathematics, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions: yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of, and may be looked upon so much the stronger, by how much the Induction is more general. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur. By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in

general, from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of Analysis: And the Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discovered, and established as Principles, and by them explaining the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations.

Newton was more confident than succeeding generations of scientists have become that the analysis of phenomena can uncover indubitably and once for all the fundamental principles of a science, and that experiment can establish with unfailing certainty the universal physical validity of their mathematical consequences. Newton's confidence was indeed contagious, and the eighteenth-century workers in the social as well as the natural sciences shared with him this fundamental rationalistic assumption. Much critical spade work still remained to be done before this rationalistic heritage in Newton's philosophy could be undermined. But when the critical reconstruction finally came, it was itself a product of the powerful impulse which the Newtonian synthesis gave to experimental-mathematical inquiry.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SCIENCE

The steps in the establishment of the mathematical interpretation of nature, which have been outlined above, do not cover the entire ground of events in the development of modern science. The parallel transformations, and the great names associated with them, in the physics of liquids and gases, in optics, chemistry, medicine, physiology, zoology, botany, and geology, have been neglected in this account. But enough has been said to make clear the essentials of the experimental-mathematical method as the founders of modern science conceived it, and to indicate what elements in it were taken over by the increasingly numerous inquirers into the nature of man and society.

It should be noted, however, that the intellectual achievements which have been described did not immediately affect the thinking of the great masses of men. For the understanding of these achievements a special training is required, and this training was not supplied to its students by most universities of the period. A petition for university reform, submitted in 1649 to the British Parliament, is symptomatic of the fact that the new learning was still far removed from the minds and bosoms of university students. The petitioner declared:

I have ever expected from an university, that though all men cannot learne all things, yet they should be able to teach all things to all men; and be able either to attract knowing men from abroad out of their owne wealth, or at least be able to make an exchange. But how far short come we of this, though I acknowledge

some differences between our universities? We have hardly professors for the three principal faculties, and these but lazily read,—and carelessly followed. Where have we anything to do with Chemistry, which hath snatched the Keys of Nature from the other sects of philosophy by her multiplied experiences? Where have we constant reading upon either quick or dead anatomies, or ocular demonstrations of herbes? Where any manual demonstrations of Mathematical theorems or instruments? Where a promotion of their experiences which if right carried on, would multiply even to astonishment?

Many of the leading investigators of nature were in fact not associated with the established seats of learning; this was true, for example, of Kepler, Descartes, Boyle, and Huygens. It was only much later, and in part as a consequence of much agitation, that the universities became, as they are today, centers of research and of the propagation of scientific knowledge.

Nevertheless, the new science was slowly taking firm root in the institutions of seventeenth-century society. As has already been noted, many of the new experimental and theoretical discoveries had a clear-cut relevance for the arts and crafts of the day. And in consequence, the continued growth of science was sustained by, because it in turn helped to sustain, the development of commerce, manufacture, mining, and the arts of war. Indeed, many of the most enthusiastic and vocal devotees of science saw its greatest significance in the practical contributions it made to human welfare and in the increased power it gave over nature. Even Descartes, who cannot be accused of myopic practicality, emphasized this aspect of the new knowledge:

[The principles of Physics] caused me to see that it is possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in life, and that, instead of that speculative philosophy which is taught in the Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and all other bodies that environ us, as distinctly as we know the different crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature. This is not merely to be desired with a view to the invention of an infinity of arts and crafts which enable us to enjoy without any trouble the fruits of the earth and all the good things which are to be found there, but also principally because it brings about the preservation of health. . . .

The Role of Francis Bacon. But the most eloquent voice raised in behalf of knowledge as an instrument of control was that of Francis Bacon. He saw the reason for the small progress of science during the past, not only in the circumstance that it had been wedded to scholastic methods, but also in the fact that its "goal itself has not been rightly placed. Now the true and lawful goal of the sciences is this: that human life be endowed with new discoveries and powers." His proposed reform of the sciences was directed toward

achieving just this objective: "Although the roads to human power and to human knowledge lie close together, and are nearly the same, nevertheless on account of the pernicious and inveterate habit of dwelling on abstraction, it is safer to begin and raise the sciences from those foundations which have relation to practice, and to let the active part itself be as the seal which prints and determines the contemplative counterpart." Bacon's conception of the nature of scientific method was inadequate. But his enthusiasm for planned experimentation, and his sketch for a cooperative research institute (the House of Solomon, described in his *New Atlantis*), had an enormous influence on the establishment of scientific research as a recognized profession and a valued social institution.

Scientific Societies. Societies for the experimental study of nature were in fact slowly coming into being, first as informal gatherings and later as formally constituted bodies having the approval and support of the state. Probably the earliest of these private gatherings began to meet in 1560, in Naples, but it had only a brief existence. In Rome, the *Accademia dei Lincei*,⁸ to which Galileo belonged, was established in 1603. It had plans to found branches in all parts of the world for the gathering of factual data, and it thus anticipated some of the ideas of Bacon's House of Solomon. It had a distinguished career; but with the Church's condemnation of the work of Galileo and the death of its founder and patron, the Duke Fredrigo Cesi, its activities steadily declined and ceased to exist altogether by 1657. In that year the Medici organized at Florence the *Accademia del Cimento* (Academy of Experiment), which endured for ten years. Its membership was composed chiefly of Galileo's disciples and their students, and its organization was quite informal. During its short but brilliant life it conducted experimental investigations in most branches of natural knowledge, and contributed substantially to the improvement of such fundamental instruments as the thermometer, the barometer, and the microscope.

The London Royal Society also arose out of informal meetings of scholars and amateurs of science. Their weekly meetings were begun in 1645, and were held in London, frequently at Gresham College; during the Civil War the meetings were continued at Oxford, but were again resumed in London in 1660. The group included some of the leading mathematicians and other outstanding scientists of the day, as well as a somewhat miscellaneous collection of merchants and members of the nobility and the clergy. Its deliberations and experiments slowly acquired a certain notoriety, and Robert Boyle,

⁸ This Academy took its name from the "lynx," an animal that symbolized the battle with error and falsehood.

an early member, referred to it as the "Invisible College." A memorandum on a meeting in 1660 states that "amongst other matters that were discoursed of, something was offered about a designe of founding a Colledge for the promoting of Physico-Mathematicall Experimental Learning." And some verses written at the time, *In praise of the choice company of Philosophers and Witts who meet Wednesdays weekly at Gresham College*, help to state the aims of the society and its contempt for the established universities:

At Gresham College a learned knot
Unparalleled designs have layed
To make themselves a corporation
And know all things by demonstration.

These are not men of common mould,
They covet fame but condemn gold.
The College Gresham shall hereafter
Be the whole world's University.

Oxford and Cambridge are our laughter;
Their learning is but pedantry.
These new Collegiates do assure us
Aristotle's an ass to Epicurus.

In 1661 the Invisible College was formally incorporated by royal charter as the *Royal Society of London for Promoting Natural Knowledge*; but although royal approval was thus given to the pursuit of experimental study, largely because of its potential contributions to the arts of trade and navigation, financial assistance was not forthcoming from the royal treasury.

In its early days the Society patterned its activities largely on the Baconian ideal of knowledge. Bishop Sprat, an early member and its first historian, in describing its beginnings declared: "I shall only mention one great man who had the true imagination of the whole Extent of this Enterprise as it is now on foot, and that is the Lord Bacon in whose books there are everywhere scattered the best arguments that can be produced for the Defence of experimental philosophy, and the best Directions that are needful to promote it." And Boyle expressed unambiguously the hopes he expected to see realized by its activities:

I must ingeniously confesse to You, *Pyrophilus*, That I should not have neer so high a value as I now cherish for Physiology, if I thought it could onely teach a Man to discourse of Nature, but not at all to Master Her; and served onely, with pleasing Speculations to entertain his Understanding without at all increasing his Power. And though I presume not to judge of other Mens Knowledge: yet, for my own particular, I shall not dare to think my selfe a true Naturalist, till my skill can

make my Garden yeeld better Herbs and Flowers, or my Orchard better Fruit, or my Field better Corn, or my Dairy better Cheese than theirs that are strangers to Physiology . . . Methinks it should be a Disparagement to a Philosopher, when he descends to consider Husbandry, not to be able, with all his Science, to improve the precepts of an Art, resulting from the lame and unlearned Observations and Practice of such illiterate persons as Gardenners, Plowmen, and Milkmaids. And indeed, *Pyrophilus*, though it be but too evident, that the barren Philosophie, wont to be taught in the Schooles, hath hitherto been found of very little Use in Humane life; yet if the true principles of that fertill Science were thoroughly known, considered and applied, tis scarce imaginable, how universal and advantageous a change they would make in the World. For in Man's knowledge of the Nature of the Creatures, doth principally consist his Empire over them (his Knowledge and his power having generally the same Limits).

Boyle also argues "that the Goods of Mankind may be much increased by the Naturalist's Insight into Trades"; and he proceeded to establish two things: "The One; That an Insight into Trades may Improve the Naturalist's Knowledge. And the Other; That the Naturalist, as well by the skill thus obtain'd, as by the other parts of his knowledge, may be enabled to Improve Trades." And in fact the Society did concern itself with the construction of instruments and techniques relevant to the commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural problems of the day. It collected curious objects and various bits of information from the four quarters of the earth, intending to compile a comprehensive natural history of the world in the approved Baconian manner. And through its permanent secretary, it conducted an extensive correspondence with foreign learned bodies, which culminated in the publication in 1664 of the *Philosophical Transactions*, one of the first regular periodicals devoted to scientific subjects.

Much of this early work of the Society was highly uncritical, and is now only of antiquarian interest. For example, one of the queries, typical of the others, which was submitted to the resident-general of Batavia as part of the project for a natural history of the world was "What river is there in Java that turns wood into stone?" The miscellaneous material so carefully gathered by the Society shows clearly that a sound method in science was not an easy conquest and that fruitful research cannot be achieved on the strength of good intentions alone. Nevertheless, the formation and the growth of the Royal Society also illustrate the gradual institutionalization of science and its incorporation into the warp and woof of modern social policy.

Similar scientific societies were established on the Continent of Europe. At the strong urging of Colbert, Louis XIV established the *Académie des Sciences* in 1666, and supported it with the resources of his treasury. Colbert

was aware of the economic values of scientific research, and encouraged the *Académie* to direct its inquiries along lines which would strengthen his mercantilist policy. The organization of the French academy became a model for many of the research institutes which soon dotted the map of Europe: of these latter, the Berlin Academy, organized in 1700, deserves special mention. Before long, most of these learned bodies issued regular scientific publications, and the business of professional research was well under way.

Thus, formally organized institutes of research came into being partly because of the efforts of disinterested scholars, partly because of the pressure exerted by the problems of a commercial civilization, and partly because of the encouragement of public officials. For each of these the need for such institutes became progressively greater: for the pure scientist, because the expense involved in constructing suitable instruments and in conducting experiments required a large community to bear the financial burden; for the merchants and manufacturers, because only a permanent group of trained scientists could solve the technological problems perpetually arising from their occupations; and for the statesmen, because they recognized that prosperity in times of peace and success in times of war both depend on the cultivation of knowledge that yields power over man and nature. The love of truth, the desire for honor and fame, the hope for material gain and political power, were all factors in the furtherance of research; severally and jointly they have helped to make "Mathematical-Experimental Learning" an integral part of modern society.

The need for making the results and the spirit of this learning accessible to a wider audience was partly met by encyclopedic expositions of the significant achievements of science. The most notable of these was the French *Encyclopédie*, whose contributors were the outstanding intellectual figures of the eighteenth century, and whose influence was felt not only in France but throughout Europe and America for the next two hundred years. The *Encyclopédie* made evident the conviction that the institutionalization of science is both a factor in social change and a model for social organization.

The Social Nature of Scientific Activity. One further, though less obvious, feature of the institutionalization of science must be briefly noted. The complexity of modern research, like the complexity of a modern industry, both invites and requires a cooperative division of labor. Analogous to the way in which an industrial product is the outcome of an interrelated economic system, the intellectual products of science are the achievements of a professional community. Accordingly, what is sometimes called "scientific truth" is not simply a personal or individual product, even though the activities of gifted

individuals count heavily in its genesis. For if by "scientific truth" is understood a conclusion warranted by scientific inquiry, scientific truth is the product of a community of habitually cooperative workers, which evaluates the adequacy of every specific investigation.

The following points will make evident the extent to which scientific activity, including the evaluation of its findings, is thoroughly social in character.

(1) No research institution, and even more obviously no individual student of nature, has all the instruments and opportunities for thorough-going research. The sheer cost of some instruments makes their indefinite duplication wasteful, if not prohibitive. And such factors as a favorable physical environment (for example, a large percentage of clear days in the case of astronomical observation), the availability of certain source materials, or the existence of special human talent, place further restrictions upon research projects. In consequence, specialization inevitably sets in.

(2) However, specialization is compatible with a flourishing state of scientific development only if cooperation between various centers of specialized research becomes a habitual matter. Thus, Kepler, though not himself gifted as an observational astronomer, used the observational data of Tycho Brahe; while Newton relied on the data supplied by the Greenwich Observatory in developing the details of his theories. Different specialized researches are frequently highly relevant to one another, so that one condition for the effective investigation of nature is the free communication of ideas between various centers of study.

(3) But the communication of ideas is feasible only if a common language exists for effecting their transfer. There must be agreement on terminology and notation, and there must be conventions as to metrical units. The requirements of communication thus lead to bureaus of standards for setting up and enforcing norms of measurement, and to international committees for establishing a uniform technical vocabulary and a standard symbolism.

(4) Moreover, the communication of ideas is fruitful only to the extent that a common standard of workmanship is recognized at the various centers of research. For if one group of workers has no confidence in the findings of another group, a division of labor with respect to scientific research is futile. Accordingly, research is required to be conducted by recognized methods, whose operations are in principle always open to inspection and control. And the findings of an inquiry will in general be regarded as well established only if they have been obtained by standard methods or if they are repeatedly confirmed by other investigators. Thus, Galileo's report that he observed Venus to exhibit phases would report nothing more than an item in his biography,

if his claim were not capable of repeated verification by any competently trained student of the heavens.

It is a commonplace of modern scientific method that isolated, nonrepeatable observations carry little if any weight, and that on the contrary observations become significant only if they are obtained in accordance with the warranted methods of the scientific community. Analogous remarks are pertinent, *mutatis mutandis*, in considering the adequacy of a theory to some subject matter, or the validity of some bit of mathematical reasoning.

The institutionalization of science thus involves not merely the construction of certain obvious material structures (such as laboratories and schools), however important these may be. It also involves the establishment of a cooperating community of professional workers, within which a division of labor is effected and standards of competence are developed. It is a fundamental characteristic of modern science that its conclusions are not evaluated by an appeal to some ineffable intuition or to some selected authority. The warrant for these conclusions comes from the type of method used in reaching them, and thus ultimately from the funded experience of a community of professional students.

Chapter IX

THE ELABORATION OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE



I. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

COUNTING EACH of the federal states as one, we may say that in the seventeenth century there were in Europe more than a score of sovereign states. The number varied slightly with events like the recovery of its independence by Portugal. A number of states which formed single units for purposes of international politics were not units from the point of view of the student of constitutions. England and Scotland, from their personal union under James I till the union of their parliaments under Anne, had two constitutions, and Ireland a third, not to mention the Channel Islands and Man, or the county palatine of Durham. Constitutional unity was scarcely to be found except in minor states, and in some of the federal states it was doubtful whether the federation or the component part was the unit, even for international purposes. It was a controversial question whether the United Provinces of the Netherlands should be spoken of as one state or seven. The Holy Roman Empire was gradually ceasing to deserve the name of a state, and in 1648 by the treaties of Westphalia all the essential attributes of sovereignty were recognized as belonging to its members. These members numbered altogether, from great princes down to free towns and petty knights, more than three hundred. The government of each, however small, had its virtually separate organization; so that if we set out to make a comparative study of the specimens of constitutions which can be found at this time, we start with a bewildering wealth of materials, and the hope of detecting any development common to all seems distant. That there really was

This chapter consists of material by three different authors. Section 1 is from *The Seventeenth Century* (pp. 82-97, 155-64, 2d ed.; London, Oxford University Press, 1947), by G. N. Clark. Section 2, designed especially for the present volume, was written for its first edition by Eugene O. Golob. Section 3 is from *The Age of Louis XIV* (pp. 11-48, 52-6, 76, 80-90; New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1929), by Laurence Bradford Packard.

such a development, not merely a number of points of resemblance but a genuinely common tendency, is a striking illustration of the unity which underlay the evident diversities of the map of Europe.

Wherever a number of similar political communities exist side by side, there will normally be copying and borrowing of one institution or another, and in the Middle Ages, as in any other time, there were pattern-states and imitative states. The varieties of detail arising from local conditions were so great that to a modern eye it seems at first sight that the grammar of medieval institutions, like that of the Basque language, consists entirely of exceptions; but, in spite of this, it is true that there was a normal European method of organizing the work of government. In the larger states this consisted of a grafting of the unifying principle of monarchy upon the broader groundwork of feudalism. The tenure of land, hereditary, but in a sense contractual, was the benefit in return for which the ruling classes rendered military service, and carried out the administration of justice and the general work of government. Ecclesiastics formed another feudal body, with their own courts and taxes and hierarchy, a body of which the relations with the lay body were never in a perfectly stable equilibrium or altogether free from doubts and controversies. As towns grew up, they also attained a status of their own, with their own courts, and to some extent with their own control over taxation. Every authority was limited and liable to come into collision with the others, and, according to the local circumstances, the result might vary in any direction. There were strong hereditary monarchies which left very little play to the church or the towns or the nobles. At the other extreme were city-states which owned only a nominal imperial overlordship and themselves ruled over a subject nobility. The proportions of the different ingredients varied indefinitely, but their nature was everywhere the same, and in the later Middle Ages there had everywhere grown up a new type of institution through which they worked together.

This was the system of estates. Every country of Western Christendom, from Portugal to Finland, and from Ireland to Hungary, had its assemblies of estates. There was every variety of internal arrangement in the number and composition of the houses, their procedure, their competence, as well as in their relations to the royal power; but it is pretty generally, though not universally, true that in these assemblies there were either present or represented the nobility, the ecclesiastics, and the burghers. In a more or less flourishing condition these estates everywhere survived until the beginning of the seventeenth century, or the last years of the sixteenth. Nowhere, however, had they reached the position, which is normal to the parliaments of European countries in the age after the English and the French revolutions, of being the authority

to which the executive government is responsible. In one country or another they might from time to time, with or without success, claim some control over taxation, or over the appointment of ministers, or even over high matters of policy like wars and alliances. In some countries, though not possessing in theory an exclusive right to do the work of legislation, they had become the usual channel for it in practice. But the machinery of government was still, in monarchies, the king's, and where the estates got a hold over it they generally sowed the seeds of present or future dissensions with monarchy.

The king's control over government was indeed still precarious. He lacked the means of complete authority and the administration was only gradually approaching the stage in which it would be properly amenable to control. The concentration of armed force in the royal hands was imperfect. Not a single western country had a standing army: the only one in Europe was that of the Turks. Feudal levies and mercenary troops were apt to follow the will of their own immediate leaders, and the feudal forces had in some places a legal right to do so even against the king. Side by side with the civil government of feudalism there had grown up a royal machine, a body of civil servants, law-courts, chanceries, secretaries; but nearly everywhere it was still rudimentary. The division of functions between departments and their subordination to one head had not been made logical and firm. Offices tended to slip from the royal authority by becoming hereditary, privileged, feudal. In Protestant kingdoms where the Lutheran system prevailed the church had been subjected to the state, but the Roman Catholic Church was an independent international power, and, at the beginning of the century, it was still possible that Calvinism might become another.

In reviewing economic changes we have already seen that the social foundations were shifting in such a way as was bound to make this old superstructure untenable. The divisions of classes were changing. The agricultural wealth, which had been the material strength of feudalism, was now faced with the rivalry of the more mobile wealth of the capitalists. In England, France, the Netherlands, Germany, even in Naples, men of finance and commerce were able to acquire titles of nobility. They made it their practice, as they still do, to buy the lands and marry the daughters of the older aristocracy, but, however much they perpetuated the trappings and even the traditions of feudalism, their political influence was inevitably new in kind. Since it rested on money, it could scarcely grow without a similar growth in the money-power elsewhere. Its first clear tendency was to depress the political power of all those classes which were not comparatively rich by the new and rising standards. Democratic ideas in the modern sense play a very small part in

the seventeenth century. Few men seriously proposed to extend any sort of franchise to laborers, and no such proposal had any more influence on events than to create a temporary disturbance. The ease with which Oliver Cromwell put down the levellers and the failure of the peasants' rising in Switzerland about the same time are typical of the period. Much as they were changing, aristocracies were tending to consolidate their power. The English landed gentry, the patriciates of the Swiss cantons, the regent class in the Dutch republic, the *noblesse de la robe*¹ in France, were new nobilities which owed their power to the general tendencies of the time, and, though the nobilities of other countries as they underwent transformation met with great obstacles to their power, it remains true that there was a general tendency toward a growth of aristocratic influence.

The tendency manifested itself most plainly in an opposition to monarchy. This too was general. Ranke pointed to one of its most striking examples in the deposition in 1661 by its members of the head of the most strictly autocratic body in the world, the Society of Jesus. In the political world it found expression in conflicts between kings and estates. Practically everywhere in these collisions it was the aristocratic element, even in a rather narrow sense, which gave its force to opposition: for the towns it was . . . a period of political decline. What is, at first sight, more surprising is the further fact that the outcome of these collisions was normally favorable to monarchy: the instance in which aristocracy or the partisans of the estates succeeded were exceptional.

A summary of the facts will clear the way for the explanation. First the cases may be taken in which the estates had to give way before the rising royal power, and that power became virtually absolute. In Spain the decisive steps had been taken shortly before the beginning of the century. When Philip II came to the throne he found the *cortes* of Castile largely shorn of their liberties; those of Aragon he first restricted and then suppressed. In the Spanish kingdom of Naples parliamentary proceedings had long been almost empty forms, their sole purpose being to vote supplies and to arrange the incidence of taxation in the way least inconvenient to the barons. Even the forms of parliamentary assembly were abandoned after 1642. The revolt which was, a few years later, begun by Giulio Genoino and led by the ridiculous Masaniello, originated in a kind of liberalism, but merely proved the impotence of any such spirit. In France the absolute system was gradually built up after the confusion of the civil wars, first by Henry IV, then by Richelieu. The States-General met in 1614 for the last time before the Revolu-

¹ [Judicial nobility.]

tion of 1789. The provincial estates were thoroughly tamed. In 1648–53 another body, the Parlement of Paris, a law-court, but with a certain legislative function and staffed by a hereditary caste, formed the nucleus of the light-headed revolutionary movement of the Fronde.² After its ignominious failure Louis XIV reduced the *noblesse de la robe* to complete subordination, and the old *noblesse de l'épée*³ to a state of highly expensive futility. In Portugal the victory of monarchy was slower but not less complete. The country broke away from Spain in 1640 after a subjection which had lasted for two generations. During that period the Castilian rulers had broken their sworn promise not to impose taxes without the consent of the *cortes*, so that, as opposition always tends to enlist on its side any repressed and disfranchised force, there was an element of "liberalism" in the rebellion. In 1668 the *cortes* compelled the regent to make peace with Spain. Their triumph was, however, short. The same regent dissolved them because they attempted to control expenditure, and declined the crown because they claimed the right to dispose of it. In 1697 they met for the last time.

Among the Teutonic peoples liberty fared little better. The Great Elector, Frederick William, made himself the real founder of the power of the Hohenzollerns by repressing the estates of his two chief possessions, Brandenburg and Prussia, and by making his revenue independent of their consent. The Hapsburgs had many provinces, in some of which, as Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia, the work was already done. By crushing their Protestant subjects in the Thirty Years War they were enabled to draw the teeth of the estates in those which remained. In Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, the estates lost many privileges and, above all, that of electing their king. The Hungarian crown became hereditary in 1687. In Denmark in the sixteenth century a king had failed to make his rule hereditary; but in 1660–65 his successor succeeded not merely in accomplishing that, but in imposing a *kongelov* or *lex regia*, which is famous as one of the most consistent legal expressions of the principle of absolute monarchy. It is interesting to notice that the author of this law, Peter Schumacher Griffenfeld, was influenced by English political thought, though he was not apparently, as has been supposed, a follower of Thomas Hobbes, but rather of the high-church divine-right theorists. Across the straits in Sweden a similar consummation was reached by a different road. There the king's authority was to some extent limited by that of the senate, a privy council of which the members were appointed by him, but held office for life and

² [The series of uprisings known as the Fronde was the last attempt of the old aristocracy to challenge the growing absolutism of the French crown. "Fronde" literally means "slingshot," a derisive implication that the nobles behaved like bad boys.]

³ [Military nobility.]

took their oaths not to him but to the estates. In the last quarter of the century Charles XI, with support of the estates, repudiated this limitation, obtained unlimited legislative authority, and made himself absolute.

There were several countries in which the course of events was very different. In England, after a civil war and a subsequent revolution, constitutional monarchy was established, and the ground was prepared for the full development of responsible government. In the Dutch republic a complicated and archaic system emerged from the war of independence, in which the estates kept most of the power in their own hands, and allowed only a restricted, though not permanently and effectively restricted, authority to the stadholders, the successors to lieutenants of the king they had thrown off. Even in the Southern Netherlands, which remained obedient to the Spanish crown, obedience was purchased by leaving to the estates a simulacrum of their authority in finance and policy. In Hungary, although, as we have seen, the monarchy became hereditary, the estates survived, and when the Hapsburgs recovered the greater part of the kingdom from the Turks, they were to find themselves faced by a constitutional and national opposition.

The constitution of the Holy Roman Empire fell into hopeless dilapidation. In the elective system the princes had a lever for diminishing the imperial power: each emperor at his election had to give away something of his sovereignty. The division of the Empire between Catholicism and Protestantism was organized in such a way as to permit either confession to paralyze any attempt at action by the diet. At the end of the Thirty Years War the princes got recognition of their sovereignty and right to make alliances with foreign powers. The only links of the Empire were ineffectual: it meant little that in 1663 the diet instead of being intermittent began to be in permanent session all the year round and from one year to another. When a group of German princes accepted the guarantee of Louis XIV for their rights and territories against any encroachment of the emperor, the dissolution of the Empire was heralded. At the end of the century it may be called a limited-liability confederation, a federation of which each of the leading members had greater interests and possessions outside it than inside. The emperors themselves, the Hapsburgs, were partly to blame for the decline of the Empire precisely because Hungary meant more to them than Germany. The Spanish branch of their house renewed its voice in the Empire in the sixteen-seventies by sending a permanent representative of the Burgundian circle to the diet at Ratisbon. The electors of Brandenburg were kings in Prussia. The elector of Saxony was king of Poland—another state in which “republicanism” prevailed against the advance of monarchy. The elector of Hanover was heir-presumptive to Eng-

land. One group of German provinces belonged to the king of Sweden, another to the king of Denmark. Not only the emperor's monarchical authority but the whole machinery of the federal government was in decay.

This, however, formed no exception to the rule that the general progress of the time was toward absolutism. On the contrary, it was an instance of that rule. It was just because the members of the Empire, from the emperors downwards, were bent on establishing their own sovereignty that they dismembered the authority of the Empire. How must the rule be qualified when we consider the real exceptions, Poland, England, Holland, and so forth? In the first place we may notice that, even when the outcome was the curbing of monarchy, the same contest between monarchy and the estates took place. In England it was but narrowly won by the cause of liberty, and, on the whole, the issue is not simplified too much if we say that it was won because the anomalous, insular monarchy of England had gone through a more varied experience and fostered a more widespread political capacity among its subjects than any other. In Holland monarchy had to wait another century for its turn, but that state too was exceptional, partly because of the strange vicissitudes of its political history, and partly because of its unique economic conditions. One factor which helped "liberty" in both Holland and England was religious division. Protestantism had the upper hand in both, but in each there was an important Roman Catholic minority and a vigorous variety of sectaries and schismatics who had to be granted a grudging and not quite consistent toleration. Religious uniformity has at least a consanguinity with political submissiveness. Holland had other points in common with the other republic of Switzerland. Both were small. The conditions favorable to freedom could hardly have been found extending over wider areas. Moreover, both Holland and Switzerland were doubly small: they were broken up into still smaller units. They were federal. The amount of unity which they imposed was very slight.

In Poland and Hungary the social power of the landed class was too little influenced by the new economic forces for monarchy to find the necessary tools. Poland is always cited as an awful example of constitutional inefficiency, especially because of its *liberum veto*, a rule then recently introduced, by which any single noble in the diet could negative any proposal. This was only the last addition to a system in which central control was at a minimum, and the independence of the individual members of the feudal class, however impoverished, was allowed to go to extreme lengths. The political decay of Poland proved that it was utterly out of date. The same may be said of the small old-fashioned republics like Genoa and Ragusa. Although they survived, it was merely because a series of chances provided them, for the time being,

with sufficient allies or protectors whenever their independence was threatened. They had a respite from absorption, but that was all, and this was true even of Venice, although Venice was still regarded in the seventeenth century as a model state. James Harrington in England was one of a body of writers who in various languages recommended its institutions for imitation: they failed to see that in the future they would be inadequate to protect the venerable republic.

The general tendency consisted not merely in the triumph of monarchy, but in the rise of a particular type of monarchy. It may be called the French type of monarchy, not only because it reached its strongest and most logical expression in France, but also because it was consciously and deliberately copied elsewhere from the Bourbon model. The later Stuarts in England envied and tried to emulate the powers of their cousin Louis XIV. The Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg, a prince of distinguished conjugal fidelity, wishing to do his business exactly as Louis did, is said to have added to his establishment a lady who had the title and the court functions, though not the pleasures, of being his mistress. The departmental organization of administrative work and the supervision of local government by the central power were widely imitated from the French example, and it was monarchy as Louis XIV left it which made the enlightened despots of the next century.

It is misleading to summarize in a single phrase any long historical process, but the work of monarchy in the seventeenth century may be described as the substitution of a simpler and more unified government for the complexities of feudalism. On one side it was centralization, the bringing of local business under the supervision or control of the government of the capital. This necessarily had as its converse a tendency toward uniformity. A central government to be able to compare a number of subordinate organs with one another, and to make them all serve the same ends, needed to make them work alike. We shall see in detail how this double tendency transformed military institutions and made the standing army both the type and the instrument of the new order. In intellectual life we shall see the same movement expressed in the academies. First France under Richelieu and then in succession the other monarchies adapted for the encouragement and disciplining of letters a form of association which had been devised spontaneously, without the notion of control from above, by literary men themselves. This compulsory purchase of prosperity and recognition at the expense of the loss of freedom had its counterpart in the arts, in ecclesiastical history, and in the mercantile regulation of economic life. It was, in fact, everywhere in the life of the time; but its central achievement was the diminution of the feudal element in the state.

The feudal nobility lost its functions, and first among them its military functions. In France it was concentrated at Versailles, where Louis XIV practised the art of government by spectacle and taught his nobles that all their ambitions must depend for their fulfillment on his favor. Elsewhere the change was less striking, but fundamentally much the same. A nobleman, instead of leading his vassals to the wars, took service in an army and went through a regular course of promotion from one rank to another on the recommendation of his superior officers. The nobility threw off a branch which is continuous with it but unlike it, the officer-class. In the same way in civil government, although ancient hereditary offices retained some of their dignity and emoluments, they lost most of their real significance: if a nobleman wanted political power he had to win it in the service of the state, or, which is much the same, of the crown. Step by step the crown ousted the feudal lords from their rights and privileges. If they were impoverished, if they were refractory and liable to punishment, if they were ambitious, the king's servants knew how to take advantage of the opportunity. The extent of their victory may be gauged from the change in their character: it has been observed that in the seventeenth century the French *intendants*, the officials who controlled the provinces for the central government, were *des gens de lutte*:⁴ in the eighteenth that type of man was no longer needed, and they were *des gens de bon ton*.⁵

An early development of bureaucracy in economic affairs is well illustrated by some of the administrative departments which grew up in France. This growth was somewhat different in other countries, but it too was a general movement. It was general but not quite universal: the Dutch republic, that curiously antiquated organism, was exempt from it as it was from the centralizing tendency generally. In England also it had anomalous forms, especially a looseness of central control over local administration, a closeness of contact of the estates, the Parliament, with government, a system of putting at the head of a government office not a man but a board, the board of trade, the lords of the treasury, the admiralty board, and others. But the growth of bureaucracy—not its origin but its progress—was one of the characteristic seventeenth-century movements in most of the more thriving countries. The state made more and more concerns its own: its growing needs and its wider outlook impelled it to be no longer content with limited functions of police and defense, but, especially on the economic side, though not on that alone, to take under its care one department after another in the life of the nation. Administrative departments proved determined enemies to immunities and anomalies: their progress was not to be reconciled with the feudal spirit.

⁴ [Strong-arm men.]

⁵ [Cultivated gentlemen.]

How toughly rooted that spirit was all over Europe is, however, shown by its persistence. Despotism in the seventeenth century, in spite of the energy and continuity of its efforts, fulfilled only a small part of its program. Even the eighteenth century, in which the impetus of the new enlightenment was added to those efforts, left the greater part of the task to the more drastic methods of the revolutionary period. There were directions in which the feudal spirit, as fast as it was lopped and felled, seemed to push up new suckers from its buried roots. In France, for instance, the new bureaucratic class themselves held many of their offices by hereditary succession. The seventeenth century saw not only the decay of the old nobility, but the establishment of the judicial and administrative caste, one of the strangest of institutions, which was a sort of prosaic, civilian feudalism. The ministers who allowed this to come about did so neither gladly nor inadvertently: financial necessity brought them to it. On the frequent occasions when new methods had to be devised for raising money, it was easiest to resort to the vicious practice of creating a new office and selling it, making it a good capital investment by allowing it to pass to the buyer's heirs. This was a peculiarly French abuse, but it is only one example among many of the fact that the old régime could not afford more than limited installments of reform. And in addition it must be remembered that the new monarchy was only partly new. It was up to a certain point opposed to feudalism, but it was also itself a product of feudalism, and, as the world was to discover in the time of the revolutions, it was in a sense the great stronghold of the feudal spirit.

It was hereditary: we have seen that in the seventeenth century the survivals of the elective system were wiped out in every country except the two doomed organisms of Poland and the Holy Roman Empire. The hereditary principle may be defended or adopted on public grounds as the most satisfactory way of selecting a ruler: that is the ground on which we retain it in the British Commonwealth today. In the seventeenth century, however, monarchy was more than hereditary. It was dynastic: the kings and their families formed a caste apart, higher than nobilities and difficult of entry even for the greatest parvenu. The legitimation of his bastards by Louis XIV was a notable disparagement of noble blood in comparison with the blood royal. Whatever theorists might say in explanation of the nature of royal power, kings did normally regard their kingdoms first and foremost as the possessions, the estates, of their families, and of themselves as heads of their families. Critics of the old order in international affairs have often shown how disastrous and absurd it was that the issues of war and peace, of independence and national sub-

jection, often revolved on the chances of births, deaths, and marriages among this inbred and not very healthy stock of royalties.

Contemporaries also knew that the dynastic system meant that the interests of rulers and their subjects must be more or less widely divergent. Sir William Temple, who knew his Europe as well as any one, assumed as a matter of course that the two interests were distinct. There was not even any one class whose interests permanently coincided with those of monarchy. From time to time kings relied on the support of one class or another, and, as aristocracy, whether expressing itself through the assemblies of estates or otherwise, was their most usual opponent, it sometimes appears as if they had a natural affinity with other elements which tended to resist aristocratic privileges and pretensions. Charles XI of Sweden and Frederick III of Denmark relied on the peasants against the nobles: the house of Orange could raise the mob against the Dutch regents; the Stuarts have been almost plausibly represented as Tory democrats. More than once the regents of Naples resisted the nobility: the second duke of Ossuna even armed the mob against them. From these and similar instances it is sometimes inferred that, before the real emergence of democracy, the kings were the leaders of the poor and unenfranchised against their oligarchic oppressors. A broader view must, however, lead to the rejection of this theory. There were other occasions on which kings showed themselves favorable to aristocracy and indifferent to the lower populace. Only when its claims were exorbitant did they turn against the nobility, and never once did they attempt anything so radical as the extinction of all aristocratic privileges and power. Aristocracy was part of the established order, and when kings were not openly and avowedly against it, they were for it. Even when they were driven to work against it, the mob was not their only or their most congenial ally. Ecclesiastics of various kinds had their share even in those revolutions which have been mentioned: the clergy were actors in the Danish *coup d'état*, the Calvinist ministers were the most valuable supporters of the Dutch stadholders, and the Stuarts prospered most when they retained the loyalty of the Church of England. Monarchy needed allies and it found them where it could, but not always in the same place. Its own interest was distinct from all others. It might reconcile or it might divide; it might take a position of national leadership or foster one part of the community in order to hold down another. It was consistent only in fidelity to itself.

The contradiction between its modern and its archaic aspects is reflected in the various kinds of support which it received. It is doubtless true that its development is closely related to the economic movements of the early

capitalistic age; but its rise was not solely or even mainly due to economic causes. When kings were popular leaders there is no lack of evidence to prove that, along with hopes of material betterment, they aroused a far stronger sentiment of personal loyalty and devotion. The simple faithfulness of the peasant, the soldier, the laborer, cannot be analyzed and needs no explanation. It is born of one of the primary instincts of mankind. Akin to it is the chivalrous service of military commanders like Tilly and Montrose. The latter sentiment, however, is not one for which the seventeenth century is conspicuous. It is hard to think of generals of the first rank who gave examples of it. Most of them, like Turenne and Condé, Wallenstein and Marlborough, had, in the matter of loyalty, questionable records: they were still near to the type of the feudal magnate or the *condottiere*. For strong expressions of monarchical faith one must look to words rather than deeds. The clergy of every creed and country, when they happened to be on the monarchical side, strained the language of submission to the utmost. The doctrine of the divine right of kings, after a long and eventful history, had reached a condition in which its theoretical groundwork had become unworthy of the intellectual atmosphere of the age, but its emotional force had reached its apex. It is sometimes said that the divine right of kings was the form taken in the seventeenth century by the theory of sovereignty. This is inexact, because . . . there were many writers of different schools throughout the century who expressed that theory in well-considered and, we may say, modern terms. Nor is it historical to emphasize the more reasonable side of a doctrine which had its still more prominent side of adulation and spurious mysticism.

In spite of this, the last word about the supporters of monarchy must be that, upon the whole and except for those countries and occasions which have already been characterized as anomalous, they included the best and most enlightened elements of society. In France, almost throughout the century, the opposition to monarchy, whether practical or theoretical, was interested, factious, destitute of breadth and statesmanship. In the disastrous end of the reign of Louis XIV there is a liberal spirit in the writings of Fénelon and some of his contemporaries; but Fénelon remained a monarchist, and when the chance came after Louis's death for the experiment of a new system, it was only to show how small an element this spirit was in the oligarchic sham-liberalism of St. Simon and the clerical *esprit de corps* of Gallicanism. Even in Poland it appears that the wisest men were, though in vain, on the side of an increase of royal authority. . . . [Looking] at thought and action together, we may say that the experience of the seventeenth century caused

republican ideas to be generally discarded, and led both men of action and men of thought to throw their influence on the side of the kings.

THE INTERESTS OF THE STATES

. . . [The] seventeenth century presents six great movements. The first was well on its way when the century began, the decline of Spanish power. The second also had its roots in the past, and was closely connected with the decline of Spain: it was the disintegration of Germany. The third, a consequence and a cause of the first two, was the rise of French domination, which had its sequel in the European combinations against France. A fourth followed from the second and third, the decline of the old Baltic powers, Sweden, Denmark, and Poland, before the rise of Prussia and Russia. This prepared the way for a fifth which was still only partially fulfilled, the fusion of the Baltic and Eastern question in the general European struggles. A sixth, also protracted into the future, was the fusion of these European struggles themselves with the maritime and colonial struggles in Asia, Africa, America.

From the time when nation-states were first concentrated from the feudal nebula of the Middle Ages, there has been a succession of efforts to produce some supra-national organization. It is in this light that we must regard not merely the nascent efforts of internationalism, but some of the selfish efforts of states. The first and in some ways the greatest of these efforts was the rise of the Spanish power. That power was not, as appears when we read of the part taken by "Spain" in European affairs, the power of a national state, but the power of an international organization. The Spanish kingdoms, the Netherlands, the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, the duchy of Milan, the Hapsburg lands in and adjoining Germany, the Castilian conquests in America were all ruled by Charles V, who also became head of the Holy Roman Empire. They were held together only in a personal union; but there have been many instances in which such personal union was a stepping-stone to constitutional and organic union: to contemporaries in the sixteenth century it looked as if this league of nations under Charles V might well be the beginning of a new kind of world-empire.

That prospect by 1601 seemed remote or impossible. The Reformation had divided the world so effectively that the first question which the politician now had to ask about a country was, what was its religion, and the Spanish power lay within the Catholic half of Europe. The house of Hapsburg had been driven to separate into two branches, a Spanish and a German. Half the Netherlands had become independent. But the Spanish was still the

greatest power in the world, and it was still essentially an international power. It dominated Italy more firmly than ever. It still held the Southern Netherlands as a *place d'armes*⁶ from which it could invade either Germany or northern France. In its main stronghold, the Iberian Peninsula, it had been strengthened by the conquest of Portugal, and that conquest had brought with it the Portuguese colonial empire, that is, the whole of the European establishments in the Atlantic and the East which had not previously belonged to Spain. The relations of the Spanish with the Austrian Hapsburgs were still intimate. The two branches followed a careful policy of intermarriage by which if either line should become extinct, its inheritance would fall to the other. It was not until this policy broke down by a series of unforeseen accidents that the political cooperation of Spain and Austria came to an end: they never fought on opposite sides in a war until the outbreak of the war of the Spanish Succession in 1702. Lastly, there was no religious division within the Spanish dominions. They were free from that weakness by which all their probable enemies were hampered, and there was no knowing that the time might not again come when, as in the days of Philip II, only a few years before, they would have the support of the rest of Catholic Europe in a bid for still greater power.

In 1601 two wars, already of long standing, were in progress, but both nearing their end, in which Spain was the loser. That which had begun more recently of the two was the war with Elizabethan England. It was almost entirely a maritime war, a war of sea-fights or of brief raids on shore with no sustained fighting on land. The English had proved themselves great fighters, and had inflicted much loss and irritation; but they had made no conquests, and their hopes of establishing colonies had come to nothing. Latterly, on their side, the war had been unprofitable and badly planned. In the beginning, sixteen years before, it had been a war of defense against Spain as the leader of the international Catholic reaction. The danger had been averted, and when James I succeeded to the English throne, it was merely at the dictation of common sense that he made peace. By doing so he left in isolation the persistent enemy of Spain which had been at war even longer than England. The Dutch, however, though they had needed English and French help in the earlier days of their war of independence, were now strong enough to stand alone. They had for a good many years established themselves as a state, and turned what had been a civil war into a regular international contest. Recently they had begun a new phase in their warfare by carrying on trade and hostilities in the Eastern seas. The Spaniards, seeing their colonial possessions threat-

⁶ [Fortress.]

ened, and checked in attempts to succor them, were brought to make a Twelve Years Truce in 1609.

At the time of this truce Spain had lost little in military efficiency, and, although her financial and economic difficulties were plainly visible, her political prestige remained very great. She was still, at least in appearance, the first power of the world. She had made her concessions to the Dutch only in the provisional form of a truce. Only a year after the truce was made there came the murder of Henry IV of France, and the only power from which the Spaniards had anything serious to fear entered on a period of domestic divisions which made her internationally impotent for the next fourteen years. By marriage alliances she came within the circle of Spanish influence. Spain had a chance of economic and administrative reconstruction.

Her failure to take it had far-reaching consequences. When the Thirty Years War broke out in Germany in 1618 she was no better off than she had been at the time of the truce of 1609; but her international tradition drew her into that distant war for three separate reasons. She intervened to support the Hapsburg power and also to support the Catholic cause. When the Dutch truce expired, the Dutch would not renew it, so that their war of independence was resumed, but this time with a series of diversions in Germany. Very few years passed before France, under the strong hand of Richelieu, began to come back into the arena. First she obstructed the communications between the Milanese and the lands of the Austrian ally. Next, through the succession of a Frenchman as duke of Mantua and the occupation of Piedmontese fortresses she began to acquire influence over strategical points commanding the roads into the Milanese from the east and the west. Then at last she threw all her regenerated energies into a great war. At the battle of Rocroi she broke the spell of Spanish military superiority. When the Dutch and German wars were ended by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 the French fought on, and not alone. Portugal had rebelled in 1640. Oliver Cromwell sent his fleet to the West Indies and his Ironsides to Flanders. The French war which lasted till 1659 completed the ruin of Spain, and when she yielded Portugal her independence in 1668, Spain, though still holding her Indies, her Netherlands, and her Italian possessions, had become in war and politics a second-class power, a victim. In the three wars which she had to fight against Louis XIV for the defense of the Netherlands, she had to depend on the treasuries and even on the armies of her allies. Her international bundle of possessions could be held together only on sufferance, because the strong powers grudged one another the gains they could have wrested from her.

The Thirty Years War, in the course of which Spain suffered some of her

most damaging expenses and reverses, though it involved at one time or other almost every state in western and central Europe outside Italy, was primarily German. It was not one war but a series of contests in which the issues changed and the parties to the quarrels changed with them. What provides a thread of continuity through the whole period from 1618 to 1648 is the fact that the house of Austria was fighting practically the whole time; but the aims of its campaigns were radically different at different stages of the war. The trouble arose from the constitutional and religious condition of Germany. The Holy Roman Empire was by this time almost wholly German. It retained over its non-German provinces in Italy, Franche-Comté, and elsewhere a suzerainty which had no practical importance except in rare events like the failure of a line of heirs, as in Mantua, which we have just noticed in connection with the rivalry of France and Spain. Although German, the Empire was not, however, and never had been, in the least like a national state. It retained the trappings of the old universal empire of Rome, but apart from trappings and theories, it was a federation in which the federal organs had a minimum of authority. There was a diet which resembled a congress of ambassadors more than a parliament. There were courts which heard cases and never came to a decision. There was a system of raising federal armies which could only with the utmost difficulty be made capable of coercing a refractory prince of the second rank.

The emperor himself was, by a habit now of long standing, elected from the Hapsburg house, because that family was the only one rich enough and powerful enough in its own dominions to make any use of the poor remains of power left to the imperial office after centuries of feudal encroachment. He was like the incumbent of a living which was too poorly paid to be held by any one without private means. These difficulties had been increased by the religious schism, which had led first to civil war, and then to an uneasy peace, in which the two sides were held back from further aggressions by being organized in the diet in two *corpora*,⁷ each of which could prevent any innovation by the other. For a generation past the progress of the Counter-Reformation had threatened this equilibrium. A number of ecclesiastical states and properties had been acquired by the Protestants in ways which were either contrary to the terms of the religious peace of 1555 or at least open to legal cavil. To recover these losses and to prevent similar losses in the future naturally became the aims of the Catholic party. Political circumstances, however, prevented these quarrels from coming to a head as early as might have been expected. A civil war implies two sides of which each must be firmly enough organized to stand the strain of fighting. Catholic Germany did not

⁷ [Delegations.]

reach this point until certain changes in the Hapsburg power were completed.

The hereditary dominions of the house, regarded by its members as the endowment of their family, had been divided on the death of the Emperor Ferdinand I in 1564 into three parts, each of which maintained a separate line of rulers. As it happened, two of these branches were of short duration, so that first one inheritance and then the other fell to the third line; but as long as the division lasted the power of the family did not act as a single unit, and the ultimate reunion of the dominions in 1606-8 was an event of such moment that it began the rise of Austria as a great power. Its effect was increased by the fact that Ferdinand of Styria, afterwards emperor as Ferdinand II, put an end to a period of uncertainty in Hapsburg policy which had at times bordered upon ambiguity.

He threw his weight altogether on the Catholic side. Nor had he to rely solely on Catholic support in the first great problem that confronted him. Bohemia, one of the outlying Slav members of the Empire of which the chartered privileges had been violated by the Counter-Reformation, broke into revolt, and the revolt was supported in Lower Austria itself, as well as by the half-barbarous Calvinist prince of Transylvania, Gabriel Bethlen. Frederick, elector palatine, the leading Calvinist prince of Germany, was irregularly elected to the Bohemian throne where the Hapsburgs had sat for nearly a century. Three causes were in danger: Catholicism, the Hapsburg *Hausmacht*,⁸ the imperial authority. Ferdinand was able to save them all, though he could do so only by buying Lutheran support at the expense of the prospects of Catholicism, and by buying the support of Catholic princes at the expense of his authority as emperor. Unhappily for Germany foreign rulers had a double interest in these contests. The system of international dynastic alliances provided the parties with friends on whose alliance they might reckon. We have seen that the Spanish Hapsburgs responded to this call, and by so doing brought their enemies the Dutch into the German war. Frederick less successfully appealed to his father-in-law James I, to his wife's uncle Christian IV of Denmark, and to his brother-in-law Charles I of England. These marriages which led to foreign intervention were closely connected with the division between Protestants and Catholics: there were few royal mixed marriages in the first half of the century. Thus the two old supra-national tendencies, the dynastic and the religious, brought foreign armies to German soil, the English, the Dutch, the Danes, the Swedes. By 1629 Ferdinand was in a position to oppress the Protestants. He set about taking from them all their gains of ecclesiastical territory, and they were only saved by the invasion of the

⁸ [Hereditary possessions.]

"Protestant hero" Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in 1630. Ferdinand abandoned his extreme policy, offering the Protestants other than the elector palatine, tolerable terms which most of them accepted. But in the Swedish intervention, if not before, the more modern motive of national ambition was as much concerned as the old supra-national motives; and when, soon after, Sweden's Catholic ally, France, intervened as a principal in the war, national ambition was predominant. It had the easy task of dismembering an organism in which national feeling had never yet been embodied in political institutions.

The absence of nationalism from Germany may be measured by the rise of a power still more alien than that of the foreigner, the power of armies which were virtually free from all political ties, which were controlled by no constitutional machinery and bargained with the territorial state as independent equals. In the early days of the war the mercenary Ernst von Mansfeld had set the example. Wallenstein had carried the system to its highest point. From 1625 to 1630 he was the emperor's strongest support: the jealousy of the princes, fomented by France, led to his dismissal. Two years later the Swedish victories compelled Ferdinand again to entrust his cause to this uncontrollable force; but this time it was the emperor himself whose jealousy was aroused, and it was only the murder of Wallenstein which saved him from military tyranny. But although that was averted, the fearful devastation of the German cities and countryside had its counterpart in political collapse. The Peace of Westphalia was guaranteed by two foreign states, France and Sweden. In Germany, however, it did make an internal settlement. It established once more the equilibrium of the three confessions. Exhaustion, growing indifference, the rise of ideas of tolerance combined to make it last thenceforward with few interruptions of any moment. The political settlement left Austria a stronger power than it had been at the beginning of the war, but left it with its back turned on the wreck of the imperial constitution and with less interest for its remaining possessions in western Germany, where France was a menacing neighbor, than for those in eastern Germany and beyond, where the weakness of the Turk was soon to invite attack. Several of the princes, Protestant and Catholic alike, had gained strength as Austria had gained it, and now figured in the calculations of the great powers. They were, however, not great powers themselves. They pursued no aims far from home; their horizon was limited to Germany, and even when they took part in the European combinations, it was in order to get as their share in the spoils of victory German territories or titles. For them, as for the great neighboring states, Germany had become little more than a reservoir of recruits and a field for annexations.

The power which profited most from it in the latter respect was France, the rise of which, as we have already seen, was the complement of the decline of Spain and the disruption of the Empire. France is the first clear example in European history of a national state which overshadowed the whole politics of Europe without passing from the national form to an international form like that of the Spanish or even the Austrian power. Whereas Philip II held in personal union half a dozen separate inheritances, and Ferdinand was a duke in his homeland, king in Hungary and in Bohemia, here a count and there a margrave, Louis XIV wore a single crown. His relations with his German neighbors, it is true, seemed at one time to foreshadow a system of subordinate client-states beyond his frontiers, but in the end it was not until a century later, not until the time of Napoleon, that France transcended the national form and became herself the head of a league of nations. In the circumstances of the time this was a strength and not a weakness: France was less embarrassed by the claims of dependents and less vulnerable through the weakness of outlying possessions than Spain or Austria or eighteenth-century England. Her rank among the European states was based on the solid facts of population, wealth, and geographical compactness.

In 1610, when Henry IV was stabbed, she was about to assert it. That event threw her back into internal confusion; but when Richelieu, the great minister of Louis XIII, came to power in 1624, there was soon an end of the weakness of the crown and of the divisions caused by the nobles and the Huguenots. Consequently there was a beginning of success abroad. Not that Richelieu himself reaped the crop. His blocking of strategic points about the Spanish possessions in northern Italy led to nothing for the time being, and little in the future. His intervention in Germany changed the whole character of the war there, but at the time of his death there had been neither a striking victory nor any conquest of German land. In his famous *Testament politique* he had to congratulate his master not on any extension of his realm but on the greatness of his armies and the gains he would make when his enemies came to terms. After Richelieu's death in 1642 this consummation was delayed. The war entered upon a glorious stage, and in 1648 the Peace of Westphalia gave France a rich accession of German lands, which, besides their own value, made her able to occupy Franche-Comté and Lorraine whenever she pleased. But the Spanish war dragged on. From 1648 to 1653 the civil disturbances of the Fronde shook the power of Richelieu's successor, Mazarin, and made his country impotent abroad. The recovery, however, was quick and complete. In alliance with the English protectorate and aided by the Portuguese, the French broke down Spanish resistance, and the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659

marked plainly the fact that France had become the first power in the world.

Even before that date, shrewd observers had foreseen that the progress of France might excite jealousies like those which had withstood the ambition of Spain. Rohan wrote thus: "Si les Rois de France et d'Espagne sont en guerre ouverte l'un contre l'autre, le Roy de la grand[e] Bretagne doit se souvenir que c'est de ces puissances-là seulement qu'il doit prendre ombrage, et que si l'une avoit réduit l'autre en estat de ne luy plus nuire, il seroit incontinent la proye de la victorieuse."⁹ In 1647 during the English civil disputes the editor of an edition of Rohan's book, not foreseeing the curious reversion of Oliver Cromwell to the Elizabethan war with Spain, speculated on the possibility of an attempt by the English and Spaniards together to check French progress in Flanders. As it turned out, that combination did not come about in diplomacy until the Triple Alliance of 1668, and then it lasted only for a moment. It did not become the basis of a military alliance until 1689; but by that time a similar process had occurred at so many other European courts that Louis XIV found himself at war against a vast coalition which he had to meet without a single ally.

2. MERCANTILISM

THE LEADING ECONOMIC POWERS

The years between 1640 and 1776 witnessed many changes in the chief commercial areas of Western Europe. The decline of the Hanseatic cities, chiefly North German, was due not so much to the opening of the New World as to the hostility of the rulers and the commercial classes in the rising Baltic and North Sea states, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, England. As was the case of the Italian cities, the Hansa cities never succeeded in creating a strong mercantilistic state which could promote their fortunes. Germany did not become an effective national state until the nineteenth century. The Italian cities lost much of their Eastern trade during the early sixteenth century, but they continued to prosper for another century and a half in the field of international finance. In addition, the cloth, lace, glass, leather, and books of Florence, Venice, and Genoa were unrivaled in Europe for many years.

Portugal, with an embarrassment of riches in America, Africa, and the Indies, found the task of imperial organization and control beyond her powers.

⁹ ["Although the kings of France and Spain are in a state of open warfare one against the other, the king of Great Britain ought to remember that it is from these two powers only that he ought to apprehend injury, and that if one should succeed in reducing the other to a state of helplessness, the king of Great Britain would thereupon be at the mercy of the power that had triumphed."]

In the early sixteenth century Albuquerque created an empire of trade stretching from India to China and broke the Arab naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean. In spite of her great efforts to meet them, the demands of conquest, colonization, and commerce were too exhausting for Portugal's limited home resources and population. Foreign bankers took much of the profit, while the Dutch first took over the distribution of goods from Lisbon and then seized important parts of the spice lands.

Spain, soon after 1500, acquired a European as well as an American empire. Constant and costly disputes wasted much of her vast American income. When the flow of precious metals subsided after 1600, expenses had to be met at home by high taxation and monetary depreciation. Spain also suffered heavily from the gradual rise of foreign competition, especially French and British. Her attempts to monopolize colonial trade became less and less effective, particularly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Generally, too, the business of Spain was not developed by a middle class as in England. The colonial riches went to strengthen feudal relationships, and actually hindered the development of a capitalist society. In the southern Low Countries, Antwerp replaced Bruges as the trading and financial center of north-western Europe, owing in part to better location, greater freedom for traders, and improved methods of exchange. Antwerp's period of supremacy came to an end with the Dutch wars of independence in the late sixteenth century, when financial leadership passed to Amsterdam and London.

By 1650 Holland was the chief shipping, trading, manufacturing, and financial nation in Europe. She captured the herring market, carried on the Baltic coastal trade and traffic with Portugal, Spain, and the Mediterranean. The Dutch East India Company was chartered in 1602, and by 1680 the Portuguese and the British were overwhelmed by the Dutch in the spice trade. The Dutch West India Company in 1621 secured a monopoly over trade in Africa and America. Dutch shipping was more cheaply operated than any other in Europe.

Industry in Holland prospered through the immigration of skilled workers, the use of machinery, the reworking of semifinished goods, and the establishment of special trades. The volume of printing in Holland was the greatest in Europe. Agriculture and stock raising flourished on an intensive scale. Amsterdam became the leading financial center, with practices resembling those of the banking and speculation of today. Holland declined not because of internal weakness but because other countries copied her techniques and became independent of her. As a creditor and middleman her position was also precarious because of her dependence upon foreign economic and political

conditions. It is also extremely important to note that, unlike England, Holland put her money into trade, not industry. Her resources for manufacture and her population were both limited.

The Hundred Years War had driven the English from French territory on the Continent and left France autonomous, but until after the Revolution foreign and civil war in France handicapped the country economically. Political disturbances in France disrupted French economic life. "The nation showed no lack of enterprise, powers of recuperation, or ability to produce a large income, but its head was more often bad master than good servant, and always an expensive one." Agriculture was France's chief source of income. Its progress was checked by continual warfare, and the fall of interest rates and the small yield of rented land in the sixteenth century affected disastrously the landlords dependent upon fixed dues. Enclosure and oppression of small holders occurred. In manufacture and trade, governmental regulation interfered with a free market. On the other hand, protective tariffs and internal subsidies did much to encourage industry. State control of quality supplemented or supplanted guild regulation. Commerce was stimulated by fairs, canals, road-making, decrease in tolls, and improved transportation generally. Trade with the Moslems and the Spaniards was prosperous.

France acquired a colonial empire which was later lost, however, largely to the British. Canada was relatively unprofitable, but trade in the Caribbean, especially in sugar, proved advantageous to France. The French never became economically important in Africa or in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, French commerce grew, and from 1718 to 1787 external trade increased by 500 per cent. As in the case of Holland, French capitalism, however, fell behind that of England, partly because of the lack of an intimate connection between colonial and foreign trade on the one hand and the industry in the home country on the other.

The French bourgeoisie, merchants, financiers, and an army of state officials sought safety and fixed incomes; a *rentier* psychology became predominant. This class was of great use to the court but was not adventurous. Some historians have found in this condition a powerful deterrent to French economic expansion. The prosperity of France was injured by the expulsion of the Huguenots, as well as by other factors.

By 1500 England was well consolidated politically and territorially; her agriculture was becoming commercial; industries were developing, and a merchant class was forming. The old feudal nobility was giving way to a new nobility, "supplemented by or recruited from the wealthier bourgeoisie." An absolutism, friendly to trade, ruled. The profitableness of the commercial

production of food and wool led to the improvement of agriculture. Enclosures, especially those connected with the transformation of arable land into sheep pastures, caused social disturbance by the eviction of tenants and free holders from their land. A landless proletariat was created.

The export of foodstuffs under governmental control was encouraged when the home supply was ample, and until 1760 England helped supply Europe with grain. Wool-growing was encouraged, its export prohibited; imported cloth was subjected to a heavy duty. The investments in the woolen industry increased, and cloth manufacture was improved by methods borrowed from the Continent. "Cloth supplied about one-half the English exports in 1700, and in 1760 one-third to two-fifths of that cloth went to the American colonies." After about 1580 the manufacture of cotton, especially in its fustian form, began to threaten the predominance of wool, and ultimately in the eighteenth century cotton manufacture became overwhelmingly important. English mining of coal and metals was furthered by Continental methods and promoted by Dutch and German capital. Iron-smelting increased, but until 1750 charcoal rather than coal remained of greater importance in the process. Newcastle was a center of coal production; Birmingham became a chief center of metal manufacture.

The political integration of England promoted internal free trade. The English and Spaniards had long been commercial rivals, but after 1713 were in close commercial relationship. Englishmen, after the sixteenth century, established trading connections in the Mediterranean and the Near East. The Hansards were driven from London in 1598; the English Merchant Adventurers built up a trade in the North Sea and Baltic regions which was rivaled by the Dutch and infringed upon by English "interlopers" breaking in on the Company's monopoly. The Tudors found profit in granting monopolies to various private companies.

Unsuccessful in Northeast and Northwest exploration, the English, even before the Armada (1588), began to invade Spanish commercial domains. Piracy was rife. The search for gold extended to the English colonies in America. The East was invaded. In 1600 Elizabeth chartered the East India Company, which was to become a political as well as a commercial power.

The companies found that their North American ventures were generally unprofitable. The tobacco and the slave trade and the West Indian sugar plantations were, however, profitable enterprises. Lobbies representing these interests were established in Parliament. Colonization in America was extensive.

Manufacturing and shipping were stimulated by the American colonial

markets. By 1774 colonial trade was one-third of the total overseas trade. English capital financed many American plantations. Native American traders and shipowners competed with the British, as did also the Dutch. Legislation protecting the privileges of native Britshers was passed, leading to inter-imperial as well as foreign complications.

NATIONAL ECONOMIES

Interrelated with the rise of the national state as a political, cultural, and religious factor was the growth of the national economy, as contrasted with the local economy of the Middle Ages and the cosmopolitan economy of the Roman Empire. As the national state became dominant over local political authorities—over cities, provinces, duchies, and counties—it assumed many of their economic powers. Mints, courts, and, to an ever increasing extent, customs duties passed from local to national jurisdictions. As roads and waterways were improved and cleared of local tolls and hindrances, trade increased greatly in scope. Beginning in the late fifteenth century the commercial and colonial expansion of Europe to the storied treasure lands of the East and the new world of the West brought with it vastly increased quantities of the highly prized spices, as well as new commodities which served both as stimulants to and as subjects for trade and commerce. Contemporary with this expansion, and in part resulting from it, was a sharp rise in the general price level, which helped to shake and destroy old economic relationships, many of which were based on fixed payments, often in kind. As Bodin was well aware, the influx of American treasure contributed greatly to the rise in the price level. Other factors were imports of gold from West Africa, the opening of new mines and the improved exploitation of old mines in Europe itself, the depreciation of currencies, and, of great importance, a more rapid circulation of money owing to increased trade and improved credit mechanisms. In terms of silver (rather than monetary units, whose content of precious metal was frequently changed) Spanish prices between 1501 and 1600 more than tripled, and English and French prices more than doubled.

Change in the Character of the State. Above all, however, the character of the state changed. Both power and loyalties began to shift from local units and authorities to the dynasty which ruled, and stood for, the national state. As we have seen, to the kings and princes of this period national interests were identical with their own dynastic interests. Hence the economic policy pursued by the national states was bound to be interventionist in character. Thus, national economies and nationalist economic policies and practices developed in

a setting of a rapidly expanding economy and increasingly powerful national states. The name "mercantilism" has been given to the economic theories and practices which predominated in the period of 1500-1800. The term was first used by severe critics of this type of political economy, and it tends to over-emphasize commercial aspects. The word has become established in our usage, however, and, rather than coin a new one, it is best to provide for it a broad definition. Following Professor C. W. Cole, we may say that the term mercantilism may be applied to those theories, policies, and practices, arising from the conditions of the time, by which the national state, acting in the economic sphere, sought to increase its own power, unity, wealth, and prosperity.

There is no unified doctrine of mercantilism. It is an attitude toward economic affairs which had different applications in different times and different countries. Its basic element, however, common to all lands, was the belief that it was proper for the state to intervene in economic matters. In this respect it marked no radical departure from the past. In the Middle Ages the inclusion of ethical considerations in economics and the desire for security had established the propriety of intervention by political authorities for these ends. Mercantilism applied this policy on a broader, national scope.

Another element in mercantilism was the desire of the rulers of the national states to *unify their possessions* and extend them to their "natural boundaries," whether ethnic or dynastic in character. Economic unification, including lowering of internal tariffs and standardization of coinage, weights, and measures, was an intrinsic part of this tendency. A means toward unification, as well as an end in itself, was the assumption by the national state of powers previously held by local authorities in the economic as well as in the political sphere. Another factor in mercantilism was the desire of the national state to increase its power relative to that of its neighbors, its actual or potential enemies. As the economic factor in warfare received increased recognition, measures to advance the strength of the national economy were sought and introduced.

While the utilization of the basic concepts varied widely, there were many common elements in the economics of mercantilism. One was *bullionism*, the belief that precious metals were an especially valuable form of wealth, and that a nation, to be strong and prosperous, should have a plentiful supply of them. This was truer in the sixteenth century than in the eighteenth. An abundance of gold and silver was a ready support for military ventures, and, because of a relative scarcity of money, provided a stimulant to business. Mercantilist thinkers were well aware that money could not substitute for other forms of wealth, but they held that its ease of exchange, and the great demand

for it, made it especially desirable. Bullionism was expressed in measures designed to bring bullion into the country and to prevent its export. If there were mines in the land, well and good, if not, bullion had to be gained in trade. To prevent a drain of precious metals, export prohibitions were imposed and tariffs were designed to hinder or prevent the import of finished goods which might have to be paid for in gold or silver. However, under the influence of the Eastern trade and of such writers as Thomas Mun, bullionist theory was expanded into the *doctrine of the favorable balance of trade*. According to this theory, it was not the balance, favorable or unfavorable, of each transaction that was to be watched, but rather the over-all balance of all trade. In other words, England suffered no loss when the East India Company sent silver to the Orient, provided that the goods it received in exchange could be resold on the Continent for greater sums than those originally sent to the East. Mun extended the doctrine in the direction of the modern concept of balance of payments, when he urged that invisible items such as shipping charges, remittances to Rome, and the like be included in the international account.

Since a favorable balance of trade involved the export of goods of greater value than those imported, mercantilists urged that *export industries be stimulated and subsidized* and, conversely, that importation of finished goods be limited or prohibited. In order to sell, goods must be of high and uniform quality, and mercantilist writers advocated and administrators issued *regulations* concerning products, employment, and methods of manufacture. Skilled workers were much sought after, and countries vied with each other for the services of talented craftsmen who could introduce new techniques.

Fisheries and the merchant marine held high positions in the mercantilist order, both for their own sakes and because they provided trained men and ships in case of war. *Colonies* were important as sources of raw material and as markets for finished goods. Mines and agriculture were not neglected by mercantilists, although they generally emphasized industry and trade. Their goal was a nation as nearly self-sufficient as possible, for power and independence in case of war and for less reliance on imports from abroad in peacetime. Mercantilism was the economic arm of the national state and was, accordingly, a belligerent, fighting doctrine. Mercantilist thinkers and statesmen held that there was a fixed amount of wealth in the world, and that it was therefore good policy for one state to capture the trade and business of another. It was largely in virtue of this policy that Colbert aimed the tariff of 1667 against the English and Dutch, and England the Navigation Act of 1651 against the Netherlands.

While mercantilism was a highly competitive system with respect to relations among nations, no mercantilist hesitated to limit competition within the nation. Mercantilism did not, therefore, include any dogmatic belief with regard to individual initiative or the place of individuals in the economic system. State intervention, rather than free competition, was to be the guiding force. However, when a situation called for individual rather than state or monopolistic action, the mercantilist statesman was quite prepared to open the field, although he might prescribe certain rules to govern private business. Such, for example, was the case with Colbert and the French West India Company. The monopoly was established for a specific purpose, to drive the Dutch from France's colonial trade and to stimulate commerce between colonies and mother country. When this objective had been accomplished, Colbert felt that a monopoly was no longer necessary and threw the trade open to private individuals.

The mercantilist attitude toward individuals and groups was governed by their usefulness to the national economy. Colbert frequently showed tolerance toward the Jews in France, as did the Great Elector of Brandenburg. This attitude should be borne in mind in considering the position of the rising bourgeoisie in the mercantilist society. Mercantilism was not the apology of the new traders and industrialists. Colbert, the son of a businessman, often wrote bitterly of the bourgeoisie, who looked after only their own interests, and not those of the nation. Private and national interests frequently coincided, however, and many mercantilist regulations were inspired by individual businessmen or their organizations, rather than by bureaucratic administrators.

To summarize, then, the principal factors in mercantilist policy are: first, bullionism and the favorable balance of trade; second, stimulation and protection of nationally desirable commerce; third, development of national productivity in the direction of self-sufficiency; fourth, flexible approach to private business, state intervention, and monopoly, with the welfare of the national economy as the criterion; fifth, the concept of control in the interest of the national good.

Mercantilism was thus a complex and many-faceted institution. It was in harmony with some and in conflict with other heritages of the past and the developments of contemporary society. As we have seen, it continued the regulatory policies of the Middle Ages, but faced away from the medieval period with regard to both economic exclusiveness of the smaller principalities and the cosmopolitan ideals of the Church. On the one hand, it extended the boundaries of activity from locality to nation; on the other hand, it tended

to contract them from Christendom to the national state. Although mercantilism was its economic agency, the dynastic state frequently engaged in practices which were essentially antimercantilist in character. Thus, much of Colbert's accomplishment was undone by the wars of Louis XIV and the intolerance of his later years. In its opposition to idleness and luxury, mercantilism well suited the Protestant ethics of the growing middle class. In its use of regulation and insistence on the common welfare as the standard of good, it followed the Catholic ethics of the Middle Ages and ran counter to the individualistic tendencies of nascent capitalism.

It is quite impossible to pass judgment on the success or failure of mercantilism. Its complexity well reflects the principal trends of what has been called the early modern period of history: the religious struggles; the rise to dominance of the national state; the growth of capitalism; and the expansion of European civilization. Mercantilism was a mighty factor in the development of modern nationalism and, while in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a strong reaction against regulation, especially in England, the mercantilist tradition never died, and its heirs may be found in contemporary nationalist economic policy and autarchy.

Portugal. Further generalization regarding mercantilism would be to small purpose, and we may now turn to its practice in the leading countries of Europe.

The rise of Portugal marks the beginning of the great westward shift of the economic center of European civilization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic coast. It was not the seizure of Constantinople by the Turks, in 1453, that led the western European peoples to begin their search for new routes to the East. Rather, the growth of national unity and the desire for independence from the Italian cities controlling the Mediterranean trade led the Portuguese and other peoples on the Atlantic seaboard to seek new ways to the Indies and find new worlds.

Eastern and colonial trade was all-important in Portuguese mercantilism, which was centralized to an exceptional degree. Prince Henry the Navigator (1394-1460) had stimulated improvements in the art of sailing and had built a tradition of seamanship in the small Iberian kingdom. Ports were first taken on the North African coast, at Ceuta and Tangiers, and gradually the route to India was established. Diaz reached the Cape of Good Hope in 1488, and da Gama sailed to India in 1497-98. During the reign of King Emanuel the Great (1495-1521), the Portuguese empire developed into a source of immense wealth. Under the viceroys Almeida (1504-9) and Albuquerque (1509-15) and their successors, fortified trading posts were built

from Malindi on the east coast of Africa to Goa and Calicut in India, Malacca in Sumatra, and Macao in China. The Portuguese for a time gained supremacy over the Moslems in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and thereby struck a blow at the trade of Alexandria and the Italian cities.

The Eastern spice trade came increasingly into Portuguese hands, and this trade was made a royal monopoly. Spices were carried in royal ships and handled by merchants licensed by the crown. Trade in other commodities, such as textiles, was open to private businessmen and colonial officials, but they found greater profit in graft in the spice trade. The rulers of Portugal, nevertheless, made huge sums in this trade.

Several factors served to limit Portugal's economic and imperial development. First, the country was too small to support the great expense and drain of manhood entailed by the maintenance of numerous forts, trading posts, and a large fleet. Second, partly to forestall attempts by other nations to capture her commerce and partly because of lack of capital and resources, Portugal made no effort to gain or control the coastwide trade between Lisbon and other European ports. The Portuguese brought the spices to Lisbon, but it was the Dutch, English, and others who distributed them to the rest of Europe. Third, while her Eastern trade was theoretically protected from Spanish competition after 1494 by the Treaty of Tordesillas (which allotted Asia, Africa, and Brazil to Portugal and the rest of the Americas to Spain), Portugal was absorbed by Spain in 1580, and her possessions became legitimate prey for Spain's enemies, the English and Dutch.

Thus her near-monopoly was destroyed, and when Portugal regained her independence in 1640 she concentrated on trade with her great American colony of Brazil. Portuguese mercantilism was therefore essentially commercial in character. There was no adequate basis, either in resources or population, for any significant industrial development. Indeed, the very possibility was precluded when Portugal became an economic dependency of England as the result of the Methuen Treaty of 1703, by which the British granted preferential tariffs on Portuguese wines in return for the removal of import prohibitions on English cloths.

Spain. Spanish mercantilism had two fairly well-defined phases. The first, marked by an emphasis on bullionism, had its roots in the Middle Ages. The second, which appeared during the reign of Philip V (1701-46), showed the influence of the broader policies of France and England. From the thirteenth century on, various laws and edicts prohibited the export of gold or silver, and offenders were made subject to severe penalties, including capital punishment. The implications of this policy were greatly extended however, by the

growth of Spain's American empire in the sixteenth century. The vast amounts of bullion that flowed from the New World ended the scarcity of precious metals which had, in part, been responsible for the rigorous prohibitive measures mentioned. To attempt to retain within Spain these then unprecedented quantities of gold and silver was quite different from the earlier efforts to conserve a limited stock of bullion. Nevertheless, this attempt was made.

The Spanish colonial trade was only partly a crown monopoly. The king owned and provided all the ships, but merchants traded privately for their own accounts. Colonial commerce was controlled by the *Casa de Contratación*, a board of trade established at Seville in 1503. This organization was responsible for registering all imports from or exports to the colonies, equipping and managing fleets, administering criminal law in some cases, and admitting merchants to the colonial trade. At first the ships sailed in small squadrons, but from the second half of the sixteenth century they were grouped in two large fleets a year. This practice succeeded in limiting the effectiveness of British and other privateers, for during the sixteenth century only occasional ships were lost. It was part of a rigorous policy which included the limitation of ports of call in the Americas to a specific few and colonial trade to Spain to a single city—first Cadiz, and after 1503 Seville. Bullion was to be assayed at royal offices in America, and registered at the *Casa* on its arrival in Spain. One fifth was reserved to the crown. Smuggling and fraud, if detected, were punished with penalties of the utmost severity. After a brief period in which Charles V permitted some of his German subjects to participate in the Spanish colonial trade, it was closed to all foreigners, except Catholics who had resided in Spain for ten years.

While bullion was uppermost in the minds of the framers of Spanish policy, they imposed restrictions which were naturally extended to commerce in general. They endeavored completely to monopolize the colonial trade for Spaniards. In thoroughgoing mercantilist fashion, they desired the colonies to buy only goods of Spanish manufacture and ship their products only to Spain and in Spanish bottoms. The execution of such policies required a huge administrative force. In addition to the *Casa de Contratación*, there were established the Council of the Indies (1524), a general staff for colonial policy, superior to the *Casa*; the *Consulado* (1543), at Seville, which aided the *Casa* by serving as a commercial court and financial agency; and a host of smaller bureaus and offices.

The extent and character of state intervention in Spain imply a broader mercantilist policy than that of simple bullionism. Other mercantilist prac-

tices had, indeed, long been followed in the kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula. A law of 1454 in Aragon was similar in purpose to the English Navigation Acts. In 1491 the Statute of Employments of Ferdinand and Isabella included the provision that foreigners sending goods into Spain must export Spanish goods of equal value within one year. In 1495 the same monarchs subsidized shipbuilding and placed restrictions on the traffic of foreign ships in Spanish ports. Guilds and guild regulations played an important part in the Spanish economy, and were often employed as an arm of the state. Spanish industry found new markets in the New World, and was at first stimulated by the influx of treasure. Nevertheless, Spain moved away from, rather than toward, self-sufficiency in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. She failed to develop a varied, industrial economy, and Spanish mercantilism remained, in essence, bullionist, instead of developing into the broader pattern of bullionism-productivity-trade that characterized mercantilism in France and England.

There were many reasons for this. As Bodin observed, the very treasure that contributed to Spain's greatness raised Spanish prices well above those of other lands, so that Spanish goods could be undersold both at home and in the colonies. Prohibitions were of no avail. The very strictness of the regulations induced fraud and smuggling. While foreigners were theoretically barred from trading with Spanish America, they frequently employed Spaniards to act for them. The English, French, and Dutch found bribery a great asset in this commerce, and their ships became ever more frequent visitors to Spain's colonial ports as her military and naval power declined.

One of Spain's leading institutions, the *Mesta*, or shepherders' guild, tended in the long run to weaken her economic capacity. Founded in the thirteenth century, it gradually rose to a position of tremendous influence, partly because it was an excellent source of tax revenue. It was a nation-wide regulatory body, which controlled the great flocks of prized Merino sheep, owned vast tracts of pasture land and other properties, and greatly stimulated wool production. At the same time, however, it encouraged the importation of wheat (to lessen the incentive for planting grain on pasture land) and of finished cloth (to further its own exports of wool). Thus it acted as a deterrent to the development of Spanish textile manufactures. Similarly, the great holdings of the Church, approximately a sixth of Spanish land, tended to maintain the traditional economy and restrain the growth of newer types of economic activity.

Finally, there was the whole complex of weakening elements which may be grouped under the heading of "Spain's overexertion." Her dynastic wars, religious wars, measures such as the expulsion of the Moriscos (1609), and

her vast colonial efforts proved too much for a country of only about eight or nine million people, inadequately supplied with good harbors and internal communications. The tremendous expenses entailed by these ventures led to the imposition of higher and higher taxes. The *alcabala*, a turnover sales tax, which at times passed 15 per cent; import duties on colonial products; excises and export duties on Spanish goods, including wool—all these served to hinder and restrain commerce and industry. As debts and taxes rose together, it became ever more difficult for the crown to obtain funds, and, following the death of Philip II in 1598, there were successive debasements of the coinage. Inflation was followed by deflation, and this instability and turmoil was in itself a strong factor for economic decline. Bullionist Spain had really been a funnel for American treasure, pouring it over the Pyrenees and through the coastal waters to buy other nations' goods. Spain's positive decline was made even more striking by the rise of England, France, and the Netherlands.

This decline was well recognized by many thoughtful Spaniards. In 1724 Geronimo de Uztariz published *The Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs*. After picturing and lamenting Spain's decadence, he urged the adoption of a broad series of mercantilist policies to revive the national economy. Subsidization and regulation of industries, tax reform, restoration of the merchant marine and navy, stabilization of the currency, the creation of chartered companies were among the practices whose initiation he proposed. This program, which attempted to combine the best elements of English, Dutch, and, especially, French mercantilism, was in large part adopted in the eighteenth century by the Bourbon kings of Spain, Philip V and his successors. For a time industry revived under the stimulation of the central government. But Spain had been outdistanced by her rivals, who were stronger and more closely knit than the land which could still be called *las Españas*. The story of Spain's decline, however, should not lead us to forget that she was the dominant power of the sixteenth century and that by far the larger part of her empire remained intact until the period of Napoleon and the years following. In the last analysis, Spain, like Portugal, was basically too poor and weak for what she attempted.

The Netherlands. Situated at the conflux of north-south and east-west trade routes, and possessing an energetic and capable population, the seven northern provinces of the Netherlands won their independence from Spain, in a series of bloody struggles in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, and went on to build a great empire and exceedingly prosperous national economy. Because of the small area and limited resources of the land,

and the large degree of autonomy retained by the provinces and cities of the United Netherlands, Dutch nationalist economic policy assumed a peculiar form to which the name "free-trade mercantilism" has been given.

Internally, manufactures were controlled by guilds and towns, rather than by the national state. The policy of religious toleration attracted French Huguenots, Spanish Jews, Flemish Protestants, and English Catholics, many of whom contributed greatly to the advancement of Dutch industries. In keeping with the character of the country, these were directed largely toward the export market. Highly skilled trades, such as clock- and instrument-making, lens-grinding, and diamond-cutting, were centered in the Netherlands and supplied the rest of Europe with their products. Printing found its logical home in this country, where no religious censorship was in effect: for books which might fall afoul of the law were printed there, in many languages besides Dutch, and smuggled into the authors' native lands. A peculiar feature of the Dutch economy was the prevalence of processing industries. Finishing and dyeing of cloths made elsewhere, refining of sugar grown in the West Indies, preparation of cocoa, tobacco, and spices for consumption were highly profitable fields for investment.

The allied fields of the fisheries, shipbuilding, and shipping played an extremely important part both in the European development of the Dutch economy and in its expansion overseas. The Dutch, using large boats called *busses*, gradually took over and extended the Hansards' herring fisheries. To the chagrin of English and Scottish mercantilists like Mun and Law, they fished the waters of the British Isles and brought vast quantities of herring to their home ports for packing and distribution. The carrying trade, however, was the mainstay of Dutch commercial power in Europe. As we have seen, until about 1580 the Dutch were the chief distributors of the spices unloaded at Lisbon. Dutch *fluitschips*, large and efficient, carried Mediterranean, French, and English goods to the entrepôts of the Netherlands. Like the herring industry, the Baltic trade passed from the Hansards to the Dutch, and the warehouses of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were filled with the varied products of the different regions of Europe.

The Dutch held undisputed supremacy as carriers of the world's goods during the seventeenth century, and reaped great profits from freights, insurance, brokerage, and commissions. This dominance rested on several basic, interrelated factors: the geographical position of the Dutch Republic; the efficiency, organization, and low costs of shipbuilding; the merchant marine; and credit facilities. Dutch shipwrights bought lumber in Scandinavia in large quantities, because of partial standardization of design and the cheap-

ness of credit. Their yards were well planned and organized, with the result that they were able to complete ships rapidly. Even when France and England made determined efforts to capture the Dutch carrying trade, as evidenced by such measures as the English Navigation Act of 1651, their merchants still frequently preferred Dutch shippers, and their own fleets contained considerable numbers of Dutch-built ships. The Netherlands, which allowed economic considerations to override political ones to a greater extent than did their contemporaries, did not require crews to contain a minimum percentage of Dutch nationals, as did the English in the Act of 1651 and later. They hired the cheapest crews possible, of whatever nationality, and enforced a strict discipline which further increased the efficiency of their merchant marine.

In every instance so far mentioned, the advantage of the Dutch lay in their ability to undersell their rivals. To a very great extent this advantage rested on the credit facilities and commercial organization of Amsterdam. The Bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1609, was not a bank of issue or commercial bank at all, in the modern sense; it was a transfer and deposit bank. Aside from its convenience as a place to store money securely, its great importance was that a merchant could bring to it coins of different lands, and of different intrinsic and face values, and be credited with a deposit in standard, stable bank *florins*. He could make payments merely by causing part of his bank account to be transferred, a simple act of bookkeeping which avoided the difficulties of exchange and transport of money. Another important institution was the Amsterdam *Bourse*, founded in 1611. Originally designed as a commodity exchange, it gradually assumed the added function of a stock exchange, greatly facilitating the process of gathering capital for commercial and industrial ventures. These institutions served as the nucleus for the growth of Amsterdam as the leading financial center of the seventeenth century.

The policy of the Dutch government with respect to European economic affairs was one of moderate intervention. Because the Dutch economy was based essentially on trade, on the entrepôt business, and on the finishing and processing industries, import and export duties were low and traffic in bullion was relatively free. The Dutch attitude was, however, far from being passive. The navy was freely used to protect Dutch shipping, and naval power was used to compel the Danes to grant Dutch ships low rates on passing the straits which guarded the entrance to the Baltic. Also, every effort was made to prevent the revival of Antwerp as a great commercial center. The government cooperated closely with chartered companies and other

business interests, in part at least because the same rich bourgeoisie controlled both political and economic life.

With respect to the colonial empire and trade, moreover, Dutch policy was firmly mercantilist, and based on the granting of monopolies. Dutch ships began to sail to the East in the latter part of the sixteenth century, and in 1602 the Dutch East India Company was formed, with a monopoly of the Eastern trade. It was a semipublic body, receiving the active support of the States-General of the Netherlands, and in turn it handed over to the government one-fifth of its profits. Given powers, concessions, and privileges similar to those provided later by the charter of the French West India Company, it pursued a vigorous, violent, and successful course. Under Jan P. Coen, brilliant governor-general of the Indies in 1617-22 and 1627-29, and his successors, the Company established itself in the East and gradually gained a near-monopoly of the spice trade. Its basic policies were to secure rigorous control of production in the East Indian Islands and to drive the English and Portuguese from the field. The first aim was accomplished by forcibly restricting production to specific places. Coffee was grown only in the vicinity of Batavia, the principal Dutch base; pepper, nutmegs, cloves, opium, and other crops were raised in other areas. The Dutch encouraged planting by offering the natives high prices for their crops, and then, when the yield was sufficient, or began to show signs of exceeding the amount desired, they lowered the prices and curtailed production. In this way high profits were assured, although revolts on the part of the native population were frequent. The Portuguese and English were driven from the East Indian Islands by force of arms. One episode, the massacre or execution by the Dutch of the personnel of an English trading post at Amboina in 1623, was later set forth by the British as one justification for the Navigation Act of 1651 and the first Anglo-Dutch War of 1652-54. The Portuguese were decisively beaten at sea, and the English were compelled to withdraw to the mainland of India. Private Dutch citizens were likewise excluded from the Indies trade, with but few exceptions.

The Company made splendid profits and consistently paid high dividends, a policy which led it into increasing debt and eventual ruin; all this, however, occurred toward the end of the eighteenth century, when its monopoly had been broken by the French and English. Along with it fell the Bank of Amsterdam, which had departed from its original purpose and lent freely to the Company and the municipality of Amsterdam.

As was the case in the East, the Dutch West India Company, founded in

1621, concentrated on commerce and privateering rather than colonization. The settlements in the Hudson valley were poorly governed, and the Company was much more interested in the fur trade than in the establishment of Dutch civilization in the New World. The Company proved to be an effective arm of the state in the wars with Spain, however; Curaçao, part of Guiana, and other bases were taken in the 1630's. It attacked Brazil in 1624, and by 1640 controlled the most profitable part of the country. The Company was forced to withdraw in 1662, after a long struggle with the Brazilians. England seized New Amsterdam in 1664, with only small regret on the part of the Dutch colonists, and Dutch possessions in America from then on were restricted to the Caribbean.

As with Portugal and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Spain, Dutch power rested on too small a base, and her commercial supremacy passed away during the eighteenth century. As England and France drew abreast of the Dutch in one phase after another of national and economic activity, their greater resources asserted themselves, and the Netherlands became a secondary power. Dutch mercantilism, appropriately moderate at home and restrictive in the imperial sphere, was less an arm of the power-seeking national state than was true of its rivals. It was more a means for achieving the economic prosperity of the bourgeois who ruled the Dutch Republic. When the maintenance of national power involved measures that seemed detrimental to his pocket-book, the good burgher was apt to reject such measures and allow the armed forces to decline rather than pay higher taxes. Nor did there exist in the Netherlands an absolute monarch to insist that the interest of the people was of necessity identical with his own and whose principal aim was the increase of the power of the royal state.

The Germanies. The history of mercantilism in the German countries is complicated by the fact that these were so numerous, and that medieval institutions survived there longer than in the lands to the west. As in France, Spain, and elsewhere, the growth of mercantilism was in large part a process of assumption by central authorities of economic controls previously exercised by local governments. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries this trend was to be observed among the various German states. Mercantilism, properly so called, however, could come into being only when these controls were employed by a *national* state as a function of its power and as a means for the increase of this power. It is appropriate, therefore, to limit the discussion of German mercantilism to Brandenburg-Prussia, which rose to national might in the period between the close of the Thirty Years War in 1648 and the era of the French Revolution.

The basic elements of Prussian mercantilism—established during the reigns of the Great Elector (1640–88) and Frederick William I (1713–40), and carried to their highest degree of completion under Frederick II (1740–86)—were centralization of authority and control and the increase of the country's productive capacity. The task was made more difficult by the dispersion of the territories under Hohenzollern rule and by wide differences in types of landholding and local customs. The Great Elector accomplished much toward the standardization of coinage, improvements in internal communications (including the Frederick William Canal, linking the Oder and Spree), and a more efficient administration. Following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) in France, he welcomed refugee Huguenots, and twenty thousand capable French bourgeois entered Prussia and greatly advanced her commerce and industry. Under Frederick William I agriculture received strong protection and bureaucracy was centralized and improved. Agricultural and industrial protection and regulation were continued by his successor, Frederick the Great, who banned the importation of silks and cottons, subsidized silkworm cultivation and the silk industry, promoted scientific farming and the planting of potatoes, codified the laws of the land, and, generally, followed the lines of mercantilist policy laid down by Colbert.

Prussian mercantilism differed from French and English in two important aspects. First, the state and bureaucracy received even greater emphasis than in the western countries; indeed, the whole system was to a great degree the result of conscious devising rather than of piecemeal growth. Nor was there a dearth of mercantilist theorizing in Germany. A school of thought known as "cameralism" developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it attempted to formulate the general policy of the state, political and judicial as well as economic. The cameralist writers developed broad, well-rounded, and often philosophical systems of statecraft. Second, the colonial phase of mercantilism was lacking in Prussia. Aside from an unsuccessful effort in the 1680's on the part of the Great Elector to found a colony on the west coast of Africa, Prussia undertook no colonial ventures. Unlike Portuguese mercantilism, which emphasized the spice trade and imperialism; Spanish mercantilism, which was essentially bullionist in character; and Dutch mercantilism, which rested on the carrying and colonial trades, Prussian mercantilism emphasized the state and its role in stimulating and directing economic activity for the purpose of augmenting the tax receipts which alone permitted a third-class power to maintain a first-class army. Here, particularly, the bureaucracy flourished, and this left a permanent influence on German attitudes and institutions.

England. Mercantilism in its most complete form was to be seen in England and France, nations more unified and possessing greater resources than any we have discussed so far. The story of English mercantilism may be conveniently divided into two periods. In the first, from the end of the Middle Ages to the Civil War, coincident with the rise of absolute monarchy, state intervention in economic affairs was employed to increase power and productivity and to encourage just economic relationships. In the second period, from about 1650 to its decline following the American and French Revolutions, English mercantilism was a phase of parliamentary policy, and was directed toward increasing the prosperity of the country and especially of the bourgeois, through foreign and colonial trade.

Navigation Acts, laws to promote shipping, had long been employed in England. The Act of Richard II, which was passed in 1381 and which is generally agreed to have been the first of these laws, was extremely strict. It provided that no English merchant could import or export goods except in English ships. Inasmuch as this would have stopped trade completely except when English vessels were available, it was soon modified. An act passed during the reign of Henry VII, in 1489, extended the regulations to foreigners, by providing that no one could import certain wines and wood except in English bottoms. This and succeeding laws of Henry VII and Henry VIII provoked retaliations, so that under Elizabeth the practice was restricted and more direct measures were employed to strengthen the merchant marine and the navy. Nevertheless, the coastal trade continued to be limited to English-owned and -manned ships.

Other means of supporting shipping were the strengthening of the fishing industry and direct subsidies for shipbuilding. Laws of Edward VI and Elizabeth required all people to eat fish on specified days, and other enactments regulated methods of packing fish. Imports of fish were forbidden, and the medieval policy of "staple," or supply, which had prevented the export of this commodity, was reversed early in Elizabeth's reign. The practice of giving bounties for the construction of ships commenced in the fifteenth century and was continued by the Tudor sovereigns.

Bullionist legislation was likewise well grounded in tradition. Prohibitions of export of bullion and regulations concerning remittances to Rome existed from the fourteenth century and were revised and strengthened under the Tudors. High import duties were placed on some finished goods, and the import of others was prohibited. Export of commodities such as wool and leather was forbidden, in order to stimulate English manufacture. Under the Tudor monarchs and, especially, under James I, efforts were made to promote

cloth-finishing in England, in order to discontinue the sending of white cloth to the Netherlands to be dyed.

Regulation of industry became firmly established under the Tudors and Stuarts. The Weavers' Act of 1555 was an effort to control organization and employment in the textile industry in the interest of the guilds rather than the growing putting-out system. The famous Statute of Artificers, passed in 1563, set requirements for apprenticeship; attempted, in the interests of the guilds, to check the dispersion of industry by limiting certain crafts to corporate towns; prohibited idleness; and provided for the fixing of wages. Other laws regulated qualities and measurements of textiles, and established inspection by royal officials. Under Burleigh, Elizabeth's able minister, the practice of granting monopolies for the manufacture of various goods became widespread. It was hoped by this means to encourage infant industries or to strengthen old ones. Gradually this practice became burdensome, especially when James I and Charles I employed it as a means of raising money without the consent of Parliament. The granting of monopolies to individuals was forbidden by Parliament in 1624, but Charles I evaded this restriction by making the grants to corporate groups.

Another phase of English mercantilism was poor relief. Following a series of earlier measures, the great Elizabethan Poor Law was passed in 1601. It provided for the collection of a special tax, or "poor rate," and home relief for unemployables. Able-bodied poor who wished to work were to be provided with employment; those who refused to work were to be imprisoned or otherwise punished. Along with this, the old policy of supply was applied on a nationwide scale, for Corn Laws were passed forbidding the export of grain when prices rose beyond a state limit.

Nor was foreign trade neglected. The Merchant Adventurers were chartered in 1564 as a regulated company with a monopoly of the cloth export. Its members traded extensively in Europe, in other commodities as well as textiles, and although independent merchants violated its monopoly, this privilege remained in force technically until the reign of William III. In 1563 the Muscovy Company received a charter for trade with Russia, and in 1579 the Eastland Company received monopoly rights in the Baltic. Of more lasting significance was the East India Company, a joint stock organization formed in 1600, which was to play an extremely important role in shaping the destinies of the British Empire.

In the period preceding the Civil War, English mercantilism was thus developing on a broad scale, and the role of the central government was extended accordingly. The trend was changed, however, by the struggles be-

tween the Stuarts and Parliament. As we have observed with respect to the granting of monopolies, the direction and purpose of many mercantilist measures were confused by the fact that James I and his son were forced to resort to many subterfuges and innovations to raise money without the consent of Parliament. When England emerged from the Civil War into the Cromwellian Interregnum, the character of British mercantilism underwent a change to correspond with that of the new rulers. The will of the bourgeois, eager for profit, rather than that of a would-be absolute monarch, eager for power, became dominant. Although the Restoration of Charles II, in 1660, brought with it a partial return to power of the landed gentry, the essential features of English mercantilism remained those it had assumed under Cromwell. The problem was no longer one of reconciling an obdurate king and a rebellious Commons, but of effecting compromises in Parliament between the landed aristocracy and the rising commercial classes.

Both groups were in agreement on the basic principles of external mercantilism, and neither was interested in maintaining its domestic manifestations. As the landed groups desired low prices for manufactured articles and the merchants and industrialists wished to be free of hampering guild restrictions, fixed wages, regulations, and monopolies, these restraints were largely permitted to fall into disuse, although most of them were not legally abolished until the nineteenth century.

The policy of supply which, as we have said, was evidence of state intervention in the interest of economic justice, was soon abandoned with respect to grain. The objective of the government became good prices for the landed aristocracy. A law of 1670 freed grain exports from any restrictions except in cases of emergency, and in 1688 the sliding scale was introduced. Import duties varied inversely with prices, and export bounties were paid when grain prices fell below a prescribed minimum. Although the export bounty was abolished in 1760, and exports were forbidden in the late eighteenth century if grain prices rose beyond a state limit, the character and aim of agricultural protection had changed. Protection in the interest of a particular economic class replaced protection of the food supply for the benefit of all.

The main emphasis of the second period of English mercantilism was, however, on commerce and the Empire. There were two types of British colonial development. In the East, British possessions were trading posts and bases for political and commercial expansion. In the West, on the other hand, and especially in North America, arose great settlements of European population.

The British effort in the East in the seventeenth century, under the aegis of the British East India Company, was marked by failure against the Dutch

in the Spice Islands and by success against the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf and on the mainland of India. Between the first and last decades of the seventeenth century the English founded or won important bases at Ormuz in the Persian Gulf, Bombay on the west coast of India, and Madras and Calcutta on the east coast. In a series of struggles with the French between 1746 and 1763, in which Clive, supported by the British fleet, bested Dupleix, inadequately aided by his home government, the British East India Company broke the threat of France in India. With the exception of the few remaining bases belonging to Portugal—England's economic dependency—and several demilitarized French posts, there was no European competitor remaining to hinder Britain's steady advance to domination over the vast Indian sub-continent.

England's forced withdrawal from the Spice Islands was not unfortunate for her economic expansion in the long run, for the eighteenth century saw a steady decline in the importance of spices, and a corresponding increase in the importance of Indian cotton, dyes, and tea.

British colonial efforts in America, as in Asia, at first proceeded through the medium of the chartered company, seeking ready returns for its investors. The basically different situation in America soon made itself felt, however. No immediate profits were to be found there, no treasure and no direct route to the Indies. It was soon realized that the colonies could be made profitable only if they were settled by white populations and were slowly prepared to produce raw materials for the English market. Thus a trend arose toward repossession of the rights of the companies by the crown and the conversion of company settlements into royal colonies. The practice of excluding heretics and foreigners from colonial possessions, followed by Spain, Portugal, and France, was never adopted by England. French Huguenots, English Catholics, dissident Protestants such as the Quakers, and German sects such as the Moravians were welcomed to North America, along with indentured servants (both willing and unwilling immigrants) and criminals and debtors transported from the homeland.

Here as in the East, the completion of Britain's expansion rested on her triumph over France in a series of struggles lasting over a century and a half. Acadia and Cape Breton Island changed hands several times; the French drive down the Mississippi was on the whole successful, and the French effort in the Hudson Valley was a constant threat to the security of the British colonies on the Atlantic seaboard. During the period of the French and Indian War or the Seven Years War, 1756–63, the British succeeded in driving the French from northern New York and captured Quebec. The

Peace of Paris, 1763, which sealed the fate of the French empire in India, likewise ended the threat of France in America. In the Caribbean the British had made and developed numerous settlements before the Civil War, and during and after this struggle large numbers of Cavaliers emigrated to them. Strategic Bermuda had been taken in 1609, the Bahamas in 1612, and many of the Lesser Antilles group in the 1620's. In 1655 Cromwell took Jamaica from Spain. As on the American mainland, however, it was her victory over France that secured England's West Indian Empire. A successful plantation system developed in these islands, producing sugar, rum, and tobacco and requiring large amounts of manufactured articles and slaves.

The character of the British empires, eastern and western, raised several problems which had not been evident in the case of the Portuguese, Spanish, or Dutch. The East India Company sent gold and, especially, silver to India, arousing the anger of strict bullionists, and brought back calicoes and muslins, to the consternation of the British wool and silk manufacturers. The controversy over bullion exports was waged long and fiercely. In answer to the attacks of Malynes and others, and numerous anonymous pamphlets, officers of the East India Company, especially Sir Dudley Digges and Thomas Mun, replied that the Company actually increased the national stock of precious metals in the long run, by selling Indian goods to foreigners at high prices and huge profits. The import of Indian cottons produced more direct and disturbing symptoms. As the result of pressure on the part of English wool and silk manufacturers, Parliament, in 1700, forbade the importation of all but white calicoes and muslins. This failed to settle the problem, however, for the British dyeing industry, already important, grew still further. In 1720 the Calico Act was passed, forbidding the wearing or household use of printed calicoes. Although smuggling increased, the domestic industry was not destroyed. An act of 1735 legalized the domestic production of mixed linen and cotton prints, and in 1774 the Calico Act was repealed. British imperialism, in this instance, had hastened the shift of the domestic textile industry from the time-honored woolens to the new King Cotton.

The East India Company had other difficulties to face. Private English traders naturally resented its monopoly, and in 1698 managed to secure the consent of Parliament for the formation of another East India Company. The maneuver was only partially successful. The new Company was to raise a loan of £2,000,000, and its members were to be permitted to trade in India up to the amount of their subscription. The old Company, however, subscribed for a large percentage of the loan, and this anomalous situation was ended by a merger of the two companies in 1709. The East India Company

retained its commercial monopoly until 1833, and its political power until 1858.

The problems England met in relation to her American empire were similar to those she faced in the East in that they often arose from the competition of colonial manufactures with home industries. In a larger sense, however, they were the result of the rapid increase of the population, especially in North America, where, at the time of the American Revolution, the white population of the thirteen colonies amounted to approximately 3,000,000 people, about one-third that of Great Britain. England's American possessions were as different from the economic viewpoint as they were geographically. Newfoundland and the Grand Banks were the home of the cod fisheries; Canada and upper New York of the fur trade; New England of small farms, naval stores, and rum production; the Middle Atlantic colonies of both large and small farming districts, growing manufactures, and commerce; the Southern colonies of a plantation system and the great tobacco crop; the Caribbean islands of sugar, its derivatives, molasses and rum, and tobacco. The basic attitude of the home country toward these varied possessions was governed by what was called the "Colonial Compact." The colonies were to provide raw materials for the industries of the mother country and markets for these industries: in return, they were to be helped and protected, and their products given preference in the home market. Their economies were to be bound closely to that of the metropolis, and relations on their part with foreigners were excluded.

The development of this policy may be observed in its legislative history. While no clear-cut distinctions may be drawn, there would seem to have been two different emphases in British colonial legislation. From 1651 to about 1700, the exclusion of foreign nations was the dominant, although not the only concern. Roughly between 1700 and the American Revolution, the enactments of Parliament stressed the enforcement of the terms of the Colonial Compact in the colonies.

The most important of the first group of laws were the Navigation Act of 1651, which set forth the basic policy, the Navigation Act of 1660, the Act of Frauds of 1662, the Staple Act of 1663, the Act of 1673, and the Act of 1696. The Act of 1651 attempted to encourage English shipping at the expense of the Dutch by reserving the imperial trade to British subjects, by outlawing the Dutch entrepôt trade with England, and by restricting the coastal trade to English-owned vessels. Although provisions relative to the Eastern trade occurred in this and subsequent Navigation Laws, in actual practice the effect of these measures was largely limited to the American colonies.

The Act of 1651 had proved difficult of enforcement, and the refusal of Charles II to recognize the Interregnum legislation hastened its reform. The principal bearing of the Act of 1660 was on the European trade. The general prohibitions of 1651 were replaced with a long list of specific ones. It was provided that a great many enumerated articles, representing about half of Anglo-European trade, must be imported either in English ships, or in ships of the country of origin, which were subject to alien duties. The required proportion of English personnel was raised from a majority to three quarters. A series of enumerated articles, including tobacco, cotton, sugar, and dyes, was not to be exported from English colonial possessions except to England or other English colonies.

In addition to extending the enumerated list in a fashion directly affecting the Dutch entrepôt trade, the Act of Frauds included the important provision that in order to be considered English, ships must be built in England. The Staple Act reversed the direction of the enumerated lists, by adding the prohibition of the importation into the colonies of any European goods not loaded in England. Several exceptions were made in favor of Ireland and Scotland, which were largely excluded from the Empire in so far as the colonial trade was concerned. The Act of 1673 placed duties on the shipment of goods from one colony to another. Intended principally to prevent the loss of revenue through indirect shipment of tobacco to Europe (Virginia-Jamaica-France instead of Virginia-England-France), this law provided for the organization of a staff of enforcement officers. The last of this group of laws, the Act of 1696 (the Imperial Act of Frauds), was in part inspired by fear of the Scottish project for establishing a colony and trade base at Darien. It provided that colonial governors must take an oath to enforce the Navigation Laws, that the procedure for bonding cargoes be made stricter, that all colonial trade be in English- or Empire-built ships, and that the latter be registered.

Thus, commencing with a broad statement of policy in 1651, the Navigation Laws had become increasingly specific and more inclusive, and provisions had been made for their adequate enforcement. Although these acts, by their very nature, regulated colonial trade and the practices of colonial merchants, and led to increasingly strong protests in America, their emphasis was on the exclusion of foreigners from the imperial economy. The second group of laws emphasized the control of colonial commerce and industry. Of the four laws we shall consider in this series, three represented British efforts to restrain colonial manufactures, and the fourth similar efforts to limit one of the most important branches of colonial trade.

The production of woolen goods for local consumption, and, in the case of

Massachusetts, for export to other colonies, had grown during the latter part of the seventeenth century to the point where British producers and manufacturers felt themselves threatened with the eventual loss of the colonial market. In response to their protests, the Woolens Act was passed in 1699. It prohibited the shipment of woolen goods of any description from one colony to another or to a foreign country. It did not, however, forbid the production or finishing of woolens for use within a given colony. The Hat Act of 1732, passed to meet a similar development, went further in that it not only limited trade in hats but also the conditions of their manufacture, by outlawing the growth of large-scale establishments.

The iron industry was also subjected to regulation. In this instance the position of the English groups demanding protection was rather delicate. The frame houses of America provided a large market for nails, and the colonies also consumed considerable quantities of English hardware. The growth of colonial pig-iron and iron-goods industries and the dearth of charcoal in England, owing to the ravenous consumption of the forests in the eighteenth century, combined to produce a situation in which English iron manufacturers desired to encourage colonial production of bar and pig iron and to discourage the making of finished iron wares in the colonies. British iron producers, however, were opposed to the development of either branch of the American iron industry. A long dispute was finally settled in 1750 by the passage of the Iron Act, along lines dictated by the Colonial Compact. It provided, on the one hand, that colonial bar and pig iron were to be admitted to England free of duty and, on the other hand, that no new slitting or rolling mills or steel furnaces were to be erected in the colonies and that no finished iron or steel goods were to be made there.

In 1733 the Molasses Act was passed. It aimed to restrain, in the interests of broad imperial policy, the lucrative trade between the Northern colonies and the non-British West Indies. The mainland colonists had found in these islands a ready market for their timber, livestock, provisions, and African slaves, and a good source of supply for sugar, molasses, rum, and the money and credit facilities which, as we shall see, they sorely needed. The colonists traded especially with the French West Indies which, owing to several factors, were able to undersell the British. The English planters protested vigorously to the Privy Council and Parliament, and these protests, plus the desire to exclude France from economic relations with the colonies, combined to bring about the passage of the Molasses Act. This measure imposed duties on imports of sugar, molasses, and rum from the non-British West Indies. Rigid enforcement of this law would have all but ruined the Northern colonies. It

was, however, widely disregarded, and the colonists successfully maintained their trade by smuggling.

It is worthwhile at this point to note that the enforcement of both groups of laws was exceedingly difficult and that in some instances evasion was relatively easy. It should not be thought, however, that smuggling was the rule and legal trade the exception. Professor L. A. Harper argues convincingly that, while the evidence proves the existence of smuggling, its extent is extremely difficult to judge and has very probably been overestimated.

Before considering the influence of this long legislative development on relations between colonies and mother country, it would be well to note another type of restriction employed by England, and the reverse of the medal, the intervention of the colonial economy. The colonies had been seriously hampered by lack of credit, and the debtor class, farmers, small craftsmen, and laborers sought means of easing this situation. One effort in this direction was the Massachusetts Land Bank, basically similar to John Law's scheme for issuing paper money secured by land. The resulting inflation threatened to be harmful to upper-class propertied interests in America and to London merchants, who had no desire to be paid in colonial paper. In 1741 Parliament suppressed the bank; in 1751 it forbade the New England governments to issue further legal-tender paper money; and in 1764 it outlawed this type of currency in all the colonies.

Like the Navigation Laws and the acts restricting colonial industries, these measures contributed greatly to the growth of American animosity toward the mother country. It would be extremely inaccurate, however, to suppose either that Britain adopted such measures from a simple desire to keep the colonies under foot or that she did nothing for their benefit. The differences between England and the colonies arose from her wish to maintain the Colonial Compact and from the fact that the colonies outgrew this relationship.

The policy that motivated the restrictive legislation also guided British intervention in favor of the colonies. They were to be aided in economic endeavors justifiable on mercantilist grounds. Colonial products such as tobacco, indigo, and iron were given preferential duties on imports into England. Drawbacks were given on many articles shipped to the colonies by way of English ports. In 1704 bounties were established to encourage the production of naval stores, including pitch, hemp, turpentine, and masts, in America. In 1748 a bounty was provided for indigo; in 1750 a similar provision was made to encourage colonial silk production. Tobacco-growing was forbidden in England, largely to aid the Southern planters, although the desire

for customs revenue was an added consideration. The colonies benefited from the protection afforded by the British army and navy and from trading privileges in the Empire.

In all these instances the guiding factor was the relation between metropolis and dependencies. England looked upon the colonies as valuable adjuncts to her economy, even as important parts of it, but their role was to be one of supplying her with raw materials, buying her goods, and accommodating their economic structures to the needs of her own. This was a normal mercantilist outlook, hence normal according to the standards and institutions of the day. While the success or failure of this policy is judged, in part, by the very fact of the American Revolution, other aspects should not be forgotten. The colonies progressed greatly under the rule of British mercantilism, but it was the restrictive policy, especially as embodied in the Navigation Laws, that reserved to England so large a share in their development. Over one-third of British ocean shipping was engaged in the American trade, and since the Navigation Laws had made England the entrepôt for colonial goods, many more ships were employed to carry these cargoes to the Continent. Thus the apparent failure of English mercantilism, as evidenced by the American Revolution, tends to conceal its previous success. It was under this economic regime that the British merchant marine and British commerce, finance, and industry registered such notable advances in the second half of the seventeenth and in the eighteenth century. It should be remembered that it was under mercantilism that England rose to world power and, as later Continental writers were eager to point out, it was only after she had secured a substantial advantage over her competitors, well into the nineteenth century, that she abandoned it.

France. It was in France that the highwater mark of mercantilism was reached, in the brilliant France of Louis XIV, the *roi soleil* (sun king), and Colbert. It was the French pattern of mercantilism that the German princes attempted to reproduce in their own lands and to which Spaniards turned in seeking to restore their country's tarnished glory. As the architecture, splendor, and customs of the court of Versailles were imitated, so were the policies and regulations of Colbert which made this glory possible. Although the name of Colbert is almost synonymous with French mercantilism, this great minister had not employed economic concepts that were radically new in France. He had brought together, and used on a nation-wide scale, many policies followed by his predecessors, and had taken over on behalf of the royal government many local practices of intervention in economic affairs.

As in Spain and England, French mercantilism had its roots in the Middle

Ages, but from the time of Philip the Fair (1285-1314) to the end of the Religious Wars under Henry of Navarre in 1598 regulation was hampered by the disunity of the country and the consequent difficulty of enforcement. Royal edicts and decrees were often little more than pious wishes. Under Henry IV and Sully, and later under Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu, French mercantilism became more substantial and reached its full development in Colbert's ministry, between 1661 and 1683.

Bullionist regulations, to prevent the export of precious metals, were issued with increasing frequency in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Sumptuary laws, designed both to curb luxury and to maintain the external symbols of class differences, were issued by Philip the Fair, as Bodin points out, and by many later monarchs. In the sixteenth century, however, their emphasis was on the reduction of French use of foreign luxuries, in order to prevent the drain of bullion. Protectionism, to a very great extent motivated by political considerations, was pursued by the French kings from the time of Philip the Fair, who wished to exclude the Flemings from French trade. During the Hundred Years War, the British were similarly barred. Tariffs as a political weapon gave way, during the sixteenth century, to tariffs designed to stimulate French industry. Although their political implications remained, their emphasis changed. France had no long tradition of Navigation Laws, and it was only in the latter part of the sixteenth century that determined efforts were made, through the use of bounties and other measures, to increase the merchant marine and improve the fleet. The importance of foreign trade was, however, well understood. In 1535 Francis I signed a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Sultan which gave France the right to establish consulates, try Frenchmen according to French law, and made France protector of all Christians in Ottoman territory.

During the sixteenth century, repeated, if unsuccessful, efforts were made to establish colonies in the Americas. The same century witnessed numerous efforts in the field of internal regulation and encouragement of industry; these efforts were, on the whole, unsuccessful, owing to the unstable conditions of the period. Subsidies and privileges were given to encourage the founding of new industries. Great nation-wide regulations were promulgated for the manufacture of woolens in 1571 and for leather goods and other textiles in the 1580's. In 1581 was issued an ordinance calling for the institution and supervision of guilds in all phases of industry and trade. In all these cases, however, the central government was unable adequately to enforce its policies. Despite the relative failure of sixteenth-century French mercantilism, it set

forth the broad lines of policy which were to be followed with great success in the next hundred years.

French mercantilism assumed a more systematic character during the reign of Henry IV (1589–1610). His great minister, Sully (1559–1611), was a mercantilist only to a very limited extent. His chief interest was agriculture, and he accomplished much in improving husbandry and cultivation. The development of internal communications, the draining of marshes, and the negotiation of commercial treaties (with Turkey, England, and Spain) were under his direction. It was the king himself, with his assistant Laffemas (1545–1611) who became controller-general of commerce in 1601, who framed and executed the broad mercantilist policies. As head of the Commission of Commerce, founded in 1601, Laffemas acted as a spur to both the king and the French economy. New industries, including various types of textile, metal-goods, and glass production, were started in France, with the aid of subsidies and privileges. Foreign artisans were induced to come to France, and their ventures were financed by the crown. Silk culture, which the sixteenth-century rulers, especially Catherine de' Medici, had tried to foster, was successfully established in various parts of France. The famous Gobelins tapestry works was founded, skilled artisans and artists were employed by the king, a soap monopoly was created, and the importation of soap was forbidden. Regulation went hand in hand with encouragement, as by various decrees and ordinances Henry IV attempted to control the textile industries and extend the guild system. After the failures of the sixteenth century France succeeded in founding Quebec, in 1608, and commencing the establishment of her colonial empire. Thus the reign of Henry IV saw progress along all lines of mercantilist endeavor, further precedents were established, and more was added to the tradition that Colbert was later to inherit and develop.

The regime of Cardinal Richelieu (1624–42) was characterized by great but sporadic progress of French mercantilism. It was troubled by struggles with the Protestants and nobles at home, and with the Hapsburgs abroad. His first concern was therefore with the upbuilding of the French navy, which up to then had been of slight consequence. By his death in 1642 it was strong enough to be a major factor in France's wars and to contribute greatly to the security of Mediterranean commerce by fighting the North African pirates. Richelieu was much interested in colonial and Eastern trade, and he founded a series of privileged companies to stimulate this phase of French commercial activity. His first attempt consisted of the formation of a knightly colonial order, of the Holy Trinity, but he soon turned to more practical measures.

In 1627 the Company of New France was given control over Canada, in 1635 the Company of the Islands of America was given similar rights over France's West Indian possessions, and in 1642 the Company of the East was established to carry on the spice trade.

Richelieu's successor, Cardinal Mazarin, was interested in the political, rather than the economic affairs of the state, and his regime marks a slackening of the development of French mercantilism. While there was no conscious reversal of policy between 1642 and 1661, the overseas companies fell into decline. The great development of French mercantilism, therefore, was the work of Mazarin's assistant and successor, Jean-Baptiste Colbert.

The son of a small trader, Colbert became an aid to Le Tellier, the secretary for war, and was named Mazarin's confidential secretary in 1651. Combining flattery and industry, he rose to wealth and power and stood high in the ranks of the king's servants at the Cardinal's death in 1661. He soon disposed, by merciless intrigue, of his principal rival, Fouquet, the superintendent of finances, and between 1661 and his death, 1683, Colbert was Louis XIV's chief minister—in power, second only to the king himself. Colbert was the perfect aid to a divine-right monarch. His loyalty to Louis XIV was above question, his talent as a courtier excellent, his industry unflagging, and his honesty quite adequate for the times. French mercantilism is also called "Colbertism," and this is perhaps the best tribute to his importance. Under him, mercantilism received its broadest and most thorough application, its practices were evident in the fields of imperial, foreign, and domestic commerce, industry, agriculture, and what we may call social morality.

As we have seen, the French colonial empire was started with the settlement of Quebec. In the 1620's France entered into the race with Spain, England, and the Netherlands for the control of the Caribbean. Starting with St. Kitts, which they shared with England, the French had extended their sway by the mid-seventeenth century to include all the islands they now possess, Martinique, Guadeloupe, the Saints, and several others, as well as the mainland colony of Cayenne, or Guiana. The French empire also included other island possessions which were subsequently relinquished, namely, their portion of St. Kitts (to England, 1713), Granada, and St. Lucia (to England, 1763, 1814), and Haiti, which won its independence in the nineteenth century. Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Haiti became large-scale sugar producers, with great plantations worked by Negro slaves, and the source of raw sugar for the French refineries. The company founded by Richelieu, the Company of the Islands of America, sold the islands to various individuals between 1649 and 1651. Private proprietors could hardly be expected to view trade from the national

standpoint, and the islands' commerce was therefore largely in the hands of the Dutch, who were able to undersell their competitors.

Canada was in even sorrier condition, according to mercantilist standards. It consisted of Quebec and small settlements along the St. Lawrence River. The white population, only about 3,000 strong, were engaged principally in the fur trade. Colbert met the situation of the French Americas by founding the West India Company in 1664. Although the company did not succeed financially and its monopoly was soon withdrawn, Colbert accomplished his chief objectives by this means. The Dutch were driven from the French West Indian trade, and Canada was greatly strengthened by 1674, when the company was dissolved and its lands became crown colonies. Acadia, possession of which had been disputed by England, was secured to France by the Treaty of Breda (1667). French traders and explorers moved through the Great Lakes and down the Mississippi and in 1682, the year before Colbert's death, La Salle reached the Gulf and claimed Louisiana for Louis XIV.

Colbert founded an East India Company in 1664. Richelieu's company had established posts at Madagascar and Réunion (Ile de Bourbon) in 1642. The new East India Company failed to make profits and was forced to abandon Madagascar in 1674 because of a native revolt. It did succeed, however, in establishing important posts at Pondicherry and Surat, in addition to several other lesser ones.

Colbert's aim was to organize, systematize, and thereby advance French commerce. Hence he created chartered companies for all promising fields. The Company of the North, founded in 1669, was given the monopoly of France's Baltic trade. As with the East and West India Companies, it met with only partial success. Its chief objective had been to destroy the Dutch carrying trade between France and the Baltic lands, but French failure to defeat the Netherlands decisively in the Dutch War (1672-78) ruined the company. It was not a total loss, however, for it had established commercial relationships which later developed into a thriving trade.

In 1670 Colbert created the Levant Company, without a monopoly, to increase France's already important Mediterranean trade, and to capture that of the English and Dutch. Subsidies and privileges failed to make the company a financial success, and while it aided French commerce, and protected it from pirates, it was reorganized in 1678 and did not long survive Colbert.

The chartered companies were not the only means employed by Colbert to further French foreign trade. The navy, which he had raised to first rank in Europe, was freely used to protect French shipping in the Mediterranean and on the high seas. Bounties were paid for shipbuilding and smaller ones for

purchasing ships abroad. In 1668 a marine-insurance company was formed. The next year Marseilles was made a free port, and, while the export of silver from this city was restricted, bounties were paid on textile exports. Conversely, Colbert vigorously supported the illegal French trade with Cadiz, the point of entry of the American silver he desired.

Colbert sought to improve domestic conditions of trade by developing communications, unifying weights and measures, and rationalizing internal and external customs. He accomplished a great deal in the first endeavor, failed completely in the second, and was partially successful in the third. Roads and waterways were greatly improved. Obstructions to navigation were cleared from the many rivers of France, and numerous canals built, including the great Languedoc Canal, linking, via the Aude and the Garonne, the Mediterranean and Atlantic. The great diversity in weights and measures proved to be too much for Colbert to overcome, and standardization was forced to await the Revolution. Similarly, the great weight of tradition prevented him from clearing away the numerous road, bridge, and river tolls.

The French tariff system presented Colbert with one of his most vexatious problems. France had been divided into two principal sections for tariff purposes. Most of northern France was included in the "Five Big Farms," within which goods might circulate freely. Most of the rest of France consisted of "provinces reputed foreign," with several separate customs districts. Articles passing between the "Five Big Farms" and the "provinces reputed foreign" were subject to duties. Besides these groups, there were newly acquired lands such as Alsace, which were "provinces effectively foreign," and therefore entirely outside the French customs. The whole matter was complicated by the fact that there was not even one set of tariffs for the "Five Big Farms," but five for export and four for import.

Colbert attacked this problem in the first of his two great tariffs, that of 1664. One set of duties was provided for the "Five Big Farms," and, in addition, there was some added protection of manufactured articles. If this measure was primarily one of administrative reform, and secondarily one of protection, the second tariff, of 1667, was a belligerent, protective measure, applicable to all France, rather than to the "Five Big Farms" alone. Duties were raised by an average of 100 percent, and French manufactures, especially textiles, were placed behind a high tariff wall in a determined mercantilist pattern. It was therefore felt that measures to promote commerce would be in part meaningless unless accompanied by steps to improve the nation's export industries. The protective tariff was one of these steps, but Colbert placed chief reliance on more direct practices, such as the granting of privileges and subsidies, state

management and ownership of productive enterprises, and royal regulation of quality and methods of production.

There were many types of privileges; they were dispensed to groups or individuals according to the needs and promise of a particular enterprise. They varied from direct subsidies to tax exemptions, and included interest-free loans, government orders, monopolies for part or all of the country, bounties, exemption from guild and other regulations, the right of eminent domain, and the right to the title of *Manufacture royale*. Foreign entrepreneurs and artisans were induced to establish themselves in France, religious requirements were held in abeyance when necessary, towns were compelled to aid Colbert's projects. French skilled workers were forbidden to emigrate, and foreigners were employed to teach new skills in France. A list of the industries which received Colbert's attention and help reads like a catalog of the major branches of production of the day. Many types of textile production, metal industries, glass and mirror making, paper and sugar refining were among the manufactures Colbert endeavored to encourage. Between 1665 and his death in 1683 he promoted and helped to develop the great Van Robais woolen works at Abbeville, manufactures of fine woolens in Languedoc and serges in Burgundy, lace making in Alencon and other towns, and the manufacture of mirrors in Normandy, which first broke and then replaced the Venetian mirror monopoly (*Compagnie de Saint-Gobain*, in operation today). The Gobelins tapestry works, founded under Henry IV, was administered by Colbert, who placed its artistic production under the direction of Charles Le Brun. Gobelins products, designs, and styles won prominence in all branches of the luxury arts and helped to establish French supremacy in this field.

Since he believed that goods must be of high and uniform quality in order to sell, Colbert accepted and carried forward the tradition of state regulation of industry. His principal innovation was his attempt to create adequate machinery for enforcement. Between 1664 and 1669 a large number of special woolens regulations were issued. These were local in application, however, and even while they were appearing preparations were under way for the promulgation of nation-wide regulatory ordinances. In 1669 the Woolens Regulation was issued. In 1671 a long "Instruction" on dyeing was issued. It was a technical manual designed to help dyers secure the best, most lasting, and truest colors then available and forbidding certain practices in the interest of sound quality and the protection of the foreign consumer. Silk manufacture was governed by a series of special regulations and linens by regional instructions applicable to Normandy and Brittany, issued in 1676. While Colbert

did touch other fields, his most important regulations concerned textile production, the outstanding French industry of the day.

Enforcement was twofold in character, depending on the guilds and on royal officials. In 1669 Colbert established a system of inspectorships, about eighteen being assigned to various districts and others to certain industries as a whole. The inspectors were to supervise the execution of the regulations, and act as spurs to the guild officials, who were in the first instance responsible for enforcement. Violations were to be tried before municipal authorities, so that, because of their small number, the task of inspectors was essentially one of securing sufficient strictness on the part of guild and town officers. It was only natural, then, that Colbert's policy should be hampered by lingering sentiments of local autonomy, and that the degree of enforcement of his regulations should vary greatly from place to place.

Partly to collect incorporation fees but also to extend and rationalize the regulation of the French economy, Colbert issued an edict in 1673 providing for the creation of guilds in all industries, crafts, and branches of commerce. In this, as usual, he followed precedent but again surpassed his predecessors in enforcement. Where the members of a trade made no move to organize themselves into a guild, Colbert appointed officers, and compelled their masters to join. Many new guilds were formed, but it cannot be said that Colbert gained more than partial success.

Colbert's work was not limited to commerce and industry. Law, the arts and sciences, the splendor of Louis XIV, state finances, animal husbandry, agriculture, public morality—all testified to the effect of his guiding and energizing hand.

In a series of great codes, beginning with the Civil Ordinance of 1667, Colbert reformed much of the French legal structure, and this work too contributed to the development of his general mercantilist policies. In 1665 he organized a Council of Justice, excluding the members of *Parlement* who were apt to be fractious and who insisted on their own prerogatives. This body prepared the Civil Ordinance, which greatly simplified and regularized French court procedure. It was followed in 1669 by the Criminal Ordinance, which similarly systematized, to a degree at least, French criminal law. Running counter to the development of English common law, it tended to place the burden of proof on the accused, a note still dominant in French law. In the same year, 1669, was issued the great Ordinance of Waters and Forests. By this measure game and forest conservation was established in France in the seventeenth century. Royal restrictions limited the right of

private individuals to cut their timber, and in all events provisions were made for leaving an adequate proportion of trees on cut-over land.

In 1673 the Commercial Code was issued. Prepared by a group of experts, it has become known as the *Code Savary*, after Jacques Savary, who contributed greatly to its elaboration. The Commercial Code was designed to provide "regulations capable of assuring among business men good faith against fraud and of preventing the obstacles which might turn them from their employment through long lawsuits." It contained regulations concerning methods of bookkeeping, the establishment of companies and partnerships, commercial credit, the conveyance of property, bankruptcy, banking, and brokerage apprenticeship, and a host of other business practices. The Code contributed to commercial standardization and, like the other Colbertian codes, is in part a basis of modern French law.

In 1681 the Ordinance of Marine regulated the personnel of the merchant marine, shipboard practices, and all fisheries. In addition to introducing order and regularity into the fields they covered, these codes directly, in the cases of the maritime, commercial, and conservation regulations, or indirectly, in the cases of the civil and criminal codifications, were drawn up with an eye to attaining well-defined mercantilist objectives. The mercantilist role of the merchant marine and fisheries is evident; the intention was the development of French trade, shipping, and naval potentialities and the prevention of specie drain to foreign countries, especially Holland. To Colbert, good and honest business practice was essential to the smooth operation of the national economy, while the maintenance of waterways and the conservation of game and timber were required for the advancement of production. Similarly, the civil and criminal codes, by contributing to order and law enforcement, tended to benefit public morality and diminish friction.

Stimulation and regulation, Colbert's watchwords, were applied by him to the arts and sciences to such an extent that it is no exaggeration to say that he was responsible for much of the artistic, musical, and architectural development of the reign of *le roi soleil*. He took over and put life into the *Académie française*, founded by Richelieu. It was given a home in the Louvre, and urged to finish the dictionary on which it had been painfully toiling. The Academy of Painting and Sculpture had been formed by Mazarin and had been given a monopoly of teaching these subjects. This was strengthened by Colbert, who placed the Academy under Le Brun, his director of the Gobelins. In 1666 Colbert formed the Academy of Science and the Academy of Inscriptions and *Belles Lettres*. In 1671 Colbert created the Academy of Architecture,

to teach the proper principles of this discipline. The musician Lully was empowered to found the Royal Academy of Music and was given a monopoly which required his approval for musical performances employing more than two instruments. After supporting several theatrical enterprises, Colbert created the *Comédie française* (*Théâtre national*) in 1680, with a monopoly of the Paris stage. French and foreign artists, authors, playwrights, and scholars shared the bounty given by Colbert in the name of his king. Molière, Racine, Le Brun, Huygens, and many other distinguished persons were among the beneficiaries.

Colbert viewed the building program of Louis XIV with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it pained him to see his careful economies go to naught as between thirty and fifty million *livres* were spent on Versailles and three million more on the Trianon palaces. On the other, these projects not only gave France great architectural masterpieces, but, as Colbert well knew, provided a public-works program that employed French labor and products.

The question of finances was, nevertheless, uppermost in Colbert's mind. He had inherited a veritable maze of financial confusion, a tradition of graft and fraud, a royal revenue of which almost one-third was devoted to carrying charges. His remedies were drastic. Between 1661 and 1669 a special court investigated graft and tax frauds, punished financiers to the number of over 4,000, and secured restitutions to the royal treasury of over 100,000,000 *livres*. He drastically cut the payments on *rentes*, state obligations secured by specified revenues, in some instances by over two-thirds, and by this means saved about 8,000,000 *livres* a year. Colbert modified the tax system, reducing the *taille* (a form of general property tax), from which many nobles were exempt; and increasing consumption taxes and the *gabelles* (salt tax), which bore on all classes of the population. In 1674 he made the sale of tobacco a state monopoly, considering this nonessential article a legitimate subject for taxation, and this practice has continued in France to the present.

Colbert has been accused of neglecting agriculture, but it would be more correct to say that he emphasized commerce and industry. He endeavored to improve and increase French livestock by importing better breeds of sheep and establishing the *haras* (government and private stud farms for horse breeding). His grain policy was broader than the simple doctrine of supply, but did not sacrifice an adequate grain stock for the profits of great landholders. Grain exports were forbidden when a shortage threatened, were permitted when the stocks were ample, and encouraged by remissions of export duties when there was plenty.

To close this sketch of Colbert's many and varied activities, the sum of

which was French mercantilism, we may note briefly some of his efforts in what may be called the field of public morality. One of Mazarin's great interests had been the poorhouses, usually called *Hôpitaux généraux*. Colbert supported them as a means of reducing begging and vagabondage and of forcing the idle to work. To increase the productivity of the country, he succeeded in reducing the number of work-free religious holidays from forty-one to twenty-four. As he believed a large population essential to national welfare and power, he gave tax exemptions to families with ten or more children, and tried to discourage the taking of religious orders.

French mercantilism, Colbertism, was thus an all-pervading policy of state intervention, encouragement, direction, and regulation. The regime of Colbert gave France a splendid opportunity that was only partly realized. Several failings may be mentioned. One was Colbert's. He believed that the world's wealth was fixed, and therefore that it was necessary to increase France's share at the expense of others, especially the Dutch. Thus he favored the Dutch War of 1672-78, and aimed his tariff of 1667 against the Dutch (and the English). Had this war been as short as was hoped, and as successful as was expected, it might well have been beneficial to France. As it was, it ruined his financial plans, forcing him to expedients he abhorred—including the sale of offices—and weakened or destroyed many of his favorite projects, including the Company of the North.

Other elements of weakness were Louis XIV and Colbert's successors. The king's warlike propensities and ability to squander money interfered seriously with his program, especially toward the close of Colbert's regime when the war minister, Louvois, the son of Le Tellier, gained increasing influence. After Colbert's death Louis, under the influence of Madame de Maintenon, revoked the Edict of Nantes (1685), forcing into flight thousands of the commercially ablest of the French population, the Huguenots, on whom Colbert had often relied.

Colbert had given evidence of great flexibility. The Woolens Regulation had been adjusted to local or changing conditions; the West India Company was dissolved when no longer needed. His successors were more rigid, and in the eighteenth century French mercantilism was increasingly a matter of bureaucracy and minute, often stifling, regulation. The failure to maintain French sea power against England (the French navy was restored by the duc de Choiseul, 1758-70, in time to play a great part in the American Revolution) cost France most of her empire. The War of the Spanish Succession and the wars of Louis XV kept France in financial difficulties and prevented the continuation of Colbert's methods of stimulating trade and industry. France

nevertheless remained a great power, as the Napoleonic period was to prove, and rather than speak of a decline in the eighteenth century, it would be correct to say that she advanced less rapidly than did England.

MERCANTILISM: A SUMMARY

In closing this discussion of mercantilism, it will be well to recall that it was, to a great extent, the economic arm of the national state. Intervention, especially in France, was guided by what were held to be national interests. In France, where the monarchy was extremely powerful, economic interests were often subordinated to political ones as we have seen. In England, following the Interregnum, where economic and political control was increasingly held by the same groups, the political requirements of the crown did not divert economic policy from what was thought to be its logical course. Mercantilism cannot therefore be considered the entire, economic corollary of absolute monarchy. It was nationalist economic policy shaped by the needs of particular nations at different times. To criticize mercantilism on the basis of fixed economic laws is unjust and groundless. It must be evaluated according to the ends and standards of its own day, and, viewed in this light, it was probably successful for a time, having in one form or another satisfied so many people. Mercantilism well reflects, as we have said, the complex pattern of the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. It is part of the rise of national states and the breakdown of political feudalism. It is also an element of the change from medieval to modern economic institutions. Mercantilism can therefore be understood only in terms of the development of these institutions, without which mercantilist measures would have been inconceivable and meaningless. When modern economic institutions—capitalism, generally—outgrew the swaddling clothes of mercantilist restraint, they were ready for freedom.

3. THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS

In the early stages of their state-making, kings had been glad to receive the sanction of the Church. The Church needed the powerful support and protection of the civil authority, while newly established dynasties welcomed the moral and spiritual backing of the Church. It was customary for officials of the Church to perform the ceremonies of coronation, placing the crown upon the king's head and anointing him with holy oil, thus giving a solemn and sacred character to the person of the monarch and to the office which he

held. As Church and state came to struggle for preeminence, however—when the kings became more powerful and more securely established—the kings sought an independent sanction for their position. It irked them to feel dependent in any sense upon the Church and so they looked above the Church to a still higher authority for justification. Their subjects and supporters began to claim for them a place as divinely ordained as that of the Church itself.

This idea of the divine right of kings was by no means new. Throughout the medieval period, when the Holy Roman Emperors and the popes contended for supremacy, there were men who claimed that God ordained monarchs to rule His people as directly and as authoritatively as He had consecrated popes and priests to guide men's souls. Now, however, that there were new, fresh reasons, in the ambitions of kings, for advancing such ideas, there came a strong reinforcement to this reasoning. This derived from the great revolt against papal authority known as the Reformation. The Protestants, seeking an authority higher than that of the pope with which to justify their revolt, found in the Bible aid and comfort along many lines. Among other things, they discovered in both Old and New Testaments scriptural justification for the divine sanction of the secular or civil power. On the basis of scriptural texts, the English clergy solemnly asserted in 1640 that "the most high and sacred order of kings is of Divine Right, being the ordinance of God Himself, founded in the prime laws of Nature, and clearly established by expressed texts both of the Old and New Testaments."

Such texts the supporters of the Divine Right of monarchs found in God's command (I Samuel 8: 10-18) to the prophet Samuel to anoint Saul as king over Israel, and in such passages as: "By Me kings reign, and princes decree justice" (Proverbs 8: 15); and "The powers that be are ordained of God, whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God . . ." Romans 13: 1-2). Countless passages in seventeenth-century literature illustrate how widely these ideas were accepted. Most celebrated, in survival, is perhaps Shakespeare's passage (*Hamlet* iv: 5): "There's such divinity doth hedge a king, That treason can but peep to what it would."

Rulers of Protestant states naturally found much satisfaction in the divine-right theory; it enhanced their prestige in the exercise of power over their own subjects, and it eased their consciences in disavowing the authority of the pope. Even Catholic kings were not averse to such notions. Divine-right theories were accepted in practically all European states, Catholic or Protestant, during the seventeenth century. In France, especially during the wars of religion of the preceding century (the sixteenth), much stress was laid upon the theory that the king held his power directly from God. Even the clergy held

that the king "is the very image of God, the very Hand of Justice." Thus, the efforts of kings in creating the dynastic state, and in making the kingship absolute, were crowned by the general acceptance of the idea that monarchs were kings by divine right.

The Idea of the Balance of Power. It was perhaps natural that as soon as royal power became generally established and as soon as kingdoms had emerged, rivalry should occur. In fact, it has been said that as soon as there were three states in existence there was bound to be some sort of rivalry, in which two of the three would combine against the third. The rivalry which we find among the new, modern states has been called dynastic rivalry. . . . Family pride, motives of ambition, jealousy, greed, or adventure might be the inspiration for such rivalry. Victory and conquest brought glory, prestige, and family or dynastic aggrandizement. No serious reasons against handing about lands from one king to another existed; nor was there, as yet, any grave objection to the transfer of people from one sovereign to another. People were subjects, their rulers divinely sanctioned, and it mattered little whether they were loyal to one king or to another. Dynastic rivalry thus became international rivalry, and international warfare arose as the sport of kings and their dynasties. Subjects were little concerned, beyond bearing with loyalty the burdens and losses of this warfare.

It became apparent, however, about the beginning of the sixteenth century, that unrestrained dynastic ambition might result in indefinitely prolonged wars and especially in the overwhelming success of some one dynasty. Such success would accumulate so much power that the independence and interests of all the other dynasties would suffer. The hegemony, or domination, of Europe by any single dynasty was dreaded and opposed by all the others. Thus when the Hapsburg power menaced most of Europe with the extent of its possessions, rival dynasties in France, England, and the German states worked, more or less in combination, to reduce the strength of the Hapsburg dynasty. For the safety, dignity, and general well-being of the European dynasties, it came to be recognized that there should be no dominant European state, no return to the universal dominion of an imperial power like that of Rome. It was felt to be safer and better that the power possessed by the various dynasties should be evenly distributed or at least so allocated that among the greater and lesser states there should be a sort of balance or equilibrium. This balance of power became a sort of unwritten, international law for Europe. It was particularly important for small states and lesser dynasties, as it helped, though not always successfully, in protecting them against the greed and ambition of the stronger states. It also tended to lead states to group

together in coalitions, leagues, or alliances against the possible effort of a king who might aim at supreme power over the whole continent.

LOUIS XIV: ABSOLUTE MONARCH BY DIVINE RIGHT

It is in the France of Louis XIV (1643-1715) that we find the most impressive evidence of these general European conditions above noted. Not only did these developments come about early in France, but also more thoroughly and effectively than elsewhere. France was thus a leader and example to the rest of Europe. The term "Age of Louis XIV" is significant.

In the person of Louis we find a highly appropriate expression of the process by which royal dynasties had come about, had made themselves absolute and adopted a divine sanction. The royal authority in France had been brought to a high degree of strength and concentration by his grandfather Henry IV (Navarre) and by the two great ministers, the cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin. By inheritance and conviction, Louis came to have clear-cut, definite conceptions of the place, rights, and functions of a king. From childhood he retained memories of the dangers and disorders resulting from even temporary reactions against royal authority, when nobles defied the crown (the Frondes). He believed that law and order, the protection of the people, and the welfare of the state demanded a strong kingly authority. He assumed, with all sincerity, that he held his crown by divine right, and that God had entrusted him with the duty of governing.

To him, as a king, all his subjects owed homage and obedience. The lands and peoples which his ancestors had enclosed within the royal domain of France were his. The state was his dynastic property; apart from him and his dynasty, the state was nothing; it was unthinkable, even as land in the Middle Ages was unthinkable, without a lord. "*L'état, c'est moi*"—I am the state—was both theoretically and practically an entirely appropriate remark for Louis to have made.

To these royal ideas were added certain qualities which enabled Louis to stand before all Europe as the very type and pattern of what a king should be. In his policy, in the working of his government, in his own deportment, in the setting and form of his court, in short, in the entire use of his power, he set forth an example of kingship which has never been effaced, and which influenced most of his contemporary monarchs, and their dynastic successors, to imitate him. . . .

Endowed with no particular powers of intellect, educated as a typical nobleman of the seventeenth century, which is to say, instructed in manners and some soldiering, but with a minimum of book learning, Louis XIV developed

into a man of unusual capacity. He was a keen observer, and learned quickly the ways of men; he had excellent judgment, perfect self-control, and was thus able to become perhaps the best man in Europe at the highly complex game of diplomacy. No little acumen, sagacity, and finesse were necessary to match wits with the diplomats of his day. His prudence and poise contributed significantly to his diplomatic success. His devotion to what he called "the business of being a king"; his conscientiousness and hard work in this task; and above all, his pride in doing it better than anyone else, entitle him to great credit. His courtliness and charm in conversation and social contacts were unexcelled. In person, he was well built—though not tall enough to suit his dignity, so that he wore high, red heels; by some he was accounted "good-looking." Passionate and amorous, he allowed his desires full swing during his youth, but in the course of this indulgence he never forgot that he was king. . . .

The Cult of Majesty. A court provided the proper setting for majesty. Majesty was indispensable for a monarch by divine right. The king should be a fitting symbol of God, himself a sort of earthly image of the Deity. For this rôle, Louis was, in appearance and general bearing, not unworthy. He chose for his emblem the sun, and for his motto *nec pluribus impar*.¹⁰ In the sun he selected a token representing his own position as the earthly source of light and life. His motto implied a status second to none. His majesty was the "Sun King," and his subjects were to adore and reverence this majesty as the source of a divine order upon earth. "As the earth drew its life from the radiance of the sun, so the life of France emanated from his person." . . .

The generally accepted attitude of the time is expressed in the speeches and writings of Bossuet, one of the most conspicuous prelates of the French church. This "learned and upright bishop" wrote a book, *Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture*. Herein, he maintains that government itself was divinely ordained to enable man to live in organized society. "Under God, monarchy is, of all forms of government, the most usual, the most ancient, and therefore the most natural; it is likewise the strongest and most efficient, therefore the best." The king's person is sacred; it is blasphemy or sacrilege to conspire against him or to assail his person. He is to govern the state as a father governs his family. His power is absolute and autocratic; for he is accountable to God alone. "Greater reason is given to a king than to anyone else; the king is an earthly image of God's majesty, and it is wrong, therefore, to look upon him as a mere man. The king is a public person and in him the whole nation is embodied." He is the state in very truth. "As in God are united all perfection and every virtue, so all the

¹⁰ [No peer even among many.]

power of all the individuals in a community is united in the person of the king."

As the embodiment of majesty and earthly power, Louis was popular. The French were delighted with him, and other European people were impressed. He was *the king*: just what a king ought to be. It has been said that Louis XIV was the "greatest actor of majesty that ever filled a throne." . . . To us it seems absurd that a monarch, who is, after all, only a man, should rise from his bed every morning with a formal ceremony (*levee*) in which crowds of the highest dignitaries in the land performed the duties of valets. Princes and dukes handed him his underwear, shoes, shirts, and other garments; lesser lords and ladies pushed and shoved with eagerness to attain the great honor of simply being present! It seems ridiculous that this same formality and publicity should attend him at his meals, at most of his play, during his hours of work, and, finally, when he retired for the night. But it must be remembered that such formalities are inseparable from an office as exalted as that of a divine-right monarch. To impress his subjects, to create atmosphere, and to give a sense of reality to the claims which monarchy advanced, all these were necessary. That such procedure was impressive is undoubtedly true. It is still so. The glamor which attends a crown, the fascination which surrounds royalty, may be seen today in the interest of the masses of the British people in their own royal dynasty—not to mention the interest of the American people in the personal affairs of both European royalty and of their own citizens of "high degree." . . .

Versailles. Appropriate setting for king and court was created by Louis at the château of Versailles. Here, in what had been a barren wilderness, safely removed some nine miles from the turmoil and agitation of Paris and the common world, in a spot which would be sacred to majesty and to nothing else, majesty was embodied in brick and mortar. In perhaps no other historical instance are the names of monarch and his palace more frequently associated or, in this association, more imbued with meaning. Louis XIV can hardly be brought to mind without a mental picture of the vast buildings and gardens of Versailles. The survival of these buildings and parks, now dedicated "A Toutes les Gloires de la France," brings home to us, after more than two centuries, not only the tangible qualities of a real monarch by divine right, but also the identity of the monarch and the state—all the glories of France. . . .

It is not necessary to recount the statistics of Versailles to prove that the cost of creating it was enormous, or that the dimensions are in excess of those of any other castle or castle grounds in the world. To a king of Louis's grandi-

ose conceptions such surroundings must be worthy of his grandeur. They were. The palace became not only the seat of earthly majesty, the capital of the government of a kingdom, but also the residence of ten thousand people, a city in itself. Here resided not only the king and the royal family, but also the aristocracy of France who aspired to a part in the affairs of state. Not to be quartered in the palace was to be in exile. To be away from the king's presence was to be in banishment. Besides apartments for living, rooms for the conduct of business of the state and for grand ceremonials, there were a chapel, barracks, stables, museums, and other accommodations. The planning, construction, and decoration of this great structure was an historical incident in itself. The work was done by the most competent and skilful artists and craftsmen of the day, and, as a whole, it is a monument in the development of French art and taste.

Among the architects of Versailles were François Mansart (1598–1666), who has given his name to a type of roof of which we see numerous specimens everywhere in this country, and his nephew, Jules Hardouin-Mansart (1645–1708), whom Louis greatly admired and for whom he showed genuine affection. His was the guiding hand for most of what was done at Versailles. For the interior decoration François Le Brun (1619–90) was chiefly responsible. Paintings, frescoes, tapestries, bronzes, and sculptures were produced under his general direction. . . .

In style this huge palace is not, from the present-day point of view, generally accepted as interesting or impressive. Its chief note is the form and proportion reminiscent of classical architecture. Its impressiveness consists principally in its size; it has a façade of over a quarter of a mile in length. . . . Inside, the rooms in their original state were formal and imposing, richly decorated with wall and ceiling paintings recounting scenes of Louis's military, political, and cultural triumphs. . . .

Here at Versailles, surrounded by the magnificence of the château and the beauty of park, fountains, and gardens, reveled the leaders of France. Pomp and splendor, luxury and extravagance prevailed. Intrigue for the royal favor occupied many minds and much time, and gambling whiled away some of the hours; hunting, fêtes, and festivities filled the others. The natural tendency under these circumstances to vice and depravity was checked by the will and example of the king. A certain decorum and public decency were rigorously exacted. Morals were not high, it is true, but such standards as there were the king supported. No gentleman could cheat at cards and remain a moment at court. Sexual irregularities were not in themselves rigorously suppressed, but such offences as might become scandals were not tolerated.

It is not deniable that Louis's magnificence provoked universal admiration. Most of the kings and even the lesser princes and nobles of Europe endeavored, as far as their resources permitted, to reproduce Versailles, at least in miniature, on their own estates.

Everywhere the nobility rebuilt or extended their châteaux to the new pattern. A great industry [in] beautiful and elaborate fabrics and furnishings developed. The luxurious arts flourished everywhere; sculpture in alabaster, faience, gilt wood-work, metal work, stamped leather, much music, magnificent painting and buildings, fine cookery, fine vintages. Amidst the mirrors and fine furniture went a strange race of "gentlemen" in vast powdered wigs, silks, and laces, poised upon high, red heels, supported by amazing canes; and still more wonderful "ladies," under towers of powdered hair and wearing vast expansions of silk and satin sustained on wire. Through it all postured the great Louis, the sun of his world—unaware of the meager and sulky and bitter faces that watched him from the lower darknesses to which his sunshine did not penetrate.

From Versailles emanated the dress, manners, speech, and fashions of civilized Europe. The court, comprising a significant portion of the higher nobility of France, became the leaders of these manifestations of culture, and furnished the living decorations for its brilliance. The life of this court was resplendent with gaiety, extravagance, and irresponsibility. Devoted to pleasure, flattery, and intrigue, the courtiers were subjected, in their morals and character naturally enough, to a steady deterioration. Out of contact with their provincial estates, deprived of any political duties, and by special privilege exempt from the burdens of taxation and public responsibilities alike, these nobles of France became social parasites. Instead of serving as the natural leaders of the people of France, mediating between the crown and its subjects, they wasted their resources, abilities, and time in the extravagance of trying to keep up appearances at court, of gambling with the king, and of maintaining their social prestige. Possibly the king deliberately encouraged this emasculation of his greatest subjects. By inciting them to live at Versailles he assuredly confined them to a gilded cage, and destroyed their capacity for independence or for opposition to the crown. His own glory was thereby enhanced; by contrast, the noblest peers of France were weak, impoverished, and insignificant. As to the result, it has been frequently pointed out that this destruction of the free spirit and self-reliance of the most intelligent and capable element in France contributed to the causes of the Revolution. When the crisis of the eighteenth century arrived the nobles, demoralized, financially embarrassed, and without initiative, were unable to serve either the king or the people or, in fact, to save themselves.

Versailles also served to remove the king from contact with his people and

with public opinion. It eventually became a symbol of extravagance and waste, of Bourbon selfishness and royal tyranny. It was not surprising that after the meeting of the Estates-General in 1789, one of the early manifestations of revolutionary violence should have been the transfer of the king and court from Versailles, and its associations hateful to the people, to Paris, where France at last acquired possession of her monarchy.

Government by Council. In the machinery of Louis's government we may see how the monarch by divine right translated his theories into action. After the death of Cardinal Mazarin in 1661 the chief ministers of state came to the king, the young Louis XIV, to inquire of whom they should henceforth seek their instructions. It had hitherto been the practice of French kings to delegate most of the business of governing to a chief or first minister, who held his office as long as the king pleased, who instructed the other ministers, and who formulated general policies for the king's approval. To the surprise of the ministers and the court, Louis announced that he would be his own first minister and that he would actually oversee the workings of the government himself. This involved an enormous amount of routine, long conferences, dull inspection of details, endless interviews. Most kings preferred an easier life. Not so the indefatigable Sun King. He would govern as well as reign.

The most important matters of the kingdoms were discussed by the king with four or five of his chief councillors in a meeting which occurred three times a week. This group was known as the Council of State (*Conseil d'Etat*, also called the *Conseil d'en haut*, High or Supreme Council) and was the pivot of the whole government. Affairs of greatest weight were here discussed, everyone taking part, but the decision rested solely and absolutely with the king. Hence, the absolute monarchy. This council exercised no limitation upon the power of the king, nor was there any limitation as to what it should decide, except as the king willed. It did not rest upon any precedent, tradition, or custom, and did not acquire a constitutional position as did similar councils in other countries. It was the creation of the king and depended entirely upon his will. No records of meetings were kept.

Secondly, there was a similar body, or committee, known as the *Conseil des Dépêches* (Council of Dispatches), meeting under the presidency of the king, in which matters relating to the internal or domestic problems of France were considered. This corresponded to the British Home Office, or, slightly, to the American Department of the Interior. A third council, the *Conseil des Finances*, was devoted to matters of taxation and revenue. In all three of these bodies, which met in the king's apartments, he himself presided and rendered the final decision. There were no questions of majority votes or

minority opposition. The king's will was law. Other councils existed, at which the king occasionally presided, but these dealt with matters less vitally concerning the government as a whole. The most important of these was the *Conseil Privé* (Privy Council or Council of Parties), which was primarily a judicial committee, vague in its scope, but in general acting as a sort of supreme judicial court. There were also councils for commerce, for colonies, and for religious affairs.

Working through these councils, the authority of the king was felt in all spheres of the government, both central and local. Thus was completed the work of Richelieu, who, through his employment of the intendants, officials responsible directly to the crown, began the task of subordinating to the central government every phase of provincial and local government. Provincial governors under Louis XIV became mere figureheads; the intendant in each province was, subject to instructions from a council or minister, all-powerful. Provincial estates, groups representing by classes or estates—*i.e.*, nobles, clergy, bourgeoisie—the interests of the provinces (some of which had been in existence since medieval times), were strictly subjected to the crown and were completely subordinated to the direction of the intendant. Provincial parlements, courts of law, also lost much of their independence and importance. Even town governments, which had, since the days when they received certain liberties in their medieval charters, exercised a measure of local self-control, lost to the intendant most of their autonomy. Town offices which were hereditary were on two occasions revoked by the king and sold again at high prices to new bidders. In this manner did the absolute monarchy centralize the control of France, a centralization which has persisted, and even under a republican form of government is regarded by many Frenchmen as one of the most serious defects in the political life of France today. . . .

If an absolute monarch can create about him a group of loyal and efficient ministers with an *esprit de corps*, or an effective aristocracy which can be perpetuated through heredity and thus provide the material for a bureaucracy with coherence and momentum, the efficiency of absolutism may perhaps be transmitted from generation to generation. The very nature of absolutism, however, prevents just this conjunction of factors. As in the case of Louis XIV, the absolute king fears powerful and highly competent men near his throne; he can tolerate none who may become rivals in any fashion, none who may lessen the luster of his own brilliance. Louis, it is true, inherited from his predecessor a number of able servants who became ministers of signal attainment. He allowed no one of them to rise to independent power or influence; none of them, for example, was ever invested with the title of first minister,

High titles, which suggested traditional greatness and former power in the state, were one by one eliminated. No more Grand Admirals of France; no more High Constables; no more Cardinal dukes as first ministers. After the first generation of Louis's best ministers had departed, their places were filled by lesser men of no outstanding merits. . . . In some ways the most important was Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619-83), who came very near to being a great statesman.

Colbert's service to France was chiefly economic, although he is also to be remembered as a master organizer in the general field of administration and as a zealous patron of intellectual interests. He virtually created the modern French navy and made an important contribution toward the codification of French law. As a financial reformer, however, and as a leader in the development of French industry and commerce, he is chiefly celebrated. He established order in the accounts of the royal revenue, increased the sources of the revenue, and improved the method of its collection. It was the success of these financial measures that made possible the glory of Louis XIV. . . . It is possible, also, that without the vigor and impetus which Colbert injected into the royal finance, France could not have averted, until 1789, the inevitable crash of revolution. In encouraging manufactures, protecting them with tariffs and other regulations, introducing new industries, building roads and canals he gave French life new energy. In supporting trading companies, ship-building, and the development of colonies he created new spheres for this energy, and in the navy gave it a protecting force. Had Louis XIV and the nobility appreciated this "offer of Colbert" to make France the richest and most powerful economic state of Europe, it is conceivable that Louis's glory might have been more enduring.

Defects of Absolute Monarchy. In its outward show and glamor, the Grand Monarchy was deceptive. By frittering away the income of the state on the superficial brilliance of Versailles, by the corruption of the nobility, and by the policy of endless rivalries with other dynasties, Louis XIV drained France of her strength. The solid and unpretentious triumphs of peace were neglected for the spectacular and bloody feats of diplomacy and arms. Pomp and vanity of a dynasty overwhelmed the substantial, humdrum welfare of the masses of the people. Beneath the surface of courtly splendor and military heroics, the elements of disaster were accumulating. What we call the "abuses" of the Old Regime were becoming increasingly intolerable. The peasants, burdened with a disproportionate share of the taxes, harassed by petty exactions such as salt taxes and other survivals of feudal usage and by humiliating inferiorities; the bourgeoisie, also unjustly taxed but growing increasingly resentful,

more and more stimulated by the ideas of the critics and less and less willing to submit to the social and political inferiority thrust upon them by the aristocracy; the general inefficiency of the government in alleviating the conditions of these "abuses"; the exemptions and privileges extended to certain classes and officials; the slowness and expense of courts of justice; the petty tyrannies of officials; the obstacles to the free course of trade and industry, such as guilds, tolls and regulations—all these defects were present in the government of Louis XIV. Worse, however, than their existence was the fact that the administration of so great and powerful a monarch made no serious attempt to grapple with them and improve the conditions under which they prevailed. Quite the contrary, monarchy aggravated them with more and more burdens—more wars, more glory, more mistresses and pensions and, finally, with religious intolerance.

Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Since 1598, when the popular Henry of Navarre (Henry IV) had granted the French Protestants (Huguenots) the right to practice their own religious worship, to have towns and fortresses in which they might guarantee their freedom, and to share in the offices of the state, they had been molested only by Richelieu's attack on their exceptional political privileges. Their fortified towns and other special privileges were taken away, but in their religious affairs they had been reasonably free from persecution. Economically, the Huguenots had prospered; they were particularly active in industry. Mostly of the bourgeois and artisan classes, they were thrifty tradesmen and craftsmen, hard-working and in general honest and loyal. They constituted perhaps less than ten percent of the whole population, but nonetheless a valuable element.

Their independence in religious matters, however, irked the king. Ardent Catholics of course regarded them as heretics and were always on the lookout for an opportunity to suppress their heresy. In Louis XIV these Catholics found a willing and active supporter. To a monarch who prided himself upon his divine right, and especially upon his absolute authority, it was annoying that a section of his subjects should be so irreverent as to think differently upon religious matters from their august and divinely inspired master. Louis was extremely devout and pious, despite his indifference to moral restraints in actual conduct. He was undoubtedly sincere in his detestation of heresy, but his pride was even more touched by the thought of Huguenot non-conformity. It is even possible, moreover, that in favoring an attack upon Huguenot heresy, Louis was urged by other motives. In his last mistress (ultimately his wife), Madame de Maintenon, he found a guide who seriously tried to direct his interests to a better appreciation of religion. It is even pos-

sible that he may have felt that operations against heretics would be a sort of penance, a righteous amend for the scandals of his own earlier life. He may also have recalled that he had many times opposed the pope in diplomatic affairs, and considered a rigorous measure against heretics an acceptable makeweight in relations with the Holy Father.

Convinced, at any rate, that Protestantism should be eliminated and that religious unity was as desirable as political unity, Louis XIV began one of the most serious mistakes of his reign. At first the Huguenots were deprived of all privileges not directly accorded to them in law; they were excluded from public offices and many of the professions. Then efforts were made to convert Protestant communities to Catholicism, either by preaching or by applying the law that children at seven years of age could select their own religion. It was not always difficult, with the suitable inducements, to tempt a child to declare his conversion. Legal penalties could be exacted from parents who interfered with such a conversion. By 1681 came the use of the dragonnades to hasten conversions. This consisted in quartering dragoons, soldiers often of the most brutal and licentious type, upon peaceful Protestant households, exposing them to insult and even crime. Fear of these terrible dragonnades drove many Protestants into at least a superficial conversion. The king and his devout adviser, Madame de Maintenon, were delighted to receive long lists of these conversions. Zealots sought to curry royal favor by submitting such evidences of conformity. Louis was doubtless led to think, before long, that there were few heretics; he knew little, of course, of the horrible details of enforced conversions; he had no means of knowing whether or not the lists of converts submitted to him were genuine. It seemed to him that the few Huguenots remaining dispensed with the necessity of keeping the Edict of Nantes in force as a law. Hence in 1685 came the revocation of this celebrated edict. After this no Protestant worship could be legally held in France. Huguenot pastors were banished and all Protestant churches closed.

At once it became apparent that by no means all the Huguenots had been converted; hundreds of thousands, it now was revealed, had not conformed to the king's religious views. But nothing was done to remedy the situation. Legally Protestantism did not exist; its devotees were deprived of the protection of law and were hounded from one injustice and abuse to another. None was permitted by law to leave France. Catholics rejoiced; flatterers congratulated Louis that now at last he was king and told him that this was the greatest act of his reign. The outcome, however, was quite otherwise than great or encouraging. It was necessary to employ the dragonnades more terribly than ever. Many Protestants were imprisoned or sent to living deaths

in the galleys, and thousands, in spite of the law, fleeing from this scourge of persecution, sought refuge abroad. Over two hundred thousand, it is estimated, left France, thus taking away some of the most valuable labor, skill, and thrift the nation possessed.

To England, Holland, and Brandenburg they went—even overseas to the English colonies in America and to the Dutch colony in South Africa. They carried abilities, especially industrial and commercial, and helped not only to develop the economic strength of the potential enemies of France but also to stimulate fear of Louis XIV and dread of his religious intolerance. It is not without significance that in the First World War, high officials in the German Army and Navy bore such names as von François and Souchon. Even in France the persecution did not succeed. Although they lost over half of their numbers, the Huguenots continued in their obstinacy. In the south, particularly, they persisted. . . . It was not until shortly before the Revolution, in 1789, that they secured, once more, a decent toleration. . . .

Summary. . . . The reign of Louis XIV occurred at the moment when the trend toward absolute monarchy had reached its fullest development. Accepted by the age as a monarchy by divine right, it became, in the hands of Louis, completely realized. In his person, in his court at Versailles, in the government of councils, in his policy of aggrandizing his dynasty Louis exemplified the theories and ideas of absolute monarchy. His diplomatic and military ambitions in the interest of his dynasty forced Europe, as we shall see, into combinations against him to preserve the balance of power. The cost of these policies and his revocation of the Edict of Nantes helped to undermine the strength and resources of his kingdom, providing ultimately for the eighteenth-century trend toward revolution.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE REIGN OF LOUIS XIV

The Advent of Modern Diplomacy. . . . It was on the threshold of the Age of Louis XIV that the first formal recognition of the existence of modern states appeared. By the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 the new order of Europe's political units, the dynastic states, was definitely and officially established.

Among these new units a new kind of relationship came about. Antiquity with its various empires or city states, the medieval period with its spiritual dominion of the papacy, its Holy Roman Empire, and its feudalism—all had possessed nothing precisely resembling the dynastic state of the Renaissance and modern times. Both the Roman Empire and its ghostly successor, the Holy Roman Empire, as well as the papacy, were theoretically universal dominions transcending such units as states and giving no scope to relations

such as those between states. Rivalries and conflicts were perhaps the first relations of the new states with one another; there were comparatively few customs or principles, other than those of war, according to which intercourse between states could be conducted. By the time of the Treaty of Westphalia, however, it became apparent that if the states of Europe were to continue to exist, if they were to avoid destruction through exhausting conflicts, or if they were to prevent their own absorption by a single conquering power, they must learn to live, for some of the time, at peace; war must become the exceptional and not the normal condition of the Continent. Relations must ordinarily be those of negotiation and not war. Negotiations must be those of diplomacy and not of arms.

As a basis for such relations there must naturally be some generally accepted principles or usages which could be maintained between states. There must arise customs or laws which would become international. The devastating effect of war between the dynastic states was brought home to Europe by the long struggle between the Hapsburgs and the Valois (who were ultimately supplanted by the Bourbons, both being branches of the Capetian dynasty), a struggle the first phase of which extended from 1494 to 1559. The Thirty Years War (1618–48) still further ravaged Europe and drew into its wastage nearly all the states of the Continent. The cruelty and suffering of these scourges began at last to make an impression on the European mind and first led to attempts to formulate rules for mitigating the horrors of war. Protection for non-combatants, care for the wounded, and restraint of sacking and pillaging constituted the early efforts. Such needs slowly led to more ambitious attempts at providing rules or general principles for the conduct of states, for if nations were to remain normally at peace, questions of non-combatants, wounded, sack, and pillage would be less frequently raised.

Significantly enough, the first conspicuous effort of this kind was a treatise published in 1625, during the course of the Thirty Years War. It was entitled *De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace)*. Its author, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), has come to be acclaimed as the father of international law. Other men of course had prepared the way, as is almost always the case for the advent of epoch-making changes. A Dominican, Francisco de Vitoria (1486–1546), and a Jesuit, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), had set forth thoughtful analyses of human needs transcending the boundaries of states and of the nature of law between states. Alberico Gentile (1552–1608), a heretic under condemnation of the Inquisition, wrote a treatise called *De Jure Belli*, in which he drew upon both Civil and Canon law to define the laws of war and peace. But higher than both of these authorities, he found in the *Jus*

Naturae (The Law of Nature) the ultimate form of righteousness, the highest common sense of mankind. Nature, or common sense, would hold that peace and not war should prevail. Gentile grasped, as a whole, the nature of the relations of states to one another and distinguished these relations as international problems, different from all other legal relationships.

It was the work of Grotius, nonetheless, which first attracted widespread attention and exerted a distinct influence upon the subsequent development of international law. He made the first influential attempt to define a principle of right which should govern the relations of states; he sought for a basis for human society outside the Church or the Bible by establishing it on a foundation of morality and justice. Nature herself provides such a fundamental law, as immutable and true as the very principles which control the existence of the universe itself. The reputation of Grotius's work has been more widespread and more enduring, perhaps, than that ever enjoyed by any other legal treatise.

Somewhat later, in 1672, appeared Pufendorf's *On the Law of Nature and Nations* (Samuel Pufendorf, 1632-94). This work reinforced the earlier productions of Gentile and Grotius and definitely created a basis among civilized states for new conceptions as to their relations. The true state of Nature, said Pufendorf, is not war but peace. Peace is indeed feeble and insecure and must be fortified by law to preserve mankind. International law is not restricted to Christendom but constitutes a common bond between all nations because all nations form a part of humanity. Wars should be waged only for just motives and not for defense. Force alone should not regulate the relations of peoples. To observe treaties is the wisest practice and should be the greatest strength of kings.

To point out that a growth of ideas or principles called international law accompanied the growth of states is not to assert that the states obeyed or even observed this body of law. Far from it. The creation of the states, as we have observed, was largely a process of force, by which kings subjected vassals and neighbors and thus conquered their kingdoms. It was not strange, then, that in their relations with other kingdoms kings for a long time employed chiefly force, sometimes tempered with guile, in seeking their ends. Among early modern states relations were, as among the political units of antiquity, normally relations of hostility. . . .

Diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV. In no respect is the preeminence of France during the seventeenth century more clearly to be seen than in the influence which Louis XIV and his policy exerted upon the development of diplomacy. One of the first requisites of communications between states is a medium of expression, *i.e.*, a language. Latin had been the international

language on the eve of the appearance of the modern states, but with the Renaissance, vernacular speech and literature gradually replaced Latin. Diplomacy began to be practised contemporaneously with the rise of France to European prominence. The French language moreover was at the same time acquiring a wide reputation for its inherent excellence and for the literature in which it was embodied. The king of France was practising diplomacy in a grand and masterly fashion. French interests were actively manifested all over the world, and the French language became, during the seventeenth century, indisputably the most widespread and most frequently used of any of the modern languages. . . .

As the France of Louis XIV thus supplied a language for diplomacy, so the policy and influence of her monarch provided a pattern and a fashion for the conduct of diplomacy.

The seventeenth is the great century of French diplomacy. Never did the diplomats of the Most Christian King exercise greater prestige, hold a firmer or more vigorous tone; never did they display greater skill. Their activity was incomparable. Their role was of the first rank. They were charged with the negotiation of princely alliances, with the task of making partition treaties. In an age when states were considered as the patrimony of reigning families, when the fate of peoples was regulated by the convenience of sovereigns, without even consulting their subjects, the diplomats had in their hands, even more perhaps than the military men, the destinies of history.

These diplomats in the service of Louis XIV were of two general kinds. First, there were the great nobles whose functions were purely ceremonial. Dukes, counts, and marshals would be sent on missions to represent the king in paying formal visits and in conveying royal sentiments. Secondly, there was the much more important group of envoys who were sent to reside at other courts.

These men were usually lawyers or administrative officials of experience who could be depended upon to carry out their instructions effectively, intelligently, and faithfully. . . . To accomplish their ends they could not be overscrupulous; they must use spying, themselves, and bribery was regularly expected of them. For the latter purpose "secret service" funds were placed at their disposal. Frequently French agents as well as those of other countries bought and sold votes in the electoral body which chose the Holy Roman Emperor. Most of the German states in fact were notorious as a field for diplomatic bribery. No one could resist the seduction of French money. "Little princes incessantly held out their hands, the greater princes their hats."

French interests were so extensive and French prestige was so exalted that the manifold activities of Louis XIV required a numerous diplomatic staff.

A tradition of excellence in this service was built up which not only furnished France with trained men but which also gave all the European states a model. Louis himself, as we have seen, was a diplomat of the first rank, possessing preeminently the qualities which are set down as most necessary. Smooth and attractive manners, shrewdness, and the art of using personal influence in managing men, becoming dress, polish, dignity, and tact were peculiarly associated with Louis XIV. Inasmuch as these qualities were commonly acquired at court, Versailles was an effective training school. The tone of the profession was decidedly aristocratic and few monarchs could excel Louis in imparting such a tone. . . .

To what end was the diplomacy of the Sun King directed? To what purposes was his powerful army directed? Answers to these questions may be very complex or relatively simple. If we enter upon a detailed examination of the diplomatic combinations, intrigues, partition treaties, and other international relations of the period from 1661 to 1715, we shall find a veritable maze, wherein it is difficult to follow the main threads of the historical strand. If, however, we observe the general status of the countries of Europe at this time and then ask what their governments were trying to do, particularly what Louis XIV was trying to do in connection with these states, we shall discern certain outstanding, comparatively simple factors. . . .

Taken as a whole, we may say that most of these European states fall into two groups according to the type of policy pursued by their governments. One group comprised the states which were struggling to defend their territories and independence; their policy might be described as passive, non-aggressive, and self-contained. The other group comprised the states aggressively endeavoring to expand their possessions and power. Generally speaking, Spain, most of the German states, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and most of the Italian states were on the defensive, trying to maintain the *status quo*. France, Russia, the Turks, and, among the German states, Brandenburg-Prussia especially were ambitiously on the offensive, aiming to expand territorially and seeking more prestige and power. The Hapsburgs were in a sense in both groups; *i.e.*, they were forced to be on the defensive by the nature of their dominions, their location, and the enterprise of their neighbors; at the same time the Hapsburgs were ambitious, grasping, and aggressive. Their whole history is a maze of contradictions and inconsistencies, and it is not surprising to find them, paradoxically enough, in both groups of states. England hardly belongs in either category. She had no aggressive Continental designs and stood, on the Continent, more or less on the defensive. She was concerned in the maintenance of the balance of power and desired to see no

state acquire a hegemony, nor did she intend to allow any strong state to lodge on the shore of the Low Countries. Economically, however, and in the colonial world England was just beginning to take the initiative in acquisition. In these fields she was about to become decidedly aggressive.

What constitutes the explanation of such a difference between these seventeenth-century states? Why should the policy of one group be defensive and of the other aggressive? Certainly we may assume that as far as being eager for the glory and spoils of military victory is concerned, one state would be as prepared as any other to gain as much as possible. Limitations of size and resources, the weakness of their governments, and the proximity of strong neighbors compelled many of them to remain on the defensive. What led the others to an aggressive policy? In other words why were the larger and more powerful states constantly at war or ready to fight? We must remember that most of the European states of the seventeenth century were controlled by dynasties, nearly absolute in power, and fortified by what they believed to be divine right. These dynasties could therefore conduct the policy of states as they saw fit. No consultation with their subjects was necessary, although it was true of course that important interests such as industry and commerce could at least present their desires to the sovereigns.

What was it that these dynastic kings pursued in their policies of state? For what purpose did they assume that God allowed them to reign over their respective states? Obviously the answer given by any of them might have been: to protect their lands and peoples, to maintain law and order, to dispense justice, and to provide for the general welfare of their subjects. Such duties, we should say, as belonged to any government. Our search, however, is directed to the discovery of what these kings considered to be this *general welfare*. In this crucial question we find a most important bearing upon the whole history of royal dynasties, as well as of modern states. Seventeenth-century dynasties by divine right were commonly given to confusing the welfare of states and peoples with their own personal and family interests and ambitions, regarding them, in fact as identical. What was good for the dynasty was good for the state. . . .

Power was undoubtedly the principal ambition of dynasties—power and what it implies in exalted position, enviable influence and the consciousness of controlling men and resources. . . . Mercantilist ideas undoubtedly convinced seventeenth-century monarchs of the validity of these conceptions of power. Mercantilists held that more land and people implied more resources and labor, consequently more trade and precious metal, and ultimately more

power for the state. A policy for power was clearly one of the characteristics of seventeenth-century absolute monarchy.

Man's very ancient tradition of what constitutes human greatness, namely, triumph by physical might, glory in martial victory—a special survival of feudal and chivalric sense of honor and glory—and the imposition by force of one will on another, must be reckoned as another potent consideration of the kings as to what constituted the welfare of the state. Proud of their achievement in state-making, dynastic monarchs could feel the vigor of their new strength and, as ambitious, overbearing, and quarrelsome individuals, could use their strength in seeking what glory they would. . . . Their nobles, affected by similar traditions and instincts, readily followed. Their people also followed—and paid.

Guided by such considerations, policies of state were framed during the seventeenth century. The monarchs of the strong states could act with positive vigor, interpreting the welfare of their dominions in an aggressive fashion. Weaker states must be content with a more passive, defensive policy. France, as we have observed, was uncontestedly the most powerful of European states, and her monarch keenly sensitive of his preeminence. To Louis XIV, power, glory, and triumphs in arms were a consuming passion. At times his judgment and policy were subordinated to these influences. He was not, however, always so foolish as to abandon a sense of what was fundamentally for the welfare of France. Yet at other times the glory of the Bourbon dynasty led him, as in the case of the Spanish succession, into a war in which his dynasty would in all probability be much more benefited than his people. As a whole the foreign policy of Louis XIV developed through two important phases. The first was concerned with the security of France, the second with the aggrandizement of dynastic power. The first covered the period from 1661 to 1697 and entailed three great wars. The second covered the period from 1702 to 1713 and was devoted to a great war for making a Bourbon the lord of the Spanish inheritance. . . .

In the end, Louis gained little but the empty satisfaction of seeing his grandson, Philip V, king of Spain. It is true that Spain was subsequently much under French influence, but the resources of Spain were so depleted that this was not of great assistance to France. The Spanish succession did not come to France; the balance of power was maintained. Besides the cost of the war, France lost valuable colonial opportunities to England. These later proved to be for England stepping stones for imperial successes against France. In the Treaty of Utrecht [1713] England acquired from Spain

Gibraltar and Minorca and an entrance to Spain's colonial trade (the *Asiento*). From Louis XIV she gained Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and the Hudson Bay region, ominous signs of what was later to happen to the promising beginnings of a French empire in the heart of North America.

Thus ended, in war and diplomacy, the Age of Louis XIV. France had been led by her Sun King to a pinnacle of power and glory. Everywhere her influence in diplomacy and arms had been felt and her example copied. French ideas and French policies were universally adopted, respected, and feared. Finally, however, came a check to all this greatness. Louis XIV had attempted too much. Ambition and dynastic pride led to excessive drain upon the strength of the state and made possible the beginning of a progressive decline which ultimately worked into revolution.

Chapter X

ABSOLUTISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE



DURING THE FIRST four decades of the seventeenth century England appeared to be following the same general pattern of political development that was bringing into existence the strong centralized monarchies of Continental Europe. Though hampered by a tradition that made their task far from easy, the first two Stuart kings, James I (1603–25) and Charles I (1625–49), had gradually whittled away the independent authority of certain institutions that stood in the way of a strong and effective kingship. By the year 1637 the most important of these institutions—the medieval two-house Parliament, made up of Lords and Commons, and the courts of the common law—had, for all effective purposes, been brought under the control of the crown; and the reigning monarch, Charles I, could congratulate himself that he had such a government in England as few of his ancestors had known. At that moment it would have been hard to foresee a January day twelve years later when this same King Charles would kneel beneath the headsman's axe on a scaffold before Whitehall palace, or a night in December forty years further on when Charles's son would leave England forever as an ignominious fugitive. For the years lying between the apogee of Stuart power and the last of these events were to give to England that political distinctiveness that has marked it off from the rest of Europe since the end of the seventeenth century.

The history of this development is one of turmoil. Civil war, dictatorship, a restored monarchy, and, finally, revolution once again were all a part of the pattern—with long periods of quiescence in between, for the century was not entirely given over to chaos. The issue that had to be settled by all of these writhings of the English body politic had many aspects, but essentially it involved the determination of one important question: where in the state did the sovereign power—the ultimate residuum of political authority—finally lie? On its political side the struggle to settle this question took the form of a long contest between the crown and the most important of its own institu-

tional creations, the Parliament. The customary way of describing the dénouement of this conflict is to say that by the end of the seventeenth century the doctrine of "parliamentary supremacy" had been established, that England had ceased to be a state where all effective political power remained in the hands of a single executive, the king, and had become instead a constitutional monarchy where the king's official acts were limited by the power of a sovereign legislature. The term "constitutional monarchy" must, however, be understood in its late seventeenth-century context. The settlement of 1689 did not—and was not intended—to reduce the crown to such complete parliamentary subservience that English kings thereby became mere constitutional showpieces. English monarchs retained their distinct executive functions but with the partly unspoken understanding that they would exercise them within the framework of certain broad and rather vague limitations that had been passed into law by Parliament as a part of what was called the Revolution Settlement. The long evolution of English kingship from that position to its present one belongs not to the seventeenth century but to those centuries which followed after.

Nonetheless, the spadework of bitter preparation that preceded 1689 was of fundamental importance for this later evolution. War and revolution had first to alter the bases on which the monarchy had been established for centuries before the later development could begin; for the whole of English legal tradition as well as political custom provided a setting for the kingly office that had to be changed almost completely before the king's power could be limited even to the extent that it was in 1689. Let us turn now to a brief examination of certain of the historical elements that made this change possible.

THE LEGACY OF THE TUDORS

At the death of Elizabeth, last ruler of the Tudor dynasty, on March 25, 1603, the English crown passed to the Stuarts, the royal house of Scotland. With it went a legacy of strong kingship that had been built up steadily in the period of almost one hundred and eighteen years since the first Tudor, Henry VII, had won the crown on Bosworth Field. From the disorder of feudal anarchy that Henry found at the end of the fifteenth century England had passed to the relative internal stability of the first years of the seventeenth century.

The process by which this change had been accomplished was closely connected with the success of the crown in broadening the bases of its power and focusing upon itself the loyalties of diverse groups within the nation. Through-

out the sixteenth century the royal prerogative—a vague term used to describe the full legal powers of the crown—had entered into areas where its authority had not been known to the same extent before. The greatest extension of Tudor power had occurred when the church was absorbed into the framework of the state and the sovereign thus became chief magistrate in all things, spiritual as well as temporal. In other ways, however, the pervasiveness of Tudor rule was equally evident. From year to year the jurisdiction of those courts of law that depended upon the crown directly for their legal existence was expanded to include an ever-widening cognizance of the affairs of Englishmen. In some instances new prerogative courts were actually created where none had been before. All of them, whether old or new, sapped the foundations of the older common-law system and its tradition of virtual autonomy that had made it so difficult to bend to the royal will. Moreover, the very customs on which the common law was based were themselves reshaped or swept away by a flood of statute law poured out by the generally compliant Tudor Parliaments.

The Tudor system of government, for all of its quasi-absolute and often ruthless appearance, was not unpopular. The very fact of parliamentary subservience in most important matters is indicative of the way in which Tudor policies and the desires of the most important political and social elements in English society often coincided. This happy conjunction was the result of several things: a desire for social and political stability following the tumults of the late fifteenth century, a political skill that seemed to inhere in the Tudor line of rulers, the menace of external invasion during Elizabeth's latter years, and, it must be admitted, an obvious measure of good luck. The queen was fortunate in having to rule over a country that was expanding both materially and culturally but whose growth had not yet given rise to tensions capable of straining the existing political order. In retrospect her reign would be remembered as "a golden age."

Even during Elizabeth's lifetime, however, there were signs below the political surface of things that all was not as calm as it seemed. There was serious religious discontent among irreconcilable Protestant extremists on the one hand and obdurate Catholics on the other. Mutterings against the crown's practice of granting rights for the sale of certain items of trade to favored licensees in return for money payments were to lead to at least one serious outburst in Parliament before the queen's death. Ireland was the scene of a protracted rebellion that forecast the future growth of a perennial "Irish problem." All of these difficulties were in some measure traceable to one fundamental problem that had developed with the centralization of royal

power. As in other national monarchies, the increase in royal authority was a phenomenon resulting from the growing complexities of sixteenth-century society. With the breakdown of feudal localism and the gradual disappearance of its institutions, the crown, as the one great institution capable of carrying on the public functions of society, encompassed a greater number and variety of administrative responsibilities. Not only were new burdens accepted by the state, but the older and relatively simpler obligations of medieval kingship—the maintenance of public peace, the dispensation of the king's justice, and the defense of the realm—were increased and broadened enormously. Tudor sovereigns accepted a responsibility for every side of their subjects' lives. Theirs, quite literally, was a legal power to determine the fate of every Englishman and his well-being from the cradle to the grave and, as masters of the church, even beyond. The intellectual justification for such a system was based upon a belief that the social order of the nation was organic in its form and consisted of interdependent parts, all of which worked in harmony with one another. Its apologists saw in the human body their best illustration of the functioning of such a social organism; and, as the human body could tolerate no alien growth, neither could the body politic tolerate the "ill humours" of diversity and dissent. In a society so conceived and constituted the government needed two things above all else in order to function successfully. It needed, first of all, an unlimited coercive power to deal with dissenters of every complexion; and it also needed financial resources beyond anything previously known in history. With the Tudors the first of these two needs was easily satisfied. The second was to prove an insoluble problem that would finally destroy the system of government they had so laboriously builded; for, by the end of the sixteenth century, the fiscal system on which they and later Stuart kings depended for the maintenance and expansion of governmental function was completely and almost hopelessly inadequate.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

Matters had come to this pass because of the way in which the English monarchy had developed from the twelfth century onward. Like some other European states during this period, the English state was an anomaly that partook of two natures: in certain of its legal aspects it was the private, personal instrument of the king by which he governed the realm as a kind of huge personal estate; at the same time it was a depersonalized, public, corporate entity very similar to more recent systems of government in its concern for something broadly defined as the public well-being. Under law the English king was simultaneously a person who, as chief landlord of England

according to ancient feudal right, could govern the kingdom for his own personal ends and a symbolic being—a legal fiction—who personified the nation. In England, however, the anomaly was further complicated by the fact that kings from the days of the Norman Conquest had been far more successful in maintaining their legal position as chief landlords of the realm than had any of their Continental fellow rulers. By gradually extending their feudal authority, they had built up and expanded the branches of an administration within the royal household that helped, over a long period of time, to create the notion that the kingship was also a public institution. With time, too, many of these administrative branches of the household developed traditions and practices that made their functions appear to be independent of the crown. As a result of this autonomous growth, English kings often found themselves in situations where their personal rights and public responsibilities conflicted; and it was this conflict, fundamentally, that lay at the root of all the difficulties that were to arise in the seventeenth century.

In many ways the problem of crown revenues was the heart of the matter. The king's difficulties in this connection stemmed from the fact that the most important part of his regular income, which enabled him to function in both his public and private capacities, was drawn from sources he possessed in his private capacity only. The greater part of the royal revenue was made up of rents from the crown lands or estates, known as the "ancient demesne," that comprised the king's personal holdings. The king, to use an oft-quoted fifteenth-century phrase, was expected to "live of his own." That part of his revenue which was more like modern public taxation and took the form of grants and subsidies voted by Parliament was to be used, according to legal theory, only for extraordinary needs that might arise in times of emergency. Under such circumstances, the growing administrative responsibilities of the crown as a public institution and the costs of government that followed the index of rising prices in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries increasingly strained the crown's private resources and forced it to resort to others that were customarily reserved for extraordinary purposes. Since, by a rather vaguely defined custom, most of these other resources were considered to be within the cognizance of Parliament—the most important institutional creation of the medieval monarchy—English rulers were forced to deal with that body more and more frequently as their financial difficulties increased in scope.

Translated into political terms this financial tension was to lead to a struggle for power between the monarch, striving to balance the expenses of government by converting his extraordinary sources of income into regular, pre-

dictable revenues, and Parliament, whose members were content to let the old system continue. The conflict was peculiarly aggravated by the fact that the crown in extending its authority so as to comprehend, in one way or another, virtually every aspect of English life had aroused the latent hostility of many dissident groups for political, economic, or religious reasons—and, often enough, for a combination of all three. These groups, many of whom were represented in Parliament or had great influence there, formed the basis of opposition that was to alter the existing constitutional arrangements by which the machinery of government functioned. In this way also, Parliament, to the virtual exclusion of every other institution, was to become the center of resistance to certain royal policies throughout the seventeenth century.

Before concluding our discussion of the central problem of seventeenth-century English constitutionalism it might be well to say a bit more about the constitutional arrangements under which the state functioned. Unfortunately, there was not then (and to a large extent there is not now) a set of organic, written laws that could be described as the "English Constitution." Before 1640 almost every political theorist would have agreed that the king possessed a final authority in all matters pertaining to the commonweal, though there was much disagreement as to whether or not this authority was circumscribed by certain legal and historical precedents. The supporters of the common law or of parliamentary custom both argued that the king was limited in his decisions by a legal system and a political tradition that bound him even against his will. The defenders of the royal prerogative countered with arguments to the effect that the king had in the past observed certain customs but that he had done so only because it suited his pleasure and that he could not be bound by them if he wished to do otherwise. Both sides believed that theirs was the correct view of the "constitution," though modern historians have pretty much come around to the belief that the king's position was, in essence, legally correct. The supporters of Parliament were to prove in time, however, that means of power were more efficacious in winning a constitutional argument than legality.

JAMES I AND DIVINE RIGHT

At the accession of James I (who had been James VI of Scotland) this constitutional problem with all of its political and social ramifications was intensified in a number of ways. James, first of all, possessed none of the personal characteristics that had made his predecessor popular; and, in 1604, by ending the long war with Spain that had begun almost twenty years before, he deprived himself of any justification for continuing certain of Elizabeth's

fiscal practices. The coming of peace also allowed the forces of discontent to turn their attention from external danger to questions of domestic importance. Into a situation that would have taxed all of the old queen's political ingenuity James projected his own complex personality with what were probably decisive results. Though his intelligence has often been slighted by historians, there is little doubt that his political outlook and the policies resulting therefrom contributed much toward worsening a situation that was already latently serious. Possibly his greatest misfortune lay in the fact that he had been a relatively successful king in Scotland. There he had been able to impose a greater amount of order and stability than that turbulent country had known for a long time; and he never quite got over feeling that his accession to the English throne amounted to a kind of retirement from the arduous duties of active kingship.

His Scottish experiences also affected his outlook in another significant way. In Scotland social and political necessity had demanded a strong central authority where almost none had existed before. James, in undertaking to achieve this goal, had come to certain conclusions about the nature of monarchy that tended to strengthen and justify his own course of action. Moreover, since he had some genuine intellectual and scholarly abilities that made it possible for a sardonic wit to label him, rather unfairly, "the wisest fool in Christendom," he tried to translate his political aspirations into an intellectual system. And it was thus that he came to be one of the great elaborators of the divine-right theory of monarchy. This view—which is most aptly summed up in his familiar pronouncement to the effect that "kings are not only God's lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon God's throne, but even by God himself they are called Gods"—was not original with him. Nor did he perhaps elucidate it solely because he had a tyrannous propensity to pursue power for power's sake. Nevertheless, it was a poor argument to use under the circumstances that confronted him after he came to England. The autonomous functional development of Parliament and, to a lesser extent, of the courts of common law made such an extreme view seem preposterous to Englishmen who could recall a number of occasions when their rulers had been forced to defer to the independent traditions of both those institutions. Above all, they disliked being reminded that in a legal and historical sense the whole machinery of the English state in all its parts did, in fact, depend upon the good will of the king. Like many another person of intellectual bent, James made the mistake of assuming that because he could prove his point by intellectual methods men would thereby be willing to accept his arguments. What he found, to his annoyance and to the ultimate discomfiture of his

whole dynasty, was that those who disagreed with him could answer his arguments by making their own appeals to history. The constant reiteration of the divine-right doctrine only stimulated counterarguments intended to prove that either the common law or Parliament, upon occasion, was exempted by immemorial usage from the royal claims.

THE POLICIES OF JAMES I

James's efforts to preserve and augment the prerogative powers transmitted to him by his Tudor predecessors were further complicated by personal interests. As a Scot, he was anxious that his poverty-ridden native country should benefit as much as possible from its dynastic union with larger and wealthier England. His attempts to bring the two nations into a closer political union that would have erased the boundaries between them and his noteworthy predilection for Scotsmen as friends and confidants during the early years of his reign did little to smooth his relations with Parliament, whose members looked upon all Scots as "sour and beggarly creatures." Moreover, his known willingness to allow certain persons about the court, whether Scotsmen or otherwise, to influence his decisions did much to damage his public reputation. Favorites, such as the infamous Lord Rochester and the vain and incompetent duke of Buckingham, were not the sort of men one could trust for sound advice in governmental matters; and his adherence to them under all circumstances very nearly bordered on folly. Without the complications introduced by these personal interests James's attempts to resolve the problems confronting the royal administration would have been difficult enough. With them his task became well-nigh impossible.

From the outset of his reign James made it clear that he opposed any or all groups who might, in the most remote way, impose limitations upon his freedom to act as he saw fit. Within months after his arrival in England he had rebuffed the demands of Puritan religious groups for changes in the government of the state church and told them bluntly at a conference held in Hampton Court that he would give way to none of their requests for the removal of bishops from ecclesiastical office. Here again his Scottish experiences shaped his decision, for uppermost in his mind were memories of his struggle with the presbyterianized Church of Scotland, whose independent authority he had striven so long to curb. From that moment forward his blunt dictum "No bishop, no king" bound him to support the prelates of the established church and cut him off from a number of his Puritan subjects. The bishops, in their turn, became staunch supporters of divine right; and through-

out the century the pulpits of the establishment were to ring with denunciations of those who dared to question the royal prerogative.

In certain ways, however, the significant question that divided James from that large and vague body of dissent known as Puritanism was not whether there should or should not be bishops in the church. Many Puritan complaints were directed to what were regarded as the corrupt administration and the lack of religious fervor of the establishment. This feeling was further reinforced by an equally vague anticlericalism that stemmed from a dislike of "vainglory and show" on the part of "lordly prelates." In time, too, the religious issue was to be complicated by the infusion into the church of a system of theology, very much favored by the king, that seemed too closely to approximate Roman Catholic teaching to suit the tastes of Protestant extremists. The Puritan movement was thus something more than a party or a sect. It was an attitude of mind all the more dangerous because it comprehended many varieties of religious dissent which were united in their negation of the king's religious policies and in their dislike of the existing ecclesiastical government. To do James justice, it must be said that he was not always as harsh with them as he might have been, though it was his continuing desire that they should conform to the Church of England. His efforts to enforce uniformity by means of the ecclesiastical courts when applied, however, did raise a number of questions of more than religious significance; for the courts of the church were among those that derived their authority directly from the crown. To call them into question or to challenge their authority, as many did, was by implication to challenge the prerogative itself.

With Parliament James's relations passed through several phases. He began his reign by trying to overawe and subdue its members. Failing in this he turned to the law courts, where he hoped that judicial interpretation would give him the revenues that Parliament would not. Here, in spite of the stout resistance put up by Sir Edward Coke, self-styled Chief Justice of England, he was more successful. The judges, never completely independent, since their posts depended upon the pleasure of the king, broadened the interpretation of the law just enough to allow James to collect impositions (customs duties) formerly thought to be solely within the power of Parliament to grant.

Even this shrewd device proved insufficient, and in 1610 James made his only attempt to come to a permanent financial settlement with Parliament. Angered, however, at the excessiveness of parliamentary demands and the interminableness of parliamentary debate, he finally dissolved the session and thus ended all hopes of a permanently contracted revenue.

For a decade, with but one brief exception, James ruled without the two houses. During that period his increasing use of monopoly grants steadily built up opposition against him. When the needs of foreign policy finally forced him to call Parliament again in 1621, the storm broke. Leading monopolists and even the king's great servant, Francis Bacon, Viscount Verulam and Lord High Chancellor of England, were impeached and sentenced for their violations of the law. In this way Parliament made it clear that henceforth the prerogative could not protect those whom it wished to call to justice. The road to compromise was already very nearly closed.

CHARLES I AND THE GROWTH OF ABSOLUTISM

By the time of James's death in 1625 the constitutional structure of the English state was perceptibly changing. The lower house of Parliament—the House of Commons—whose membership was drawn from the landed gentry, city merchants, and common lawyers, was slowly swinging the balance of parliamentary power away from the House of Lords, or upper house, to itself. The forcefulness of its leadership and the vigor with which it pushed its protests against royal policies gave it a political importance that it had never possessed before in its history. As a result of these altered circumstances, James's son and successor, Charles, found himself facing a situation which he, like his father, only helped to make worse.

Charles I, who was destined to die as dramatically as any king in England's history, had four great disadvantages that no head of state should ever possess—particularly in combination. He was short of stature, somewhat lazy, slow thinking, and morally stubborn. There was also a trace of the dissembler in his makeup, but the fact is sometimes hard to prove, because many of his apparent public deceits may have been the result of his general ineptitude. In extenuation, it may be said of him that he, like his father, had no desire for power as an end in itself. Nevertheless, he had a remarkable genius for arousing public distrust, and few months after his accession he did so by taking as his wife the French Catholic Princess Henrietta Maria, whose faith made her more than suspect to English Protestants of every persuasion. In one sense, it might also be said that the new queen added a fifth permanent disability to the four that Charles came by naturally. Her uxorious influence on him throughout his life was to complicate immeasurably a general policy that would probably have been tortuous and erratic enough even without her.

From the moment he became king, Charles's every public act only served to deepen the crisis that had been building up during his father's reign. The worst of his problems arose, however, when he embarked on an ill-conceived

and worse-conducted foreign policy that forced him into two wars—first with Spain and then with France—within five years of his accession. In this way the financial needs of the state were increased manyfold, and, failing to get adequate supplies from Parliament, Charles was forced to go to greater lengths than James had ever gone in order to meet the crisis. His solution was to levy the equivalent of taxes, known as “forced loans,” just as though Parliament had voted him the authority to do so. The attempt provoked resistance that carried over into the next session, where he found himself faced with the dilemma of accepting a famous constitutional document, the Petition of Right, or going without supply. In June, 1628, because he had little choice, Charles signed the Petition, whose most important provisions were intended to eliminate forced loans and the arbitrary imprisonment of those who refused to pay them. In any immediate sense, however, the guarantee was meaningless, because the king at once sought other expedients that only raised the cries of the opposition to a higher pitch.

The end of this session of Parliament, which came in March, 1629, was destined to be long remembered in English history. Angered at the king’s attempts to evade the Petition and at the growth of religious innovations that seemed to reflect a suspected Catholic influence about the royal court, the House of Commons undertook to debate these issues and to vote public censure on the policy that made them possible. The king’s response was dissolution and the imprisonment of parliamentary leaders. For eleven years Charles was to govern his kingdom without the interruption of parliamentary protest.

In order to achieve any kind of success, the experiment of ruling without Parliament called for sharp retrenchment and the development of new sources of revenue that would ultimately permit the crown to balance its income and expenses on a permanent basis. After 1630, as a result, the expenses entailed in pursuing a vigorous foreign policy were eliminated by the simple process of abandoning any active policy altogether. The problem of increasing revenues was somewhat more difficult and needed time for its solution. To this end old statutes and half-forgotten obligations, all the more arduous because they had long been in disuse, were revived and placed in full legal force. Once again, the interpretive powers of the courts were pressed into service to give the “ancient laws” legal sanction and to broaden the scope of their application. By this method—an ominous portent for the future of parliamentary government—the revenues of state could be expanded limitlessly. The best known of these devices, the ship-money writs, followed just such a pattern. In the beginning they were applied, as they had been during Elizabeth’s reign, only for the collection of monies from port towns for the support of the royal

navy. From 1634 to 1639, however, they were gradually extended to include the whole of England. In a famous test case heard by the Court of Exchequer Chamber in 1637 the judges confirmed the king's right to issue ship-money writs as he saw fit and laid it down that he was, in effect, the "living law" of the realm. The road to an independent centralized monarchy seemed to open wide, for it was clear that henceforth judicial decisions would increasingly favor the prerogative. By 1638 the finances of the crown were in a better condition than at any time since the Stuarts had come to England.

THE REVIVAL OF OPPOSITION

In spite of its apparent successes, Charles's personal government was still a delicately balanced system. Its permanence depended upon the ability of the king and his advisers to avoid external difficulties that might call for extraordinary expenditures until such time as Englishmen had become accustomed to paying levies made without parliamentary approval. So far as England was concerned, all might have gone well for an indefinite period had Charles not forgotten that he was also ruler of another kingdom to the north. During the last days of July, 1637, word was brought to Whitehall that rioting had broken out in Scotland and that bishops were being stoned in the streets of Edinburgh.

The immediate cause of these disturbances was the attempted introduction of liturgical forms more nearly like those of the episcopalian English church into the traditionally presbyterian Church of Scotland. Charles, wishing to continue the policies of his father and to bring the two countries into closer conformity with one another, had taken the ill-advised step of suddenly imposing a "Service Book" containing the new liturgy on his Scottish subjects. The move, which culminated a long series of acts that had alienated important social groups in Scotland—but particularly the nobility and gentry—united the greater part of the nation against him. Before the autumn of 1637 passed, rioting gave way to organized rebellion, and Charles had neither the financial nor military strength to suppress it.

During the three years that followed, Scottish affairs demanded most of the king's attention and had a far-reaching effect on his whole system of personal government. After banding themselves together in a solemn public pledge, the National Covenant, Scotsmen proceeded to raise an army to enforce their demands that the king recognize certain changes they wished to make in the Scottish church and state. In typical fashion, Charles first tried temporizing with them and then used what little military force he had available. The result, in both instances, was failure and only drove the Scots to

further resistance. Twice, in 1639 and again in 1640, Scottish armies showed the king how weak his position was. On both occasions the Scots made public overtures to the opposition in England and seem to have been in secret communication with some of the disaffected former leaders of the House of Commons. In the summer of 1640 Scottish forces suddenly precipitated the final crisis of Charles's personal government by occupying the northernmost English counties and refusing to leave until the king should summon a properly constituted English Parliament to deal with them. Made desperate by his financial and military plight, the king at last gave way and issued the summons that called for an election. On November 3, 1640, the members of what was to be the longest parliamentary session in English history assembled at Westminster.¹ The meeting of this body had been made virtually inevitable when Charles discovered that his English subjects were in no mood to support him in all-out war against the Scots.

APPROACHES TO CIVIL WAR

Between November, 1640, and August, 1642, a large number of Englishmen passed through a political and intellectual crisis that forced them to decide for or against the constitutional arrangements that continued, in theory, to exist throughout that period. During the early months of the Long Parliament all except some few extremists among its members believed that they were only redressing certain outstanding grievances that had upset the ancient balance of the constitution. They did not desire to overturn the monarchy; nor did they wish to deprive the king of what were vaguely called his "just powers." Their complaints, at the outset, were not even directed at the person of the king but at his "evil counsellors," who, it was argued, were solely responsible for abridging "the liberties of the subject." The whole tone of their argument showed how little they understood the functioning of the state. What they envisioned was a partnership between the crown and Parliament in which each would share coordinate and coequal powers. Only time and the pressure of events would make plain how unworkable this "theory of balance" actually was.

The first steps toward eliminating the major grievances were easily and quickly taken. In rapid succession ship-money writs were declared illegal; the worst and best of the prerogative courts were swept away; and the survival of Parliament was seemingly guaranteed by a Triennial Act that called for sessions once every three years, with or without the royal assent. Satisfied mo-

¹ An earlier parliament (the Short Parliament) had met for a few weeks in April and May of 1640 but had been dissolved before supply was granted.

mentarily, the houses then turned to bigger game. All were agreed that the most hated of the king's counselors were Archbishop Laud and the earl of Strafford, the one because of his religious policies, the other not only for his public acts but for his apostasy from the parliamentary cause. Both were impeached, but Strafford was punished first. After a trial in which questionable procedures were used he was executed in May, 1641.

Strafford's death revealed one very important weakness in the parliamentary position. Calling the king's servants to account was all well and good, but, if the king chose to do so, he could easily find other, equally unpalatable advisers. Under existing circumstances, it would be difficult to prevent the king from resorting to expedients that would demand constant future redress, for he still possessed the power to dissolve Parliament, to veto its legislation, to choose his own ministers, and to control the military forces of the country as he saw fit. The various attempts to resolve this impasse pushed the two sides closer to civil war.

Matters were further complicated by the religious issue, which became a center of stormy debate as the session progressed. Here again, many members were vague as to their desires. Some—possibly even a majority—were convinced that the king's religious policies were intended to reintroduce the Roman Catholic Church, "the evil Antichrist of Popery," into England; and their hysterical frenzy at this danger, reinforced as it was by a revolt that began in Ireland in 1641, knew no limits. Others simply disliked the pretensions of such high ecclesiastics as Laud, whose retainers had gone before him through the streets of London crying, "Roome, roome for my Lords Grace. Gentlemen be uncovered my Lords Grace is coming." A smaller number had specific sectarian connections and wished to see some form of Presbyterianism, probably on the Scottish model, or Congregationalism (Independency), after the patterns of Holland or New England, established in place of the existing government of the church. Some were perhaps secretly indifferent to the issue and opposed the crown on religious grounds only because they were opposed to it in other ways. So far as bishops were concerned, there appear to have been two general schools of thought. One group wished to curb their powers and retain them; the other sought to eliminate the office altogether. In the main, however, the attitude of all these groups was negative: they disliked the church in one way or another as it was presently constituted and wished to return to something they thought had existed before the king brought in his innovations. As with most other issues, the matter of religion was difficult to separate from other elements of opposition, though many were undoubtedly strongly

influenced by it when the time came to choose between king and Parliament on the eve of civil war.

At the last, matters finally came to a head for a complex of reasons. The problem of religion was intensified by a growing division between the Lords and the Commons over the influence of bishops in the upper house. From the autumn of 1641, however, until the summer of 1642 the issue of peace or war turned on one great question. Who was to control the military forces raised for the suppression of revolt in Ireland? In their Grand Remonstrance of November, 1641, the Commons, by a narrow voting margin, defied both Lords and king alike with what seemed exorbitant demands in this and other matters. Had Charles been content to wait, the two houses might have quarreled so seriously as to undo their earlier work. Caution, however, was not one of the king's great virtues; and in January, 1642, he attempted to seize five of the Commons' leaders. From that point events moved rapidly to a conclusion. In June Parliament submitted to the king its Nineteen Propositions, which contained demands that were tantamount to a declaration of parliamentary supremacy. The dreaded impasse had been reached. Parliament, to guarantee the permanency of its enactments, must bind the king forever. Charles, for his part, saw in the acceptance of these demands an end to royal sovereignty in England. On August 22 the royal standard was raised at Nottingham; and loyal subjects were called upon to meet the obligations of their ancient allegiance to the crown.

THE LINES OF DIVISION

The way in which men responded to the call of king or Parliament tells us much, but not all, about the makeup of the forces that opposed each other during the English Civil War. One warning, however, must be kept clearly in mind. This was not a struggle in which men divided according to any simply explained pattern of motivation. The reasons that led Englishmen to choose one side or the other were many and complex; and nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the manner in which Parliament itself was split. From the House of Commons about one hundred and seventy-five members went to follow the king's standard, while nearly three hundred remained at Westminster to throw in their lot with the houses. Of the approximately one hundred and fifty peers, about eighty joined the king, about twenty took no part, and slightly more than thirty stood by Parliament. Thus the conflict was quite clearly not one between all the nobility and the king on one side or all the commoners and Parliament on the other; nor was it a contest between all the

members of two distinct classes or all the inhabitants of different sections of the country.

In broad outline, however, there are certain generalizations that can be made about the sources of strength on both sides. The north and west, in general, went for the king, the south and east for Parliament. In this, the advantages lay very much with the houses, for, in the seventeenth century, most of the nation's wealth was concentrated in the more highly developed mercantile and agricultural sections of the country lying south of the Trent and east of the Severn rivers. Both areas had large enclaves of opposition sympathizers, however, who were to reveal their true sympathies at the opportune moment. Moreover, most of the larger cities and towns, with some few important exceptions, declared for Parliament, including, most importantly, London with its great resources of wealth and manpower.

Among social groups the king commanded a majority of the nobility and landed gentry. Parliament's strength, on the other hand, also depended to a large extent on the gentry but with them were allied a large segment of the merchants and many members of that important professional class, the common lawyers.

Apart from more evident political or religious factors, there were underlying social causes that seem to have helped in swaying these latter groups to Parliament. In many respects the gentry—those gentlemen of coat armor whose lineage, landed wealth, and numbers gave them a preponderating influence in Parliament—had been injured in their social pride, if not in their material well-being, to a greater extent than any other group in English society. They particularly resented those aspects of Stuart policy that seemed to lower the social and political status of their order, since they had for long been the virtual rulers of rural England. From their ranks were drawn the numerous justices of the peace who maintained law and order at the parish level and whose local powers were often autocratic. Even apart from this official capacity, the authority of such men remained strong in an England still bound by customary ties of loyalty to and, in some cases, affection for the local squire. When the time came to declare for king or Parliament, the decisions of such as these often swayed their neighbors to one side or the other. Oliver Cromwell, for example, whose importance to the parliamentary cause is beyond estimate, carried with him the farmers and smallholders of the neighborhood around St. Ives and Ely in Cambridgeshire, because he had been their consistent champion against the encroachments of large landholders seeking to deprive them of their rights to common- and waste-land. Cromwell's popularity with the inhabitants of the great fen lands of

eastern England was such as to win for him the sobriquet of "Lord of the Fens" from his opponents. Other equally popular squires led their friends and neighbors into the king's camp. As a class, moreover, the gentry had been growing throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and many, who had made their wealth in trade or elsewhere, were taking up lands and country seats. Among these latter were persons who had achieved the economic position of the landed gentleman but not his attendant social dignity. "These from the beginning," wrote the historian Clarendon, "were fast friends to the Parliament." The grievances of these *nouveaux riches* were as nothing, however, to the dismay with which long-established gentlemen looked upon the shift of political authority from themselves to the king's Privy Council, which had been growing steadily in power under the Tudors and Stuarts.

In this connection, it has been suggested by some historians that the interference of the central government in local affairs was the result of a cohesive social policy that sought to assure the social well-being of the very lowest groups in society and to protect them from the arbitrary oppression of their great neighbors. Some aspects of Tudor and Stuart policy, it must be admitted, lend support to this view. Under the terms, for example, of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, justices of the peace and local overseers of the poor were obligated to provide certain forms of relief for the unemployed and the destitute in every parish. From time to time throughout the early seventeenth century—most notably in the years immediately following 1631—the tone of command and the number of directives relating to Poor-Law matters sent out by the Privy Council to various parishes appear to have increased sharply. But whether this type of interference caused greater resentment in areas that later went over to Parliament than it did in districts that afterwards favored the king is an unanswered and perhaps unanswerable question, since evidence can be adduced to answer it either way. One thing seems certain. In those sections where there was a predisposition, for other reasons, to look upon the crown's policies as arbitrary, this type of interference undoubtedly helped to fan the flames of discontent. To assume, however, that the Stuart kings of the early seventeenth century took into consideration the social welfare of their poorer subjects at the expense of the rich and powerful is to oversimplify greatly the complexities of their policy. As sovereigns, they thought themselves responsible for the well-being of all Englishmen, but they do not appear to have carried the implications of this responsibility to such an extreme. What the rural gentleman probably disliked most in this connection was the tendency of the

crown to disregard his advice or to ignore his knowledge of local affairs completely in framing its policy. This oversight and the predilection of the Stuarts to place the interests of the royal court and its hangers-on above those who thought themselves more representative of the real "wealth and worth" of the kingdom were probably greater irritants than anything else. Much of the political discontent among the gentry and some, too, of the nobility, then and later, is traceable to the king's custom of favoring the interests of those with whom he was in close and constant personal contact at the expense of others who kept themselves far removed from London. In certain respects, this division of the politically important elements of English society into "court" and "country" factions was by far the most significant political alignment of the century. To it may be ascribed the motives for many actions that have been thought to stem from other causes.

The political discontent of those mercantile elements who favored Parliament is probably more directly traceable to economic factors than any other, though even here it should be remembered that not all of the merchants supported Parliament and that for some of them the religious issue was so important as to lead them to sacrifice their fortunes and even their lives for it. The merchant, furthermore, was not yet in a position to make the influence of his wealth felt directly in political matters. Most towns, except for London and some few others, still preferred to be represented in Parliament by members of the gentry, whose social position assured them and the constituents they represented of a deferential hearing in the Commons. If a merchant aspired to rise above the level of his countinghouse connection, he had, perforce, to go through the process of acquiring lands and the social dignity conferred by the letters patent that made him a gentleman. His problem was to get himself accepted in a social rather than an economic sense, and, once he had accomplished this, he often tended to take on the attitudes and outlook of other members of the gentry. For merchants who had not yet crossed this barrier and whose interests were still centered in trade the most annoying of the king's policies were those that had to do with the promoting of monopolies. Patents of monopoly were no new thing in English economic life. Like modern patents, they had long been used to guarantee those who introduced new types of manufacture or opened up new areas of trade a monopoly of the market for their goods in order to recompense them for the sums of money risked in a new undertaking. During Elizabeth's reign, however, the practice had been changed somewhat in order to provide an increased revenue for the crown. Licenses of monopoly came to be granted to persons who sold long established commodities in return for fees paid to

the crown. Few merchants resented the grant of this privilege for the usual reasons, but they disliked its being conferred on court favorites or on persons who had, in effect, bought it from the monarch. The crown, on the other hand, found this an excellent means of tapping the expanding mercantile wealth of the country and was loath to give it up in the desperate pursuit of revenue. In the long run, the device was an unfortunate one from the crown's point of view, because it affected not only the purveyor of goods but the consumer as well and thus alienated many who might otherwise have had little sympathy with the complaints of the merchants.

The last of the three important groups who made up the opposition to the king consisted of common lawyers, whose professional interests very nearly made them a distinctive class in their own right. Their common education at the Inns of Court, where for centuries the greater part of the legal profession of England had been trained, and the very nature of their vocation gave to all of them, in varying degrees, a sense of belonging to a specialized and influential segment of society. They regarded themselves as the particular custodians of the law's "might and majesty"; and their consciousness of this custodianship sometimes bordered on arrogance. Professionally, they had a number of reasons for viewing any increase in the royal prerogative with suspicion. The system in which they practiced was peculiarly hostile to attempts made by the king or anyone else to circumvent the tangle of precedent and procedure that had grown out of socio-legal conventions already centuries old. Its three great courts—Common Pleas, Exchequer, and King's Bench—had followed a course of development roughly similar to that of Parliament: they too had originated in the royal household as administrative instruments of the crown; and they too had established a tradition of autonomous function that sometimes conflicted with the interests of the sovereign. Unlike Parliament, however, the practitioners of the common law had no way of ensuring the complete autonomy of their institutions and, as we have noticed, were often particularly susceptible to the influence of the crown where questions of legal right were involved. Moreover, the common-law courts had dangerous rivals whose continually expanding authority seemed, in the ultimate, to threaten their very existence. These were the various prerogative courts whose powers, since many of them were fairly recent creations, still depended far more directly upon the crown. Time after time cases formerly heard by common-law judges found their way into the prerogative courts despite prohibitions and injunctions to the contrary. Thus it was that long before 1642 necessity and professional pride had made many common lawyers valuable allies of the other dissident groups

who opposed the crown. The failure of the greatest of them, Sir Edward Coke, to establish the supremacy of the common law over the king forced him and others into Parliament, which they came to see as the sole autonomous institution capable of at last bringing the crown to terms. Men such as these, with their legal training and antiquarian skill, saw in history rather than in human reason the rationale that justified revolt. In the end, their views helped to give English revolutionary thought the conservative and legalistic strain that characterized it throughout the century.

For the mass of Englishmen the politics of the great and the constitutional subtleties that divided crown and Parliament were meaningless arguments that many would not have understood if they had been told about them. The greater number of those who took an active part in the struggle followed their squires or local leaders out of habit or affection, or even both. Some in the rural areas stood aside completely and formed bands of "club-men" who resisted the plundering incursions of either king or Parliament. In the cities, but particularly London, where there were a great number of those religious enthusiasts, the "tub preachers" or, where the influence of extreme Puritan elements was strong, the religious issue led to many a riot. Among sectarian extremists apocalyptic visions of an earthly kingdom in which the social order would be reconstructed by a newly regenerated mankind or of the beginnings of the Biblical millennium were accepted widely. In the long run, however, widespread mass influence did not affect the course of events to any significant extent. The English revolutions, in 1642 and again in 1688, were engineered and won by an oligarchical group at the top of society who carried with them the masses of Englishmen in passive or active acquiescence. Even the political and social ideas of the later Levellers and Diggers, though the groups themselves had a transitory importance, had no immediate influence on developments. To some extent their role has been exaggerated by later historians.

CIVIL WAR AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OPPOSITION

The outcome of the struggle between the parliamentary forces and the crown was ultimately determined by the superior material resources of the former, though it was not until parliamentary strength had been properly organized and military leadership placed in able hands that the issue ceased to be in doubt. During the period of uncertainty the leaders of the two houses were forced by necessity to call in the Scots, who had been neutral since their armies had withdrawn from England during the summer of 1641. At the height of military crisis in 1643 John Pym and others who directed Parlia-

ment's war effort negotiated the Solemn League and Covenant with Scotland which amounted to a guarantee that England would accept the presbyterian system of church government cherished by the Scots in return for military aid. Strengthened in this way, the parliamentarians then turned their attention to the reorganization of their own military forces, and in the winter of 1644-45 that powerful instrument, the New Model army, came into being. When the New Model finally took the field, the king's hopes of victory were virtually ended; and the last battle between the royalist army as an organized military unit and parliamentary troops was fought at Naseby in June, 1645. Eleven months later, in May, 1646, Charles surrendered to the Scottish army at Newark, and the first phase of the Civil War had ended.

For the various groups who made up the opposition, however, their real difficulties had only begun. The king had been defeated and taken prisoner, but what was to be done with him now? He was still king; and if he refused to cooperate with his captors, there could be no permanent constitutional settlement. The words of the parliamentary general Manchester to the effect that though "we beat the King ninety-nine times, yet he is King still" had come home to roost; and none knew this better than the king himself. Charles's policy from the moment of his capture was to come to no definite settlement with anyone but to foment as much division as he could among his former enemies.

Even without the king's maneuvering the divisions were serious enough. In the main, most of them stemmed from Parliament's bad bargain with the Scots and the rapid growth of divergent sectarian religious interests within parliamentary ranks. The major issue that divided all groups was the question of religious toleration for the various sects who had fought on Parliament's side. Under terms of the Solemn League and Covenant plans for a presbyterian church government had been drawn up by an assembly of divines at Westminster and passed into law by parliamentary statute. This system, though it changed the ecclesiastical form of the Church of England, did not change its essential nature. It remained, in theory, the sole church of the nation and to it all Englishmen were expected to conform. Moreover, the new machinery of church government was far more comprehensive and efficient than the defunct episcopalian system, so that it seemed to stand a better chance of enforcing its ecclesiastical discipline and standards on a much wider scale. Once this fact was clearly understood, many who had been sympathetic to a religious reformation that seemed to abolish the evils of episcopalianism reacted sharply and bitterly. Like the poet Milton, they saw in the new Presbyter only "old Priest writ large"; and their hatred led

to a chain of fateful consequences. It sharpened differences between the Presbyterians, on the one hand, and the Independents or Congregationalists who championed the cause of sectarian toleration, on the other. Since most of the important leaders of the army—among whom was the distinguished commander of the parliamentary cavalry, Oliver Cromwell—sympathized with the Independents and the sects, the army as an organization tended to be anti-Presbyterian and thus came into conflict with Parliament, where Presbyterian influence was by this time fairly strong. The split was further aggravated by the fact that the houses had allowed army pay to fall into arrears; and the combination of these circumstances led many among the military rank and file to wonder why they had fought or what they had gained by fighting. A crisis was finally reached in June and July of 1647, when the army seized the king's person and then marched on London to restore certain anti-Presbyterian members to the seats in Parliament from which they had been ejected by the Presbyterian majority. In the months that followed there was much talk around army campfires of the rights of *all* Englishmen from highest to lowest; and the term "Leveller" came to be heard more frequently in military circles.

Before matters became worse, a temporary diversion united Parliament and army once more for a very brief time. The king's constant plots, even while in prison, were finally successful, and he was able to negotiate a secret agreement with the Scots by which, in return for a three-year trial of Presbyterianism and other concessions, they agreed to come to his aid. In alliance with its former royalist enemies, the Scottish army, which had withdrawn from England in 1647, recrossed the border and began what is known as the Second Civil War in the summer of 1648. With quick dispatch, the veterans of the New Model marched northward to Preston and routed the Scots before the campaign had well begun.

By this time it was clear that something would have to be done about the king. Many in the army, leaders and men alike, were beginning to feel that "Charles Stuart, that man of blood" should be called to account for his misdeeds. "Stone dead hath no fellow" was the blunt conclusion of one of them; and by December, 1648, they were ready to carry the maxim into effect. The army's first move was to eliminate any possible opposition from the Presbyterians in Parliament. On December 6 a file of musketeers under the command of Colonel Pride cleared the Commons of all but a "Rump" of fifty or sixty members known to share the army's views. One month later this body, acting without the concurrence of the Lords, erected a tribunal "for trying and judging of Charles Stuart, king of England" for his "wicked

design totally to subvert the ancient and fundamental laws and liberties of this nation" and for "having levied and maintained a cruel war in the land against the parliament and kingdom." On the next to last day of the same month, the king mounted to the scaffold in the presence of "silent thousands" gathered before the Banqueting House at Whitehall and knelt to the headsman's axe. For the moment, at least, the constitutional impasse was resolved.

THE GREAT EXPERIMENTS: COMMONWEALTH AND PROTECTORATE

With the king's death, England embarked upon a period of constitutional experimentation in which efforts were made to find some stable and workable substitute for monarchical government. The weeks immediately following Charles's execution saw all of the outward forms of the ancient constitution swept away: the House of Lords was abolished; the nation was proclaimed a Commonwealth; and power was given over to a forty-one-man Council of State nominated by the purged remnant of Parliament. Shortly thereafter, the troublesome questions raised about popular sovereignty by the group of Levellers in and out of the army were answered by a rejection of their demands for political reform along democratic lines and by the stern repression of army mutinies. At about the same time the quasi-socialist Diggers, who had attempted to found a communal farming colony at St. George's Hill in Surrey, were dispersed. The new system was established as an oligarchy controlled by an alliance of religious groups headed by the Independents in conjunction with army leaders such as Cromwell and members of the gentry, merchants, and lawyers, who had belonged to the original opposition that began the Civil War.

The years from 1649 to 1653 marked a period of consolidation in which Cromwell, as the military leader of the new state, set about reducing the whole of the British Isles to the Commonwealth's control. Ireland was speedily subdued in a harsh and bloody campaign that was to leave its mark on Anglo-Irish relations forever after. The Scots, who had supported King Charles's son and successor, Charles II, out of native loyalty and the hope that he might accept their religious system, were somewhat more difficult to deal with, but two defeats, in 1650 and 1651, put an end to their resistance. By 1652 the whole of Scotland had been brought to terms. In this way, the Commonwealth accomplished what no other English government had done before. It brought the different political units of the British Isles under one centralized authority and made all of them participants in a single system of government.

Not until 1653 did the Commonwealth seem to be firmly established, and

by that time the fatal weakness that was ultimately to force the restoration of the monarchy was revealed. Cromwell, disgusted with the internal bickerings of the purged Parliament and growing corruption among its members, determined to start afresh and reconstruct the framework of government in such a way as to eliminate the evils that seemed to him to be rampant. Accordingly, in 1653, he asked for a dissolution of the Rump and, failing to get it, followed the example set by Colonel Pride nearly five years before. Once again, the soldiery drove the members from their seats. This use of force, though effective for the moment, made plain the strength and weakness of the revolutionary experiments in government. No stable system of civil authority could be established without the support of the military; and the more often military leaders intervened in civil matters, the less likelihood there was that any civilian government could ever be successful.

With the disappearance of the last remnants of the Long Parliament, Cromwell and his supporters determined to try an even more radical solution for the problem of government. The result was the Nominated (so-called from the fact that its members were named from lists submitted by Independent ministers) or "Barebones" (from the name of one of its members) Parliament, which was, in effect, an experiment in saintly rule. The members of this body soon displayed their utter political incompetence by attempting to replace the common law with the Mosaic code and drew from Cromwell the observation that he was now more troubled "with the fool than with the knave." After a few brief months of existence the "rule of the Saints" came to an end, and power was handed over once more to Cromwell and the military faction, who were the only ones capable of wielding it.

The Nominated Parliament was followed by England's only attempt to erect a government on the basis of a written constitution. This document, the Instrument of Government, provided for a Parliament whose members were to be chosen by electors with a higher property qualification than had been required under preceding systems, a Council of State, and an elected Lord Protector, Cromwell, who was to hold office for life. In 1657 the Instrument was amended by the Humble Petition and Advice, which created a Second House—the equivalent of the old House of Lords—and permitted Cromwell to choose his own successors. In this fashion, political power was concentrated in the hands of a narrow faction. To make matters worse, even the members of this group could not agree; and Cromwell found himself in conflict with Parliament almost as frequently as the Stuarts had been. For a time he was forced to dispense with it and to rule through the major generals of the army. Worn out at last by his unremitting efforts to restore

political stability and the constant strain of attempting to maintain some kind of balance among conflicting groups, Cromwell died in September, 1658. With his death, the Protectorate was even more clearly revealed as an instrument that depended for its existence upon the abilities of one strong man.

The failure of the Cromwellian system was the failure of good intentions. Probably few dictators have been more reluctant to seize or hold power than Cromwell, and probably few have ever been forced to pursue policies so completely at odds with their own beliefs. A Parliament man and a believer in civil government, he was driven to use military methods because there seemed no other way to run the state. Dedicated to the principles of religious toleration within certain limits—he did not, for example, grant freedom of worship to Anglicans or Catholics, though he did extend it to Jews—he found himself forced to repress religious extremists who endangered his rule. His great goal was unity and accord with the leading Protestant states, but the realities of foreign policy often drove him to work against his own desires. Perhaps his most important contribution to English political and constitutional development was a negative one: had he not played the part he did, Englishmen might never have had the futility of opportunistic military government driven home to them. His example was also a constant reminder to English kings—though it was later to be forgotten by one of them—that what Englishmen had done before they might also do again, if circumstances forced the issue.

THE MAKING OF THE RESTORATION SETTLEMENT

Eight months after Cromwell's death England was in a state of chaos. The Protector's son and successor, Richard, known to the generation following as "Tumble-down Dick," had neither the abilities of his father nor the reputation that would have bound to his person the loyalties of old comrades-in-arms. Moreover, he was faced by a situation in which men of greater importance thought themselves more worthy of his high office than he. The strongest of these was General John Lambert, who acted in conjunction with other army chiefs to turn Richard out and call the Rump back into session. When its members proved as uncontrollable as they had always been, Lambert once more played the old army game and drove them from their seats.

At this crisis, which occurred in October, 1659, a new military leader came to the fore. George Monck, commander of the garrisons in Scotland, had been devoted to Oliver Cromwell and would have stood by his son had Richard been a man of resolution. Though lacking in ambition for himself,

Monck could not tolerate the idea of Lambert's holding power. At the end of the year, armed with a commission from the defunct Council of State, he began a march upon London from Coldstream near the Scottish border. As he approached the capital, his opposition melted away; and shortly after his arrival he was able to force elections for a "free Parliament" to which all who had been "secluded," even including royalists, were free to come. On April 4, 1660, Charles II from his place of exile at Breda in the Low Countries publicly offered to grant a "liberty to tender consciences" and to leave all other general matters to the settlement of Parliament. At the end of May the young king rode through the streets of London to enter upon his long-deferred inheritance. A country wearied by recurring political crises, social instability, and army rule greeted his arrival with bells and bonfires.

Though the restoration of the monarchy was in theory "unconditional," in fact it was more nearly like the constitutional settlement envisioned by a large number of parliamentarians on the eve of the Civil Wars. The full legal powers of the earlier Stuart kingship were not revived. All the acts of Parliament to which Charles I had given his formal assent remained on the statute books. The prerogative courts and unparliamentary taxation were consigned to the realm of unpleasant memories. In a constitutional sense, England was already a kind of "limited monarchy," though the king remained in possession of very real powers. His right to summon and dissolve Parliament was still conceded as a part of the intrinsic authority of the crown, and he also had the power to veto legislation. To balance this, Parliament continued to control the public purse, though, in the first flush of enthusiasm and loyalty at the king's return, it tried to make him financially independent and failed only because it badly underestimated the sources of revenue made available to him. As a body, Parliament remained essentially what it had been twenty years before. Its membership, in spite of innovations introduced by Cromwell, was based upon the ancient franchise system of the country and would remain so for nearly two centuries.

Probably the most significant change, however, was in the attitudes of those who sat in the first, or "Cavalier," Parliament which met after the Restoration. Here was assembled a group of men many of whom or whose counterparts had furnished the "country" opposition to Charles I in the early days of the Long Parliament. Now, with two decades of bitterness and, in many cases, exile behind them, they were resolved that no vestiges of the revolutionary spirit that had overturned the monarchy should be allowed to survive. Those affected by this view ranged from moderate Presbyterians,

whose part in the Civil Wars had made them somewhat subdued, to violent royalists, who vociferously demanded the return of their confiscated estates and compensation for their sufferings. These were the men who finished what Monck had begun; and when their work was completed, there was little about it that reflected the spirit of compromise in which the king had first been invited home.

It was in the settlement of ecclesiastical affairs that this attitude was seen most clearly. In the eyes of disgruntled royalists, most of the evils of the past twenty years could be ascribed to Puritan fanaticism; and they were determined to break the back of religious dissent by the sternest repressive measures. In taking this course they threw away any possibility of settling differences between themselves and Presbyterians whose support had helped to bring back the king, but, at that moment, they were not moved to acknowledge their gratitude to anyone who had played a part in rebellion. As a result five separate statutes, known as the Clarendon Code after the king's chief minister (who actually had little to do with it), were passed into law between 1661 and 1665, all for the purpose of punishing those who were tainted with Puritanism in any of its forms. Under the Code's terms, those who refused to conform to the Church of England were deprived of all place in church or state under severe penalties. The Puritan movement, which had been weakened by its own internal divisions during the Civil Wars and Interregnum, was thus officially cut off from the Church of England and forced to become a permanent body of Nonconformity.

For the king the exuberant and overweening royalism of his Cavalier Parliament was both gratifying and embarrassing. Charles II, who has been called "the most amiable of all the Stuarts," had all of the external virtues that make for public popularity. He was intelligent, clever in speech, charming in manner, and easily accessible to those with whom he came in contact. Years of comparative hardship during his exile had taught him that dissimulation was the most important of public virtues, and, as a result, he spent much of his life pretending to be indifferent to things that he often valued highly. Above all, he had, as he put it in a famous phrase, no desire to "go on his travels again," the truth of which was borne out by the skill he displayed in refusing to push political issues to the breaking point. Though he seemed to care little for religion, many of his policies pointed to secret Roman-Catholic sympathies that were not finally revealed until he was on his deathbed. He had one devotion for which he was willing to risk a great deal, however, and that was his loyalty to his dynasty, whose interests he placed above those of his country to such an extent that he was willing to

engage in foreign intrigues in order to maintain them. It is not surprising that to such a king the vehement royalism of his Parliament was often troublesome. Time and again he was forced to sacrifice his friends or personal projects—for example, the granting of Indulgences permitting both Catholics and Nonconformists to worship as they wished without legal penalty—to satisfy parliamentary clamor against persons whose devotion to the royalist cause was even slightly suspect in the eyes of the majority.

THE PARLIAMENTARY TRANSITION, 1661-79

In certain respects, the most significant political and constitutional change of the reign of Charles II was that which took place in the Cavalier Parliament itself during the eighteen years of its existence. Within that period its fervent loyalty to the king gradually gave way to feelings of suspicion and finally to an open opposition to his policies. A part of this metamorphosis can be explained by the infusion of new blood through the by-elections held to replace older members as they died off, but most of it was the result of a change in the political atmosphere.

In spite of the increasingly lavish use of pensions to secure the compliance of members and its loyal predisposition, Parliament very soon made plain that it did not intend to let the king do as he pleased in all matters. As early as 1665 the houses voted that funds must be appropriated for a specific cause and two years later established a commission to audit the public accounts. It was in 1667 also that Parliament forced the dismissal and exile of the earl of Clarendon, greatest of the king's ministers. Clarendon, who was officially charged with mismanagement of a naval war against the Dutch, was more the victim of his own pride and the king's dislike than of bad policy. An austere man, he was the very epitome of all that was best in Restoration royalism. He had joined the cause of the king's father before the outbreak of the Civil Wars because he felt that Parliament was going too far in undermining the constitution and had followed young Charles into exile afterward. As a constitutional royalist, he had sought the restoration of the king without foreign aid and had been rewarded for his efforts and his loyalty with the highest offices the crown could bestow. Moreover, he was allied to Charles through the marriage of his daughter to the king's brother James, and in every way his position seemed secure. His fall from power made it evident that Parliament would not hesitate to attack those who were closest to the throne, though it must be admitted that Charles was not unhappy over the departure of his too powerful minister, whose views on many matters were directly opposite to his own.

By this time the king was aware that the easiest way to run the government without hindrance was to select ministers who found favor in the eyes of Parliament. For that reason he appointed no single chief adviser to succeed Clarendon but a group, known as the Cabal, whose unity, in spite of diverse religious viewpoints that ranged from Roman Catholicism to indifference, was based upon a common desire to promote toleration. Members of the group also served Charles well in his tortuous secret negotiations with France that finally led to his becoming a virtual pensioner of Louis XIV. The end of the Cabal came in 1673 when Parliament, angered at the promulgation of a Declaration of Indulgence suspending the penal laws against Nonconformists and Catholics, refused to vote supply until the king had abandoned the Declaration. By forcing the toleration issue and urging an end to current hostilities against the Dutch, the houses drove the king to break up the Cabal. Nor was this the limit of their anger at his policies; for already there were rumblings of another storm soon to follow. The conversion of the king's brother and heir, James, the duke of York, to the Catholic faith had become a matter of public knowledge. In fear of growing Catholic influence at court and already disturbed at the possibility of a Catholic succession, Parliament pushed through a Test Act requiring that all who held civil or military office under the crown should take communion in the Church of England under penalty of dismissal. Early in 1674 the houses also introduced a bill to provide for the education of the duke's children as Protestants. Before its passage, Charles stepped in to prorogue the session.

The year 1674 thus marked a watershed in the relations between the king and his Cavalier Parliament. From that time forward the question of Catholic influence stood as a permanent barrier between them. The growing importance of this issue, however, was not solely the result of Parliament's strong anti-Catholic sentiment. It also served the political ends of one who has been called "the first party manager in English history." Anthony Ashley Cooper, first earl of Shaftesbury, had been Lord Chancellor and a member of the Cabal, but his suspicions that the king's attempts to grant toleration were only a cloak for Catholic sympathies and his dislike of other aspects of royal policy forced him out of office and into opposition. From 1675 onward he proceeded to organize and direct the activities of the violently Protestant "Green Ribbon Club," which gradually evolved into the Whig party. Before many years were out the Whig political program would come to have two specific aims: the exclusion of the king's brother from the succession and the extension of toleration to all Protestants. Against these the royalist faction—soon to be known as Tories—would counter with demands that the sacro-

sanctity of the succession and the unity of the established church be respected under all circumstances.

This alignment did not emerge clearly, however, until other events had first taken place. In 1678 the country was swept by a wave of panic at partly manufactured rumors that a vast "Popish" plot was afoot to overthrow the government and turn the nation into a Catholic province ruled by the duke of York. The hysteria attendant on this fear sent the innocent as well as the guilty, the great as well as the unknown, to their deaths. At its peak incredible witnesses, such as the infamous informers Titus Oates and Israel Tonge, were able to persuade judges and juries that any statement was true so long as it was violently anti-Catholic. Many of the charges, and not entirely without reason, came very close to the throne itself.

It was in this overheated atmosphere that the Cavalier Parliament met for its last session in October, 1678. Immediately it turned to the question of Catholic plots; and Shaftesbury asked for the duke of York's removal from the privy council. On November 28 the queen was accused of treason before the bar of the House of Commons. Shortly thereafter the earl of Danby, who had succeeded to power as the king's chief minister after the fall of the Cabal, was implicated in what seemed to be a treasonable correspondence with the French court. When the Commons demanded the queen's removal from Whitehall and threatened Danby with impeachment, Charles had no choice. He dissolved Parliament to save his family and his minister.

THE REVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM: FIRST STAGE, 1679-85

King Charles met three more Parliaments in his reign, and each of them served only to convince him that there was little hope in that quarter of preserving his family's legal right to the throne in the face of strong Whig opposition. At first, he may have been deluded into believing that the dissolution of the Cavalier Parliament would shake the influence of Shaftesbury and other implacable opponents of James. If so, the elections of February, 1679, soon disabused him of that notion. By reaching out to every corner of England and employing every means of swaying the electorate, the Green Ribbon Club rolled up a large majority. Perhaps fortunately for the king, its leaders were divided on the problem of exclusion. Shaftesbury and his supporters favored by-passing James completely; others were willing to concede his right to the throne so long as it was hedged with constitutional safeguards. The impasse did not prevent Shaftesbury from introducing the first Exclusion Bill in May, 1679. Charles's response was prorogation and then dissolution.

Twice more Parliament met, and twice it stubbornly continued to raise the now fatal question of exclusion. On the second occasion, however, the king, armed with a secret promise of financial support from Louis XIV, was ready to try greater conclusions with his Whig foes than any he had tried before. Hardly had the Commons passed its almost perennial Exclusion Bill, when Charles confronted them in his robes of state and pronounced the words that dissolved his last Parliament.

With that act a nation-wide reaction set in, and the Whigs, who for a moment talked of violent measures, found themselves on the defensive. Whig leaders and their Nonconformist followers now witnessed a Popish Plot in reverse. Intrigues, real or fancied, were used as an excuse to fill the jails and to send Whig magnates to the block. Shaftesbury, acquitted of treason by a London jury, fled to the Low Countries, where he was soon joined by his middle-aged secretary, John Locke. Others remained at home to face a martyrdom that did their cause little immediate good.

It was one thing to break the Whig party, however, but quite another to prevent its revival—as Charles well knew. For that reason the four-year period between the meeting of his last Parliament and his death was spent in striking hardest at the franchise rights of the cities and towns of England whose electors were usually Whigs. Most municipalities had electoral rights, frequently very ancient, that had been conferred by crown charter; and a charter was a simple thing to withdraw if one could prove that its provisions had been exceeded by the slightest technicality. By raising often trivial objections to certain customs that violated the letter of these documents, the law officers of the crown were able to declare them forfeit and thus permit the king to replace them with others that brought the municipal corporations directly under his control. With the surrender of London in 1683, there was no town in England capable of holding out. When the process was completed, there seemed little danger of a Whig resurrection. The monarchy was free at last to develop a new system of authority untrammeled by any archaic survivals from the Middle Ages. When a sudden stroke carried Charles off in February, 1685, the government he passed on to his brother seemed more secure than that established by their father half a century before.

THE REVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM: LAST STAGE, 1685-88

The new king, James II, whose acts were to undo within a space of less than four years all that his brother had so deviously accomplished, came into his inheritance quietly. There was no Whig organization to resist his claim, and the Tories were predisposed by political faith and temperament to

believe that he would not raise a hand against the existing order in church and state. Every portent seemed to confirm the acquiescence of the nation to his rule. The established church, of which he was legally head, was committed to the doctrine of nonresistance almost as an article of faith. Parliament was now a more faithful instrument of the crown than any that had met since 1661, though its Tory sentiments did not keep it from voting against repeal of the Test Act. When, in the summer of 1685, a futile double invasion led by James's illegitimate nephew, the duke of Monmouth, and the Scottish earl of Argyle was put down without great effort, his popularity seemed secure. Why then did it all change so quickly?

Change came because James II, in spite of his long and intimate connection with English politics, still did not understand the political and social attitudes of Englishmen. He was not fully aware, for example, that Tories and churchmen alike expected him to keep his religion a private matter or that his rule was tolerated only because he had no Catholic heir. The extreme professions of loyalty made by bishops and Tory squires seemed to him to imply that they would permit him to follow any course of action without protest. What he forgot was that both had much to lose if he should succeed in re-establishing his own faith. The squire was in possession of lands and tithe rights that made up the ancient patrimony of the medieval Church, while the bishop was usually a man whose marital status and other impediments would have disqualified him for his high office in a Romanized establishment. Even in those cases where memory was short, it was still a difficult matter to make any English Protestant love Rome. Generations of fear and hatred had created an attitude of mind that showed itself all too evidently in such frenzied outbursts as those that accompanied the Popish Plot and in traditional celebrations that called for the burning of the pope's effigy. In this respect, many of James's coreligionists, both in England and Rome, were wiser than he and trembled at the consequences of that policy on which he was about to embark. Had James stayed his hand, his strong political position might have won for Catholics more privileges than they had enjoyed in a century. Why he did not has long been a subject for historical speculation. Perhaps it is most plausible to suggest that he was touched by megalomania. Whatever the case, he seems to have wanted power for his own purposes and to have wanted it quickly.

Evidences of this desire appeared immediately after Monmouth's rebellion when the king did not disband the troops raised for its suppression. There was an ominous note too in his request to Parliament that he be allowed to retain certain officers who had not met the requirements of the Test.

Hints were soon followed by deeds, and within a short space Catholics known for their devotion to James began to be appointed to all the highest civil and military posts in the kingdom. When this point was reached, a question of constitutional importance was also raised. The king claimed—and he was careful to get a judicial decision in support—that the prerogative gave him dispensing powers by which he could exempt those whom he wished from statutory limitation. There were precedents on which to base the argument, but none of them had decided so important an issue as this. By making use of them James was clearly going far beyond the express intentions of the law.

In ecclesiastical matters his policy vacillated. At the beginning of the reign he openly attacked the Nonconformists and punished a number of their leaders for genuine or spurious reasons. Meanwhile, he also undertook a frontal assault on the established church, apparently in the belief that Anglicans would willingly unite with Catholics against their common Nonconformist enemy. For that purpose he began by setting up a body similar in function to the old ecclesiastical Court of High Commission, which had been abolished by the Long Parliament in 1641. When it was clear, however, that James intended to use this court as an instrument for the Romanizing of the Anglican Church, leading bishops refused to have anything to do with it. Still the process went on, and everywhere pressure was brought to get Catholics or Catholic sympathizers accepted in ecclesiastical posts.

In the long run, James had to face one difficult fact: there simply were not enough Catholics in England to allow him to accomplish his ends completely. This problem finally led in 1687 to a startling reversal of policy when the king suddenly stopped his persecution of the Nonconformists and sought an alliance with them instead. The change was announced by the promulgation of a Declaration of Indulgence granting toleration all around, to Nonconformists and Catholics alike. Without parliamentary approval the action was questionable, and it was clear that James was relying on his claims to dispensing power in order to justify it. An accompanying statement was also intended to allay fears that he planned any radical alteration of the establishment or that he might be about to disturb the holders of former church lands. The result of this effort was largely a failure. Anglicans were not yet ready to go so far, and Nonconformists did not feel they could trust the king's word. A second Declaration of Indulgence followed in May, 1688, with little more effect. This time, however, when James ordered the bishops to distribute it throughout their dioceses, his answer was a petition signed by Archbishop Sancroft of Canterbury and six other prelates protesting his order on

the grounds that the dispensing power of the crown was illegal. Here was a public challenge to his authority from which James could not withdraw. The bishops were ordered to trial for circulating a seditious libel; and, at the end of June, their case was heard in an atmosphere of intense public excitement. When it was learned on June 30 that the jury, after an all-night session, had brought in a verdict of acquittal, the news was greeted by such a "wonderful shout, that one would have thought the Hall had cracked." Outside, the crowds of London spread jubilation with huzzas and bonfires. More ominous for James, however, was the news that even the troops on Hounslow Heath had cheered the court's decision.

THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION

On the night of the bishops' victory, while bonfires still burned in the streets of London, seven great magnates met at the house of the earl of Shrewsbury. Their numbers were not nearly so significant as the cross-section of opinion they represented, for three were Tories, and, of these, one was a bishop. When their meeting was concluded, they had pledged themselves to revolution by inviting a foreign prince to the English throne.

William, prince of Orange and Nassau, chief stadholder of the Netherlands, to whom the invitation of the seven intriguers was addressed, had been deeply involved in English politics for several years. In their own right he and his wife, Mary, combined excellent claims to the throne. William himself was a grandson of Charles I; Mary was a daughter of James by his first marriage. Both were Protestants. So long as James had no male heirs by his second marriage to the Catholic princess, Mary of Modena, it was assumed that the crown, in due course, would pass to William and Mary; and it was this probability that quieted many restive elements who would not otherwise have accepted a Catholic sovereign even temporarily. Nevertheless, as dissatisfaction at James's policies grew and with it the fear that he might do some irreparable harm to England before the crown changed hands, William began to lay plans for possible intervention. To a great extent his purposes were influenced by European events, since the major enemy of his native country was Louis XIV, who was at that moment preparing for another of his military ventures against an, as yet, unknown enemy. For William, who had also heard rumors of a secret understanding between Louis and James, it was a matter of vital importance to learn what part England was expected to play in this project. As early as May, 1687, his agents had crossed the North Sea, apparently to establish relations with centers of English discontent; and in January, 1688, his suspicions had been strongly aroused by James's attempt

to recall English and Scottish regiments from Dutch service. Two months later he made it known to one of the leading English exiles that he was ready to lead an expedition if he received a call from persons of power and influence. The event that resolved all hesitation on the English side, however, and prepared the way for the invitation of the seven magnates took place on June 10. On that date the queen gave birth to a son, whose rights as a male heir in direct line of descent superseded all others. Within two months after the child's birth James's agents brought him word that the shipyards of the United Provinces were humming with activity.

The last months of James's rule were filled with vacillation and indecision. Only when it was too late did the king try to reverse all that he had done before. His efforts availed him little; and on November 1, when the wind, which had kept the Dutch fleet in port, turned fair, William's motley expedition set sail. Four days later it landed at Torbay in the southwest of England and began its slow progress toward London.

No one will ever know what possessed James at this moment or in the days that followed. Had he struck boldly with his relatively strong army, he might have rallied the nation and driven William into the sea. Instead he veered from one course to another and finally fled the country. On December 18 William and his army, swollen now by persons of every degree who had deserted James's standard, entered the capital. There a representative group of Whigs and Tories invited him to summon a Convention Parliament, which met on January 22, 1689.

For some days after Parliament convened there was debate among the various political factions over the disposition of the monarchy. Various Tory schemes, all of which sought in one way or another to preserve the doctrine of indefeasible hereditary right, were finally rejected because they raised more problems than they resolved. In the end it was the Whig argument, with certain modifications, that prevailed because it cleared all difficulties and came closer to describing what had actually occurred. On January 28 the House of Commons at last resolved that "King James II, having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of his kingdom by breaking the original contract between king and people . . . and having withdrawn himself out of the kingdom; has abdicated the government; and that the throne is thereby vacant." The legal fiction that James had abdicated thus made it possible to offer the crown to William and Mary. To the offer was appended a Declaration of Right (soon to be known as the Bill of Rights) summing up and redressing all of the legal and constitutional grievances against James. By the end of February the prerogative powers of the crown were no longer limited by vague historic

practices or ancient legal conventions but by the precise wording of statutes. In this way royal absolutism as a political principle reached its terminus in English history.

THE REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT

The important constitutional decision of 1688–89, as is so often the case, was not embodied in any of the declarations or statutes passed by Parliament but in the events of the revolution itself. England became, in effect, an elective monarchy the instant it was known that James had fled. From then on only time was required to complete the process of constitutional-legal adjustment made necessary by that important event. From one point of view, it can be said that the process has never really stopped, but goes on and will go on so long as England maintains its institutional continuity.

Fundamentally, however, the Revolution accomplished two things. It settled the question of political power for almost a century and a half, and it destroyed in England the last vestiges of a theory of society that had dominated English, as well as European, thinking for centuries. On its political side, the Glorious Revolution transferred the final authority in the state from king to Parliament—though it would be generations before this change-over was complete—and in so doing conferred power on those groups in English life who controlled the latter institution. Exactly who these groups were is not a matter for simple explanation. The English parliamentary system was a confusing hodgepodge of overlapping rights and privileges that combined narrowly oligarchical elements with vestiges of popular sovereignty. Requirements for membership in the House of Commons were not clearly defined by statute before the eighteenth century, and the franchise was determined by a curious mingling of practices that had grown up over the centuries. Except in the boroughs, which had been weakened by the legal assaults of Charles II, the right to vote depended on the holding of free land worth forty shillings income a year. In many cases, those who possessed this right were the tenants or neighbors of powerful squires and noblemen who exerted every influence to see that freeholders voted as their social superiors wished. Thus, by a variety of methods, the great landholders were usually able to control rural elections. In many cities and towns, where the franchise had been defined by charter, the situation was often worse. There the electors had sometimes dwindled to a small number or, as in the case of the famous “rotten boroughs,” become the property of one or two persons. These peculiarities did not, however, apply to the House of Lords, which remained, in spite of the rising influence of the Commons, an important part of the system of government with very real

legislative powers. In the upper house the peers represented themselves alone and were not, even theoretically, responsible to a constituency. From the vantage point of that position they were able to check any moves that might endanger the privileges of their order or the personal rights of individual noblemen. In conjunction with the gentry, who helped them to sway elections, they were also able to influence the deliberations of the Commons to such an extent that the "landed interest" was assured of parliamentary dominance throughout the eighteenth century. Merchants and other men of substance, such as the lawyers, were not excluded from political participation in this system, but in order to so participate they were forced to align themselves with one or another of its factions.

The other great accomplishment of the Revolution was scarcely less important. By his devotion to his faith, King James had finally forced the issue of religious toleration; and among the enactments of Parliament that followed his dethronement was a statute legalizing freedom of worship for Nonconformists. In this way both the major Whig aims of limited monarchy and toleration for the Protestant sects were finally realized. The Revolution Settlement may thus be said to have destroyed not only the organically conceived monarchy but the social theory that helped to justify its existence. Gone was the idea that men's words and deeds must conform to a single standard of institutionalized belief. With some few exceptions the individual Englishman was henceforth free to choose the religious standards by which he would live, without *ipso facto* becoming an enemy of the state for having made the wrong choice. This concession also marked for most Englishmen the end of that faith, already shaken at the Reformation, that the Christian church was one and indivisible for all mankind. With it too went the dream of a unified English church, for the failure of the establishment to comprehend all Englishmen had been one of the conspicuous facts of the century. By the Act of Toleration the makers of the Revolution Settlement were, in effect, recognizing that religious diversity was to be a permanent element in English life.

In the realm of political theory the results of 1688 also had important consequences. The language of Parliament's resolution declaring the throne vacant indicated how much the leaders of the Whig party—and even the Tories to a degree—were influenced by the type of thinking popularized in John Locke's *Treatise on Civil Government*, which appeared after the Revolution. It matters little that the theory of an original "compact" or "contract" between king and people is completely unhistorical. What does and did matter is that for this particular moment in history it seemed to describe the English political situation with some measure of exactness and justified the overturn of James.

More importantly, however, the dominance of the Lockean view shows how far the revolutionaries had gone in rejecting both the theory of divine right as enunciated by James I and the secularized theory of absolutism implicit in Hobbes's writings. In contrast with Hobbes's argument that the original compact entered into between rulers and their subjects was unilateral—irrevocable and binding only on the latter—Locke saw the political contract as a bilateral agreement. Men owed obedience to their sovereigns, but kings, in their turn, owed their subjects good government. A breach on either side permitted the aggrieved party to enter into other arrangements. Through its evidently successful illustration of this theory, the Revolution of 1688 helped to give it wide currency and an influence that spread far beyond the English scene.

In the long run the Glorious Revolution must still stand as one of the most important events in English political history. It is true, of course, that many of its immediate effects were very limited in scope: though political power had been transferred, those who now wielded it were relatively few and were often selfish in outlook. It is also true that the establishing of popular sovereignty as it was to be understood in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was very far from the intentions of those who initiated the revolt. And yet, despite this narrowness of purpose, the results of 1688 undoubtedly contributed more to the nonviolent political development of England in the centuries since than any other event. What these seventeenth-century oligarchs accomplished, for all of their limitations, was the preservation of certain English institutions—of which the most important was Parliament—at a time when other European states were allowing similar representative bodies to fall into desuetude or abolishing them entirely. In this connection, there is an element of truth in the epithet that has labeled this overturn a “preserving” revolution. By saving Parliament from the discard, the revolutionaries of 1688 kept alive the institutional tradition of representative government, so that when the time came to democratize the bases of political power in the nineteenth century it was unnecessary to create something alien to the habits and thought of Englishmen. It was, on the contrary, necessary only to adjust the workings of Parliament to the needs of a later period. One can imagine the crisis that might have arisen at some later time if Englishmen had been forced to resurrect a long-forgotten medieval institution in order to initiate change, as the French did in 1789. The Glorious Revolution thus made it possible for the ancient constitutional machinery of England to preserve its outward form and to go on developing upon the strong foundations of a continuous and unbroken tradition stretching back to dim origins in the Middle Ages.

Chapter XI

THE ENLIGHTENMENT: BACKGROUND AND IDEALS



BETWEEN THE Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 and the outbreak of the French Revolution, just a hundred years later, a profound change was brought about in the minds and consciences of Europeans. Increasing wealth made possible an enlargement of the educated class; culture and learning became more easily accessible to persons of modest means; the expansion of commerce and the growth of industry created a more urgent social need for highly trained personnel, for improved technological processes, and for an accelerated tempo of scientific discovery. At the same time, more abundant material resources were being made available for the support of these enterprises, and a new leisure class—increasingly urban and mercantile—was steadily taking the place of the royal, aristocratic, or ecclesiastical patrons who had formerly financed (and thus, to some degree, controlled) the activities of artists and thinkers. These economic and social changes must all be taken into account when we try to explain the background and character of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

The word “enlightenment” itself offers an essential clue, for it expressed what was surely the deepest aspiration of the age. At no time since the age of Pericles had educated men been more unanimously persuaded that all evils flow from ignorance and that knowledge is an unmixed blessing. This central conviction is expressed in the frequency with which men of different nationalities, writing in different languages, made use of the same metaphor—that of a flood of sunlight triumphantly breaking through and dispersing a dense bank of black clouds. For the Frenchman the eighteenth century was “le siècle des lumières”; for the German it was “die Aufklärung”; for the Italian it was “il secolo dell’ illuminismo”; for the Englishman and the American it was “the Age of Enlightenment,” or “the Age of Reason.”

This chapter, designed especially for the present volume, has been revised from its form in the first edition and is by Charles Frankel and Ralph H. Bowen.

Earlier ages, indeed, had respected learning and placed a high valuation on the life of the mind. Yet not since the time of Plato had men been so confident in the power of natural reason to penetrate the inmost secrets of the universe; never had men more firmly believed in the fundamental lucidity and comprehensibility of all things. Nature was a lock which the key of science would open once the proper notches and grooves were contrived. The contrary supposition—that nature possesses no orderly plan, and so must remain ultimately inaccessible to systematic inquiry—had of course been as alien to the prevailing mood of the previous centuries as it was to that of the Enlightenment. For Christian rationalists of the scholastic age, as for most thinkers of the eighteenth century, it was axiomatic that the world must be thought of as a coherent whole, in which all phenomena were manifestations of an underlying regularity, of unchanging natural laws. These laws, however, were now no longer thought to be discoverable in the divinely inspired pages of Holy Writ; instead it was to be the glorious task of experimental discovery, aided by critical reason, to unveil the truth, to demolish the screen of ancient superstition and inherited prejudice that had so long concealed its radiance from the eyes of men.

To this program—at once constructive and destructive—the leaders of the Enlightenment were dedicated. It was this common enterprise that unified their diverse contributions, that created a common sympathy among men of widely varying national traditions, of infinitely diversified interests and pursuits, and of sharply contrasting attitudes toward existing social, economic, or political issues. It was this overarching commitment to free inquiry as a thing desirable for its own sake that went far to produce an amazingly consistent and sustained development of ideas, beginning with the earliest, most tentative expressions of the new spirit in the closing years of the Age of Louis XIV and ending with the radical and self-assured generalizations that were finally to be given their mature formulation by men of the Revolutionary generation.

We may briefly distinguish the immediate intellectual progenitors of the Enlightenment. No summary can overlook the humanists, nor omit the names of Rabelais, Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci, Thomas More, and Francis Bacon. The Enlightenment revered those names, and felt the closest possible kinship with men whose insatiable thirst for knowledge and experience it so enthusiastically shared. Nor would it be fitting to pass over the contribution of skeptics and rationalists, such as Montaigne, Descartes, and Bayle, whose tough minds and nimble wits had cast so much doubt on the accepted certainties of Aristotelian science, of Biblical revelation, and of scholastic the-

ology. In their skillful hands the sharp knife of analytical logic and the dissolving acid of systematic doubt had opened great gaps in what had formerly been a seamless fabric of authoritative belief. In the political sphere the thinkers of the eighteenth century sat at the feet of such sturdy realists as Hobbes, and even more frequently they looked for guidance to the libertarian exponents of natural rights and constitutional safeguards whose tradition culminated in Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke. Finally, and perhaps most enthusiastically, the Enlightenment took its rise from the splendid unification of physical science that was achieved with the publication of Isaac Newton's *Principia Mathematica* in 1687. It is worthwhile to consider some of the more direct antecedents of the Enlightenment in a little more detail.

FORERUNNERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Humanists, Rationalists, and Skeptics. In the late sixteenth century, the French moralist Michel de Montaigne had written an urbane and sprightly collection of *Essays* infused with gentle irony and pervaded by a typically humanist curiosity about the individual personality and the workings of the human mind—"I myself am the subject of my book." After calmly weighing the evidence for and against most of the beliefs held by his contemporaries, Montaigne had concluded that all were as likely to prove false as true and had expressed his universal skepticism in the celebrated refrain, "*Que sais-je?*"—"What do I know?"

This general preoccupation with individual opinion had its source not only in intellectual dissent from inherited authorities but also in the general shift of the center of men's interests from other-worldly concerns to worldly ones. Montaigne had argued that it was setting considerable value on one's own conjectures to burn others for disagreeing with them. In the seventeenth century, his stoic tolerance and disillusion gradually passed into a kind of epicureanism. This *libertine* (or "freethinking") position, as it came to be called, emphasized the priority of happiness over salvation, and the inherent worth of human pleasure. Leaning heavily on the writings of Montaigne and Lucretius, it opposed asceticism, sought happiness in the here-and-now, and trusted man's instincts. The most important of these epicurean humanists was Saint-Évremond, whose philosophy is summed up in these words: "Man ought to apply himself to the quest after his happiness, since it is in his power to augment his pleasures and to diminish his pains."

In such epicureans we have the precursors of the eighteenth-century attempt to divorce ethics from theology and to make happiness the supreme moral standard. As we shall see, they anticipated the "utilitarianism" of Helvétius

and the "materialism" of Holbach, though they did not share the optimism of these later men concerning the powers of human reason.

Coming a half-century after Montaigne, and converting the latter's skepticism into a fundamental principle of his "method for rightly conducting the reason in the search for truth in the sciences," René Descartes had taught his followers—and few minds of the latter seventeenth century escaped his influence—that every inherited opinion must be subjected to "systematic doubt" and that nothing must be accepted as true unless it could be "clearly and distinctly perceived" by the critical, analytical understanding. Descartes, at the same time, gave a powerful impulsion to scientific investigation and to the growing enthusiasm for science among laymen, increasing numbers of whom came to see in his mathematical, or analytical, method a promising instrument for the remaking of all human knowledge.

Among those whose thinking had been decisively shaped by Descartes, Pierre Bayle, and Bernard de Fontenelle made signal contributions to the formation of the "philosophic spirit" that was to dominate the first half of the eighteenth century. Bayle applied the Cartesian method of doubt to the criticism of the Bible, of history, of popular superstitions, and of religious tradition; Fontenelle extended Cartesianism to other fields and popularized the new science. Joseph de Maistre, writing after the French Revolution, called Bayle and Fontenelle "the fathers of modern incredulity." Bayle's voluminous *Dictionnaire historique et critique* was the chief arsenal from which the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment drew their most effective polemics. Convinced of the unalterable constancy of natural laws, Bayle cast serious doubt upon the possibility of God's miraculous intervention in human affairs. He argued that even a society of atheists might be moral, and thus suggested a favorite theme of the *philosophes* that theology might be divorced from morality. Fontenelle's work was parallel in many respects to that of Bayle. He employed the critical apparatus of Cartesianism, the faith in "reason" and the postulate of the constancy of nature. In his notable *Digression on the Ancients and Moderns* he examined the question of how far the geometric, or Cartesian, method might be extended, and he concluded that it could be used to good effect in all fields, even the fine arts. Fontenelle is especially interesting because he exhibited so clearly the influence of both the humanist and the scientific traditions. He emphasized the cumulative character of the sciences, their essential unity, their evident progress; yet at the same time he felt that human folly could not be reduced. The progress Fontenelle envisaged was exclusively in the sciences. He did not, on the whole, expect progress in society and morals.

Newton and Locke. But while the preliminary work of dissolving hostile prejudices, of arousing interest and sympathy for men of science and their ways of thinking, had largely been done by the opening of the new century, it remained for two heirs of the British empirical tradition to give positive direction to the rather confused and dispersed currents of thought that the seventeenth century had set in motion. In a very real sense the Enlightenment may be studied as the gradual working out of all the direct and remote consequences that were implicit in the cosmology of Newton and in the psychological and political theories of Locke.

It was in part through Voltaire's brilliant work of disseminating and popularizing their views that these became the two great names of the Enlightenment. But there were various other reasons for the vogue of British philosophy, including the fact that, by the 1730's, Cartesian physics was moribund. British philosophy had been characterized since the time of Hobbes by its secular turn, and Britain's religious and political liberties made its philosophy the natural rationale for those fighting for religious and political liberties elsewhere. As Voltaire wrote, "When one considers that Newton, Clarke, and Leibniz would have been persecuted in France, imprisoned at Rome, and burned at Lisbon, what are we to think of human reason? One would swear that reason was a native of England in the present age, at least."

Moreover, the aspect of Descartes's influence which found deepest root was his enthusiasm for the application of the mathematical method to the whole range of human knowledge. In this respect the philosophy of Locke was, in the eyes of Voltaire, for example, more consistently Cartesian than was Descartes himself. He thought Descartes had abrogated his own purpose and method by positing a substance—the mind—to which mechanics was wholly inappropriate; whereas Locke had pushed forward boldly to uncover "the anatomy of the soul" by placing it within the world of physical bodies in motion. Moreover, as the French Cartesians interpreted Locke's so-called empiricism, his method was not very different from that of Descartes. Like the Frenchman, Locke analyzed complex problems into their simple parts, and "no one has shown more fully than he that a man, without the smallest assistance from geometry, might still possess the most geometrical intellect possible."

In the eyes of the educated classes, the major event of the time was the intellectual revolution implicit in the development of the new mathematical-experimental method which had been so dramatically vindicated by the triumphant discoveries of Newton. Why should this mighty searchlight serve only to illuminate the physical universe, and why might it not with equal success invade such previously sacrosanct fields as religion and politics? In addi-

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tion, the new method, at once precise and matter-of-fact, seemed to offer a popularly accessible language by which the liberating conclusions of the new science might be popularly disseminated.

Another purpose was served by the general employment of Newton and Locke during the Enlightenment. Descartes's philosophy had, in his own hands and in the hands of others, been used as an appendage to theology. Increasingly during the seventeenth century it tended to become either a new kind of scholasticism or the basis of comprehensive metaphysical systems. The dominant interests of the Enlightenment, on the other hand, were practical, humanistic, and secular, rather than ascetic and supernaturalistic. Holbach's words are representative:

Man seeks to range beyond his sphere: despite the repeated checks met by his foolish ambition, he continues to attempt the impossible, and strives to carry his inquiries beyond the visible world. . . . He wants to be a metaphysician before he has become a practical philosopher. He quits the contemplation of realities to meditate on chimeras. He neglects experience to feed on conjecture, to indulge in guesswork . . . and he frequently leaves the plain and simple road of truth, which is the only road by which he can ever reasonably hope to reach the goal of happiness.

In the experimentalism of Newton the Enlightenment thought it had found the warrant and instrument for such positivism. And in Locke's emphasis upon understanding the origin and limits of the human mind they found a method for returning philosophy to its proper business as a guide for human life.

NATIONAL VARIATIONS IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The influence of Descartes, of Renaissance thought, and of the intellectual enterprise culminating in Newton and Locke combined to create a culture whose appeal transcended national boundaries. The Enlightenment fostered and was in turn sustained by a European culture. While the Enlightenment was a European movement, however, it took on somewhat different characteristics within various nations.

Though in France the Enlightenment was most dramatic and most intense, and most fruitful in practical and political consequences, there were allied currents in neighboring countries. In England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, there was on the whole a feeling of achievement, a confident sense that the constitution and the Whigs were safe in England and that England was enlightening the world. Locke's defense of revolution was already a defense of vested interests. It is partly because the typical figures of the Eng-

lish Enlightenment were not prophets of a revolution but glorifiers of an achievement that the leadership in the further development of political thought during the eighteenth century passed from England to France.

The English Enlightenment was thus relatively complacent and conservative. Convinced that what is right already *is*, such men as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Pope saw in the Newtonian vision of the harmonious order of nature a proof that "whatever is, is right." Thus Locke defended the reasonableness of Christianity, and Clarke, Butler, Wollaston, Gay, and Paley used "natural religion" to sanction a "broad-church" theology that remained nominally Anglican but laid little stress on the Thirty-nine Articles. There was, to be sure, a group of notorious "free thinkers" in England, writers such as Anthony Collins and John Toland, who attacked Christianity itself in the name of "natural religion" and reason; but this radical element in the English Enlightenment was confined almost exclusively to religious issues and had little influence on social philosophy. Indeed, formal "utilitarianism" began in England as an appendage to theology, and it did not become an instrument for the reform of English social conditions until it had passed, as we shall see, through the hands of the French. It was not until the shock of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution had dislocated British social relationships that English political philosophy took on a different tone. In Scotland, however, and especially in Edinburgh, a school of moral and political philosophy gradually developed a critical and skeptical tendency. In the works of Adam Smith and David Hume this course of thought came to its culmination. In addition to attacking mercantilist policies, these thinkers developed a moral and social philosophy which found in human nature itself the grounds of social virtues and moral principles. Their accounts of how self-seeking and social sympathy (or moral sense) supplement each other became a major tradition of the second half of the Enlightenment.

In contrast with the complacency that characterized much of the British Enlightenment, and in contrast with the rather smug, academic flavor of the German Enlightenment, the French Enlightenment was at once a political weapon and a revolutionary portent. Many basic intellectual materials of the Enlightenment came from England, but its moral animation came from France. A person such as Voltaire would go to England a poet and return home a philosopher; and a British or German philosopher would go to France and leave a propagandist. France was the acknowledged literary and intellectual arbiter of the age, and its radical brand of enlightenment was the most widely disseminated throughout Europe.

The moderate and respectful arguments employed by Locke in defense of

toleration seemed, when Voltaire applied them to French conditions, to be radical. Most of the great leaders of the French Enlightenment, men such as Voltaire and Diderot, spent short periods in the Bastille. These two, as well as such other leaders as Helvétius and Holbach, found it necessary to write under assumed names, or to have their books published in Holland and distributed in semi-secrecy. Rousseau's *Emile*, a treatise on education, was burnt by order of the Parlement of Paris. Buffon was forced to renounce everything in his geology "that might be contrary to the narrative of Moses." D'Alembert was hounded into weary submission and driven to resign his position as one of the editors of the *Encyclopédia*, the vast work which symbolized the unity of the philosophic group in their criticism of the old regime. The feeling among Frenchmen that they were late in reaping the fruits of enlightenment only aggravated the existing discontent.

The European Enlightenment nourished the American movement for independence and produced in the colonies a generation of enlightened men of affairs, such as Jefferson and Franklin, whose ideas not merely dominated the crucial era of the American Revolution, but contributed a permanent and influential factor in American tradition. In addition, the success of the American Revolution and its use of the principles of the French and British Enlightenment provided a not inconsiderable impulse for the French and seemed to them to be a prelude to their own Revolution.

The Enlightenment in Germany was for the most part academic rather than practical like the French or skeptical like the Scottish. Leibniz's was the outstanding name of the period and his doctrine of "preestablished harmony" gave to German thought the theoretical analogue to Pope's complacent "whatever is, is right." It was a popular rendition of Leibniz's optimism that provided the occasion for Voltaire's *Candide*.

The Leibnizian philosophy was a product and expression of the new mathematical sciences, though its scientific character was transformed into an arid, rationalistic metaphysics by Christian Wolff, in which shape it exercised its most direct influence on the German Enlightenment. However, poet-philosophers such as Lessing and Goethe later gave a moral impetus to the German Enlightenment, which laid the foundations for German idealism. The infiltration of French ideas moved the German Enlightenment still closer to practical affairs, and the skeptical influence of Hume operated more particularly through the philosophy of Kant.

THE THREE MAIN STAGES OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Until about 1740 the Enlightenment was everywhere a tentative, exploratory movement. Its representatives were typically men of upper-class outlook, con-

servative critics of the *status quo* in church, state, and society, and they had little systematic contact with one another. Often they did not publish their bolder writings but were content to allow these to circulate surreptitiously in private correspondence or in manuscript copies. The dominant world-view was essentially that of Descartes, gradually modified by the ideas of Newton and Locke.

The essential moderation of the period is best appreciated when we examine the religious philosophy of deism to which nearly all of these early proponents of the Enlightenment subscribed. God was conceived of as a sublime artificer—a cosmic watchmaker—who had fashioned the universe in the form of a marvelously complex and delicately adjusted machine, which he had then wound up and left to run without further intervention. Men might feel awe at the vast intelligence or the benign purpose exhibited in His work by the Creator of the Universe, but they could hardly expect Him any longer to heed their prayers or to be continually altering the springs and cog-wheels of His universe in order to produce special miracles. Indeed, God came to be defined by many in Spinoza's terms—as the abstract principle of order and necessity in nature—and so came to be thought of as subject to His own laws, for if God's essence was reason, how could He behave arbitrarily or capriciously without destroying His own being? Gone was the immanent divinity of Augustine, Calvin, Luther, and Bossuet; gone was the comfort of His special providence or the fear of His special vengeance. God had ceased to be a loving father or a wrathful scourge of iniquity; He had become a geometer-in-chief, a benign but chilly contriver of the spectacle of nature, a supreme legislator and judge, but one whose laws—discovered by Newton—were sublimely simple and immutable, and whose judgments were no longer made dreadful by anger or tempered by mercy.

Most deists continued to believe in an afterlife in which the law-abiding would be rewarded and the others punished—at least they argued that society could not subsist unless the lower orders continued to hold this belief—and they tended to be complacent about the existing scheme of things. God, after all, was by definition benevolent and all-powerful; He had had an infinite number of possible worlds to choose from when He began His creation; and the fact that He had chosen this one proved conclusively that this was, in Leibniz's famous phrase, "the best of all possible worlds." Hence it contained the greatest possible quantity of good and the least possible sum of evil. The blade of grass must be sacrificed so that the cow might live, and the cow must die to provide food for man—each lesser evil was only the indispensable condition for the emergence of some greater good. Absolute, radical evil was thus abolished, and the Devil of the Manichees and Christians was dead.

Revelation, too, forfeited its age-old sacrosanctity. Moses became merely another great lawgiver like Solon or Lycurgus, and Jesus became a human reformer, no longer the Son of God and Redeemer Whose suffering had repaid the debt of Adam and Eve, but a simple carpenter, a moral teacher like Confucius or Buddha. The pages of Holy Writ came to be regarded as a crude and credulous history of the doings of primitive Hebrew tribes. The Church and the churches now appeared to be human institutions, subject to corruption and error, and priests were coming more and more to be represented as cynical charlatans, manipulating the fears and anxieties of the ignorant in order to perpetuate their despotic power and unapostolic opulence by keeping men's minds in darkness.

By 1740, however, this deistic philosophy, with its characteristic blend of theological radicalism and political conservatism, was beginning to show definite signs of obsolescence. The Cartesian metaphysics on which it had been built was no longer supreme, for the experimentalism and empiricism represented by Bacon, Newton, and Locke had all but discredited Descartes's scientific theories (his vortices, for example) and weakened the prestige of his essentially abstract, mathematical, analytic method—even in France, where it reigned the longest. New discoveries in astronomy upset Newton's case for belief in God's continuing governance of the universe by showing that apparent irregularities in the behavior of planets were actually self-compensating. New knowledge in the fields of biology, much of which was made possible thanks to the careful use of the microscope by Dutch researchers, more and more prompted a younger generation of naturalists and philosophers to speculate about the origins of life and the location of that shadowy line which often seemed to separate inert from living matter. If nature was a machine, was not man perhaps also a machine? Were not man's vaunted intelligence and imagination merely more intense forms of the sensitivity or irritability that even the most elementary organisms had been found to possess? Had not, perhaps, all these forms of life arisen from random combinations of "dead" matter? Was not the deists' idea of "purpose" or "design" in the universe merely a subjective prejudice? What need had the material world of an immaterial Creator—might it not have existed from all eternity?

The ferment produced by such ideas—whether they were suggested by the reading of Lucretius or by work in the laboratory—was profoundly corrosive of the smug certainties of the deists. Between 1740 and 1770 the most advanced thinkers moved steadily away from theological preoccupations and became progressively more firmly convinced that only the experimental study of nature—of which man and his society were parts—could furnish reliable

guides for the conduct of life. We may broadly characterize this central, most original and creative phase of the Enlightenment as one of scientific humanism—for man had become, *par excellence*, the center and the measure of all things, and his purposes were now to be controlling. These purposes, in turn, were no longer regarded as occult or mysterious, nor were they imposed from outside by some superior wisdom or will. Instead, science would explore man's physical nature, discover his actual needs and propensities, determine which were most favorable to his survival, and finally elaborate a new scheme of priorities and values. In the end, it was hoped, science would discover how to make men more humane—that is, more human.

Locke, Toland, Leibniz, Wolff, Shaftesbury, Voltaire, and Montesquieu had been the great names of the early Enlightenment, and these names continued to command respect. But the new generation, rallying to the standard of the *Encyclopédia*, more and more took its watchwords from radical naturalists, evolutionists, skeptics, materialists, and positivists, and Diderot, d'Alembert, Helvétius, Holbach, Hume, Gibbon, Lessing, and Beccaria were its most authentic spokesmen.

The years between 1740 and 1770 were also decisive for the diffusion of the new outlook. The slashing irony and brilliant wit of Voltaire, the massive documentation of Diderot's *Encyclopédia*, and the flowering of intellectual conversation in the *salons* conducted by aristocratic or upper-middle-class ladies—these were only the most conspicuous agencies that were operating to introduce at least the common denominators of "enlightened" thought into all educated minds. Even the nobility took up the new ideas—particularly in their moderate deistic form—and the Society of Jesus was by 1750 objecting, on intellectual grounds, only to the more extreme doctrines of the chief Encyclopedists. Many high officials (including Malesherbes, Sartine, and Turgot) sympathized strongly with the Encyclopedists and protected them secretly; Madame de Pompadour interceded with the king on their behalf. By 1770 the *philosophes* had won their battle for the control of public opinion; their books were in everyone's hands; the government's censors were of their persuasion, and the police were making only a token attempt to prevent the circulation of even the most audacious attacks on throne and altar.

The twenty years immediately preceding the Revolution witnessed the further diffusion of "enlightened" ideas and their penetration into the consciousness of the lower middle classes, most of whom could not afford to own the *Encyclopédia* but could easily afford the small membership fee that would permit them to consult it in a public reading room, or who could purchase some of the innumerable digests or anthologies that purveyed its more sensa-

tional articles or paraphrased its more telling criticisms of established institutions.

These two pre-Revolutionary decades also saw the fruition of several monumental attempts to give general systematic expression to the new ideas. The greatest and most enduring of these synthetic achievements were those of Kant and Condorcet. Like so many previous syntheses, these two not only summed up and comprehended the thought of an age that was ending, but also revealed the limitations of that age and suggested future directions for philosophic and scientific inquiry. In many ways the thought of Kant especially bridges the transition from the scientific humanism of the eighteenth century to the romantic outlook that was to reach full flower in the early decades of the new century. Kant, in turn, had built to an important degree upon the insights of Rousseau, who had half shared and half rejected the ideals of his Encyclopedist contemporaries. Thus the "Age of Reason" had itself incubated and brought to life the new emotion-centered world outlook that was to animate the Romantic Generation—men who were at once the heirs of the *philosophes* and their vigorous critics. Thus Critical Reason was transformed into Creative Reason, and the path was charted forward from the outposts established by Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau to the nineteenth-century citadels erected by Hegel, Marx, and Darwin.

MAJOR IDEALS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Free Enquiry: toward a Science of Society. During the "Age of Enlightenment," a group of men self-consciously professed allegiance neither to tradition, to supernatural prescription, nor to simple and arbitrary despotism, but to what seemed to them to be scientific methods and results. That their methods were often inadequate and their results sometimes overly simple does not alter the fact that they were concerned predominantly with showing their contemporaries the inherent virtue of free inquiry. And above and beyond any of the specific programs which they fathered, they left a lasting deposit in the Western mind—the idea of science as an independent political and social power, as a solvent of hardened customs and traditions. "The philosophers of different nations," as the last of the distinguished *philosophes*, Condorcet, wrote, "embracing in their meditations the entire interests of man, without distinction of country, of color, or of sect, formed, notwithstanding the difference of their speculative opinions, a firm and united phalanx against every description of error, every species of tyranny." It was this conviction of the world-wide validity of scientific method that gave force to their doctrine.

A peculiarly forceful and broadly representative statement of this philo-

sophic program was given by Holbach in a passage that may actually have been written by his close friend Diderot:

Let us then endeavor to disperse those clouds of ignorance, those mists of darkness, which impede Man on his journey, which block his progress, which prevent his marching through life with a firm and steady step. Let us try to inspire him with courage—with respect for his own reason—with an inextinguishable love of truth—. . . so that he may learn to know himself—to know his justifiable rights —so that he may learn to go by his own experience, and no longer be duped by an imagination that has been led astray by authority—so that he may renounce the prejudices of his childhood—so that he may learn to base his morals on his own nature, on his own wants, on the real advantage of society—so that he may dare to love himself—so that he may learn to pursue his true happiness, by promoting that of others—so that he may no longer occupy himself with useless or dangerous dreams—in short, so that he may become a virtuous and rational being, who cannot fail to become happy.

This “socialization” of science in the interest of human happiness and good citizenship was what the *philosophes* called “the philosophic spirit.” “The philosophic spirit,” predicted the *Encyclopédia*, “will spread . . . its influence through the whole system of the state, through all the works of the hand or of the mind.” “Philosophy is nothing else than the application of reason to the different objects on which it can be exercised,” d’Alembert tells us, and his is consequently the most “philosophic” of centuries.

Our century has therefore called itself the philosophic century *par excellence*. . . . From the principles of the profane sciences to the foundations of revelation, from metaphysics to questions of taste, from music to morals, from the scholastic disputes of theologians to commercial affairs, from the rights of princes to those of peoples, from the natural law to the arbitrary law of nations, in a word, from the questions that affect us the most to those that interest us the least, everything has been discussed, analyzed, disputed.

Against the “philosophic spirit” and against this organization of men of letters committed to its extension and popularization there stood the forces of the “Old Regime,” the established Church, the institution of divine-right monarchy, the parlements, the censorship, the persistent vestiges of feudalism, mercantilism, and paternalism. The enlightenment of the *philosophes* stands out all the more because they were cosmopolitan in an era of competing national states; because they turned to natural law while political institutions were held to be grounded on divine right and buttressed by ecclesiastical power; because they argued that the real source of political authority was the “general will” while the monarchs of Europe continued to regard their realms as mere family possessions. Above all, it was “the philosophic spirit” that gave

distinctive tone to the eighteenth century and established its significance for contemporary civilization. Not since the Middle Ages had the educated classes of Europe been so unified, or so stirred by a common allegiance to a set of beliefs and to a method of inquiry, and by a common apprehension of the task before them. As early as 1751 Duclos reported the state of mind of his contemporaries in the following way: "I do not know whether I have too favorable an opinion of my century; but it seems to me that there is a certain fermentation of universal reason which is tending to develop, and which perhaps will be left to dissipate itself, but whose progress could be assured, directed, and hastened by skillful cultivation."

Progress and Perfectibility. This "fermentation of universal reason" of which Duclos spoke was reflected in the idea of progress which pervaded the thought of the Enlightenment. Essentially, the idea of progress represented the recognition that the impressive process begun with Descartes, and carried to its culmination by Newton and Locke, had vouchsafed a new power to human intelligence, the power of science, which might permeate a culture and make it more liberal, more humane, less superstitious, and less irrational.

A number of contrasting versions of the idea were worked out during the Enlightenment, but they all had the common concern to define the specific ways in which the new science was progressive. Only in Germany did the notions of progress have a somewhat different point of departure. In France the most representative expositions of the idea of progress were given by Voltaire, Turgot, and Condorcet. They differ, as we shall see, in many important ways, but they are all animated by an acute consciousness of the tremendous import of the "fermentation of universal reason."

Voltaire's predominant concern was to show that it is through human reason alone that any age leaves a permanent contribution to those following. Poets and thinkers rather than kings and generals are the true benefactors of the human race. Voltaire's histories were tracts for his own time and dramatized what he took to be the central issue of his age—the clash of reason and superstition. "My principal aim was to trace the revolutions of the human understanding in those of governments."

Voltaire's *Essay on the Manners and Mind of Nations* was written partly as an answer to Bishop Bossuet's appealing *Discourse on Universal History*, a seventeenth-century restatement of the Augustinian view that history exhibits the conflict between Good and Evil in which the "City of God" ultimately triumphs. In its outlines, however, the story that Voltaire told was very similar. Though he was not concerned to recount the conflict between the "City of God" and the kingdom of Satan, history was for him nonetheless

simply an illustration of the persistent conflict between opposed forces, now reason and superstition. Voltaire was concerned to trace out the course of events by which "at last, with time, men came to correct their ideas and learned to think." "We may believe that reason and industry will always progress more and more; that the useful arts will be improved; that of the evils which have afflicted men, prejudices, which are not their least scourge, will gradually disappear among all those who govern nations, and that philosophy, universally diffused, will give some consolation to human nature for the calamities which it will experience in all ages."

Indeed, the very triumph of reason, as Voltaire presents it, sometimes seems to be as miraculous an occurrence as is the vouchsafing of God's special revelation in the more traditional Christian epic. Voltaire never developed explicitly a theory of progress. For him it was the development and propagation of science which more than anything else had changed the face of the world and had rendered the modern era incomparably superior to any other age; and the use of science as an instrument of criticism shows that those ages which lacked the capacity to think philosophically were nothing but a shameful "mass of crimes, of folly, and of misery." This is why Voltaire remarks that for the beginning student the history of the ages before the fifteenth century is hardly worth studying. This view of progress as beginning practically *de novo* in modern times, and of history as the record of crime and folly, was widely prevalent during the Enlightenment. Gibbon's classic *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* was a judicious account of "the triumph of barbarism and religion."

Whereas Voltaire assumed that enlightenment had come *at last* and *suddenly*, others began to reinterpret history in terms of stages of progress, so that history appeared to them as the unfolding of reason in the world. This conception was stated by Turgot, who more clearly than any of his predecessors formulated the idea of necessary and inevitable progress.

Universal history embraces the consideration of the successive stages in the progress of the human species, and the specific causes that have contributed to it; the formation and mixing of nations; the origins, the revolutions of governments; the progress of languages, of physics, of morals, of manners, of the sciences and arts; the revolutions which have made Empires succeed Empires, nations follow on nations, religions on religions; the human race, always the same through these upheavals, and constantly advancing toward perfection.

Turgot's theory of progress—or, more accurately, of man's perfectibility—differed from Voltaire's in maintaining that progress rests on the continuity with which the materials of the past are carried into the present, and not on

the success with which the present is purged of the vestigial traces of its unenlightened ancestry. Thus, in the first of two discourses delivered at the Sorbonne in 1750, Turgot argued that Christianity was one of the most important factors that had made for progress, that it had saved antiquity from superstition and had preserved the sciences through the ages that would otherwise have been completely dark. This view was related to Turgot's fundamental principle, namely, that human communication is the basis of progress, that language is the essential medium for the preservation and transmission of that wealth of historic traditions to which every generation makes its own contribution. His interpretation of the nature of the process of communication led Turgot to the conclusion that every event was a factor in progress, since every event, through communication, was rendered part of the historic tradition with which men work and was therefore automatically instructive. "No mutation has taken place which has not brought some advantage; because none has been made without producing some experience, and without extending or improving or preparing instruction."

It would be wrong to imagine that Turgot did not share the *philosophes'* preoccupation with and admiration for the development of science, or that because he held that Christianity was a progressive force he did not share the worldly values and secular concerns of his contemporaries. On the contrary, Christianity was held to be progressive for two principal reasons: it was both a promoter and preserver of science, and it was an indispensable agent in the formation and cultivation of good citizens. Indeed, Turgot's measures of progress were the degree to which the sciences are progressively unified and their methods improved, and the extent to which they mark the quality of public enlightenment. Moreover, Turgot attributed to "analytic method" the same power as did his contemporaries—the power of undermining authority and its intellectual ally, the so-called *esprit de système* (the dogmatizing spirit); and his reflections on particular historical events (such as despotism, which he condemned in a thoroughly forthright manner) were not always in consonance with the deeper logic of the argument he made central to his thesis.

What gave Turgot's view a fruitful direction was his emphasis upon the "analytic method" which enters the field of tradition and, while continuous with it, acts as a critical instrument upon it. The importance of this point was brought out even more clearly in Condorcet's *The Progress of the Human Mind*, which was the culminating statement of the Enlightenment's hopes and ideals of progress. Condorcet's work, which was itself only an outline, nevertheless carried out more fully Turgot's plan for a universal history

tracing the progress of the human mind, and used many of the principles which Turgot had introduced into his reflections.

At the same time, however, that Condorcet reiterated Turgot's conviction concerning the relentless and continuous march of progress, he shared Voltaire's emphasis upon the persistent struggle between reason and superstition. His interpretation of science as a body of *conclusions* added force to the latter attitude. On the other hand, his concern with scientific method in operation and his view that it is a continuously and critically improving process allowed him to retain a belief in the continuity of progress without finding everything in the past to be necessarily progressive. Condorcet's survey of the past was guided by his hatred of the priests, which made him regard all religion as priestcraft and the clergy as in great measure responsible for retarding the progress of reason by monopolizing education. Largely because of the special interests of this privileged class, Condorcet felt, knowledge had been turned into a mystery of revelation and employed mainly as a weapon to keep power over the uninitiated populace.

Condorcet's striking vision of the future is a guidepost to the dominant ideals of his day. His belief "that no bounds have been fixed to the improvement of the human faculties, that the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite," was perhaps even more optimistic than the views of others among his optimistic contemporaries. Condorcet was, however, not exceptional in his view of the constituents of this progress. He argued that mankind would progress in three respects: in the destruction of inequality between different nations; in the progress of equality in one and the same nation; and in the real improvement of man. By equality Condorcet did not mean actual similarity in physical or mental equipment, but "that state in which all will possess the requisite knowledge for conducting themselves in the common affairs of life by their own reason." Nor did Condorcet mean by the perfectibility of mankind primarily an actual change in man's physical composition, but rather the indefinite improvement in techniques. There is no reason for setting a limit to the progress of the human mind, for there will never be a time when man's problems will become too complicated for its comprehension.

In Germany, the tone of the dominant intellectual circles was set by Leibniz. As expounded by Christian Wolff, Leibniz's philosophy represented the attempt to bring together the new science and both ancient and scholastic philosophy in such a way as to retain both the mathematical structure of modern physics and the traditional system of final causes. In the course of this enterprise Leibniz had been one of the few, and certainly the most outstanding, of the seventeenth-century thinkers to lay down a theory of develop-

ment and the basis for an idea of progress. However, in his urge to make a neat ideology out of Leibniz's diffuse enterprise, this side of Leibniz's thought was obscured by Wolff. The consequence was that it was not until comparatively late in the century that progress became a theme of importance. Lessing saw progress as the education of man by religion, until he is prepared for full knowledge of God. Herder regarded history as a completely determined series of epochs, each turned toward the realization of its specific potentialities, and leading up to the final age whose fulfillment is the highest. Kant saw history fundamentally as the attempt to fulfill man's predisposition to rationality—a level to be attained only in a "universal civil society." All history might be explained and understood in terms of this final goal.

Cosmopolitanism and Humanitarianism. The "fermentation of universal reason" was also the animating force behind another of the characteristic attitudes of the Enlightenment—its cosmopolitanism. This attitude represented the merging of the new vision of science with the tradition of natural law inherited from Stoic thinkers. The Enlightenment was steeped in the classic ideals of Seneca and Cicero, and inherited the ancient persuasion of the oneness of humanity, the conviction that in their liability to natural law all men are equal and alike. It was such a conviction that had led some of the ancient Stoics to condemn slavery, and this belief brought the ideals of equality and cosmopolitanism together. The revived strength of this conviction was largely due to the power of the Newtonian vision of the uniformity and harmony of nature and to the growth of a European society of "philosophic spirits," who hoped that human society would soon be patterned on the universal natural order. Thus Lessing, a leader of the German Enlightenment, could hope "that there were men in every country who had advanced beyond the prejudices of the populace, and knew exactly when patriotism ceased to be a virtue."

The cosmopolitanism of ancient Rome was congenial to the fact of a multinational Empire, and the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment similarly attended the commercial and colonial expansion of Europe and the discovery of new and different cultures. During the first part of the century a host of travelers' tales appeared, especially in France, which, in displaying the virtues of other civilizations, were obliquely devoted to criticizing existing conditions in Europe. Such criticism rested upon the postulate that a single set of laws applied everywhere, and that the peculiarities of European civilization were "unnatural" accretions, stupefying the society in which they were present and separating it from others.

This conviction that human nature was everywhere the same developed

into a humanitarian concern for individual welfare, and the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment was displayed not only in the vision of a common European civilization but in the indignation frequently expressed at the treatment of non-Europeans by Europeans. Negro slavery was attacked, and the rule of the British in India was condemned. Both the rationalist Abbé Raynal (in his *History of the Two Indies*) and the Whig Edmund Burke were forthright in their denunciations of conditions in the colonies.

The philosophic basis of cosmopolitanism was most generally the belief that societies are simply "artificial" bodies made up of separate individuals, each fully endowed with such inalienable natural rights as liberty, security, and property. Societies had been founded simply in order to protect these individual rights. Consequently, a man's country was always, in a sense, an "adopted" one, which he was free to accept or reject. And, in the final analysis, the only society worthy of an enlightened man was that ideal one made up of all who served the common ideals of *reason*, *nature*, and *humanity*. The words of Montesquieu are expressive of this attitude: "If I knew of something that was useful to myself, but injurious to my family, I would cast it from my mind. If I knew of something which was useful to my family but injurious to my country, I would try to forget it. If I knew of something that was useful to my country, but injurious to Europe and the human race, I should regard it as a crime."

Immanuel Kant, in his *Essay on Universal History*, attempted to suggest principles for the interpretation of history which would indicate that it tended toward a world republic. In his *Essay on Universal Peace* he outlined a plan for world peace that expressed the cosmopolitan horizons of the characteristic thinker of the Enlightenment. His plan was hardly the first. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre in the early part of the century had written extensively on projects for world peace, and while his contemporaries looked upon him as a visionary they too were oftentimes prone to share his optimistic belief that world peace would be a natural consequence of universal enlightenment.

Toleration and Liberty of Belief. At the end of the eighteenth century the opinion was expressed by such representative thinkers as Condorcet and Thomas Paine that the granting of toleration by the state was no less despotic or audacious than the withholding of toleration, because the state was claiming to grant a right it did not own. Expressed in this way the position was an extreme one for the eighteenth century, yet it is suggestive of the basic premise in the struggle of the Enlightenment for toleration—namely, that the religion of individual citizens is no business of the state. The theoretical groundwork of this position had been laid in the seventeenth century by

Bayle and Locke, from whom the *philosophes* took most of their weapons in the struggle for toleration. Locke had argued that the state, as an exclusively secular instrument, had no justifiable concern with the religion of its citizens so long as that religion did not interfere with their fulfillment of their civil obligations. Bayle had argued, in a work written only a year after the revocation (1685) of the Edict of Nantes had withdrawn toleration from the Huguenots, that coercion cannot make an argument true. Imbued with the Cartesian attachment to reason, he argued that the only legitimate and actual compulsion of the mind is the logic of argument; Bayle, moreover, being of a pronouncedly skeptical turn, was convinced that no truth is certain enough to warrant the withdrawal of toleration from views which oppose it.

Frequently the struggle of the Enlightenment for toleration was a struggle for political unity and stability. Voltaire, for example, was convinced that the attempt to base political unity upon universal agreement in religious matters did just the opposite of what it intended to do. It promoted discord and internal strife. The development of toleration was best seen in England, and the history of that process indicated that toleration was accorded because in the course of time it was found to be the only way in which men of different faiths, having found it impossible to exterminate one another, might live together. "If one religion only were allowed in England, the government would very possibly become arbitrary; if there were but two, the people would cut one another's throats; but, as there is such a multitude, they all live happily and in peace."

It was essentially this "lesson of history" which animated the belief in toleration. What reinforced this belief, and made the struggle to realize toleration particularly urgent, was the "fermentation of universal reason," the process of philosophic criticism and inquiry for which enlightened men were anxious to achieve free and full play. A *philosophe* such as Voltaire demanded toleration not only out of skepticism, but also because it was the indispensable condition for the discovery and propagation of truth.

I quite understand that the fanatics of one sect should slaughter the enthusiasts of another sect . . . ; but that the wise Charron should have been threatened with the loss of his life, that the learned and generous Ramus should have been assassinated, that Descartes should have been forced to flee to Holland to escape the fury of the ignorant, that Gassendi should have been obliged to withdraw several times to Digne, far from the calumnies of Paris; these things are a nation's eternal shame.

At the same time, the struggle of the *philosophes* for toleration was not fought on behalf of any particular religious sect, or out of a conviction that

the competition of theologies in the arena of public debate would contribute to the closer approximation of a "true" religion. It arose mainly out of indifference toward religious questions (except insofar as such controversies tended to disrupt the body politic) and out of the dominant preoccupation with the establishment of social tranquillity and freedom for scientific discussion.

In the same way, the struggle for toleration was, on the whole, not motivated by the urge to promote individual diversity or group differences. Voltaire, for example, felt that debate over intellectual issues simply attested to the fact that neither side had the truth.

Sect and error are synonymous. You are an Aristotelian and I am a Platonist; we are therefore both wrong; for you combat Plato only because his fantasies have revolted you, and I am alienated from Aristotle only because it seems to me that he does not know what he is talking about. If one or the other had demonstrated the truth, there would be a sect no longer. To declare oneself for the opinion of the one or the other is to take sides in a civil war. There are no sects in mathematics, in experimental physics. . . . This is the character of truth; it is of all time; it is for all men; it has only to show itself to be recognized; one cannot argue against it.

The ideal of toleration during the Enlightenment was thus both an instrument for permitting differences and for attaining a higher unity that could reconcile them. What was mainly wanted was not open-mindedness toward any opinion but freedom for demonstrating the truth. The philosophic premise of this ideal was the conviction so widely prevalent that the truth is one, that the moral law is "written on the heart of every man," and that the traditional authorities needed simply to be removed for it to be displayed in all its splendor. In some this belief in absolute truth was held so fanatically that the doctrines of the Enlightenment became dogmas, and the victory of truth implied the destruction, not the toleration, of error. For example, Sébastien Mercier's 2404, an imaginary picture of the future world to be established by enlightenment, tells of a public burning "of all those books which we judged either frivolous, useless, or dangerous, . . . as an expiatory sacrifice to veracity, to good sense, and true taste," and goes on to remark, "We have therefore done in enlightened enthusiasm what the barbarians once did in an enthusiasm that was blind."

Mercier's is an extreme statement, of course, and few indeed were the thinkers who went that far. Furthermore, the growth of more experimental attitudes toward the question of truth tended, as we shall see, to moderate the confidence in absolute truth.

The Cult of Reason and Nature. One of Voltaire's most important objections to Bossuet's *Discourse on Universal History* was that it was not universal at all, but a study of a particular and local tradition, making much of the history of Jews and Christians, and subordinating the story of pagan antiquity and of other cultures. Voltaire's objection to Bossuet is symptomatic of the attempt of the Enlightenment to disengage its religion and morals from a particular tradition, to make them universal, natural, and reasonable in the same way that Newton had succeeded in displaying the invariable laws of the physical world. Disenchanted with the historical faiths it had inherited, the Enlightenment attempted to establish a relationship between God and man that was not man-made, but a logical consequence of the natural order of which man was a part.

The basis of this natural religion lay in the scientific vision of the vast Order of Nature, exhibiting a pervasive harmony and a perfection and fullness in all its parts. Operating within the Cartesian vision of a universal mathematical science of nature, Spinoza identified the geometrical Order of Nature with God. Leibniz found nature to be bound by a "preestablished harmony," and Newton, who seemed to his contemporaries actually to have succeeded in describing the Order of Nature, believed that the harmony of nature was too impressive to be an accident and required the existence of God. "Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could produce no variety of things. All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing."

Nature, in other words, was so thoroughly rational that to an Age of Reason it seemed to be the work of God. As Maclaurin, a popularizer of Newton, declared: "Natural science is subservient to purposes of a higher kind, and is chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for Natural Religion and Moral Philosophy; by leading us, in a satisfactory manner, to the knowledge of the Author and Governor of the universe."

The attempt was thus made, especially during the early Enlightenment, to treat religion not primarily as an institutionalized practice and faith but as a body of moral truth about the nature of the world. Theology was a branch of physics; natural religion accompanied science, and both rested on the same canons of reason. First in England and later on the Continent, a host of deists argued on behalf of the rational religion of nature and attempted to establish religious principles which could be accepted by all men without an appeal to a special historic Revelation. Those who were concerned to save the Christian revelation, such as Locke and Tillotson, did so on the basis of

“reason,” arguing that the essence of Christianity was identical with natural religion, and that revelation simply reinforced reason with the evidence of prophecies and miracles. “Natural religion is the foundation of all revealed religion,” wrote Tillotson. However, as the Frenchman Pascal had suggested in the seventeenth century, the rational proof of religion in general could not be used altogether successfully as an argument in behalf of any religion in particular, and as the eighteenth century moved on the deists became more outspoken in their attacks on revelation. Tindal’s *Christianity as Old as the Creation* argued that natural religion was perfect and needed no special dispensation. And Voltaire argued that Jesus was a deist.

This glorification of the pervasive rational law that ordered human affairs as it did all other natural events tended to split in opposite directions during the Enlightenment, one tendency becoming complacent, the other critical. Especially in England did natural religion take the former of these directions, and Pope could claim:

All Nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good:
And, spite of pride, in erring reason’s spite,
One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right.

And Lord Kames might pen the following apostrophe to Nature: “Neither imperfection nor malice dwell with thee. Thou appointest as salutary, what we lament as painful. Even the follies and vices of men minister to thy wise designs: and as at the beginning of days thou sawest, so thou seest and pronouncest still, that *every thing* thou hast made is good.” If the world is really rational through and through, then, as Leibniz argued, it is the best of all possible worlds.

The reader of Voltaire’s *Candide* will be aware of the resentment stirred up by this kind of worship of Nature. Where circumstances (as in France) were not quite so propitious for identifying the natural and reasonable with the *status quo* nature and reason were used as contrasting conditions in the light of which the stark imperfections of man-made or historical conditions might be seen more clearly. The effort of such thinkers as Helvétius, Holbach, and the Physiocrats was to brush aside those man-made institutions which interfered with the natural harmony of events, and the cult of reason and nature was used to attack traditional authority in politics, supernatural authority in religion, and mercantilist interference with “natural” business practices in economics.

The function of natural religion in the eighteenth century (and in other times as well) was primarily to be a warehouse of morals, and its essential message was that human reason is so constructed by a provident nature that man in pursuing his happiness rationally is at the same time obeying God's moral law. The purpose of natural religion was simply to provide a sanction in natural and divine law for human morality, to reinforce the obligation to be a good citizen. Thus, the content of natural religion was defined by Voltaire as nothing else than "the principles of morality common to the human race," and the only question was whether the supernatural was required as an additional incentive for being virtuous. But whatever one's position on this issue, it was agreed that the essence of true religion was morality. As Tindal wrote in his *Christianity as Old as Creation*—the book which came to be called "the Deist's Bible"—true religion consists "in a constant disposition of the mind to do all the good we can, and thereby render ourselves acceptable to God in answering the end of our creation."

The content of this morality was for the most part agreed upon, although men employed various arguments to reach it. It was benevolence, the golden rule, the essential message of a nonecclesiastical and undogmatic Christianity. Happiness depended upon equitable dealing between man and man, upon observance of the maxim, "Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you." This was a morality that at once imitated and illustrated the harmony of nature, that fostered human happiness by bringing together individual welfare with the public good. Mandeville, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and many others carried the faith in the Order of Nature into human affairs. Mandeville showed that each in loving himself is automatically loving others and hence doing his duty. Rousseau, starting from the opposite pole, argued that "each, in uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone." And Smith, along with Helvétius and Bentham, starting with the tendency of each man to advance himself, found that an "invisible hand" automatically turned such enlightened self-interest into the channels of the public interest, making private enterprise a public benefaction and private utility identical with justice.

On the whole, the cult of nature and reason exercised more lasting influence in the sphere of economics and politics than in the sphere of religion. As a religion deism was but a passing phase and naturally developed atheistic tendencies. As Pascal suggested, "Cartesianism made one well-directed flick from God send the world spinning on its axis for all time." In general, the Newtonian emphasis upon the immutability of universal mechanical law not only made it increasingly difficult to believe in Providence and miracles, but removed God as a constant and immanent presence in the world, making

of him a great "watchmaker" whose main business was done once the world was set in motion. The attempt to substitute reason for feeling as a basis of religion led naturally to emphasis upon the rule of mechanical law and the denial of the need of a Creator. As one thinker remarked, it was not until Clarke attempted to demonstrate the existence of God on rational grounds that one thought to question His existence on such grounds.

Not only did the rationale of natural religion contribute to the growth of atheism; its humanistic orientation did so as well. If the essence of natural religion was morality, and if this morality was really universal and natural as claimed, then institutional religion hardly seemed necessary. The primacy which the deists gave to morals bespoke an indifference to religion for its own sake, and the atheism that marked the last part of the eighteenth century especially in France was a natural consequence.

Holbach carried the cult of reason and nature to its culmination in an atheistic denial of the deists' Supreme Being, and made the most influential attack on rational religion. From a completely materialistic point of view he asserted that matter in motion was the source of all things and denied the necessity of a First Cause; he attacked the belief in the moral governance of the world and pointed out that the evidence for design was based on nothing but the trite observation that means have ends. Such atheism was not a denial of the cult of reason and nature but its very apotheosis. Holbach's denial of a Supreme Being is simply the other side of his almost pantheistic adoration of mechanical law for its own sake. As much as any deist he had the faith—for essentially it was a faith—that nature was thoroughly harmonious and that this harmony was beneficent with respect to human affairs. In Holbach's belief that Nature is completely rational and that man can be happy by returning to Nature and being rational, the cult of reason and nature found its culmination.

The cult of reason and nature in the Enlightenment expressed the attempt to divorce the moral ideals of the period from a specific revelation, from a particular history. Holbach's position would indicate that the natural religion of the Enlightenment was itself preeminently the product of a specific historical incident and a particular inspiration or "revelation"—namely, the revelation of the Order of Nature as disclosed by the sciences. It was not the atheism of Holbach but the skepticism of Hume that made the cult of reason and nature more precarious. Here as elsewhere, Hume brought the most fundamentally probing arguments to bear on the faiths of the Enlightenment, arguing that natural law was but one more custom or convention, and that the harmony of nature was a misnomer for a specific human habit and had no rationally demonstrable ground.

Chapter XII

THE ENLIGHTENMENT: MORAL PRINCIPLES AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS



I. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DOCTRINES

METHODS AND VALUES

THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES we shall now examine may be distinguished with respect to the specific methods they employed. Three types will be discussed: (1) those based on the so-called "analytic method"; (2) experimentalism and utilitarianism; (3) the appeal to sentiment.

The "Analytic Method." Animating the social philosophies of the Enlightenment were the ideals of cosmopolitanism, toleration, natural order, and, especially, the belief that the progress of universal reason offered the key to general social reform. In addition to these ideals the Enlightenment formulated or carried further methods for investigating political and social phenomena. As Diderot explained in the *Encyclopédie*, it was necessary to surmount two obstacles retarding the progress of reason and the realization of rational ideals—namely, "authority and the *esprit de système*." By the latter term was meant the elaborate and "abstract" systems of scholastic and Cartesian metaphysics.

The several methods mentioned above were all attempts to surmount or to circumvent these twin obstacles of arbitrary external authority and speculative *esprit de système*. Of these methods the so-called "analytic method" was most widely used in France and was perhaps most characteristic of the Enlightenment as a whole.

The eighteenth century's version of the analytic method was an extension to an extreme of Locke's conception that all ideas come from experience. It at-

This chapter consists of material by three different authors. Section 1, designed especially for the present volume, has been revised from its form in the first edition and is by Charles Frankel and Ralph H. Bowen. Section 2, designed especially for the present volume, was written for its first edition by Donald W. O'Connell.

tempted, first, to clarify equivocal and vague words, to remedy "the abuse of words," by tracing the ideas for which they stood back to the simple sensations from which they arose. It attempted, secondly, to rebuild human knowledge by giving to each word in the language of science a precise and unequivocal reference to an idea whose elements were clearly specifiable as sensations. Thirdly, as stated by its most thorough-going expositor in France, Condillac, its attempt was modeled after mathematics. Like Descartes, Condillac broke up complex ideas into simple ones and proceeded from the easy problem to the more difficult one. The major difference from Descartes was that the clear and distinct data or original ideas basic to the "analytic method" were sensations, whereas Decartes's first principles were self-evident logical principles.

The object and nature of the "analytic method" Condillac described as follows:

Because, in our childhood, we think in imitation of others, we adopt all their prejudices: and, when we arrive at the age where we believe we are thinking for ourselves, . . . we are only thinking in accordance with the prejudices that they have given us. Thus, the more the mind appears to make progress, the more it goes astray, and errors accumulate from generation to generation. When things have come to this point, there is only one means for putting order back into thought: that is to forget everything we have learned, to take our ideas back to their origin, to follow the generation of them, and to remake, as Bacon says, the human understanding.

The literature of the Enlightenment is rich with witty, ironical, and unsympathetic criticisms of traditional institutions. The great critics—Voltaire, Holbach, Diderot, Bentham—turned to political uses what Condillac had expounded in a more specialized context. By tracing institutions back to their origins in customs and usage they believed they had demonstrated that these institutions had no other warrant than customs and usage and that, consequently, they were indefensible on purely rational grounds.

On its constructive side, the "analytic method" rested upon the presumption that there was a rational and natural law superior to any convention, and that social as well as physical science was concerned to adumbrate such a law. The specific virtue of analysis was that it purged men of the unnatural accretions of convention and tradition and led them back to Nature. The first teacher of the "analytic method" is Nature herself, argues Condillac, and instruction in the "analytic method" consists simply in making men notice "what they do continually."

In other words, while the "analytic method" employed an empirical technique in order to attack other systems, it built its own on a rationalistic basis.

This was especially true with regard to the social sciences. Thus, Condillac argued that moral ideas are traceable to sensations—the tendency to conform our actions to laws “which are conventions that men have made.” But he then went on to argue that these conventions have a basis in “the needs and faculties” of human nature.

The laws that determine the morality of our actions are not arbitrary. They are our work, because they are conventions that we have made: however we have not made them alone; nature made them with us, it dictated them to us, and it was not in our power to make others of them. The needs and the faculties of man being given, the laws were given themselves; and, although we made them, God, who has created us with such needs and such faculties, is, in truth, our only legislator.

This conviction was widely prevalent in the social thought of the Enlightenment and was so deep-seated in some cases that it was argued that greater certainty could be obtained in moral and political questions than in the physical sciences. Voltaire, for example, remarked, “It has taken centuries to learn a part of nature’s laws. One day was sufficient for a wise man to learn the duties of man.” And he sees the same basic ingredients in all versions of the moral law. “There are not two systems of morality. Those of Confucius, of Zoroaster, of Pythagoras, of Aristotle, of Epictetus, of Antoninus, are absolutely the same. God has placed in every breast the knowledge of good, with some inclination for evil.”

Thus, the social sciences that were developed by using the analytic method were cast in the image of Newtonian science as social thinkers saw it—an infallible science displaying the reign of universal, harmonious law, established on the basis of an analytic investigation of empirical facts. After analyzing human nature into its component parts they attempted to establish a social physics based on the natural “rights” or natural “propensities” they had discovered. By appealing to experience they showed the worthlessness of the traditional body of beliefs; by appealing to natural law they attempted to substitute something rational.

The progress of the “analytic method” led to the development of French utilitarianism. Its distinctive character lay in the fact that, making a more critical use of the analytic method, it rested not on intuitive or axiomatic natural rights but (in Condillac’s phrase) on “well-established facts” of human nature, namely, man’s pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. This “utilitarianism” was, especially in France, allied to theories of enlightened despotism, but because it brought a new intellectual foundation for this creed, it had consequences and uses that lay beyond that particular political philosophy.

Helvétius's utilitarianism rested upon the application of the "analytic method" to human nature and was a product of Locke's emphasis upon the importance for an understanding of human behavior of an account of the origin and development of the human understanding. Indeed, the philosophy of Helvétius represented the application of one part of Locke's philosophy—that describing the development of ideas out of experience—to the destruction of the other part of his philosophy, which (in the *Treatises on Government*) rested on self-evident natural rights. Helvétius's contribution in this respect was that he substituted a single standard of value—the greatest happiness of the greatest number—for an indefinite number of natural rights and that he carried out the implication in Locke's philosophy that a political philosophy must rest upon a psychological account of human behavior. The basic aspects of the psychology employed by Helvétius had been developed by Hobbes and Locke. His central psychological principle of "association" had been developed some nine years before the publication of *On the Mind* (1758) by David Hartley in his *Observations on Man*. Adhering strictly to the analytic method, Hartley developed the main outlines of what is known as associationist psychology, explaining the specific ways in which ideas are combined or "associated" with one another. Hartley was convinced that all ideas stem from experience and that it was not only possible to direct men on socially advantageous paths on the basis of knowledge of the laws of "association," but that it was also possible to make men similar as well as equal by subjecting them to the same experience.

It is of utmost consequence to morality and religion, that the affections and passions should be analyzed into their simple compounding parts, by reversing the steps of the associations which concur to form them. For thus we learn how to cherish and improve good ones, check and root out such as are mischievous and immoral, and how to suit our manner of life, in some tolerable measure, to our intellectual and religious wants.

Helvétius turned this psychology, and the belief that all ideas come from experience and are organized by their associations, to immediate political ends. He made it clear that the implication of Locke's emphasis upon the omnipotence of environment was that human nature was indefinitely perfectible, since its defects are traceable to a faulty environment, which simply needs to be changed. Thus, Helvétius laid the foundations of the democratic ideal of equality and faith in education. "To be happy and powerful is only a matter of perfecting the science of education." And education was not only an affair of the schoolroom but of laws and the community as a whole. The wise legislator is he who knows the motives of individuals and is competent in enlightening them so that the maximum of pleasure may be maintained.

Being once assured that man always acts in conformity to his interest, the legislature may assign so many punishments to vice, and so many rewards to virtue, that every individual will find it in his interest to be virtuous. . . . Make good laws; they alone will naturally direct the people in the pursuit of the public advantage, by following the irresistible propensity they have to their private advantage. . . . It is of little consequence that men be vicious; it is enough that they be intelligent. . . . Laws do everything.

While Helvétius himself hoped that his work might serve as a kind of handbook for the enlightened monarch, his clearly stated principle "that all men are created equal" became a democratic notion. Probably his most important contribution, however, was to substitute the standard of utility for that of natural law. All institutions are to be judged exclusively with respect to their usefulness—their contribution to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

When *On the Mind* appeared in 1758, it shocked the reading public with its explicit obscenities and its implicit blasphemies. Yet, as a lady of the *salon* remarked, it was shocking just because "it told everybody's secret." It meant the beginning of the vogue of materialist philosophies that marked the last part of the eighteenth century and that found culmination in Holbach's *System of Nature*. Holbach used the principle of utility to display the wickedness and folly of religions, and employed his materialistic view of nature and human behavior to erect a new morality of "good sense" and citizenship.

The attempt of Helvétius, Holbach, and other French utilitarians was to erect a political system purged of allegiance both to self-evident natural rights and to theological authority. They hoped to accomplish this task by making ethics and politics rest upon the firm foundation of a science of human nature. On the whole, however, it seems likely that their psychological account of human behavior was in reality merely an appendage to a set of political principles that had been developed antecedently. They believed without question that society is simply an "artificial body," compounded of separate individuals, each of whom is governed by self-interest and has fully specifiable needs. Consistent too with their use of the "analytic method" and their adherence to the mathematical ideal of "calculating," they regarded all pleasures and pains as intrinsically alike and assumed that one man's happiness is not only as valuable as any other man's but essentially of the same nature. Most important, they persisted in the assumption that the individual's pursuit of his own interests is, when enlightened, identical with the promotion of the general welfare. Indeed, the list of the demands which they make on the basis of utility is surprisingly similar to the list of natural rights found in Locke.

The law . . . ought to aim at the general interest of society,—that is to say, it ought to assure for the greatest number of citizens the advantages for which they leagued together in society. These advantages are liberty, property, and security. Liberty means the possibility of doing for one's own happiness everything that does not militate against the happiness of one's fellows. . . . Property means the possibility of enjoying the advantages which labor has procured to each member of society. Security means the certainty of being protected by the laws in the enjoyment of one's person and one's property in so far as one observes faithfully one's engagements with society (Holbach).

Experimentalism and Utilitarianism. The analytic method attempted to reduce science to a set of "well-established facts," and was regarded by its proponents as an application of Newton's emphasis upon observation and experiment. In order to destroy the *esprit de système* in accordance with which men established philosophies upon debatable principles or upon obscure and ambiguous ideas, it assumed that the human mind is originally a *tabula rasa* —a blank tablet—and that human behavior may be explained by tracing the successive imprintings of sensations upon the mind.

As we have seen, however, the analytic method was itself often the prey of a too systematic spirit, and as experimental methods became increasingly prominent in the physical sciences during the course of the eighteenth century some thinkers turned to the criticism of the mechanistic and materialistic psychology and geometric analysis that underlay the social sciences. To be sure, the geometrical ideal of science continued to be regnant in the field of social thought during the Enlightenment. But it is worth noting that no less a thinker than Diderot—in the very center of the Encyclopedic enterprise—pointed out its limitations.

Diderot's *Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature* is the classic statement of the Enlightenment on the virtue of experimental methods. His experimentalism rested on his fundamental reliance upon experience as it comes and without the preconception that it is necessarily a mathematically ordered and intelligible system. It was directed against the "systematists" who saw things not as they are "but as it would be convenient that they might be." "Instead of reshaping conceptions to existing things it seems that one makes a point of modeling existing things after conceptions. Among all philosophers, there is none in whom this fury is more evidently dominant than in the systematists."

Diderot was impressed as were few of his contemporaries with the complexity of phenomena, with the subtle individuations that set off one fact from another, and with the consequent danger of the prevalent dependence on

reasoning by "analogy," which must naturally tend to be loose. In the light of his conception of experience as an elusive and changing subject matter, Diderot criticized the belief that mathematics might be made the model for all human knowledge and suggested in place of the mathematical ideal of scientific certainty the experimental ideal of detailed and laborious investigation of specific facts. "Experimental science," he wrote,

knows neither what will come nor what will not come of its work, but it never ceases working. On the other hand rational [that is, mathematical] science weighs possibilities, pronounces judgment, and stops short. It boldly says, "light cannot be decomposed." Experimental science hears and remains silent for whole centuries, then suddenly displays the prism and says, "Light has been decomposed." . . . The understanding has its prejudices; the senses, their uncertainty; the memory, its limits; the imagination, its glimmers; instruments, their imperfections. Phenomena are infinite; their causes, hidden; their forms, perhaps transitory. . . . Have a system, I consent; but do not let yourself be dominated by it. . . . Experience must be left at its liberty; you hold it captive if you show only the side that proves and hide the side that contradicts.

Diderot was well aware that the social sciences were even more uncertain than the natural sciences, but concerned as he was with the general implications of his method he did not on the whole make specific applications of it within the field of the science of man. It was the Scot David Hume who subjected the science based upon the analytic method to its most devastating criticism and attacked the rationalist presumption that deductive reasoning from first principles can prove in advance that events must necessarily take a specific course.

Hume was, of course, not the only critic of "self-evident natural law" during the Enlightenment. Helvétius had spread the philosophy of utilitarianism in France, and in England such men as Gay, Paley, and Tucker had used it in affiliation with theology, arguing that it was but enlightened self-interest to be virtuous, since if virtue were not attended with pleasure in this world, vice would certainly be attended with pain in the next. Hume was original and important because he released utilitarianism from its associations with theology and from Helvétius's simple account of human behavior as narrowly egoistic and motivated by the self-interested pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. In addition, Hume was the most notable philosopher of the Enlightenment to attack the faith in the benevolent harmony of nature, and he was openly opposed to the notion that rational truth and moral law were one. In his analysis of the principle of causation he showed that there was no necessary connection between one fact and another, since the opposite of any matter of fact was always conceivable. Similarly, in his social philosophy he

attacked prevailing beliefs in natural justice and natural rights and showed that there was no connection between reason and value, that the moral law could not be demonstrated certainly. Attacking the "self-evident" principles of the rationalist critics of contemporary society, he showed how difficult it was to point to any other origin for reason and morality themselves than custom and usage. The worth of an object, Hume argued, was not determined by reason but by human "propensities" or desires, and reason simply functioned with respect to deciding the appropriate means to a desired end.

Consequently, Hume argued that "justice," "virtue," and "rights" are terms which refer to habits of mind and action that are conventionally approved, rather than to rational principles enshrined in nature. Social standards rest ultimately on force of habit rather than on force of argument. And they are to be criticized in the light of their utility in preserving a stable social life and for satisfying human needs.

Hume's utilitarianism was ultimately significant just because his conception of "utility" was not limited by a narrow view of human nature as guided by the one propensity to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Secondly, Hume did not regard the individual as a lightning-like calculator of his own interest, a persistently rational creature who might be benevolent only out of enlightened self-interest. In this respect Hume helped to lay the foundations for the belief in a "moral sense" which was a considerable factor in the thought of the Enlightenment. Thirdly, Hume's emphasis upon conventions as useful social rules for stabilizing action makes it possible to explain civic obedience not simply as the carrying-out of a contract but as plain habit and custom. Thus Hume attacks the most distinctive aspect of natural-law theory by placing a great deal more emphasis upon the social origins of individual behavior than do most of his contemporaries. Hume's distinctive contribution to the utilitarian philosophy was to popularize the value of utility as a test for institutions and morals.

The Appeal to Sentiment. Hume's principle that "custom is the great guide of human life" was the basis of his critique of "rational" natural rights, and his emphasis upon habit and "sympathy" was the basis of his critique of the French utilitarian view of human nature as rational and as egoistic. However, while Hume made rational science seem less certain, his skepticism was, nevertheless, "philosophic," and it laid the foundations for a descriptive account of social customs and institutions and for a critical evaluation of them in the light of their repeatedly observed consequences.

At the same time, however, Hume's attack upon the system of natural law and upon the principle of enlightened self-interest was logically a precondition

for the appeal to other authorities than analytical reason in the development of a social philosophy. Hume himself, in emphasizing that reason was anything but supreme in human behavior, prepared the way for making other factors the basis of moral behavior and standards. He and his close friend Adam Smith, along with others in the Scottish school, appealed to the "moral sense" and thereby made morality issue out of social sentiment rather than individual interest. In his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* Smith made Hume's principle of "sympathy" the basis of social behavior and found morality to depend on the individual's ability and tendency to share the feelings of others, to sense their motives, and to apply this social sense to the evaluation of his own actions. Smith's appeal to moral sentiments as the basis of morality was not in conflict with his emphasis on enlightened self-interest in his classic work in political economy, *The Wealth of Nations*. In this latter work Smith was dealing specifically with man's activities in the market-place and with the particular "propensity to truck and barter" that was principally operative in that situation. That Smith found enlightened self-interest to be peculiarly germane to the "propensity to truck and barter" does not preclude the possibility that other sentiments should be operative with respect to other human propensities.

Such appeals to "moral sentiments" were, however, essentially in accord with the dominant impulse of the Enlightenment toward applying scientific methods to social affairs. The most powerful attack upon the dominant scientific ideals came not from such sources as Hume or Smith but from the rejection of analysis as a method applied to the sentiments and the substitution of a direct appeal to sentiment. A person in whom this appeal to sentiment was forcefully represented was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. To an incalculable extent Rousseau's philosophy was rooted in the divided and introspective personality he reveals in his *Confessions*, and the power and originality of his message lay not so much in its ideas as in the way these ideas were brought to life by Rousseau's feelings. Nobody else in the Enlightenment pointed with such effect to the importance of the emotional life or so roundly condemned scientific analysis for stifling vitality and individuality. For Rousseau compassion and reverence were "natural" because they were not "rational." The elements of Rousseau's approach appear in the following passage from the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*:

But as long as we are ignorant of the natural man, it is in vain for us to attempt to determine either the law originally prescribed to him or that which is best adapted to his constitution. All we can know with any certainty respecting this law is that, if it is to be a law, not only the wills of those it obliges must be sensible

of their submission to it; but also, to be natural, it must come directly from the choice of nature.

Throwing aside, therefore, all those scientific books, which teach us only to see men such as they have made themselves, and contemplating the first and most simple operations of the human soul, I think I can perceive in it two principles prior to reason, one of them deeply interesting us in our own welfare and preservation, and the other exciting a natural repugnance at seeing any other sensible being, and particularly any of our own species, suffer pain or death. It is from the agreement and combination which the understanding is in a position to establish between these two principles, without its being necessary to introduce that of sociability, that all the rules of natural right appear to me to be derived—rules which our reason is afterwards obliged to establish on other foundations, when by its successive developments it has been led to suppress nature itself.

In proceeding thus, we shall not be obliged to make man a philosopher before he is a man. His duties toward others are not dictated to him only by the later lessons of wisdom; and, so long as he does not resist the internal impulse of compassion, he will never hurt any other man, nor even any sentient being, except on those lawful occasions on which his own preservation is concerned and he is obliged to give himself the preference.

Rousseau first gained considerable note in 1750 with his *Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences*. This work won the prize offered by the Academy of Dijon for the best essay on the question, "Has the restoration of the arts and sciences had a purifying effect upon morals?" Rousseau's answer was anything but what might have been expected in an age proud of its enlightenment. "The arts, literature, and the sciences," he argued, "stifle in men's breasts that sense of original liberty, for which they seem to have been born; cause them to love their own slavery, and so make of them what is called a civilized people." Moreover, as Rousseau saw it, the self-appointed propagandists for "liberty" and "equality," the *philosophes*, were fundamentally in alliance with the society they detested.

What is philosophy? What is contained in the writings of the most celebrated philosophers? . . . One of them teaches that there is no such thing as matter, but that everything exists only in representation. Another declares that there is no other substance than matter, and no other God than the world itself. A third tells you that there are no such things as virtue and vice, and that moral good and evil are chimeras; while a fourth informs you that men are only beasts of prey, and may conscientiously devour one another. Why, my great philosophers, do you not reserve these wise and profitable lessons for your friends and children? You would soon reap the benefit of them, nor should we be under any apprehension of our own becoming your disciples.

Rousseau regarded the opinions of the *philosophes* as a reflection of the conditions under which they lived. In opposition to the morality based upon

rational analysis, and upon calculation of pleasures and pains, he appealed to another standard. In place of the artificial morality of the mind he set the natural morality of the heart. He was convinced that genuine morality must originally arise quite spontaneously and cannot be the product of a coldly reasoned decision.

There prevails in modern manners a servile and deceptive conformity. . . . Ceremony has its forms, and fashion its laws, and these we must always follow, never the promptings of our own nature. . . . What happiness would it be for those who live among us, if our external appearance were always a true mirror of our hearts! But . . . virtue rarely appears in so much pomp and state.

In his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* Rousseau went still further in his argument that man is born good and that society makes him evil. In the light of this position it has seemed to many critics to be utterly, but characteristically, inconsistent that Rousseau should have gone on to argue in *The Social Contract* that, "instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, [society] made him an intelligent being and a man." That Rousseau's individualistic appeal to the sentiments of the "natural man" should have been followed by his drawing up of the most supremely effective program during the Enlightenment for the organic unity of the state is indeed a striking paradox, one that has been labeled by German scholars *Das Jean-Jacques Rousseau Problem*. Nevertheless, Rousseau himself claims in his *Confessions* that "every strong idea in the *Social Contract* had been previously published in the *Discourse on Inequality*." There is, of course, much that is inconsistent in Rousseau, and he has influenced widely diverse groups. Nevertheless, it seems likely that Rousseau's attack upon the stifling rationality and the artificial individualism of contemporary society was of a piece with his emphasis upon emotional individuality and upon the community in *The Social Contract*. The problem for Rousseau was not to return to primitivism, which he expressly recognizes to be hypothetical and impractical, but to establish social conditions of such a kind as would permit and promote the expression of the naturally good instincts of the natural man. Convinced of his own goodness, and of its naturalness, Rousseau was concerned to formulate those conditions which might make it possible for men to be themselves. The central problem of social philosophy is: "By what conceivable art has a means been found of making men free by making them subject?" Rousseau devoted the *Social Contract* to describing the social conditions in which man might find freedom as a member of a community.

The society Rousseau envisaged was essentially one bound by fraternity rather than by self-interest. In this romantic and sentimental figure we have

the revival in modern times of the classic philosophy of the city-state—the emphasis of Aristotle upon citizenship as a development of friendship, which attains its highest perfection by participating in the group life, and the insistence of Plato that the community is the best teacher of virtue. Rousseau was opposed to the popular belief of his time that society is an “artificial” mechanism devoted to protecting the individual’s “natural” and pre-social rights. He argued that “the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights,” that, in other words, the obligations of the citizen are the basis of the rights of the individual.

The community was thus for Rousseau “a moral being possessed of a will,” and it was the “general will” that was the supreme authority. As Rousseau employed it, the concept of the “general will” was extremely abstract and formal; it meant simply what is really best for all members of society collectively. It is not to be confused with what Rousseau calls “the will of all,” which is the expression of the actual desires or interests of the majority. The problem of good government was really to make “the will of all” coincide with “the general will,” and it is for this reason that Rousseau placed so much stress upon the necessity of popular education.

A second element in Rousseau was also a factor in the development of democratic societies. To a very great extent Rousseau trusted that the will of the majority would usually coincide with the general will, with what is really best. To some degree this was a reflection of Aristotle’s view that public opinion is likely to be wiser than any expert, but to a greater degree it simply reflected Rousseau’s sentimental glorification of the common people, who came closest to the picture of the natural man. Rousseau’s belief that the common man possessed the unspoiled moral virtues was in the background of the democratic faith in majority rule.

However, while this deification of majority rule was thus an element in popular government, it tended, by the same token, to lead in some quarters to what John Stuart Mill later called “the tyranny of the majority.” While Rousseau himself applied his principles to the conditions of the city-state republic, his principles have come to be used in the modern collectivist state to justify the suppression, in the name of majority rule, of minority rights. “Each man alienates by the social compact only such part of his powers, goods, and liberty as it is important for the community to control; but it must also be granted that the Sovereign is sole judge of what is important.” Furthermore, Rousseau did not always identify the will of the majority in practice with the theoretical general will, and he argued that on occasion it might be necessary “to force men to be free.” He thus made it possible for such con-

trasting individuals and groups as Napoleon and the Jacobins to claim that they represented the general will as against the mistaken will of the majority. Rousseau was the prophet of an age in which all governments claim to be "popular." By the same token he was the prophet of a collectivist age in which governments claim supreme authority over individuals, and his influence is consequently not to be discerned only in those societies ruled by parliamentary forms or by the "majority."

In summary, Rousseau's appeal to sentiment is important in the following respects: (1) he emphasized the group, the community, rather than the individual; (2) he wrote the manifesto of popular government, establishing the right of democratic revolution by denying any independent rights to government as such; (3) although he was concerned to promote the democracy of the town meeting, he laid the foundations, despite himself, for totalitarian methods of suppressing individuals and groups in the name of the community as a whole; (4) last but not least, he proclaimed to an Age of Reason that the moral will, and the passions and emotions, had a value superior to and quite apart from reason. He reminded men that there was more in their experience than was ever dreamt of in their philosophies. Whatever one may think of this appeal to sentiment, it remains nevertheless true that since Rousseau's time no attempt to apply science to human problems has been able successfully to avoid taking into account those aspects of human experience so powerfully expressed by Rousseau.

POLITICAL DOCTRINES AND INSTITUTIONS

Broadly speaking, two contrasting theories about the organization of political authority held the field in eighteenth-century discussions. These were the liberal doctrine of limited government stemming from British Revolutionary experience as interpreted by John Locke, and the doctrine of unlimited government in its various forms.

Constitutionalism. The liberal, or constitutionalist, attitude reflected an essential distrust of government and sought to safeguard the "natural" or "inalienable" rights of the individual by insuring that no government could ever become too efficacious. This end was to be achieved by dividing the functions of government among several independent branches (for example, executive, legislative, and judicial) so that each might hamper the others and thus check the assumed natural tendency of all states to become Leviathans. Fundamental constitutional enactments were to render this separation of powers permanent and inviolable, and any encroachment by one branch upon the powers reserved to one of the others was to be promptly detected and

repressed by an independent judiciary. This program was enunciated by Locke, who saw the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 as a triumphant vindication of "the British constitution" against the Stuarts' absolutist pretensions, and his doctrine became the orthodox philosophy of the dominant Whig party in eighteenth-century Britain.

After 1763, when friction developed between the American colonies and the mother country, Locke's natural rights philosophy seemed to the colonists an admirable support for their claims, and they likewise sought to argue that their rights were protected by the British constitution. Unfortunately, this constitution, consisting as it did of a large, amorphous body of law and precedent, had never been written down; so it was possible for the English Parliament also to claim that its interpretation of the constitution was the right one. This lesson was not lost on the next generation of constitutionalists, especially in America, where the idea of a formal, *written* constitution was taken up and finally given its classic expression—together with the principle of the separation of powers—in the Federal Constitution of the United States of America in 1787.

Elsewhere the philosophy of limited government was powerfully affected by Locke's ideas and by British experience—though the latter was not always fully understood or even accurately known. The French philosopher Baron Charles-Louis Secondat de Montesquieu visited England early in the eighteenth century and made a study of the British constitution, but—as so often happens with travelers—he seems to have found in it only the virtues that his previous thinking had led him to expect. He did not grasp the essential point that since Parliament had assumed the power of regulating the succession to the throne, and especially since the crown had abandoned (in Queen Anne's reign) its claim to exercise an independent "prerogative," the two legislative chambers had become supreme—had, in effect, acquired paramount authority not only over legislation, but also over the executive and the judiciary, and could, if they desired, alter the constitution itself by simple act of Parliament.

Montesquieu, nevertheless, returned to France full of admiration for the "separation of powers" which he thought he had found in England. His glowing account of the liberties enjoyed by Englishmen, thanks to this principle, found many enthusiastic readers both in France and in America and became the basis for the American Constitution as well as for the very similar separation of powers that was written into the French revolutionary constitution of 1791.

In addition to giving wide circulation to an idealized conception of British constitutionalism, Montesquieu elaborated, in his *Esprit des lois* (1748), a

telling critique of absolutism and a theory of government that furnished more than one point of departure for Rousseau's theory of the general will. In particular he concluded from his extensive comparative studies of past and present constitutions that each people had developed a "general spirit" which was peculiar to itself since it was essentially the reflection of the geographical and physical influences under which that nation lived. He believed, for example, that cold climates made men phlegmatic, more manageable, and thus better adapted to self-government; in hot countries the force of human passions was so great that only a despotic government could preserve society. Mountain dwellers were, he thought, especially likely to be jealous of their independence and devoted to free political institutions. Hence a country such as France—neither torrid nor frigid, partly mountainous and partly flat—could only thrive under a mixed government, one in which the monarchical power was "tempered" by the existence of "intermediate powers" representing the traditional corporative interests of the realm.

As a member of the Parlement of Bordeaux, Montesquieu himself was attached to one of these corporative interests, that of the *noblesse de robe* (nobility of the judicial gown), the body of ennobled lawyers, magistrates, and administrators who claimed a "constitutional" power to declare royal decrees illegal by refusing to register them in the Parlement of Paris. Besides the *noblesse de robe* there were other corporative bodies, such as the clergy, the *noblesse d'épée* (military nobility), the university, the guilds and the provincial estates, who claimed at least the right to be consulted by the crown and, by implication, the right to a certain independent authority under France's medieval "constitution." Montesquieu was generally in sympathy with the aspirations of these groups to reassert their traditional privileges, which had been reduced to an almost negligible remnant by Louis XIV. In the eighteenth century Montesquieu's argument for the existence of intermediate powers was seized upon by all opponents of the "royal thesis"—the doctrine of absolute monarchy, best formulated by Bossuet—and served liberal as well as reactionary ends. Montesquieu's constitutionalist doctrine justified the parlements in their resistance to royal reforms that would have mitigated the abuse of noble and clerical privileges, but at the same time it served to encourage liberal reformers who desired a more genuinely representative system of limited monarchy on the English plan.

Enlightened Despotism. On the whole, however, although the *philosophes* were enthusiastic admirers of British government and liberties, the most prevalent political philosophy in France during the Enlightenment was that of enlightened despotism. Voltaire preferred "to obey a fine lion, much stronger

than himself, than two hundred rats of his own species." The breakdown of the old regime was due less to the antipathy of the *philosophes* toward monarchical government than to the failure of the monarchs to be "enlightened."

Enlightened despotism was the professed practice of several leading monarchs of Europe during the eighteenth century; from the political point of view the period has often been called the "Age of Enlightened Despotism." Ironically, it was the French monarchs who were least receptive to the idea. French rationalism invaded the courts of Austria, Tuscany, Portugal, Sweden, and Spain. Catherine the Great of Russia called Montesquieu's *The Spirit of Laws* her "breviary," and Diderot instructed her in Encyclopedist principles, thumping her knees in his enthusiasm.

The most famous enlightened despot was Frederick the Great (Frederick II, 1740-86) of Prussia. From his predecessors in the Hohenzollern line, notably Frederick William (The Great Elector, 1640-88) and his father, Frederick William I (1713-40), he had inherited a unified Prussia with a strongly centralized government and 80,000 disciplined soldiers. From them he also received traditions of administrative efficiency and economic reform, and, to carry them forward, the loyal, well-trained (and eventually cumbersome) bureaucracy for which Prussia came to be renowned. Captivated by the era's intellectual fashions and enlightened canons of government, Frederick tempered the dour, sometimes capricious paternalism of the Hohenzollerns with a clear sense of public obligation. "The monarch is not the absolute master," he asserted, "but only the first servant of the state." And he in large measure lived up to his doctrine by encouraging scientific farming, introducing administrative economies, humanizing the law, supporting the arts and sciences, and granting freedom of religion.

Before further examining the reigning ideals of enlightened despotism, however, it must be pointed out that Frederick did not wholly fulfill them, that he proved disappointing to the *philosophes*. This was because of the astute and highly opportunist statecraft with which he conducted Prussia's external affairs. The nations of Europe, each defining its sovereignty in absolute terms, were by now quite negligibly influenced in their policies by such constants as sectarian religious differences or their common ethos of Christendom. The half dozen or more important powers formed an unstable equilibrium of fast-shifting alliances, a type of regime characteristic down to our own time. By comparison, the balance-of-power machinations among England, France, and Spain in the sixteenth century had been child's play.

Frederick shrewdly capitalized on the dynastic intrigues and colonial

rivalries of his fellow monarchs. His particular object of envy was the fertile region of Silesia, which belonged to the somewhat disordered realm of Queen Maria Theresa of Austria. Frederick's chance to acquire it was furnished by two wars, that of the Austrian Succession, 1740-48, and the Seven Years War, 1756-63. (A dramatic reshuffling of coalitions which occurred between these wars, known as the "diplomatic revolution," suggested the tenor of international relations.) By virtue of his bold diplomatic and military strategy, his cavalier disregard for international agreements, and Russia's timely shift of allegiance (1762) from Austria to Prussia, Frederick finally annexed his prize. Later, in 1772, he rounded out his expansionist design by joining Maria Theresa and Catherine the Great in the first of three partitions of helpless Poland.

Whatever the moral frailties of its practitioners, however, enlightened despotism retained popularity as an ideal. For one thing, it seemed the most feasible way to bring about reforms under the then existing circumstances. Difficult though it might appear, it was more likely that a few monarchs could be enlightened about the law of nature and the rights of individual men than that either the whole populace or the parliaments should be. And in the final analysis, there was no logical reason why the monarch should not abide by natural law once he was enlightened concerning it, since it was the condition of his own advancement as well as that of his nation.

A more basic conviction explains the readiness of the *philosophes* to accept the dominion of benevolent despots as embodiments of the law of nature. Convinced by Newton of the universal governance of natural law, they regarded it as a "general providence," thoroughly benevolent and harmonious in all its parts. In the field of human affairs natural law meant the "invisible hand" through which the serving of the individual's interest tended inevitably to serve the community at large. On the basis of the assumed identity of private and public interests, it was easy for a *philosophe* to believe that a monarch could be readily enlightened, since this would amount simply to his being shown his own interest; and it was natural for a *philosophe* to regard this as a good thing since an enlightened monarch would recognize that his own interests were identical with those of the community. Since we have already mentioned the "cosmic Toryism" sometimes associated with deism, and since we shall give some attention to the views of the Physiocrats in a subsequent section, it may not be out of place here simply to quote without further discussion a sentence of Mercier de la Rivière which is notably illustrative of the faith in paternalistic, enlightened rulers. "All our interests and wills will be linked to the interest and will of the Sovereign, creating for our common good and

harmony, which can only be regarded as the work of a kind Providence that wishes the land to be full of happy men." To attain this general happiness only enlightenment is needed, and for enlightenment itself very little is required. As another economist wrote: "It will suffice to have that amount of capacity and patience which a child who is good at arithmetic employs to become a good politician or a truly good citizen."

Furthermore, it is necessary to realize that the philosophy of the Enlightenment, whatever it claimed or attempted to be, was predominantly a middle-class philosophy and was concerned with specific economic and social objectives rather than with general political change. The list of natural rights was presumed to be eternal and universal, but they expressed with special fitness the particular needs of the middle class within the peculiar circumstances of the eighteenth century. Such watchwords of the age as "liberty" and "property" were meant to have a universal and eternal appeal, but, at the same time, they stood for specific demands for specific reforms.

Liberty for the *philosophes* meant civil liberty, the recognition of such natural rights as "entire liberty of person and of goods; the right to speak to the nation through the medium of the pen; to be tried upon a criminal charge only by a jury of independent men; not to be judged in any case except according to the precise terms of the law; to profess peacefully what religion one wishes" (Voltaire). Not only were these the specific liberties won by the middle classes in England but, the *philosophes* maintained, they were not properly the prerogatives of the lower classes. Liberty, as d'Alembert said, "is a good which is not made for the people; because the people is a child which falls and destroys itself as soon as it is allowed to walk alone, and which arises only to attack its government." Voltaire, too, could write that "the people . . . will always be stupid and brutal. They are cattle and what is wanted for them is a yoke, a goad, and fodder." Voltaire would have limited liberty and enlightenment to those sections of the lower classes "whose occupations require a decent education" and would have excluded those "which involve only manual labor and daily effort. The latter class is the most numerous, and the only recreation it will ever want is to go to High Mass or to the tavern, in both of which places it can sing." "They would die of hunger before they became philosophers. It seems to me necessary to have a class of innocent boors. If you were cultivating a property as I am, or had ploughs to be worked, you would agree with me. It is not the workman who needs education, it is the *bon bourgeois*—the town dweller—that is a big enough undertaking." For the most part, the *philosophes* were in accord with these views of Voltaire, the paternalistic "Lord of Ferney," Diderot and

Condorcet—both radical democrats—being the most notable exceptions. Helvétius and Holbach also demanded education for all on grounds of social utility, but on the whole the impulse toward democratic education came, not from the practitioners of the “analytic method” or those who emphasized intellectual enlightenment, but from Rousseau.

By “liberty” and “equality” the *philosophes* meant the abolition of feudal privilege, of guild monopolies, of mercantilist restraints on trade, of the entire tissue of law and practice which continued to give special privileges to special ranks when these ranks were no longer performing special functions. This demand was that of the middle class and, during the French Revolution, of great sections of the lower classes as well. But the leveling of all stations and situations was not envisaged by the *philosophes*. As Voltaire said, “it is as impossible for men to be equal as it is impossible for two preachers or two professors of theology not to be jealous of each other.” The typical view is stated by d’Alembert: “Citizens are equal, not with that metaphysical equality which confounds fortune, honor, and situation, but with a moral equality which consists in being equally protected and equally bound by the laws.”

The belief of the *philosophes* in enlightened despotism was only occasionally developed in a full and explicit way. It was not so much a philosophy as it was a faith in enlightenment as a self-sufficient panacea and a practical concern for effecting immediate reforms within the existing framework. The *philosophes* habitually dissociated civil liberty from political liberty, and it was not until the persevering ineptitude of the Bourbons had convinced them of the emptiness of their earlier faith in enlightened despotism that they were ready to face the task of framing a constitution and of legislating for the sovereigns. They envisaged enlightened despotism (in the words of Regnaud) as “the Frenchman subject to his king, the king subject to the laws”; and to subject the king to the laws, to temper his power with “reason and good morals,” they felt that little more was necessary than “the progress of universal reason.” More than anything else, enlightened despotism reflected the faith that enlightenment is the most powerful of political forces, that “when an established religion begins to fade and die before the enlightenment of an Age of Reason, it is to that reason alone that one must have recourse for the maintenance of society and for its preservation from anarchy” (Boulanger, *The Origins of Oriental Despotism*).

The fact that the particular interests of the analytic philosophers and utilitarians were on the whole identical with the specific demands of the rising commercial classes of their day does not, of course, decrease the value of their

philosophy. Their contribution transcends their immediate importance in effecting the overthrow of a vestigial feudalism. By identifying general moral standards with specific class interests they gave the reformer a more concrete objective and a more practical instrument for attaining it. By making the test of utility explicit they prepared the way for further applications of experimental politics in which new institutions might be tested in their new environments rather than by preconceived standards and traditional principles. To be sure, their own preconceptions prevented many of them from seeing, as did Hume, for example, that the system of natural law was in danger from their own innovations. Moreover, predominantly concerned as they were with the affairs of a basically agricultural society, they hopelessly oversimplified the nature of social problems, especially as these arose in the complex industrial society that was to emerge in the next generation. Though they thought the task of enlightenment comparatively easy, and though they perhaps placed too great a burden on "education," the fact remains nevertheless that without their faith, even if tempered, the growth of free society would undoubtedly have been much slower. Their faith in science, and especially the flexible utilitarian version of this faith, has exerted an influence that goes beyond the immediate results they obtained; while they were concerned with the specific problems that confronted them, they developed methods that had more lasting application. Their ideals, their methods, and their vision of a society emancipated from ignorance and needless cruelty have become surprisingly powerful agencies for good in the modern world. It is to them that the contemporary liberal owes the consolidation of his faith.

MORAL AND POLITICAL INDIVIDUALISM

Kant. The various tendencies that have been presented in the course of this sketch were diverse manifestations of the same forces. The intellectual authority of individual judgment, the self-interest of the business man, the utilitarian's "calculus of individual pleasures and pains"—all these were parallel manifestations of the breakdown of the group life of the Middle Ages, and of the decadence of such old authorities as the scholastics, the guilds, and the arbitrary canons of tradition and custom. In the philosophy of Immanuel Kant the attempt was made to synthesize these various currents of individualistic opinion into a coherent system, allowing a suitable place for each one. Like St. Thomas before him, Kant tried to bring together traditional values and contemporary "enlightenment."

Geographically, if not otherwise, Kant lived on the borderline of the Enlightenment, in Königsberg, East Prussia. Though he shared the cosmopolitan

ideals of the age and looked forward to the establishment of a world-state, he never traveled, spending his eighty years (1724-1804) in his native city. The poet Heine remarked of Kant that he had neither a personal life nor a personal history. Nevertheless, Kant's detachment from all but academic concerns was very largely the product of his single-minded devotion to working out his "critical" philosophy, and his life work gave a basically new turn to modern thought. Kant himself regarded his enterprise as a veritable Copernican revolution in philosophy.

Kant was impressed by the divergent attitudes that characterized the eighteenth century, and accepted all of them as facts that could not be explained away. Bred in a pietistic background, he also made much of the element of inner experience that enters into religion and that enters irresistibly into one's apprehension of the world. Under the influence of the Enlightenment, Kant regarded the success of science as an impressive fact, and from such thinkers as Holbach he took over the naturalists' critique of deism. Reared in an intellectual environment in which the leading light was Leibniz, he maintained the rationalist presumption that *a priori* elements enter into the construction of a science. Yet Hume's skepticism "awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers" to a recognition that the scope and prospects of science were limited by the nature of human experience. With marked analytic gifts he was at the same time profoundly taken with Rousseau's revelation of the surpassing power of the moral will.

To bring these various and seemingly incompatible attitudes together Kant wrote a number of "Critiques" designed to show the appropriate areas and the limits of the various human faculties. His *Critique of Pure Reason* argues that we can attain scientific knowledge within the limits of the "phenomenal" world of space and time, but that science, within the limitations set for it by such categories as space and time, cannot hope to discover the "real" or intelligible world, the world as it is in itself quite apart from the peculiar and partial structure of the human mind. Kant's conviction that the field of science was merely "phenomenal" and that there was a "real" world undiscerned by physics arose out of his sensitivity to the ineluctable force of inner experience. Such feelings as religious reverence, moral obligation, and the sense of beauty seemed to Kant to require a world to which they were appropriate, a world quite unlike that of mechanistic physics, since it rests not on public knowledge and science, but on individual conviction. That the concepts of God, freedom, and immortality should prove to be invalid on grounds of "pure reason" or rational science did not discredit these beliefs, but was an indication of the limits of "pure reason." Kant's critique of pure reason thus

leaves a place for "practical reason," for faith. Especially the irresistible sense of moral obligation, conscience—what Kant called "the categorical imperative"—justified belief in a morally ordered universe as the appropriate setting for human endeavor.

Thus Kant laid the groundwork for interpreting morality in personal terms by relating obligation to the rational performance of one's intuitively recognized duties. In other words, Kant situated individualism in the moral will (which is "nothing but practical reason") rather than in the intellect. His moral individualism was expressed in his famous dictum that the individual is an end, not a means.

If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is *an end in itself*, constitutes an *objective* principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: *rational nature exists as an end in itself*. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so: so far then this is a subjective principle of human action. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: *So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.*

The Transition to Romanticism. Kant thus points ahead to the distinctive emphasis of nineteenth-century liberalism upon the realization of the potentialities of each individual. While Kant's work was a synthesis of the divergent intellectual and moral tendencies of the eighteenth century, it also foreshadowed a new age in which the promptings of inner experience, of intuition, or of faith, were given priority over scientific demonstration. The romantic idealists that followed Kant distinguished between reason (*Vernunft*) and mere scientific understanding (*Verstand*), holding that the former was the key to the discovery of the fundamental nature of things. At the same time, Kant's appeal to personal experience was the basis of a morality that was preoccupied with "self-expression" quite apart from intellectual discrimination. To be oneself was considered intrinsically worthwhile, even without regard to consequences; and the Bohemian as well as the Brahmin was moral in conscientiously "expressing" himself. The romantic cult of the personality, which made self-reliance (as in Emerson, for example) the supreme virtue, was an extension of Kant's moral individualism.

2. ECONOMIC LIBERALISM

PRE-SMITHIAN CRITICS OF MERCANTILISM

The full social and economic impact of the great discoveries and explorations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not spend itself with the development of strong national monarchies competing with one another for shares in the wealth of new worlds. The process gave an enduring stimulus to commercial enterprise in Western Europe; and this activity, carried on by men of imagination but of uncertain or varied social standing, became a base upon which mercantilism was erected as a superstructure. For the defense of their ships on foreign seas and of their goods in foreign lands, the merchants required and received national protection. For protection at home, against one another and against potential competition from outside, they appealed in France and in England for an adaptation of medieval guild and trade restrictions. In this program, economic tradition and the drive for power of absolutist monarchies were on their side. Trade and treasure would strengthen both monarch and merchant. The nationalist economic policies which resulted gave to the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the designation "Mercantilist Era."

Yet mercantilism was something more than tariff policy and bullion hoarding. It represented a technique of government in which authority over political-economic matters was centralized in an authoritarian national power—a power which could, for example, grant or withhold a merchant company charter, prescribe restrictions for the movement and occupations of workers, restrain or prohibit the manufacture of cottons, subsidize and safeguard the processing of wool. It thus "protected" trade and hampered many aspiring traders at one and the same time. By discriminating in the fostering of particular manufacturing, trading, or speculating interests, it incurred the resistance and resentment of those merchants whose opportunities it restricted. The strong national governments, of course, lost their popularity with merchants who were legally excluded from certain trading activities, or who, though permitted and encouraged to trade, were hampered by internal tolls and taxes, tariffs, and quality specifications. At the same time, by contributing so much toward the reduction of the hazards incidental to the transport and marketing of goods, these governments, ironically enough, removed one of the essential economic justifications for their existence. That justification was the setting up of a sufficiently stable and safe marketing environment to permit individuals profitably to deal with one another regularly and on a large scale.

Further, as time went on mercantilist restrictions became less flexible,

mercantilist administrators more bureaucrats than statesmen, mercantilist agencies, such as the guilds, instruments of special privilege rather than of national welfare. In France mercantilist regulation after 1683 lacked the wisdom and energy of its master builder, Colbert. In England, after the Puritan Revolution, mercantilism became increasingly the employment of state power for economic ends by private interests, rather than the economic arm of the dynastic national state. Thus, internal controls in Great Britain were rapidly relaxed, while foreign commerce remained under regulation. Attacks on mercantilism therefore varied in nature. In France, they rose in part from the dissatisfaction with the perpetuation of dynastic restraints in an increasingly national state, with regulation that had lost its inspiring and progressive character. In England, complaints at first were directed against specific policies, such as the Stuart monopolies. Later, they were aimed at foreign-trade regulations that seemed superfluous in the light of growing British economic superiority, and at restrictions in foreign lands which lessened Britain's trade opportunities. In both countries attacks on mercantilism also stemmed from the rational and naturalistic systems of the Enlightenment.

While it is true that, in the eighteenth century, criticism of mercantilism stepped from the specific to the general plane, it must be borne in mind that late eighteenth-century critics of mercantilism were not acting as apologists for a new order but rather as its prophets. For mercantilism lived on into the nineteenth century. In England the Navigation Acts were not finally swept away till 1849. France never completely abandoned protectionism, and the traditions of mercantilism and the memory of Colbert always had wide respect. It is true that as France came more and more under bourgeois control internal regulations were removed, so that in the first half of the nineteenth century the nation entered upon a phase of mercantilism comparable to that which characterized England a century before. Mercantilism had not been created for the sake of the middle classes, but it set them on the road to power. Eventually it died at their hands in England and was shaped to their needs in France.

The members of the merchant class hostile to mercantilist authoritarianism ranged all the way from politically insignificant London tradesmen to such men as Sir Bevis Bulmer, a son of the sixteenth century, who, when the seventeenth finally claimed him, had achieved legendary fame for the sureness of his financial operations. Spurred on by the wealth obtained from the mines of Mexico and Peru, he turned to the exploitation of the mineral deposits of the British Isles. He built up in the process a mining empire with equities in lead, silver, iron, coal, and gold. Bulmer was primarily a speculator.

His success in developing new enterprises inspired others to similar efforts. It was he and his kind who, as much as any other business type, contributed toward splitting the seams of mercantilist straitjackets. And it was such men as Bulmer who, as much as any others, protested against the restraints of the mercantilist system. In the reorganization of the English East India Company in 1698 we have an example of pressure exerted against monopoly by both excluded commercial and more purely speculative interests. Here intruders or interlopers, as they were called, upon the monopoly of the old East India Company succeeded, through Whig representation in Parliament, in compelling the formation of a new Company. The old monopoly was later re-established by the merger of the two companies, and, while the number of privileged had been increased, privilege itself remained.

This example is doubly significant, for it reflects the growing political strength of men whose only claims to attention were their aptitudes for commerce and industry and their financial successes in exploiting them. These men were not hereditary aristocrats, political-minded men of the Anglican Church or land-owning country gentlemen. They were, for the most part, representatives of a new social and economic class, more heterogeneous in origins, more aggressive in behavior, less respectful of binding tradition. They were the "middle class." And as their ranks drew upon the more ambitious and capable members of the lower city and country groups and attracted imaginative and enterprising recruits from the ruling conservative order, their political and economic star came more clearly into the ascendant.

They were not alone in their labors and in their objections to mercantilism. During the seventeenth century, and more conspicuously in the eighteenth century, their cause was furthered by their own reasoned attacks, as well as by those of some disinterested and perspicacious compatriots. Thus, Sir William Petty, a doctor of medicine who accepted appointment by Cromwell to conduct a land survey in Ireland, combined a speculative temper with a knowledge of the unhappy effects of mercantilist regulations upon Ireland's prosperity. Although frequently a defender of protectionist policies, he was not misled by the importance generally attached to bullion. In his *Political Arithmetic*, published posthumously in 1690, and in other writings, he asserted the fundamental significance of land and labor as sources of wealth. Flying again in the face of accepted doctrines, he maintained that there was a natural course of exchange which it was desirable to maintain unconfined and undirected by legislative restrictions. Important as were Petty's arguments against English controls over Irish commerce, restrictions on the export of bullion,

and the general mercantilist presumption in favor of regulation, these were not his whole contribution. He devoted much time to the compilation of statistics of population, taxes, and trade, for he was convinced that plans for the devising of economic policy should be based upon acquaintance with ascertainable facts. The value of this part of his work was perhaps more immediately recognized than was that of some of his theoretical arguments. His figures on population were studied even in Germany and served as an incentive for similar activities there. Edmund Halley, the great astronomer and friend of Newton, was another investigator who wished, like Petty, to provide some systematic basis for the analysis of economic problems. One of his own contributions, made in 1693, was the preparation of figures on English death rates and population.

One of the most ingenious controversialists of his time was Sir Josiah Child (1630-99), a governor of the old East India Company. This gentleman defended the monopoly enjoyed by the Company because of the unusual conditions characterizing the Indian trade, but he argued that generally trade would flourish most if left free. To his attacks on the bullionist mentality he added a broadside to the effect that it was cheap money—that is, a low interest rate—and not inflows of gold or silver which most helped trade. He might have pointed out that inflows lead to cheap money; the connection apparently escaped him.

A criticism of mercantilist doctrines from still another point of view was made by Bernard de Mandeville, another physician who found speculation and debate equally to his liking. He sought to destroy the fundamental conception that full exercise of power by a national monarch was in the national interest. By his paradox that private vices (pride, ambition, luxury) are public virtues, since they promote expenditure and generate prosperity, Mandeville implied that the vices of individuals could be depended upon to make the nation wealthy. Moreover, individuals and the state strive for the same thing, increase in wealth. There is no conflict of interests between them and therefore no need for a monarch to regulate the economic activities of individuals; the state would be strong if it left individuals free—free to be selfish.

Even more incisive than Mandeville in his dissection of mercantilism was David Hume (1711-76). The few essays he wrote on economic matters covered most of the important questions of policy. Money, he said, "is none of the wheels of trade. It is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more smooth and easy." Bullion is not an ultimate economic good in itself. It should therefore not be the exclusive object of national trade policy. In particular,

outflows of bullion, reflecting an unfavorable balance of trade, should be no cause for alarm. As the money flows out, prices in England must fall. In foreign countries into which the money moves, goods become dear; imports into England must therefore decline. By the same token, exports from England must increase, for English goods are cheap to foreigners. By this natural mechanism the unfavorable balance soon reverses itself. As it does, money flows into England, and English prices rise to their normal level. In this simple fashion was Hume able to undermine the core of bullionist doctrine. It is necessary here simply to indicate that Hume's attacks were in most cases more devastating individually, and certainly better integrated into a systematic criticism of trade restriction policy, than had been those of his predecessors.

Thus the protests against mercantilism came from many quarters and struck at many aspects of the policy. But David Hume died in 1776, at a time when England was still willing to go to war to defend her right to control the trade of her subjects. England retained her Corn Laws until 1846. France did not relax her trade barriers against England until 1786, and then only slightly. Something more than isolated theoretical criticisms and protests by individuals or groups of merchants was necessary before the popular presumption in favor of mercantilism could be destroyed. A broad critique based on arguments that would appeal to the eighteenth-century mind was needed. Only slowly did it take form in terms of a rational, deductive "science" of economics.

THE PHYSIOCRATS

The first comprehensive attempt to find natural laws underlying economic behavior was made in France in the eighteenth century. There the opponents of Colbertian protectionism and of the monarchy's paternalism analyzed the agricultural, commercial, and industrial community in a search for universal principles. The effort was led by a group of so-called Physiocrats—"Physiocracy" means "the rule of nature"—of whom François Quesnay and Dupont de Nemours were the outstanding theoreticians. The fundamental principles were not hard to find, for the economic sympathies of the investigators and the state of trade in France gave them their points of departure. Obviously, Quesnay maintained, the Author of the Universe has created a natural order in which men can live. Equally surely, He has endowed them with certain rights. These rights are preeminently those of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. To the legal-minded twentieth-century critic it might not be clear that these interests, established and maintained only by virtue of specific man-made laws, must be natural. To Quesnay, who saw them infringed upon by authoritarian government, and who was keenly

aware of their importance to the dominant agricultural class and to all traders, the only thing which could possibly be unnatural would be their destruction. Given these axioms, Quesnay inquired as to their bearing on economic organization and policy. Here he was most true to his French background. France was predominantly agricultural. She had not developed a large commercial, much less an industrial, class. It was the farmers who in greatest numbers chafed under outmoded restraints. Agriculture, said Quesnay, is the sole source of wealth in society, since it alone yields more than is put into it in the form of labor and materials. Industry merely changes the form of natural products; commerce shifts their location. The net productivity of agriculture was thus attributed to nature's bounty.

Quesnay believed that the owners of land should receive the net product agriculture made available, both because of the natural right of property and because they were responsible for bringing new lands into cultivation. Part of the net product they were to return to the actual cultivators—the productive class—and part to the commercial, industrial, and service groups—the unproductive, or sterile, classes. It was at this point in the development of his theory that Quesnay made his most useful contribution to the science of economics. He held that among the three above-named classes (owners or proprietors, productive workers, and sterile classes) the wealth produced in the economic society circulated in a regular way. Any interference with this circulation could only handicap future production. In particular, internal duties on the movement of grain and tariffs on the export of grain were undesirable encumbrances. As his essay on "Natural Right" indicates, he was ready to generalize this attack on trade barriers to the extent of insisting that they, or any legislative enactments, should not be considered desirable if they violated the natural laws of the production, circulation, or distribution of wealth.

Quesnay's theory had a wide appeal. Its foundation in natural order, its espousal of *laissez-faire*, and its ingenious analysis of the circulation of wealth found supporters for it in England. Here the commercial middle class was, of course, dominant. The agricultural interest was relatively much smaller than in France. But here too, although of greater importance than across the channel, the industrial group was still in its infancy. It should, consequently, occasion no surprise that the most celebrated English synthesis of economic analysis and prescriptions for policy emphasized the interests of merchants. It was Adam Smith (1723-90) who presented it and was the first to analyze systematically the processes of production and exchange and to envisage the possibilities of an industrial society.

ADAM SMITH

Smith (and also the Physiocrats) believed that complete liberty of action was undesirable. The state must provide protection from possible aggressor nations; it must maintain a domestic police and courts of law; and it should build and operate such socially desirable enterprises as canals, bridges, and roads, which would not be profitable for private producers. Implicit in all this is the protection of personal liberty, personal security, and private property. Smith, famous to this day as a proponent of free trade, even supported the Navigation Acts, for he believed them essential both to Britain's successful participation in the bitter international competition for trade and to the maintenance of an adequate navy. This was the extent and limit of Smith's advocacy of protectionism; for basically and broadly he opposed trade restraints and the overweening authority of governments which had pretensions to greater wisdom than their subjects. In his *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, he drew upon the contributions of Mandeville, Hume, Hutcheson (his teacher at Edinburgh), and scores of others in a successful effort to demonstrate the fallacies and misunderstandings inherent in the mercantilist position.

If this were all Adam Smith did, we might dismiss him as a remarkably forceful pamphleteer. But he did not simply repeat old arguments. Assuming the existence of a natural order (and he never questioned it), he argued in much the same way as had Quesnay that interferences by the state could generally do only harm. He stressed more than did the Frenchman the importance of the individual. He argued that individuals are motivated by self-interest so far as their economic activities are concerned, that the national welfare is simply the sum of the individual interests operating in a nation, and that each man knows his own interest better than any statesman can envision it. Smith thus founded his economic analysis more explicitly on the doctrine of *economic individualism* than had any of his predecessors or contemporaries. Indeed, the very meaning that we now attach to the term economic individualism derives from the personal interests, protections, and restraints with which his argument was concerned. Economic individualism does not mean complete liberty. It means assurance to the individual of full opportunities for self-expression and the pursuit of gain, limited only by the restraints necessarily involved in making good a similar assurance to everyone else.

Smith found support for his basic argument of self-interest from the activities and mercantile successes of the merchant class, many of whom were his

friends in Scotland. For the manufacturers he had little sympathy; they were too intent on extracting the last ounce of energy from their workers and too keen on tacit or express agreements to restrain trade.

As anyone acquainted with his pin-factory illustration of the division of labor knows, Adam Smith made a searching investigation into the production and distribution of wealth in society. His treatment of these problems became a model for later investigators. His theory of prices, or value, became the principal subject of economic speculation and debate. But his captivating style and the wealth of his illustrations were embellishments on a method that was predominantly deductive. It was, moreover, his broad application of the deductive process to economic analysis which most influenced theorists who succeeded him. His synthesis of economic criticisms of restrictive trade policies amounted to a theoretical system. He, more than anyone else, made of economics a formal discipline, if not a science. With disciples in England and elsewhere, his influence spread and grew; and even today he remains the fountainhead of economic thought.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE DOCTRINE

One of Smith's principal successors, and a most distinguished one, was the Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834). By the time Malthus first published his *Essay on Population* (1798), Smith's free trade arguments had been widely read, well received, and presented in Parliament by Pitt in support of suggestions for a reformed English commercial policy. It was Smith the deductive analyst, not Smith the proponent of free trade, the careful student of economic conditions, or the friend of the workingman, to whom Malthus paid allegiance. Indeed, where Smith had been optimistic about increases in wealth to come from the division of labor and freedom of trade, Malthus was pessimistic about the operation of the inexorable natural laws according to which population would outrun the food supply. Thus an economic discipline which had been developed to set man free was used by Malthus to point out the inevitability of certain limits on his freedom.

The emphasis on individuals as the responsible and guiding forces remained intact. Economic individualism was established as respectable. And by the same process which characterized the earlier utilization by the merchant classes of the doctrines of natural law and identity of interests between the individual and the nation as grounds for the removal of mercantilist restraints, there occurred a later employment, this time by the rising industrialists, of the theory of the automatic mechanism of Smith and Malthus as

grounds for the denial of any state protection to the sweated and impoverished laborers in the new factories.

Thus are ideas frequently employed to rationalize the dominant economic interests of society. This was the fate of the doctrine of economic individualism in the nineteenth century, and notably in England. In our own day, economic individualists see nothing incongruous in a protective tariff. Nor do they see anything inconsistent in a body of law which recognizes the corporation as a person and at the same time purports to protect the personal liberty and security of the individuals whom the corporate person controls. The explanation is simple: social and economic theories always take some time to catch up with social and economic conditions. At any given time the predominant theory is usually outmoded, or only lately arrived. Yet, as the late Lord Keynes insisted,

the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.

It may very well be that the vigor which the doctrine of economic individualism retains in our age of economic centralization derives from its having had as one of its proponents such an illustrious "academic scribbler" as Adam Smith.

Chapter XIII

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION



SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION

HISTORY ABOUNDS in "revolutions," but some other term would be more appropriate for most of the events or processes frequently so described. For example, the French "revolution" of 1830 was little more than a *coup d'état*, in that it changed the names of the nation's rulers and altered governmental policies to some extent but left the form of the state and the structure of society virtually unchanged. The "industrial revolution," like the "commercial revolution" and the "price revolution," was a profoundly significant series of changes in economic life, but these innovations were effected so gradually as to be almost imperceptible to men living in their midst.

The French Revolution, however, like the English Revolutions of the seventeenth century, like the American Revolution, and like the Russian Revolution of 1917, brought about a profound and lasting modification of the nation's social structure and organization by means of a sudden, violent political upheaval. In the French Revolution, as in all the great social revolutions of modern times, the central fact is the rapid transformation of the relations among men and among groups of men—the creation of a new set of social institutions in place of the old.

Certain striking and important similarities may be traced between one social revolution and another. These can easily be overstressed, and should not be allowed to obscure vital differences of time and place. But a general pattern does seem to be common at least to the great middle-class revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (Though the Russian Revolution of the twentieth century began as a middle-class movement, it rapidly developed beyond that stage and ceased to be fully comparable to the earlier liberal-democratic revolutions.)

Each of these liberal-democratic revolutions had its origin in the striving of middle-class individuals to translate into political actuality the superiority

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they had already gained in the economic and intellectual spheres. Poverty and injustice were not the principal causative factors for, if they had been, one would be at a loss to explain why no revolutions occurred in Poland or Spain, where economic distress and political oppression were incomparably more acute and widespread. Instead of eventuating in organized, well thought-out movements aiming at reform, conditions such as these seem more likely to produce either apathy and stagnation or blind orgies of indiscriminate revolt, like the "jacqueries" of the Middle Ages or the German Peasants Revolt of 1524-25. Constructive opposition to absolute monarchy and decaying feudalism could apparently emerge and gather strength only where substantial economic and social progress had already been made.

At some point in the history of each of the countries most strongly affected by the advance of capitalism a situation seems to have come about in which the leaders of the middle class despaired of achieving further reform by orderly, "legal" methods. Refusing to abandon objectives which were not only of prime importance to their own class but were in addition vital to the well-being and continued growth of the whole nation, they resorted to violence for the purpose of overcoming the obstructions placed in their way. Often they were compelled to do so against their own desires, either by the threats of the established authorities forcibly to suppress the whole reform movement or by the pressure of their own impatient followers among the lower classes.

In each case there came a time when the monarchical government had lost public loyalty and stood discredited in the eyes of popular opinion by reason of its own conspicuous failures. Repudiated even by many of its "natural" supporters among the groups whose interests it had sought primarily to serve, the existing authority found itself without the means even of continuing to rule by force alone, because it had lost the support of the police, the army, and the bureaucracy. Apparently not even the agents and beneficiaries of the old order any longer possessed either the self-confidence or the will to maintain a universally detested scheme of things. At this juncture the most vigorous leaders of the innovating party were able with little more than a show of organized popular force to occupy the political vacuum and to take control of the supreme law-making and law-enforcing agencies of the state.

Thus the great middle-class revolutions of modern times "began" (if anything so deeply rooted in the past can be said to have a beginning), and thus the French Revolution "began." The storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, placed supreme power in the hands of the bourgeois leaders of the third estate. If nothing more had resulted, however, the substitution of one set of rulers for another would not, by itself, have been particularly significant.

Social Reorganization: The First Stage. The important, lasting consequences of the French Revolution flowed from the fact that, in order to satisfy their supporters, the new rulers of the nation were obliged to carry out the program of reforms proposed and propagated by eighteenth-century liberal theorists and publicists—in particular, by the Encyclopedists. There followed a drastic reordering of relations among individuals and of the relation of social groups to one another. The whole fabric of law, economics, politics, education, foreign affairs, religion, manners, and, indeed, of every social activity, underwent rapid, fundamental modification. The social psychology was transformed as old standards of behavior lost their binding force.

The first stage of the French Revolution was completed during the two years that followed the fall of the Bastille. By 1791 the original aims of the Revolution had been substantially achieved. France had been transformed into a constitutional monarchy under which the upper middle class would exercise decisive influence on national policy. Feudalism had been abolished in principle, and measures looking toward its eventual abolition in fact had been set in motion. At this point, however, as in the other middle-class revolutions of the early modern period, a cleavage appeared among the groups that had previously united to initiate the Revolution and to carry it thus far forward.

Deepening of the Revolution: The Second Stage. Those groups which had been nearest to complete social emancipation under the old regime—the bourgeois financiers, for example—became the “moderates” of the Revolution’s first stage. By 1791 these groups (generally speaking, the whole upper middle class) had fully achieved their own aims and had become intent upon “stabilizing” the Revolution. But in order to overthrow the old order these leaders had been obliged to set in motion the great masses of the underprivileged. The latter had furnished manpower for the “mob” that destroyed the Bastille; in the countryside it had been the peasants who, by attacking the châteaux, had administered the real death blow to feudalism. These allies of the bourgeoisie took little interest in philosophizing about natural rights; rather they expected the new regime to do something at once to lessen the hardships of everyday existence among those vast numbers of the population who wore long trousers rather than silken hose and knee breeches (*culottes*) and hence had come to be known as *sans-culottes*.

Instead of bringing an extra loaf of bread to the workingman’s table or adding another acre of land to the holding of the small peasant, the first stage of the Revolution actually worsened, even if only temporarily, the condition of the *sans-culottes*. The cost of living had reached an all-time high in the late spring of 1789; during the next years it remained at a high level. Trade and

industry were upset by the turmoil and uncertainty attendant upon a great social upheaval. Unemployment became a widespread curse in the cities. As increasing numbers of aristocrats sought more congenial surroundings abroad, the industries that had formerly catered to the upper classes fell upon hard times. Bad harvests intensified food shortages and, though speculators thrrove, the peasant had little to show for his labor.

In these circumstances it was not to be wondered at that the *sans-culottes* began to press for radical economic and social reform to supplement the legal and political reforms already achieved. Now that liberty was secure, what remained but to establish equality? Still another powerful impulsion was given to the movement toward state intervention in economic life after 1792, when France became involved in a desperate war of survival against the combined monarchies of Europe. The laissez-faire policies of the bourgeois Revolution were superseded by the "embryonic collectivism" (Mathiez) of the democratic nation-in-arms. By 1794 the leftward swing of the Revolution had led to a dictatorship of the lower-middle-class Jacobins in the Committee of Public Safety led by Robespierre.

Retrogression and Stabilization. With the subsequent lessening of the national emergency, however, it soon became apparent that a number of the advanced outposts occupied by the popular forces were too thinly held. France had not been prepared, either by economic evolution or by the diffusion of radical democratic ideas, for a social experiment that seemed to involve such heavy inroads upon the rights of individual private property. The peasants, whom Robespierre's government had finally enabled to become small land-owners, had achieved their heart's desire and, as long as no one proposed to bring back the old regime, they ceased to take an active interest in politics. As soon as the Jacobin "republic of equality" had saved the Revolution from its domestic and foreign enemies by the suppression of reactionary internal revolts and by the creation of a victorious citizen army, the moderate men of property in the National Convention took back the dictatorial powers they had entrusted to Robespierre and sent him, with his chief collaborators, to the guillotine. This was the Thermidorean Reaction, so called because it took place on 9 Thermidor, Year II of the Republic by the Revolutionary calendar (July 27, 1794).

For the next five years the government of France was in the hands of men whose social outlook was not greatly different from that which had dominated the first stage of the Revolution. The Republic again became less preoccupied with the condition of the economically underprivileged and more solicitous of the interests of the well-to-do. Austerity and high idealism gave

way to venality and cynicism in public life. Militarism fastened itself upon the nation at home, while imperialism replaced the earlier unselfish desire to liberate foreign nations from tyranny.

Napoleon merely intensified these last two tendencies, while continuing in a more efficient fashion the efforts of his predecessors to consolidate the permanent constructive work of the Revolution in the fields of legal and administrative reform. His armies, however, spread the gospel of militant popular nationalism to the remotest corners of Europe and thereby raised up an overwhelming host of enemies. By 1813 the effort to dominate the European Continent had brought France to the verge of exhaustion. Little energy, either material or moral, remained with which to resist the decision of the victorious monarchical coalition to restore the Bourbons, especially since Louis XVIII brought with him not only a charter that promised limited representative government and preservation of the Revolutionary land settlement, but—more attractive still—assurances of peace.

FRANCE UNDER THE OLD REGIME

No other country on the continent of Europe had reached a higher degree of social and cultural development than France in the latter part of the eighteenth century. A relatively homogeneous population of twenty-five million occupied a unified territory that was endowed with many natural advantages. These included a climate both temperate and varied, a fertile soil, an enviable network of river valleys that permitted easy communication both by land and by water, and a very favorable location near the focus of the world's principal trade routes.

In the exploitation of these natural advantages Frenchmen had made striking progress in the three centuries since the Hundred Years War. In the countryside the manorial pattern of agriculture had been gradually modified by the widespread substitution of money for barter, by the conversion of personal obligations into pecuniary relationships, and by the increasing dependence of rural economy on urban markets. Within the thriving towns a vigorous middle class had grown up, enriched by the swelling profits that it drew from commerce, industry, and finance.

Rural France. Approximately four out of five Frenchmen were still engaged in agriculture in 1789. There were still a million serfs, but the great bulk of the peasantry had bought off its servile obligations. A few had become unconditional owners of the land they worked, and the rest had, by and large, converted their feudal dues into hereditary tenures for which a cash rent was paid. Share-cropping (*métayage*), whereby the lord supplied land, tools, and seed

while the peasant supplied labor, the crop being proportionately divided, was a common arrangement in some parts of the country. In the vicinity of towns considerable numbers of peasants were employed in cottage industry, supplementing the inadequate livings they derived from their minute landholdings. Another large number of peasants were obliged to work full or part time as agricultural wage laborers because their land holdings were insufficient or nonexistent.

An enclosure movement similar to the British had begun, often under the auspices of middle-class capitalists, but it had made little headway except in a few areas adjacent to large centers of population. Some forward-looking cultivators, who were frequently, as in England, bourgeois capitalists seeking to invest their profits from commerce in profit-yielding farming, had made attempts to introduce the new scientific methods that were currently revolutionizing English agriculture, but the average French peasant lacked the capital, even if he possessed the knowledge and the will, to take advantage of these improved techniques. Crushing taxes usually absorbed any surplus he might produce. Besides, too great a show of prosperity could only be counted upon to increase the rapacity of the tax collector. The transfer of land from noble to commoner was made extremely difficult by the survival of feudal "entail"—laws forbidding the division or sale of landed property owned by a noble family—and, where this did not suffice, by the imposition of a prohibitory tax on such transactions.

In French agriculture generally, more progress had been made than in any other country except Holland and England. By the latter half of the eighteenth century, however, further progress was being blocked by the survival of outmoded social and legal institutions. The discrepancy between the actual poverty of the French countryside and its potential wealth was daily becoming more apparent.

Bourgeois Frustration. French trade, both domestic and foreign, and French industry of all kinds had grown steadily since the Crusades; foreign trade in particular had grown with almost breathtaking rapidity since the Peace of Utrecht (1713). The efforts of Henry IV, Sully, Richelieu, and Colbert had given France a merchant marine, overseas colonies of great promise, valuable trading concessions in the Near East and elsewhere, internal order and security, and a measure of active state encouragement for industry in the form of monopolies, subsidies, tax exemption, customs simplification, and protective tariff duties.

Yet the royal government had frequently taken back with one hand what it had given with the other. The expulsion of the middle-class Huguenots,

the dissipation of national resources in the fruitless wars of Louis XIV, and the loss of Canada and India in the Seven Years War did much to cancel out the benefits of mercantilism. French mercantilism at its best, moreover, had frequently been a wrongly conceived and poorly executed policy, strengthening the guild system and inhibiting the growth of competitive capitalistic business. The patronage of the court had one-sidedly stimulated luxury industry, while at the same time the poverty of the bulk of the people had denied to staple, mass-production industries a lucrative domestic market comparable to that which was beginning to be available to British factory owners. The opposition of entrenched feudal interests had frustrated Colbert's most strenuous efforts to abolish internal customs barriers and to bring about national uniformity of coinage, of taxation, of commercial law, and of weights and measures. The same interests had likewise joined together to balk the attempts of reforming royal officials of the eighteenth century (most notably those of Turgot in 1774-76) to break the monopolistic power of the guilds and to establish free trade within France.

These failures of royal mercantilist policies, together with the rise of newer, more enterprising branches of industry like cotton textiles, caused the more vigorous section of the capitalistic middle class more and more to espouse economic liberalism of the Physiocratic variety. This doctrine had first been put forward by agrarian capitalists like François Quesnay (founder of the Physiocratic school) who were desirous of establishing a free market in grain. Their teachings and their slogan, *laissez-faire, laissez-passer*, were in origin an attack upon the *police des blés*, a system using medieval methods of market regulation which was maintained by the royal authorities to prevent profiteering in time of food shortage by requisitioning supplies, by prohibiting exports, and by fixing prices. Thus in commerce, in the newer branches of manufacturing, and in agriculture the crown's stubborn championhip of an older form of economic organization and of the interests enjoying vested rights under that organization stood as a barrier to the further advance of French capitalism.

Nowhere was the monarchy's economic and social policy so far out of harmony with middle-class requirements, with rationality, and with the national interest, as in the field of public finance. Taxes were arbitrarily imposed, capriciously and destructively assessed, wastefully collected, and recklessly spent—all without any attempt at detailed accounting. Not even Necker, the financial wizard and during several terms of office the king's controller-general, could, on his own admission, unravel the tangle of the public debt. It was a profound shock to the middle-class creditors of the state and to the tax-paying public at large when some inkling of the true state of affairs was

revealed in the *Compte rendu* which Necker published to justify his stewardship in 1781.

The king's private purse was not kept separate from the national treasury. Only the most sketchy effort was made to budget expenditure and to balance it with anticipated income. The crown continued to levy taxes dating from the time when the king had been a great feudal lord, but added to these was a series of newer obligations (like the *vingtîèmes*) instituted subsequent to the seventeenth century—uniform, in theory, for the whole country and for all subjects, though in practice the nobility and clergy mostly secured exemption. The provinces joined to France after the time of Joan of Arc had been allowed to keep their old tax laws almost intact; while in the older, central provinces (known as the Five Great Farms) a large proportion of the taxes was collected not by royal civil servants but by the agents of a syndicate of private financiers (the farmers-general) who contracted with the crown to pay a specified sum for the privilege of collecting an amount that was usually much larger. The clergy, exempt from all taxes, periodically assessed itself through its general assembly the sum which it felt the crown needed (and it was willing to spare) out of its vast revenues. In the more recently acquired provinces the local estates of the three orders (clergy, nobles, and commons) exercised the same privilege. Elsewhere no one asked the consent of the middle-class taxpayer or of the peasant, and no one accounted to them for so much as a sou of the money they had contributed. The ultimate burden of nearly all taxation came to rest upon the shoulders of these two groups—some authorities believe that as much as four-fifths of the total tax burden was borne by the third estate.

Nor were the inefficiency and the injustice of the system its only bad features. Because no equitable method of apportionment existed, the heaviest tax was assessed, as a rule, against the peasant who seemed most prosperous, thus largely destroying any incentive he might have to improve his property. Customs duties collected at provincial and municipal boundaries, and a whole multitude of private tolls jealously maintained by privileged individuals and corporate bodies throughout the realm, effectively strangled interprovincial trade and prevented regional specialization within France along lines of greatest natural advantage. The crown lost much of its rightful revenue to the tax farmers. Still worse for the economic development of the country, capital that had been accumulated in commerce and industry and that would otherwise have been turned back into productive enterprise came to be diverted into the purchase of shares of ownership in the tax-farming syndicates because of the fat profits to be safely and easily obtained there.

Royal expenditures were almost never covered by receipts; by 1789 the annual deficit amounted to one-fifth of total expenses. In consequence, still another large amount of potentially productive wealth was absorbed, only to be rendered sterile, by the steadily mounting public debt. By 1789 more than half of the crown's yearly tax revenues were pledged in advance to satisfy the interest claims of the state's creditors. When in desperate financial straits (and these occasions were not infrequent) the crown borrowed until its credit dwindled, and then resorted to the self-defeating practice of selling, for lump sums in cash, salaried positions (especially judgeships) and titles of nobility carrying tax exemption. Year by year the financial morass grew more hopeless, despite the universally acknowledged fact that the annual cost of government, if equitably distributed and rationally administered, was far from excessive in relation to either the total wealth or the national income of France.

Nor would matters have seemed quite so deplorable to the middle classes if the Crown had spent its revenues in works of national improvement or even in successful wars for commercial advantages. Instead, however, the king lavishly poured the contents of his purse into the outstretched hands of a swarming court nobility who, in turn, squandered their pensions, gifts, and unearned salaries on luxury, ostentation, and dissolute living. Or he dissipated his resources in ill-conceived foreign ventures, such as the costly but unrewarded aid which France gave the American colonies in order to even the score for France's defeat at the hands of Britain in 1763. (This aid was costly to the monarchy in more than the pecuniary sense, for it prompted many of Louis XVI's subjects to wonder why their government should deny liberty at home while helping to establish it on the other side of the Atlantic.)

Political Affairs. Thus the absolute monarchy had become incompatible with continued advance in economic and social affairs. Its failings as a political organization probably seemed the more intolerable to Frenchmen precisely because they were already the most emancipated people on the Continent of Europe, excepting only Holland and Switzerland. To be sure, the state and the church maintained a double censorship; the government operated a network of political espionage. Arbitrary arrest, imprisonment without trial, trial without a jury of one's peers, and the use of torture to obtain confessions were all permitted by law. But in practice the censorship was lax and the police were tolerant or inefficient. The success of the *philosophes* in spreading the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment indicates that restrictions on personal freedom were far from absolute.

It would probably be more nearly correct, in fact, to attribute the collapse

of the old regime not to oppressive treatment of its middle-class critics but rather to its policy of permitting virtually unlimited criticism at the same time that it allowed or, rather, obliged the faultfinders to remain irresponsible. For the fundamental grievance of the increasingly liberal middle classes was that they were given neither a voice in the determination of national policy nor a commensurate share in the responsibilities of carrying it into effect. Across the English Channel a middle-class Parliament had held control over Britain's destinies since the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89; across the Atlantic, representative government had won an even more recent and spectacular triumph. France was the acknowledged intellectual and cultural leader of European civilization; it was absurd that Montesquieu should be honored in Philadelphia and not in Paris.

Of representative institutions, however, France possessed hardly more than a vestige. Like the other feudal monarchies of Europe, France had boasted, in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, an Estates-General in which the delegates of the third estate—the *bourgeoisie* or “townsmen”—had joined with the first estate (the clergy) and the second estate (the nobility) to limit the king's power. This they had been able to do on numerous occasions by making their grant of funds conditional upon his redress of their grievances. But with the rise of absolutism after the Hundred Years War, and especially after the wars of religion of the sixteenth century when the crown had been able to play the first and second estates against the third, the development of this embryonic parliament had been stunted and then fully arrested. The Estates-General were summoned only once (in 1614) between the accession of Henry IV and the spring of 1789.

The last four Bourbon kings of France prior to 1789 governed either personally or through ministers answerable only to themselves, without even a pretense of consulting the opinions of the governed. All legislation was prepared and promulgated in one of the subordinate royal councils or in the principal Council of State presided over by the king himself. After the centralizing achievements of Richelieu and Louis XIV the measures so enacted were carried into effect by a corps of salaried administrators directed on the provincial level by the intendants—“the thirty tyrants of France.” These officials, who were unusually energetic, ambitious, capable individuals chosen from the petty nobility and upper middle class so that they would “owe everything to the king,” having no interests apart from his service, performed a valuable national service in stamping out the remnants of feudal particularism among the provincial nobles, and not a few were, like Turgot, enlightened

administrators of humane vision and constructive imagination. But the system as a whole encouraged rigid local conformity to the letter of instructions drawn up at Versailles, and in the reign of Louis XV the caliber of the average intendant seems to have deteriorated as the office came to be more and more monopolized by the nobility.

It is eloquent if somewhat ironic testimony to the crying need of eighteenth-century France for some kind of representative institution that a narrow-minded and self-seeking clique of ennobled lawyers (the judges of the parlements, or provincial high courts of justice, the most illustrious of which was the Parlement of Paris) was able to pose with remarkable success between 1763 and 1789 as the guardians of liberty and as the repositories of the popular will to resist monarchical oppression. By no stretch of the imagination could the parlements of France be likened to the British Parliament, despite the similarity in name, for the latter was an elected body responsible to its constituents, something that the parlement most decidedly was not. Yet, when the judges of the Parlement of Paris defied the royal will and were consequently punished by being suspended from office and exiled from the capital, they became martyred heroes in the cause of freedom.

It was the judges' contention (historically and legally very dubious) that no royal decree could have the force of law until it had been registered in the Journal of the Parlement of Paris, a procedure originally instituted merely to insure the use of correct legal forms, and not intended to give the magistrates any power of changing the content of the measure. Nor had the king traditionally been bound to respect the objections of the parlement—Louis XIV had on several occasions appeared before the court in full regal panoply to hold what was called a "bed of justice" (*lit de justice*); after he had peremptorily ordered them to register his decree, the judges of the seventeenth century had considered that they could no longer refuse, as subjects, to obey their sovereign and had tamely proceeded to do so.

Louis XV was no less an anointed king by divine right, but the parlement, sensing that public opinion no longer sanctioned that theory of kingship, refused in 1763 to register an objectionable decree even when formally ordered to do so in a *lit de justice*. And in their stubborn refusal the magistrates were supported by the great majority of the general public, even though the decree in question was one that proposed to abolish part of the tax exemption enjoyed by the privileged orders, of which the judges themselves were members! Louis XVI was hailed as a liberator when on his accession in 1774 he recalled and reinstated the Parlement of Paris—whereupon the parlement showed

its zeal for popular interests by refusing to register, one after another, the decrees of reforming finance ministers from Turgot onward, and thus frustrated the only measures which might have averted the Revolution of 1789.

It was, therefore, becoming abundantly clear after the middle of the eighteenth century in every major department of national life that France must shortly cast off the loosened, but still confining, shell of feudal institutions which had once protected but now only encumbered her vigorously growing national life. The logic of her historical development was driving with well-nigh irresistible force toward the destruction of the absolute monarchy which, in order to remain what it was, could adopt no other course than to uphold the feudal institutions which it had allowed to survive after having converted them, or perverted them, into bulwarks of its own existence. Nor was there any other group within the nation so well prepared as the enlightened bourgeoisie, by reason of its wealth, its material interests, its intelligence, and its patriotism, to take the destinies of France into its own hands. How this sequel came to pass is the story of the Great Revolution that began with the meeting of the Estates-General on May 5, 1789, in the palace built by Louis XIV, the Sun King, at Versailles.

But first the climate of opinion in the spring of that momentous year must be described.

On the Eve of the Revolution. In the spring of the year 1789 there were very few Frenchmen who did not ardently desire sweeping changes in their society. A poll of public opinion would probably have shown that as many as nine out of ten of the subjects of Louis XVI had some fundamental dissatisfaction with things as they were. Even the beneficiaries of the old regime—the nobility and the higher clergy, together with a small number of ennobled bourgeois—were restive and half-hearted in their loyalty to the absolute monarchy of the Bourbons. The vast majority of the population hoped for changes in the direction of constitutional, parliamentary government, while the disgruntled “Notables,” led by the parlements, looked back to the time when the crown had been little more than the tool of the great feudal and ecclesiastical magnates of the realm. In all strata of society, however, there was virtual unanimity about the pressing need for far-reaching change.

The peasants staged no demonstrations and circulated no pamphlets, for they were illiterate almost to a man and were obliged, if they would ward off hunger, to spend every moment of daylight in back-breaking labor; but in the light of later events it cannot well be doubted that the peasantry throughout most of France was seething with silent, dammed-up anger against an order that kept them without land of their own and yet wrung from them

in taxes, church tithes, unpaid labor, and manorial dues an intolerably large part of their meager harvests.

The harvest had been a poor one in 1788; famine stalked several provinces; bread was everywhere scarce in the spring of 1789. The fall in the purchasing power of money throughout the 'seventies and 'eighties had brought the peasant a slightly higher price for that part of his produce that he sold to the city dweller, but this gain had been more than canceled by rising prices which he paid for urban products and by the campaign successfully carried on by the lords to increase feudal dues with a view to maintaining their own standard of living. Most of all the peasantry resented the activities of lawyers employed to search the ancient manorial rolls for old obligations, long since forgotten, which could be revived and collected again. The "Great Fear"—widespread and apparently spontaneous outbursts of mass violence in the countryside during the summer of 1789—resulted in the destruction of these manorial records whenever the enraged peasants could lay hands upon them.

The middle classes, enriched by nearly a century of growing commercial prosperity, and educated by the Encyclopedists in the philosophy of natural rights, were conscious of intolerable personal and patriotic frustration when they contemplated the ramshackle pile of outmoded makeshifts that passed for the government of France. Men of wealth among them were both disgusted and alarmed at the chaos prevailing in the state's finances. It was undeniable, too, that the imminent bankruptcy of the royal treasury stemmed in substantial part from the headlong extravagance of the court nobility—drones who believed all useful labor to be shameful and who occupied themselves with little except gambling, intrigue, court ceremonial, and sexual promiscuity.

Nor were men of money alone in condemning established political and social arrangements. Men of ability, unless by some rare chance they could show noble ancestry for several generations, were excluded from all the highest posts of honor and responsibility in public life so that those offices might be given as sinecures to "pedigreed imbeciles" at the court. Men of intelligence were revolted by the hopelessly involved capriciousness of the ecclesiastical and royal censorships and by the complex chaos of the legal system.

The urban working classes (artisans, journeymen, and other wage workers), though they were not numerous except in Paris and in a few other large cities, suffered more than any other group from the rise in the cost of living which had been gathering momentum since the early 1770's and which reached an all-time high in the late spring of 1789. Widespread unemployment had still further enhanced the squalor and insecurity in which the families of

these workers lived. After 1786 many textile centers in particular had been hard hit by British competition to which they had been exposed as a result of the tariff reductions granted to British products by the commercial treaty concluded, under Physiocratic auspices, between France and England in that year.

Even among the "privileged orders" few were content. Many a young noble had fought in America with Lafayette or had waxed enthusiastic over Rousseau's vision of liberty and equality. Among the lower clergy there smoldered latent indignation at the multitude of absentee bishops, abbots, curates, and other beneficed clerics who squandered their rich incomes at the gaming tables of Versailles while a miserably paid, ill-educated, and sadly over-burdened clerical "proletariat," hired as substitutes, performed the actual parochial functions as best they could.

Finally, the prime beneficiaries of the existing order were disgruntled at the eclipse of the "ancient liberties" of the "notables of the realm." This opposition, which centered in the claim of the judiciary nobility composing the parlements (*noblesse de robe*) to refuse their consent to royal decrees, looked backward rather than forward; but the success of the Parlement of Paris in defying the royal will earned for it considerable popular acclaim, and it posed the issue of absolutism or constitutionalism at a time when the crown could ill afford the embarrassment of seeming to override the national will.

THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION

On June 27, 1789, Arthur Young wrote, "The whole business is now over and the revolution complete." He left Paris the following day. Less than eight weeks had elapsed since the first meeting of the Estates-General in the Hall of Mirrors of the palace of Versailles. In the brief interval since May 5, the representatives of the third estate had successfully defied the king and compelled him to sanction their claim to be a National Assembly with power to give France a new constitution. It might well have seemed to an intelligent observer that the nation's demands had now been met in principle and would shortly be fully satisfied in detail.

How would the National Assembly use its sovereign power? Would its victory, so easily won, prove to be lasting? Had the king and the privileged orders really yielded, or were they merely awaiting a favorable opportunity to restore their fallen fortunes, perhaps by the use of military force (which they still controlled) against the Assembly? These were now the questions agitating all minds. Before plunging into the stream of ensuing events that were to furnish answers during the next months and years, it will be well to

survey briefly the manner in which the end of absolute monarchy had come about.

The old regime had not been overthrown by a conspiracy. No organized, self-conscious revolutionary party had deliberately plotted to undermine its power. Universal loyalty to the monarchical ideal and to the person of Louis XVI prevailed in France when the Estates-General met. The only tenable explanation of the collapse of Bourbon absolutism is that the slow processes of history had eroded away its social and economic foundations. The privileged classes—far from helping to retard or avoid the catastrophe—had actually taken the lead in hastening its arrival. By the latter years of the 1780's the whole underpinning of the old order had been so thoroughly weakened that dead weight alone was sufficient to bring the vast and imposing structure crashing down in ruins.

The last opportunity to ward off disaster had been brushed aside in 1787 when the representatives of the privileged orders had refused to rescue the crown from bankruptcy by surrendering their tax exemptions. This Assembly of Notables had had nothing to offer the king but advice—to summon the Estates-General and, if possible, secure its consent to the imposition of new taxes. In its extremity—for the state's credit was near the vanishing point—the royal government could think of no better expedient.

After extensive historical research it was decided that the first two estates (clergy and nobility) would be represented either in person or by directly elected delegates, while the third chamber representing all the rest of the population would be chosen by indirect elections in two stages on the basis of a very wide popular franchise. This last provision was expected to insure the election of a third chamber submissive to the crown, for no one doubted that the great mass of illiterate peasantry would choose either priests or intensely conservative squires as its representatives. Probably in the hope of using the third estate as a counterweight to overcome the anticipated resistance of the first two estates to any reform measures which the government might propose, it was provided that the third estate would elect 600 representatives, while the other two would have only 300 each.

This expectation of the court was rudely disappointed, however, when in the spring of 1789 nearly five million voters (out of six million males over twenty-five years of age) met in their electoral assemblies to choose representatives and to draw up *cahiers de doléances* (statements of grievances) requested by the king. It was by far the most democratic national election that had ever been held in Europe up to that time. Of the 600 deputies elected by the third estate, half were middle-class lawyers, one-eighth were merchants

and businessmen, one-eighth were administrative officials, one-sixth were farmers or landed proprietors, and the remainder were professional men (doctors, army officers, clergymen) and men of unspecified callings.

Property was over-represented, as were the urban trades and professions, but there were no party groupings. Each constituency had chosen its deputy either because of his personal reputation or because of his adherence to popularly approved principles. What these principles were can readily be deduced from the *cahiers*. With striking unanimity and usually in conjunction with a request for royal attention to a list of specific local complaints, these demanded a constitution that would insure representative government, personal liberties, equality before the law, security for property, and equality of public burdens.

Confronted with these unequivocal demands the king and his ministers were without a plan of action, a state of affairs that was never remedied. Though the third estate had been given as many representatives as the other two orders combined, with the apparent intent of equalizing the privileged and unprivileged classes, it was now belatedly announced that each order as a whole would cast one vote and that all questions would be decided by the vote of two orders out of three. This meant that the third estate, representing more than nine-tenths of the electorate, would be sure to find itself permanently in the minority on all important issues. Its members thereupon (June 17) resolved to transact no business as a separate estate but to remain passively in session until they had been joined by the other two orders in a National Assembly, in which a simple majority of individual deputies would carry all decisions.

When the king, on the advice of the reactionary court party, persisted in his refusal to alter the voting procedure, and when his officials, with almost incredible stupidity, committed the blunder of locking the third estate out of its meeting place, the unanimity of the commoners and thereby their success in the first stage of the Revolution was assured. Finding themselves excluded on the morning of June 20 from the Hall of the Lesser Pleasures, they immediately adjourned to a near-by indoor tennis court and there swore a solemn oath not to disband until they had given France a constitution.

Within the next week more than half of the clergy (led by the impoverished parish priests) and a considerable number of nobles seceded from the assemblies of their own estates and joined the third. The King was left with no alternative to the recognition of this accomplished fact, and on June 27, exactly one week after the Tennis-Court Oath, he formally ordered the three orders to sit and vote together, "by head," in a single National Assembly.

He had not, however, rejected, but had merely postponed, another plan of

action urged upon him by his advisers—the use of loyal troops to intimidate, coerce, or, as a last resort, to disperse the Assembly. Aware of this threat, the Assembly proclaimed the immunity of its members from arrest and set in motion the organization of a National Guard (to consist of armed members of the Parisian middle class under the command of Lafayette) for its own protection. On July 14, the citizens of the capital, alarmed by the approach of royalist regiments summoned from the frontiers to camps in the vicinity of Paris and Versailles, broke into the royal arsenals to obtain arms and gunpowder and, joined by artillerymen from the disaffected French Guards regiment, stormed and captured the Bastille, a fortress, arsenal, and prison, as well as a hated symbol of tyranny. The Assembly was now secure against the king's threat of military intervention, and he recognized the new situation by consenting to disperse the menacing regiments.

"Abolition of the Feudal System." Having effected its seizure of supreme political authority, the National Assembly proceeded to its task of remodeling the institutional structure of French society. Its labors in this enterprise occupied the following two years. During that time it functioned simultaneously in two capacities—as a "constituent assembly" laying down fundamental constitutional enactments and as a national legislature extemporizing solutions to a multitude of pressing day-to-day problems. Its most important acts were eventually drawn together into the first of the Revolutionary constitutions, that of the year 1791. The ink was hardly dry on this document when it was rendered obsolete by the failure of the experiment in limited monarchy for which it provided, but in its other provisions it registered an achievement which is almost without a parallel in the history of social progress and which was destined to be of permanent and central significance for France and for the modern world.

While the ashes of the Bastille were still warm, the Assembly turned its attention to drafting a preamble to the new constitution. These debates were interrupted early in August, when peasant uprisings throughout France ("the Great Fear") compelled attention to popular clamor for the abolition of feudalism, but the delay was a brief one and on August 27 the Assembly approved the final text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.

This great charter of personal liberties, embodying as it did the whole eighteenth-century philosophy of inalienable natural rights, and enshrining the ideal of limited sovereignty, stands as one of two antithetical principles in the Revolution. More and more sharply opposed to this philosophy, as time went on, was the idea of absolute popular sovereignty proclaimed by Rous-

seau. As one national emergency after another turned the course of the Revolution steadily farther to the left, the latter principle assumed greater and greater prominence, posing what was in one sense the central problem of the Revolution and of all subsequent experiments in social organization—the problem of finding, under changing conditions, the most satisfactory compromise between the demands of the individual and those of the community.

Practical application of the individualist principle was made at once. In the midst of its debates on the Declaration of Rights the Assembly decreed "the abolition of the feudal system" in an effort to calm the turmoil in the countryside. This decree ended the session of the night of August 4-5 when, moved by reports of the burning of châteaux and in a near-frenzy of generous patriotic emotion, one orator after another from the privileged classes had mounted the tribune to renounce the feudal rights held by nobles and clergy. Less generous sentiments prevailed when it came to the question of *how* these rights were to be abolished—whether with or without compensation—and on August 11, when the enthusiasm of the deputies had been somewhat cooled by reflections about the sacredness of property and by the news that calm had been largely restored in the villages, they decided that only serfdom (*mainmorte*) and the personal services owed by the villain to his lord were to be summarily ended, together with all hunting rights, tax exemptions, corporate privileges, and seigneurial rights of justice. Other dues, fees, tithes, and contributions would continue to be collected until they had been "redeemed" by the payment of twenty to twenty-five years' obligation in a lump sum. It was not until the second, democratic phase of the Revolution that the last of the property obligations surviving from feudalism were unconditionally ended (July, 1793), but in the meantime most of them had virtually disappeared simply because the peasants understood the decree of August 5 to mean what it said and ignored the afterthoughts of the Assembly.

As one recent historian of the Revolution (J. M. Thompson) has written of the resolutions of August 4-5, "The original intention of the speakers may have been to save something from the wreck that private property was suffering all over the country; the effect was to turn French society upside down." For besides dealing, ambiguously and inadequately, with feudal rents and property rights, a number of extremely significant measures of social reform were included. Civil offices and military posts were thrown open to all citizens; the extent to which the individual might rise in the world would henceforth be limited only by his ability. Justice would henceforth be obtainable without cost, in that magistrates were forbidden to exact fees and perquisites from litigants, as had formerly been their practice, and the sale of judgeships was

discontinued. Provinces and municipalities surrendered their local privileges and France became one uniform area for administrative and customs purposes. The guilds (soon to be abolished altogether by the Le Chapelier law of 1791) were deprived of their monopolistic control of occupational affairs. The abolition of feudalism "gave birth to the equal citizenship which became the strength of modern France."

The Veto and the Vote. After many fervent tributes had been paid to Montesquieu's principle of the separation of powers the Assembly next turned its attention to the problem of providing for new, permanent machinery of government. Popular feeling was on the whole opposed to giving the crown any power to restrain the elected members of the future national legislature, while the large royalist group in the Assembly favored an absolute veto for the king. A compromise was finally adopted on September 11 whereby the king received a "suspensive veto"—that is, the power to overrule two consecutive legislative assemblies; but if a third session should enact the same law, it was to enter into force without the approval of the executive.

As for the future Legislative Assembly, it was arranged that it would be elected for one year at a time and that its powers to alter the constitution would be extremely limited. Despite the promise of the Declaration of Rights that all citizens were to enjoy equal rights, in providing for the exercise of the franchise the constitution-makers drew a distinction between "active" and "passive" citizens. The latter (the two million whose property holdings were insufficient to render them liable to pay annual taxes equivalent to three days' wages of a common laborer) were denied the privilege of voting for public officials, though they still retained all the other rights of citizenship. One-third of the adult male population was thus disfranchised. The privilege of being elected to public office was still more narrowly restricted—only 50,000 persons in all France paid enough property taxes (ten days' wages) to qualify them for election to secondary regional assemblies which, in turn, chose the deputies to sit in the national parliament. To be eligible for election to the Legislative Assembly itself one must pay direct taxes equivalent to fifty days' wages. This last provision was so bitterly criticized that it had to be omitted from the final version of the constitution.

Beginnings of Conflict within the Third Estate. Thus far, as these voting arrangements clearly indicate, the Revolution had been largely limited to satisfying the demands of the upper-middle class, and so the latter intended it to remain. The legal equality and the as yet purely negative freedom of opportunity established in the summer of 1789 would redound primarily to the interest of the business and professional men so heavily represented in the

National Assembly and to the interests of capitalistic property owners at large. There were as yet no tangible benefits which the lower-middle classes (the artisans and shopkeepers of the cities and the small peasant landholders of the provinces) could claim as their reward for having contributed the popular energies that had swept away the old order. Least of all could the wage-earning population that crowded the slums of Paris and the other large cities point to any improvement in its situation. On the contrary, at least in material aspects, the Revolution had, even if only temporarily, created disorder and uncertainty that led to widespread unemployment, prevented the movement of food from the country to urban market places, and drove the cost of living higher with every passing week. The lower-middle classes were similarly affected, though with less severity, by the deepening economic crisis. The National Assembly, however, was committed to laissez-faire policies in economics as well as to liberal individualism in politics, and took only the most half-hearted measures to cope with this growing distress.

In the fall of 1789 it was still too early to expect an independently organized, self-conscious political movement to arise out of the discontent of the submerged masses. These "stepchildren of the bourgeois revolution" lacked virtually all the necessary prerequisites for creating an effective party of their own—they were, almost to a man, without education, experience in public affairs, leadership, money, or arms. In the years 1789–92 the propertied classes enjoyed a virtual monopoly of all these assets, and even at the high-water mark of democratic power—the Jacobin commonwealth of 1794—the *sans-culottes* were to make barely a beginning in the business of asserting their claim to a share of the fruits of the Revolution. Led even then, and as frequently misled or betrayed, by radical members of the educated lower-middle class, the *Enragés* (or *Bras Nus*, as they were also called) were easily disarmed and suppressed by Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety. Keeping these facts in mind, it is, nevertheless, against the background of increasing economic discontent among the "passive citizens" that the disintegration of the experiment in constitutional monarchy must be studied.

The king had shown great reluctance about accepting the suspensive veto, and he had been suspiciously tardy in promulgating the other constitutional measures of the summer of 1789. It began to be more and more widely believed that he was preparing a new military coup against the Revolution. This belief became universal in October when the Flanders regiment, officered by fervently royalist nobles, arrived and encamped at Versailles. Though it is not known who, if anyone, was responsible for organizing the reply of the city of Paris to this situation, the so-called "March of the Women to Versailles"

was the beginning of a train of events that inexorably carried France toward a republic, though virtually no one desired, and very few even contemplated this result at the outset.

This twelve-mile pilgrimage in the rain on October 5, 1789, was ostensibly a peaceful deputation of several hundred shabbily dressed Parisian housewives that had set out with the idea of begging the king to do something about the shortage of bread. (There is good evidence that many of the marchers were, in fact, men.) Lafayette and the National Guard followed to prevent violence, but did little to check the activities of a few extremists present in the crowd. During the night the queen's bedchamber was invaded by would-be assassins, though she and the royal children escaped in time to avoid injury, and order was at once restored. The whole tragi-comic episode ended next day when the king and his family were brought back to Paris as hostages by the crowd. For the next three years they were lodged as prisoners in all but name in the old royal palace of the Tuileries.

The fiction of an independent executive power was, however, maintained by middle-class politicians for nearly two years more out of fear of the increasingly republican populace, although in June, 1791, the king was temporarily "suspended" from his constitutional functions following an unsuccessful attempt of the royal family to escape beyond the frontier to the waiting Austrian armies. Louis had planned to lead these foreign troops and a sizable contingent of emigrant nobles back to Paris against his rebellious subjects. Recognized at Varennes, within a few miles of their goal, the king and queen were seized and brought back to Paris. Even after this "Flight to Varennes," which ruined the king's popular prestige beyond repair, the monarchy was retained by the Assembly as a bulwark against popular pressure until a second insurrection of the Parisian workers (August 10, 1792), provoked by the king's treasonable relations with the monarchical coalition whose armies were invading France, forced a reluctant decree of the newly elected National Convention abolishing royalty (September 21, 1792).

The "Civil Constitution of the Clergy." More than from any other single cause, the failure of the experiment in constitutional monarchy under upper-middle-class auspices stemmed directly from the decision taken on November 2, 1789, by the National Assembly to appropriate the princely landholdings of the clergy and monastic orders. The value of these lands was roughly equal to the national debt, and, since Frenchmen after the fall of the Bastille seemed to consider that liberty meant the end of all taxes, there appeared to be no other method of avoiding bankruptcy—the very danger that the

Estates-General had been summoned to cope with. It was provided that the clergy were to become salaried employees of the state and were actually to enjoy higher incomes, especially in the lower ranks, than they had received under the old regime.

The confiscated lands were to be sold to individual purchasers, but, since this would be a lengthy process, the government proceeded to issue warrants (*assignats*) which the holder might then use to purchase land. The *assignats* were to have been automatically retired from circulation as the "national lands" were sold, and at first the scheme was cautiously administered. But the printing presses were more and more relied upon to finance governmental expenditures, especially after the outbreak of war in 1792, and the *assignats* rapidly depreciated, falling to less than two percent of their face value by 1795.

Between 1789 and 1793 the national lands were sold only in large parcels and presumably passed, therefore, principally into the hands of the more well-to-do peasants, wealthy townsmen, and bourgeois speculators, but as the Revolution became more democratic it was made easier for the poorer peasants to satisfy their age-old craving for a little land of their own. In the long run the breaking up of the estates of the Church was perhaps the most significant single reform brought about by the Revolution, for it created, in the form of a large new class of purchasers of Church property, a powerful bulwark against the return of the old regime in the countryside.

In its immediate effects, however, the "civil constitution of the clergy" was profoundly disruptive of the apparent stability achieved as a result of the triumph of the upper-middle class. It alienated half of the clergy (those who refused to take an oath of loyalty to the new constitution and were consequently removed from their parishes) and precipitated rebellion among the peasantry in backward sections of the country like the Vendée where reactionary and clerical influence was still strong. It convinced Louis that he could no longer accept his role of constitutional monarch without doing violence to his religious conscience and forced him into a futile and disastrous attempt to find refuge and military support against the Revolution abroad. It greatly accelerated, too, the process of inflation that sent the cost of living sharply upward and made the urban workmen progressively more discontented and ready for new violent attempts to extend the Revolution leftward from the political and legal realm into that of economic and social reform.

Disintegration of the Constitutional Monarchy. In the Legislative Assembly provided for by the constitution of 1791, and which ruled France from

September, 1791, until September, 1792, there appeared an increasingly sharp division among the deputies. Men of similar political views formed the habit of sitting together in the Assembly, the conservatives on the president's right and the radicals on his left. Moderates tended to sit near the center of the hall on the lowest levels of banked seats because they wanted to switch back and forth on frequent occasions between the left and the right, and it was more convenient to change one's seat if one remained near the front row. These moderates came to be referred to, usually contemptuously, by extremists as "the Marsh" or "the Plain," while the radicals on the left, who occupied the highest rows of seats at the back of the hall, came to be known as "the Mountain" (*Montagnards*). The right, in general, sought to "freeze" the Revolution and to preserve the constitution of 1791 unchanged, while the left, more sensitive to the desires of the lower classes, embraced a whole range of more democratic aspirations.

During 1792 the most vocal and influential leaders of the left were the Girondins, whose ascendancy lasted until their overthrow by the more radical Jacobins in June, 1793. Led by Brissot, Vergniaud, and Madame Roland, the Girondins were a group of highly idealistic though rather doctrinaire intellectuals of moderate republican views who greatly admired the American federal Constitution. They derived their name and, in part, their principles, from the fact that their original nucleus had been the deputies from Bordeaux, the chief city of the Gironde *département*, a center of commerce and shipping where the upper-middle class had become extremely prosperous and liberal during the eighteenth century.

The Girondins drew most of their support from the towns and cities of the provinces. Property-conscious to a high degree and devoted to the laissez-faire tenets of economic liberalism, they resisted the city workers' demands for state intervention to control the rising cost of living and to restrain profiteers, speculators, and hoarders. They consequently came to be extremely unpopular with the lower classes, especially in Paris, where the wage-earning population was most numerous, most effectively organized, and most severely affected by the economic crisis. The Girondins, seeking to reduce the power exercised by the Parisian lower classes by increasing the relative influence of the provinces, embraced the theory of federalism; they pinned their hopes to the ideal of an aristocratic republic embodying the individualistic doctrine of natural rights as well as the principle of separation of powers.

As popular discontent mounted under the twin stimuli of inflation and war, the political leadership of the Girondins in the French Revolution gave

way to that of the Jacobins, so-called because the group had originally met in a monastery formerly belonging to that order. The latter were more representative of the sentiments and aspirations of the lower-middle classes, and, to a degree, they were sympathetic with the plight of the urban wage earners. The triumph of the Jacobins in the spring of 1793 was in no small measure owing to their having previously organized a network of affiliated societies and political clubs throughout France which gave the mother "Society of Friends of the Constitution" in Paris an unrivaled "machine" for influencing opinion and mobilizing support for its program. Their most eminent leaders were, at first, Danton and, later, Robespierre. They favored unrestricted universal suffrage and insisted upon the need for national unity and vigorous centralized leadership to preserve and extend the democratic gains of the Revolution against the growing menace of reaction within France and against the threat of invasion by the hostile monarchical coalition with which France was at war after April, 1792.

The Insurrection of August 10, 1792. The fate of the constitutional settlement of 1791 was sealed, ironically enough, by the Girondins themselves. Because they hoped that war would strengthen their own position (which had grown steadily weaker, especially in Paris) by embarrassing the king, they recklessly plunged France into a conflict against the combined might of Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain for which the nation was woefully unprepared (April, 1792).

As the Girondins had anticipated, the war soon brought about the overturn of Louis XVI's throne and turned France into a republic, for the king and queen could not refrain from treasonable correspondence with the enemy. The final disaster to the royal cause came when, on July 25, 1792, the duke of Brunswick, commander of the invading Prussian forces, issued a manifesto inspired by emigrant aristocrats in which he declared that all Frenchmen who refused to lay down their arms would be treated as rebels. He further promised that if any harm came to the royal family the capital city would be totally destroyed.

When the news of this threat reached Paris, there seemed only one possible conclusion to be drawn—the king was a traitor. Determined to depose him, the radical leaders of the working-class districts (*sections*) of Paris organized an insurrectionary committee. Under Danton's leadership this committee (later to be known as the Revolutionary Commune) of extreme Jacobins occupied the Town Hall from whence, on August 10, 1792, it directed the infuriated populace in a savage attack upon the Tuileries. Warned in time, the royal family escaped and took refuge in the hall of the Legislative Assembly.

The Swiss Guard, left to defend an empty palace, was massacred to the last man.

The Legislative Assembly, reluctantly obeying the dictates of the Revolutionary Commune, suspended the king from his constitutional functions and placed the royal family under protective arrest. It then issued a summons for the election of a new National Convention to decide upon the future of France now that its experiment in limited monarchy had become obsolete.

THE SECOND REVOLUTION, 1792-94

The two years following the attack on the Tuileries witnessed the unfolding of a series of dramatic events that constituted, in their total effect, a second and in many ways a more profound revolution in the domestic affairs of France than the one completed in 1791. With the Parisian lower classes forcing the pace, the National Convention abolished the institution of monarchy, canceled all titles of nobility, distributed the national lands on easy terms of purchase to the poorer peasantry, instituted a systematic campaign to break the grip of traditional religion on men's minds, proclaimed the right of all citizens to education at public expense, and gave decisive impetus to militant popular nationalism.

The new assembly, elected like the National Assembly by virtually universal manhood suffrage, met on September 21, 1792, to begin its appointed task of giving France a new republican constitution. (The revolutionary calendar, established a year later, accordingly began its "Year I" from that date.) In the interval between August 10 and the meeting of the Convention, Danton and the Revolutionary Commune were the only effective government, and the crisis which they endeavored to surmount was a formidable one.

Brunswick's invading armies met with little effective opposition, and until the third week of September, when they were checked at Valmy, continued their methodical advance on Paris. Owing to the emigration of many aristocratic families the French armies had lost large numbers of their best-trained officers. Of those who remained, nearly all were either apathetic or disaffected. Morale was at a low ebb. The services of supply were in a chaotic state. No one offered a plan of defense; the French retreated even more swiftly than the Prussians advanced.

In this dark hour there occurred a rallying of national energies such as the modern world had never seen. Inspired by Danton's cry—"Audacity, more audacity, and still more audacity!"—Frenchmen threw themselves into the task of mobilizing and arming a citizen army which, under the leadership of vigorous, young, talented, and ambitious generals like Hoche, Pichegru,

Moreau, and Jourdan, depended on numbers, revolutionary enthusiasm, and rapid movement to win smashing victories for the next twenty years over the caste-ridden, parade-ground armies of monarchical Europe.

Fortunately for France the squabbles of the hostile coalition about the distribution of spoils following their partition of Poland provided a breathing space during which Lazare Carnot, a middle-class career officer of the old army who sat in the Convention as a moderate republican, could mold the ragged recruits of '92 and '93 into the redoubtable fighting force that carried the banners of the Republic—inscribed with "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"—to foreign soil in the following year and to the farthest corners of Europe during the next generation.

Internally France became an armed camp. One after another the "sacred," "inalienable," "natural," or "imprescriptible" rights of the individual were set aside in favor of emergency governmental control over the citizen's actions, beliefs, property, and even over his life. In their total mobilization of the nation's resources for defense the French Jacobins established precedents which even the most democratic nations have since imitated under the stress of similar danger. No doubt there occurred many acts of government which, by reason of their injustice or inhumanity, cannot possibly be sanctioned; it must be remembered, however, that the Jacobin leaders of the Republic were not bloodthirsty, self-seeking monsters and that the enemies of the Revolution were frequently even less scrupulous in their conduct of the struggle.

Revolutionary Government. The National Convention had been elected by universal suffrage, though only a million voters, of the five million eligible, actually went to the polls. Not one of the 750 deputies returned had stood for election as a royalist. There is little reason to doubt that the Assembly, in this respect as in most others, truly represented the whole nation except for the irreconcilable royalists, who abstained—although most of the satisfied peasantry did not take the trouble to vote.

Nearly half the deputies were connected in some way with the legal profession; another large fraction consisted of business and professional men; only two members described themselves as *ouvriers*, but perhaps as many as half a dozen more were manual workers by occupation. Of the three popular assemblies elected since 1789 the National Convention contained the fewest landowners and cultivators and the fewest representatives of the upper-middle class. The great bulk of its members were of the lower-middle class—Robespierre, the provincial lawyer, was, in his social origin, typical of the majority.

The Convention, like the National Assembly of 1789-92, had the task of remodeling the constitution. In addition, now that France had ceased to be a monarchy, it was obliged to function as the legislative power, as the executive, and as the supreme judiciary. The separation of powers had disappeared. Committees of the Convention now took over supervision of the various executive departments (the ministries of war, interior, foreign affairs, and so on). More and more the direction of all national affairs fell into the hands of two special Committees, that of Public Safety (or, as its French title, *comité de salut public*, is more accurately rendered, "the committee for saving the nation") and the Committee for General Security (concerned with police affairs).

Triumph of the Jacobins. During the first months of the Convention, until the spring of 1793, the ministries remained in the hands of the Girondin party by virtue of its ability to retain the support of a majority of the "Marsh" in the Convention. As their policies and their political clumsiness made them more and more unpopular with the Parisian populace and with the Convention itself, the Girondins were gradually replaced in the ministries and in the committees by Jacobins. The latter had evolved, by this time, their vast network of political clubs; they enjoyed the support of Paris; and, above all, they stood for vigorous, offensive action against the enemies of the Revolution, both domestic and foreign, while the Girondins temporized. Particularly disastrous for the Girondin party was its futile attempt to save the king from the sentence of death pronounced by the majority of the National Convention in December, 1792, and carried out in January, 1793. Fearful of the return of the old regime, the nation came to feel that only the Jacobins could be depended upon to prevent the triumph of reaction. On June 2, 1793, in response to a bloodless insurrection of the Parisian lower classes, the Girondin deputies were expelled from the Convention and placed under house-arrest.

As for the new constitution, the elaborate and moderately democratic document painstakingly drafted by the Girondin philosopher, Condorcet, was hastily revised by a committee of Jacobins in such a way as to remove all checks upon the popular will as expressed in the majority vote of the national legislature. Submitted to a plebiscite in July, this constitution was accepted by a vote of 1,801,918 to 11,610. It never entered into force, however, for the Convention easily persuaded itself in August that the exigencies of foreign war and internal rebellion made its own continuance in office indispensable. On October 10 a decree was approved which sanctioned the emergency government for the duration of the war and indefinitely suspended the operation of the constitution of 1793. This "Constitution of the Year I" was placed

in a little shrine near the speaker's desk in the Convention where it remained an object of veneration but without practical significance.

Religious Conflict. The National Assembly had shown no desire to attack the Church in a religious sense. In attempting to regulate its temporal affairs (for example, by rearranging dioceses to coincide with the eighty-two new *départements*) they were acting wholly within the Gallican tradition. In return for having deprived the clergy of their lands the nation had assumed an obligation to pay their salaries. No outcry against the "civil constitution of the clergy" had been raised at first either among the French clergy or at Rome. On only one point was there cause for apprehension—numbers of priests began to ask themselves whether they could conscientiously take the prescribed oath of allegiance to the constitution. These scruples were strengthened and the number affected by them was increased by the ambiguous attitude of the king. The issue was brought to a head by the intransigence of the pope who in March, 1791, condemned the "civil constitution." Thus the French Church was split into two antagonistic halves—the "constitutional church" presided over by Bishop Talleyrand, whose priests had taken the oath and, in consequence, been excommunicated by the pope; and the "non-juring" priests, whose salaries had been stopped and their pulpits closed to them by the French government. The "non-juring" priests became the chief agents of the counterrevolutionary noble party within France.

As part of its campaign against the internal enemies of the Revolution, the National Convention in 1793 and 1794 endeavored to suppress the treasonable activities of the refractory clergy, while continuing to reaffirm the principle of liberty of worship for all sects. At the same time a "de-Christianization movement" was promoted independently of the Convention by leaders of the Revolutionary Commune of Paris and by certain deputies acting in their capacity as special agents of the government in the provinces. These anti-clerical leaders, many of whom were atheists by conviction, made strenuous efforts to destroy a cult that they identified with superstition and that was in fact becoming more and more closely identified with counterrevolution. Their activities included closing of churches, prohibiting of religious emblems and clerical dress in public, confiscation of church vessels and ornaments for the use of the mint, mutilation of images, and burning of relics. Many sections of Paris transformed their churches into Temples of Reason where the Rights of Man were preached and patriotic hymns were sung.

The Convention and the Committee of Public Safety had little sympathy with this anti-Christian agitation. A theist by conviction, Robespierre sought to maintain toleration and separation of the church from the state. He be-

lieved that the promoters of the new Cult of Reason were alienating the Catholic lower classes in both town and country and feared the effect of their anti-Catholic proceedings on foreign opinion. A decree of December 6, 1793, therefore reaffirmed liberty of worship, and the leading atheist agitators were arrested and sent to the guillotine on April 13, 1794.

In the meantime, however, France had been split irretrievably into two camps; great bitterness had been generated on both sides; and the alignment of clericals against anticlericals, which was to bulk so large in subsequent French politics, had been solidified. The way was prepared for the moderate Catholic reaction of 1801 and for the more extreme resurgence of clericalism after 1815. An incidental though by no means unimportant product of the Revolutionary religious quarrel was to place popular education in the hands of the state, for the church lost both the wealth and the personnel to continue its traditional monopoly of education. The new public schools founded by the Revolution and extended by Napoleon greatly furthered the spread and intensification of nationalistic feelings in all classes of the population.

The "Reign of Terror." Under the increasingly absolute control of the two special committees, with Robespierre at the head of the Committee of Public Safety after July, 1793, the Convention became little more than a place where speeches were delivered and decrees ratified. Effective power was exercised by Robespierre and his followers in the Committee of Public Safety. Opposition, whenever it raised its head, was speedily detected by an intricate system of secret police aided by private informers. Punishment was meted out swiftly, though with reasonable fairness until the late spring of 1794, by a Revolutionary Tribunal. The condemned were accorded "equality" under the efficient knife of the guillotine—decapitation (instead of hanging) had formerly been a privilege enjoyed only by nobles.

The total number of victims of this "Reign of Terror" was not so large as is commonly believed; the number of condemnations probably did not exceed 20,000 for all France. At its height in the months between April and July only 1,500 persons were executed in Paris, while a slightly larger number were acquitted by the Revolutionary Tribunal in the same period. The real purpose of the Terror was not extermination of the royalists, clericals, Girondins, and other opponents of the Jacobin government—such a program would have seriously reduced the population—rather, it was hoped that these elements could be intimidated, frightened into inactivity, and thus neutralized during the months of crisis. This aim was in fact achieved. Since the alternative was probably a much more bloody civil war and perhaps even loss of national independence as well, the Terror should perhaps not be condemned

out of hand as a means of defending the Revolution. It was prolonged, however, after the crisis had passed. When it had become merely the means of keeping Robespierre and his friends in power, when it began to strike at the middle and lower classes and at the Jacobins in the Convention itself, the fall of Robespierre was rendered inevitable. This event occurred on 9 Thermidor of the Year II (July 27, 1794), when he and his supporters were proscribed by overwhelming vote of the Convention. He died on the guillotine next day.

At every crucial stage of the Revolution from the storming of the Bastille to the overthrow of the monarchy the leadership had come from the middle classes, while the actual fighting had been done by the poor. As leadership fell more and more into the hands of men of the lower-middle classes an increasing sympathy for the plight of the urban wage earner and landless peasant became apparent in the policies adopted to deal with economic problems. At no time, however, and not even under the radical Jacobins of 1793–94, did those in power contemplate seriously any far-reaching redistribution of wealth or any interference in principle with the rights of private property. At most they were prepared to make certain temporary concessions like the Law of the Maximum, under which an ineffectual attempt was half-heartedly made to prevent the further rise of prices. As a political gesture, too, Robespierre supported the so-called Laws of Ventôse, under which the property of suspected traitors was to have been distributed to needy patriots.

Apart from these rather dubious claims to working-class support, Robespierre figured in the main as a friend of property and of bourgeois order. He invoked the Le Chapelier law prohibiting all private combinations of citizens for economic purposes (it had been adopted with the object of suppressing the guilds in 1791) against the beginnings of trade unionism and used force to break strikes of carpenters and of bakery employees in the spring of 1794. One of the workers' few capable and honest leaders, Jacques Roux, was among the first victims of the Terror. When his place had been taken by corrupt opportunists whose chief stock-in-trade was their scurrilous anti-Christian demagogery, Robespierre found it easy to suppress the whole working-class movement under the pretext of purging this "Hébertist" faction.

Small wonder, then, that the workers of Paris scarcely lifted a hand to save Robespierre when his own supporters in the middle-class Convention turned against him. Sporadic, ill-organized, and for the most part unenthusiastic attempts were made to rescue him on the night of 9 Thermidor when he lay wounded and a prisoner in the Hôtel de Ville. But the people as a whole were apathetic, and it may fairly be said that it was their apathy, rather than

the hostility of the Convention, that sent Robespierre and his friends to the scaffold. For Paris had decided the fate of France on numerous previous occasions and had more than once forced assemblies to bow to the popular will. But on this occasion the popular will had been paralyzed and the people themselves demoralized. It no longer seemed worth their while to shed blood on behalf of one faction of middle-class politicians as against the others.

Few figures in modern European history have been the subject of more controversy than Maximilien Robespierre, passionate disciple of Rousseau and virtual dictator of France in 1793-94. To some he has seemed a mediocre, egocentric pedant blinded by fanatical belief in his own virtue and crazed with power; while his admirers have sought to portray him as a humane, selfless patriot determined to establish social justice for the disinherited classes who had gained little from the first, bourgeois phase of the Revolution. Each of these characterizations is, in all likelihood, too extreme; though each contains elements of truth.

Under his leadership France achieved a higher degree of economic and social equality than any nation had known up to that time. It was also his merit that he guided the national destinies safely through a year of extremely critical dangers both external and domestic. During that year the reactionary revolt in the Vendée was quelled and an even more menacing "federalist" insurrection led by disgruntled members of the proscribed Girondin faction was brought under control. Against the foreign enemy the new republican armies rallied after a grave setback occasioned by the desertion of the Girondin general Dumouriez to the enemy; they won their first victories in 1793, and by 1794 French troops were triumphantly advancing on foreign soil.

In mitigation of his claim to rank as a far-sighted statesman it may not unfairly be said that he yielded only in small measure and with great reluctance to popular demands for economic security, that he alienated men of property while failing to win the submerged masses to the support of his "republic of virtue," and that in the end he provoked, by his ineptitude and increasing reliance on terror, a conservative reaction that led to the undoing of much of the Revolution's constructive work after 1794.

The Revolution had reached its extreme point. During the ascendancy of Robespierre, a high-water mark of political and social democracy had been attained. Upon the withdrawal of the workers of Paris from the revolutionary struggle, the tide began to ebb swiftly. The next five years witnessed an unrelenting swing back toward the right, until Napoleon came to stabilize the

Revolution approximately at the stage it had previously reached in 1791. A "white terror" followed the fall of Robespierre, and during the years of "Thermidorean Reaction" those radical Jacobins who had gone into hiding to escape the guillotine in July, 1794, were mercilessly hunted down and exterminated, unless they were able to flee the country. The upper-middle classes resumed their interrupted control of the government. In this sense, the Revolution had found its natural level—it had brought about no more and no less than the philosophers of the Enlightenment had prepared the educated middle classes of France to accept.

THE QUEST FOR STABILITY, 1795-1815

Now that the Jacobin dictatorship had been overthrown, the ardent hope and confident expectation of most Frenchmen was that life would speedily become less turbulent, less strenuous, and less austere. The end of the Terror was greeted with universal joy. Political prisoners and suspects were freed, civil liberties were restored in large measure, the proscribed Girondins resumed their seats in the Convention, and the two special committees were shorn of their arbitrary powers. The watchwords of those in authority now became "order," "moderation," and "peace." The Place de la Révolution, where formerly the guillotine had stood, was renamed Place de la Concorde.

The well-to-do classes settled down to enjoy the fruits of their victory. Property qualifications were reestablished for voters, the Jacobin clubs were closed, price controls and other emergency restraints on profiteering were eliminated. Bands of foppishly dressed sons of the newly rich—the so-called "gilded youths" (*jeunesse dorée*)—strutted about the streets of Paris jeering at the poverty-stricken and taking great delight in manhandling any stray beggar suspected of Jacobinism.

Leadership passed into the hands of opportunistic politicians whose sole aim was to perpetuate themselves in power. Between 1795 and 1799, France was ruled by a five-man committee called the Directory, the members of which were with few exceptions corrupt, cynical, and incompetent. The triumph of either of the extreme parties—Jacobins on the left or royalists on the right—would be equally fraught with peril for these men, all of whom had voted both for the death of Louis XVI and for that of Robespierre. Since both of the extreme parties tended to grow stronger with the passing of time, the difficulty of steering a middle course became ever more acute.

Before long the directors began to intrigue against one another and to compete for the support of the army upon which their increasingly unpopular government was becoming steadily more dependent. The stage was being set

for the appearance of a "strong man," and the more ambitious directors began to search for a victorious general without close political affiliations either to the right or left to fill this role. Bonaparte was chosen only after the first candidate had been killed and a second had declined the honor. Ironically, the self-seeking politicians and men of wealth who placed General Bonaparte in power labored under the delusion that he would be their puppet afterward—the same miscalculation made by the groups instrumental in Adolf Hitler's strikingly similar rise to power more than a century later.

But if Bonaparte declined to gratify in full the personal ambitions of his sponsors and co-conspirators, at least he paid them the compliment of modeling his regime closely after their ideas. For he carried on the general policies of the Directory virtually without interruption save in one respect—his rule was more efficient. The years from 1795 to 1815 thus exhibit an underlying continuity that the surface changes from Directory to Consulate (1799) and from Consulate to Empire (1804) did little to disturb. This continuity arose from the continuing preponderance of the upper-middle classes in national affairs and from their continuing need for guaranties against the two things they most feared—a resurgence of extreme democracy on one hand and a restoration of the old regime on the other.

This "stability," which the Directory vainly sought and which Bonaparte more successfully provided, was of necessity a highly unstable system in the long run, for it could be maintained only at the cost of sacrificing the most vital interests of the majority of Frenchmen. Year by year the political and economic gains of the Revolution were canceled out by the steady hardening of all national institutions into a stultifying militaristic mold. Reckless pursuit of imperialistic objectives abroad drained away the wealth of France and ended in disaster when movements of national liberation provoked by French domination and exploitation of the conquered European peoples finally combined to bring about the downfall of the whole Napoleonic system.

The Directory, 1795-1799. By 1795 the National Convention had already prolonged its own life considerably beyond the period originally provided for, inasmuch as it had been called together to make a new constitution, and that task had been completed in 1793. But instead of dissolving itself the Convention had postponed the entry into force of the new constitution—and hence the date for electing a new legislative assembly under its terms—"until the end of the war." The war did not end with the fall of Robespierre, but the dazzling French victories of 1794 had made peace an imminent possibility, and the prospect of allowing the extremely democratic "Constitution of the Year I" to become valid as the supreme law of the land was not an attractive one

for the men who had just sent its Jacobin authors to the guillotine. Yet the turn to the right must not be too abrupt, for the *sans-culottes* might still make trouble if democratic ideals were too openly flouted.

The "Constitution of the Year III" (1795) was the product of these considerations. It rested nominally upon popular sovereignty, yet contrived to place many subtle obstacles in the way of a too-hasty expression of the popular will. Elections were to be indirect, as in the constitution of 1791, and only propertied citizens might vote or hold public office. The legislative branch consisted of two chambers—a Council of Ancients with 250 members, and a Council of Five Hundred. The latter might propose laws but not vote upon them; the Council of Ancients might debate only those laws proposed by the lower house and must accept or reject them without change. Lest the five Directors learn to work together too effectively, one of their number was to be replaced each year. Directors were elected by the legislative assemblies, and, since the latter feared a strong executive, the best recommendation for the office was to be known as a man of mediocre ability and flexible principles. Carnot was the only outstanding member of the original Directory, and he was forced out of office in 1797.

This constitution was accepted with sullen resentment on all sides. Especial hostility greeted the decree of the expiring National Convention that two-thirds of its members must be elected to the new assemblies whether the voters wanted them or not—in fact, they might take their seats even if repudiated at the polls. A royalist mob demonstrated in protest outside the Convention on October 5, 1795, but this "insurrection of the 13 Vendémiaire" was easily crushed by the army. A "whiff of grapeshot" fired into the crowd on this occasion by a young Corsican artillery officer named Bonaparte was remembered with gratitude by the frightened Directors.

Economic conditions continued to deteriorate. The national economy was still subjected to the strain of maintaining more than a million men under arms. Industry, except the branches engaged in making munitions and materials of war, languished. British sea-power was achieving greater success in its aim of cutting France off from access to overseas markets and raw materials. *Assignats* continued to pour off the printing presses—by 1796 about forty billion francs had been issued and their purchasing power had all but vanished. When the Directory finally repudiated them the following year, it took 300 francs in paper money to purchase a silver franc piece. Paris was severely affected by the economic crisis, and thousands of its unemployed had to be fed at national expense lest new revolts should break out.

In this atmosphere compounded of political reaction and economic stagna-

tion, the lower classes for the most part sank back into hopeless apathy; only a handful still retained the courage to go on fighting against overwhelming odds. In 1796 a small band of these die-hards joined together in a communistic conspiracy led by "Gracchus" Babeuf. The movement made considerable headway and even affected part of the army before its leaders were betrayed by a police spy and executed in 1797 on the eve of their projected uprising. Derived from the teachings of Rousseau and his more radical disciples Mably and Morelly, Babeuf's program demanded full political democracy, a concept which was to be given economic meaning by abolishing poverty. Hence Babeuf had advocated a drastic redistribution of wealth designed to bring about rough equality as well as public ownership of land. After Robespierre's suppression of the Parisian workers, there had remained little possibility of realizing such a program. The Babouvists, however, were celebrated by nineteenth-century socialists as martyrs to the cause of communism and as precursors of a "republic of equals."

Having dealt with their enemies on the left, the directors again found themselves threatened from the monarchist right. Many émigrés and antirepublican priests had slipped back into France after the relaxation of the Terror had made it relatively safe to do so. By playing chiefly upon the religious grievances of the peasantry in many districts, this reborn royalist movement rapidly assumed formidable proportions. When the elections of 1797 returned a substantial number of reactionaries to the legislative assemblies the directors—all of whom had voted for the death of Louis XVI—again called in the army, this time to purge the assemblies of royalists. This lesson was not lost in military circles. It was daily becoming more apparent that the politicians could not rule without the generals. Ambitious generals began to ask themselves why they might not rule without the politicians.

The Imperial Republic. While the Directory floundered ingloriously amidst its difficulties at home, the armies of the Republic were marching from one dazzling victory to another. The recruits of '93 were now skilled veterans, and their revolutionary fervor (in contrast to the general apathy of the civilian population) was still at a high pitch. As these armies overran all opposition and became, in their turn, irresistible invaders of foreign lands, the European coalition formed against France in 1793 rapidly fell to pieces. Prussia, Holland, and Spain made peace in 1795. In 1796 the Army of Italy under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte, the hero of Vendémiaire, brilliantly defeated numerically superior forces and forced the Austrians to sign the treaty of Campo Formio in 1797. Only Great Britain remained at war, and, with its fleet largely immobilized by mutinies against intolerable conditions, Britain was on the

defensive. At no time since the reign of Louis XIV had French ascendancy in Europe been so great.

The directors were torn between two conflicting desires with respect to the areas now under their military control. They could treat them as liberated nations and respect the wishes of the natives as to the kind of government to be established. Or, as in fact it happened, the Directory could yield to the temptation to ward off approaching bankruptcy at home by systematically looting the new "sister republics." Belgium was annexed outright, in defiance of its inhabitants' desire for independence. Holland became the Batavian Republic. In Italy French bayonets maintained a Cisalpine Republic with Milan as its capital and a Ligurian Republic that included the area around Genoa. All these regions, together with the former petty states on the left bank of the Rhine, were compelled to copy French institutions more or less literally and, in addition to feeding large French armies quartered upon them for their "protection," were obliged to pay heavy tribute to indemnify France for having brought them liberty. Bonaparte's first Italian campaign alone brought in eighty million francs. The Directory postponed as long as possible the day when its victorious armies should return to France because it was cheaper to keep them abroad at others' expense and also because the presence of popular generals in Paris might be politically dangerous.

The Man of Destiny. But for a remarkable conjuncture of circumstances, including the fact that the Revolution had thrown open the gates of opportunity to men of ability, Napoleon Bonaparte would most likely have ended his days as a major of artillery (higher ranks were closed to nonnobles before 1789). A second lieutenant when the Estates-General met, his republican sentiments combined with great discretion enabled him to survive subsequent changes of government. In 1794 he was rewarded for having helped to recapture Toulon from the British by being promoted to brigadier general. After Thermidor he was reduced in rank and briefly imprisoned under suspicion of Jacobin sympathies, but his stock began to rise rapidly again after his "whiff of grapeshot" saved the Directory in 1795. His marriage in 1796 to the politically astute Josephine de Beauharnais, widow of a republican general and mistress of the influential Director Barras (even after she became Madame Bonaparte), gave the ambitious young general access to official circles and provided him with a good deal of valuable information and advice.

Upon his return in 1797 from brilliant military and diplomatic conquests in Italy, the Directory found Bonaparte's popularity embarrassing and in order to get rid of him made him supreme commander of the Army of England. Instead of striking across the Channel—a risky venture in view of French

naval inferiority—he persuaded the Directory to authorize his alternative plan of bringing England to her knees. This project involved the conquest of India by a land expedition through Egypt and the Middle East. The first stage went well—a French expeditionary force, having taken Malta en route, landed safely in Egypt and soon subdued the Nile delta. Then, however, communications with France were irreparably destroyed when Nelson's pursuing squadron caught up with and virtually annihilated the French Mediterranean fleet in a hard fought battle at the mouth of the Nile (August 1, 1798). Napoleon's eastward advance was checked in Syria where the French sustained heavy losses in a protracted siege of Acre. Leaving his decimated army to the ravages of the plague and of fanatical Moslem tribesmen, General Bonaparte slipped back across the Mediterranean in October, 1799, with a view to being on hand in the event that the tottering Directory should finally collapse.

As he had expected, Bonaparte found France adrift without leadership in the midst of economic prostration and incipient civil war. Widespread poverty and intensified unemployment had enabled the resurgent Jacobin left to win sweeping victories in the elections of May, 1799. The financial oligarchy was aghast at the decree enacted by the new radical majority providing for a levy on capital in the form of a forced loan to the amount of a hundred million francs. Even worse, the Jacobins were determined to restore the whole system of revolutionary government which they believed indispensable in order to save France from the expected onslaught of a new coalition called into life in 1798 by British subsidies. These developments struck terror into the hearts of the corrupt Directors and their friends, the speculators and profiteers who had prospered so flagrantly since Robespierre's fall.

Fresh military disasters abroad in 1799 threatened to strengthen Jacobinism even further; certain directors were already intriguing to bring about a Jacobin seizure of power, while the conservative wing under Sieyès could see no way out of their dilemma except through a military coup against the assemblies. After approaching two other generals, Joubert and Moreau, the Sieyès faction finally came to terms with General Bonaparte. On November 9, 1799, the latter dispersed the assemblies by a show of military force and made himself master of France. This was the *coup d'état* of 18 Brumaire.

The Consulate. On the morrow of his overthrow of the Directory the thirty-year-old First Consul, as he now chose to call himself, issued a proclamation explaining that his action had been made necessary by the discovery of a hazily described "anarchist plot" to overturn the Republic. This danger having been happily averted, he promised to bring about with all possible dispatch the five things for which all true Frenchmen had long been yearning

and which had so long eluded their grasp. These were: (1) a permanent constitution, (2) a definitive end of the civil conflict that had been raging intermittently since 1793 in the Vendée and other strongly Catholic *départements* of the West, (3) codification of the laws, (4) stabilization of the state's badly disorganized finances, and (5) termination of the foreign war by the speedy conclusion of an honorable peace.

The attainment of several of these objectives required only the completion of efforts already far advanced by the revolutionary assemblies and by the Directory. The latter, for example, had largely restored order in the public finances by the simple expedient of repudiating the worthless *assignats*. Only a few of the reforms of the Consulate were the sole work of Bonaparte—notably, the Concordat of 1801 and the administrative reorganization which revived the pre-Revolutionary intendant under the new title of prefect and gave France a uniform, centralized administration that has endured virtually unchanged to the present day.

Bonaparte reaped the credit for everything, however, for no one scrutinized too carefully the ultimate authorship of his achievements. By this time France was thoroughly weary of political turmoil, of economic chaos, and of ineffective government. Bonaparte seemed to offer stability, efficiency, and peaceful maintenance of French dominance in Europe. He took care to represent himself as a true son of the Revolution, and many a staunch republican came to feel that Napoleon alone could be depended upon to prevent a Bourbon restoration. Moderates accepted him with positive satisfaction, partly because he retained the great bourgeois reforms of the Revolution and wove them permanently into the fabric of his Civil Code, and partly because he made special efforts to adapt his labor legislation, his tax system, his financial policy, and, indeed, his whole Continental System, to the interests of French employers, bankers, and industrialists. Many even among the royalists were attracted by his conciliatory attitude toward religion, and continued persistently to hope that he might some day abdicate in favor of Louis XVIII. Any opposition that still survived was small, disorganized, and closely watched by a marvelously efficient secret police. Rigid censorship permitted him to keep France in total ignorance of defeats such as the naval battle of Trafalgar until 1815.

Besides, the First Consul possessed an unrivaled gift for seeming all things to all men. His personal charm won many an enemy to his side, and, since he completely lacked any inhibiting scruples, he could exploit his phenomenal talent for Machiavellian deception to the utmost. His capacity for painstaking work was boundless, his powers of memory were almost incredible, and his genius for showmanship has seldom if ever been equaled.

These qualities, taken together with his extraordinary talent as a military organizer and tactician, go far to account for the enduring hold he was able to gain over the loyalty and imagination of his countrymen. Even the catastrophic end of his regime in 1815 failed to destroy the luster of his name, for there remained a Napoleonic Myth strong enough to make his nephew, Louis Napoleon, president and then emperor of the French after 1848.

The Constitution, the Concordat, and the Codes. Eight weeks after the events of Brumaire the First Consul presented France with the "permanent constitution" he had promised. Drafted by the Abbé Sieyès, one of the few surviving heroes of 1789—he had written the momentous pamphlet *What Is the Third Estate?* and had ever since been itching to try his hand at constitution-making—the text was judiciously revised by General Bonaparte with a view to increasing his own importance as First Consul. This "Constitution of the Year VIII" provided in principle for universal manhood suffrage but virtually nullified it in practice.

A Senate of 60 members was to be appointed by Sieyès and his friends. This body would then select from "national lists" the 100 members of a Tribune and the 300 members of a Legislative Body. The "national lists" were to be made up by indirect elections in three stages—in actual fact the first lists were drawn up by Bonaparte himself on the pretext that there was no time to wait for the results of the elections. The Legislative Body might debate only those laws submitted to it by the First Consul and his appointed Council of State; it was not allowed to vote upon these laws, however. The Tribune then must accept or reject without discussion the laws sent to it from the Legislative Body. The Senate functioned as a kind of supreme court, passing upon the constitutionality of all legislation. Provision had been made for a Second and a Third Consul, but they were given only minor functions and in practice were completely overshadowed by Bonaparte.

When this constitution was submitted to the nation in a plebiscite, confidence in Bonaparte was so great that it was accepted, despite its undemocratic features, by a vote of 3,011,007 to 1,562. It went into effect immediately and early in January, 1800, the new assemblies convened. At first it was by no means certain that the First Consul would be able to steer his own course without obstruction from the legislative chambers, for the constitution had given them the power of the purse. But by playing upon divisions within the assemblies and by threatening when necessary to appeal to the nation over their heads, he soon overcame all attempts to create a "constitutional opposition," and assumed powers that were in fact little less than dictatorial.

In order to redeem his second pledge by restoring civil peace within France

the First Consul found it necessary to heal the schism in the Gallican church. This meant coming to terms with the papacy and that, in turn, meant an about-face on the part of the French state with respect to the refractory clergy. In June, 1800, immediately after his victory at Marengo had restored French domination in Italy, Bonaparte opened secret negotiations with the newly elected pontiff, Pius VII. Doubts about the permanence of his regime led the papacy to proceed cautiously at first but in February, 1801, the Peace of Lunéville marked a completely victorious end to the war between France and its chief European enemy, Austria, and decisively confirmed the First Consul's domestic position. Rome prepared to conclude the negotiations, only to discover that Bonaparte had stiffened his terms. However, there seemed no other course open to the pope but to accept them if the Holy See were to retain its temporal possessions in Italy; therefore the Concordat finally signed in July, 1801, contained a number of far-reaching concessions to the principle of state control over religious affairs. The pope gave his sanction to the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, thus reassuring the purchasers of the "national lands" and reconciling the refractory clergy to the Republic. In return the French state assumed an obligation to pay the salaries of Catholic priests; bishops were to be nominated by the First Consul and consecrated by the pope; the lower clergy were to be appointed by the bishops. Catholicism was recognized as "the religion of the three consuls and of the great majority of Frenchmen," but the government retained the right to issue police regulations prescribing the manner in which all religious worship was to be "safe-guarded."

Acting under this intentionally vague police clause, Bonaparte arranged to neutralize the anticipated opposition of strong anticlerical groups in the legislative councils, where the Concordat would have to be ratified, by embodying its provisions in a more comprehensive law for the regulation of religious cults. This law provided for the payment of state salaries to Protestant clergymen as well as to priests, and it gave the government authority to edit the catechism, to limit the number of seminaries, and to exclude papal bulls or legates. The legislators, intimidated by the First Consul's great gain in popular esteem after the conclusion of peace with England in March, reluctantly voted the law in April, 1802. Ten days later a solemn *Te Deum* was celebrated at Nôtre Dame to signalize the reconciliation of France with the papacy. With some modifications, the Concordat of 1801 continued in effect down to 1905.

Both in economic and legal matters, as in religious affairs, Bonaparte showed the same desire to establish lasting compromises that would preserve the chief

gains of the middle classes and prevent either a fresh eruption of radical democratic forces on one hand or a return of the old regime on the other.

In finance the task of achieving stability had been made infinitely easier by the previous regime. The Directory had, in effect, permitted inflation to wipe out the public debt inherited from the old regime. The vast sums involved could hardly have been raised by taxation; instead the three billion francs owed by the state in 1789, plus the cost of ten years' large-scale warfare, were obtained by speeding up the printing presses. As paper money lost its value inflation operated like a hidden tax and distributed the extraordinary public burdens with rough equality.

It now remained for the Consulate to reestablish public credit. Bonaparte set about this task by consolidating that part of the debt still outstanding, by enforcing strict economy in all branches of the administration, by increasing greatly the efficiency of tax collections, by augmenting the tribute levied on the conquered territories, and by restoring general confidence in the stability of the government. By 1802 the budget had been balanced, at least on paper. The prices quoted for government securities rose steadily on the exchanges during the first years of the Consulate. In 1801 the First Consul founded the Bank of France, an ultraconservative central banking institution, expanded and strengthened in 1803, which considerably aided the government in financing its activities at reasonable rates of interest.

The codification of the laws, an aim that had been central to the reform program of the eighteenth-century philosophers, had been placed near the head of the list of things the Revolution ought to accomplish by all the national assemblies since 1789. Legal experts had been continuously at work, though their labors proceeded cautiously and slowly, bringing order into the vast body of statutes and customary law which France had developed both prior to and during the Revolution. This task was finally brought to fruition in the first years of the Consulate. Bonaparte himself actively participated in the revision of the experts' final draft by the Council of State. There his energy, his impatience with fine-spun legal quibbling, and his knack for resolving a complex problem in a common-sense compromise greatly hastened the completion of the project.

The resulting codes, of which the most significant was the Civil Code (subsequently adopted in substance by several other European countries and still in effect in the state of Louisiana), embodied a twofold series of compromises—first, between the pre-Revolutionary legal system and the ideal aims of the Revolution and, second, between the Roman law of southern France and the Teutonic common law of the north. In four essential respects the Codes gave

permanence to the great social reforms achieved since 1789—they reaffirmed the equality of all citizens before the law, the right of every individual to choose his profession and to exercise it subject only to the state's police power, the supremacy of the lay state in all religious and educational affairs, and the freedom of the individual conscience in matters of worship. Civil marriage and divorce were confirmed, as was the abolition of primogeniture. In several respects, however, the Codes represented a retreat from more democratic principles prominent in the earlier stages of the Revolution—for example, the rights of women, of minors, and of illegitimate children were notably diminished.

In their broad outlines, the Codes protected the interests of the propertied classes. To the citizen without property, little was granted except civil liberty. In contrast to the lively concern expressed by the republican leaders of '93 and '94 for "indigent patriots," the Napoleonic Codes displayed only the most callous indifference toward the poor and unemployed. Workers were forbidden to organize for collective bargaining, and the testimony of the employer was given greater weight than that of the worker in wage disputes. Police regulations were introduced requiring every worker to carry a little booklet (*livret de travail*) containing his employment record together with his employer's comments and official notations—a system that made it easy to black-list any employees who were not sufficiently docile and thus led to many abuses by employers. In the Penal Code, issued in 1810, the punishment of crimes against property was made more severe, and a number of barbarous punishments together with some of the lighter forms of judicial torture were reintroduced.

But with all these shortcomings the Napoleonic Codes did recognize religious liberty, civil rights, and equality of all citizens before the law. Privileges of birth found no place in them, and on the whole the principle was firmly established that no man might be punished without judgment of his peers, nor subjected to the will of another save by virtue of a contract to which he had freely assented. All careers would henceforth remain open to individuals of talent and ambition. Individual liberty and equal citizenship were secure.

"The Republic is Entrusted to an Emperor." With the signing of a peace treaty with England in 1802, France was at peace with all the powers of Europe after ten years of bitter struggle. Ten years of even more terrible warfare lay in the future, but at the moment few reflected that a resumption of hostilities was virtually unavoidable under the terms of the peace. For the treaty of Amiens had left France in a position of European dominance. The "balance of power" so dear to British statesmen since Tudor times had been destroyed.

Above all, France had been left in possession of the Low Countries, an area which Great Britain had long regarded as being of prime economic and strategic importance to herself, to be kept at all costs free of the control of any major Continental power. Incompetent British negotiators and a war-weary nation might temporarily allow these cardinal principles to be overlooked, but eventually Britain's self-preservation would demand that they be reasserted.

Because he had brought peace, however, the prestige of the First Consul had risen to phenomenal heights. The French people were asked in a new plebiscite whether the ten-year term of the First Consul should be extended to life tenure, and almost with one voice they gave their hearty approval. A year later, in May, 1804, after the exposure of a royalist conspiracy to assassinate him, the First Consul was prevailed upon by an anxious Senate to become the first emperor of a new dynasty established by the nation "to remove all hopes from the contemptible remains of the dynasty which it had overturned." This decision "to entrust the government of the Republic to an emperor" was ratified by another national plebiscite as unanimous as the previous ones. On December 2, 1804, Pius VII, who had been summoned to Paris to officiate at the coronation, was about to set the crown on Napoleon's head when the latter snatched it and crowned himself.

The new owners of national lands and the regicide politicians had acquired an additional bulwark against a return of the Bourbons. Napoleon's son if he should have one or, if not, then a designated member of his family, and not the family of Louis XVI, would rule France at Napoleon's death. Otherwise there was little change either in the constitution or in the actual government. Symbolically, the coinage was restamped so that on one side of a five-franc piece one might now read "*République Française*" and on the reverse "*Napoléon I, Empereur*." A Legion of Honor had already been created shortly after the Peace of Amiens, when it had seemed desirable to provide extra rewards for numerous unemployed military heroes who had come back to Paris thoroughly disgruntled at the prospect of living on half pay. It was hardly more than a natural extension of this institution when, in 1808, new titles of nobility began to be conferred on especially meritorious servants of the state.

Napoleon and Europe. In May, 1803, the uneasy truce established the previous year was finally ruptured by a British declaration of renewed hostilities. War had been partly provoked by Napoleon's arrogant flouting of the treaty of Amiens and partly by Britain's reversion to its traditional policy of preventing any one power from dominating the European continent. In its broader ramifications the struggle now reopened was a continuation of the long

Franco-British duel for world empire and economic supremacy begun in the reign of Louis XIV.

The greatest sea power of the earth confronted the world's strongest land power. Neither could, therefore, come at its opponent directly. England was obliged to wage land warfare through its continental allies, keeping their armies in the field by means of lavish subsidies, while simultaneously seeking to weaken France economically by blockading its ports. Napoleon's only effective reply to this strategy of constriction and attrition was to smash the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian forces as often as they took the field against him, and to attempt by means of a counter-blockade to bankrupt the "nation of shopkeepers" by shutting the ports of Europe to their trade. For ten years victory eluded both sides, but in the end the coastline of Europe proved too long to be effectively sealed against smuggled British goods, and, although the Bank of England ceased temporarily to redeem its note issue in gold, and though some British industries were hard pressed, the economic life of the British Isles was never seriously endangered. French industry, however, was cut off from supplies of such essential raw materials as cotton and was unable to supply European markets with manufactured goods at reasonable prices. In the end, not even the military genius of Napoleon was sufficient to keep the Continent subjected to France.

In the autumn of 1804, Napoleon was probably closer to a decisive victory than at any subsequent time, though his greatest land campaigns were still to be fought. For more than a year he had been busily assembling a magnificent army at Boulogne on the English Channel. A vast fleet of barges and flat boats had been constructed to ferry these troops across the twenty miles of intervening water to England. Had this narrow obstacle ever been passed the war would have been over, for only a pathetic handful of regular troops was available to oppose an invasion. But as long as British men-of-war patrolled the Channel, Napoleon's flotilla dared not put to sea. Napoleon tried by a series of partly successful feints on the part of his outnumbered fleet to draw off the British frigates guarding the Channel long enough to set his army on the opposite shore—twenty-four hours, he later lamented, would have sufficed. All these hopes for a quick decision vanished abruptly, however, when Lord Nelson, with characteristic daring, led his own smaller squadron against the main Franco-Spanish fleet and virtually annihilated it off the Spanish coast near Cape Trafalgar in October, 1805. Nelson himself was killed during the first hour of battle, but England was safe. Though Napoleon might still win many brilliant victories, he now had only the slenderest chance of winning the war.

For eight more years no army in Europe could hold the field against the

French. Because Napoleon's enemies were jealous of one another he did not have to meet their combined forces until 1813. Thus in 1805 first Austria and then Russia separately sent armies against him; at Ulm he crushed the Austrians, and at Austerlitz he routed a hastily and ineffectively combined force of Austrians and Russians. Prussia had stood passively by while Austria was laid low and Russia driven back to Poland. Then in 1806, with ludicrous confidence in the antiquated military machine inherited from Frederick the Great, Prussia challenged the French colossus to single-handed combat. Napoleon demolished the flower of Prussia's army almost without effort at Jena and took up quarters in Berlin. Shorn of half its territories, Prussia was saddled with a crushing indemnity.

Pursuing the shattered remnant of the tsar's forces into the East Prussian marshes, Napoleon completed the destruction of the armies of the Third Coalition in the following year by the bloody battles of Eylau and Friedland. That summer he and Tsar Alexander I met on a raft in the middle of the river Niemen and concluded the Treaty of Tilsit (July 8, 1807) under the terms of which Russia agreed to join the Continental System against England, while Napoleon agreed that his new ally might have a free hand against the crumbling Ottoman Empire and might annex the duchy of Finland.

Napoleon had reached the zenith of his power. From Naples to St. Petersburg the ports of Europe were, at least on paper, sealed against British imports. In France his position was unchallenged. French industry, sheltered from British competition and fed with generous state subsidies, was enjoying unparalleled growth and prosperity. The crowned heads of Europe, knowing that their fate hung upon Napoleon's decisions, dared not oppose his will. At his word ancient thrones were vacated and new ones created to provide royal scepters for a whole swarming clan of Bonapartes—brother Joseph became king of Spain, brother Louis king of Holland, brother Jerome king of Westphalia, and brother-in-law Joachim Murat became king of Naples. When Napoleon declared that he no longer recognized a Holy Roman Emperor the Hapsburgs hastened to drop their ancient title and became simply "hereditary emperors of Austria." Despairing of Josephine's ability to provide him with a male heir to his throne, he divorced her and married the daughter of the Austrian emperor, the Archduchess Marie Louise, who was a niece of Marie Antoinette.

Yet clouds had already started to gather. In 1808 guerrilla warfare broke out in Spain; King Joseph was driven from Madrid, and an English army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, later duke of Wellington, landed to cooperate with the rebels. Napoleon was to pour hundreds of thousands of his best troops

into the Iberian Peninsula during the next five years, but the indomitable national spirit of the insurgents, the nature of the terrain, and the elusive tactics of the enemy completely frustrated all his efforts to subjugate the country.

Prussia and Austria were rallying their strength under the sting of defeat. Correctly attributing Prussia's ignominious collapse to her social and political backwardness, the patriotic Chancellor Baron vom Stein labored mightily through 1807 and 1808, the years of her deepest humiliation, to free the serfs, to establish occupational freedom, to introduce municipal self-government, and to break down the barriers between bourgeois and noble. Evading Napoleon's edict that had limited the Prussian army to 42,000 men, brilliant military organizers such as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau trained a new army in annual installments of 42,000, while nationalistic fervor was aroused throughout Germany by the eloquence of orators such as Fichte, by the marching songs of Arndt, and by the patriotic gymnastic societies formed by "Father" Jahn.

Meanwhile Archduke Charles of Austria was preparing to lead against Napoleon a reconstituted army recruited by national conscription and fired with patriotic enthusiasm in still another attempt to drive the Corsican upstart from his throne. In the ensuing war of 1809 Napoleon met for the first time an opposing general who was very nearly his equal and, though the decisive battle of the campaign at Wagram on the Danube was technically a French victory, Napoleon's touch had lost its old sureness and his army was beginning to show evidences of flagging morale, sluggishness in maneuver, and shoddy staff work. Worst of all, the revolutionary legions of France were being more and more diluted with conscripted German, Polish, and Italian auxiliaries who were deficient both in skill and in enthusiasm. By far too many French veterans were being used to pursue Spanish irregulars or to garrison the conquered countries.

Then, in 1812, came the disastrous Russian campaign. Disappointed with the meager gains which Napoleon had allowed Russia to derive from their partnership after 1807, Tsar Alexander had drawn away from the Continental System and had opened his ports to English vessels sailing under neutral flags. Napoleon believed that he must either force Alexander to rejoin his system of alliances or abandon hope of ever concluding an advantageous peace with England. Unless compelled to do so by the Continental System, England would never allow France to keep the conquests of the Revolution, and these Napoleon felt that he could not relinquish without at the same time forfeiting his throne. He counted on winning a quick, decisive battle near the border of

Russia and Europe; perhaps only a parade of his strength would be enough to make the tsar see reason.

Accordingly, France and her satellites were ransacked for soldiers to make up the Grand Army of 600,000 men which, in the late spring of 1812, marched across the Russian frontier. Instead of giving battle as Napoleon hoped, however, the Russian armies fell back into the interior, burning and destroying everything useful as they retreated. Unable to live off the country, and finding its supply lines at the mercy of guerrilla detachments, the Grand Army soon began to be footsore and hungry in the summer heat. At Borodino, almost within sight of Moscow, the Russian commander Kutuzov turned suddenly and fought a battle that was extremely costly to both sides, though indecisive in that the Russian army was not destroyed.

Napoleon entered Moscow in triumph, fully expecting the tsar to sue for peace. Instead the Russians set fire to their capital; three-fourths of the city was gutted; and Napoleon, who had counted on its shelter as winter quarters for his troops, now was compelled, just as the first snows began to fall, to order a retreat over the same devastated route by which the Grand Army had come. Thousands died of hunger and frostbite, and thousands more were cut down or taken prisoner by pursuing Cossacks. Only an exhausted, ragged remnant of 50,000 stumbled back across the Russian border. Napoleon himself had abandoned his stricken army, for he had been summoned posthaste back to Paris to scotch a conspiracy against his throne organized by his foreign minister, Talleyrand, and his minister of police, Fouché. Having reprimanded the culprits—without daring to punish them more severely, for their services were indispensable—he issued a laconic bulletin which neglected to mention the catastrophe in Russia but assured the nation that “the Emperor has never enjoyed better health.”

The year 1813 witnessed the crumbling of Napoleon’s whole grandiose structure of power. As the year opened, Austria, Russia, and Prussia were massing for a concerted onslaught. The puppet states drove out their French garrisons and their Bonaparte kings. Hastily assembling a new army, Napoleon moved swiftly to meet his enemies before they could join forces in central Germany. There, October 16–18 at Leipzig, a three-day Battle of the Nations was fought, and the French were decisively beaten. Falling back into France, Napoleon still managed to parry one allied thrust after another until his marshals, despairing of victory, compelled him to abdicate in favor of his infant son.

The Allies, however, entered Paris on March 31, 1814, and they insisted upon establishing the Bourbon Louis XVIII, brother of the late king, on the

throne. This was tamely voted by Napoleon's own Senate. ("Louis XVII," acknowledged by royalist emigrants as king after the execution of his father, had died in a Parisian prison in 1795.) The emperor himself was allowed to keep his empty title, was given a pension of two million francs a year by the victorious Allies, and was given sovereignty over the tiny island of Elba between Italy and Corsica.

The four victorious powers were disposed to treat France leniently. No indemnity was imposed, and the frontiers of 1792 were restored. Louis XVIII was enjoined to accept the major changes of the Revolution, to grant a constitution, and to install some form of representative government. He also retained the Napoleonic administrative system, the legal codes, the financial and fiscal machinery of the Empire, and many of its leading functionaries, among these the supple Talleyrand.

France had received the news of Napoleon's abdication with little regret, but after nine months of the restored Bourbon regime popular sentiment toward the departed Emperor underwent a profound alteration. More and more Frenchmen began to speak with nostalgia of the vanished glories of the Empire. Peasants and members of the middle classes grew uneasy when crowds of émigrés came flocking back to France determined to recover all they had lost since 1789. Patriots and discharged veterans of Napoleon's armies smarted under the humiliation of serving a humdrum, gout-ridden king who had been "smuggled into France in the baggage train of the allied army."

Heartened by news of these developments, Napoleon determined to stake everything on one last desperate throw of the dice. Slipping away from his unsuspecting British guards in February, 1815, he landed at Cannes and made his way triumphantly to Paris, gathering an enthusiastic army of cheering supporters around him as he went. Town after town opened its gates to him before a shot had been fired. Troops sent to arrest him ended by rallying to his standard. By March 20 he reached the capital, from which Louis XVIII had already fled in undignified haste.

For a hundred days the Empire was restored. Swiftly Napoleon gathered an army. Hearing the news of his return, the four allied powers ceased squabbling in Vienna over the division of the spoils of victory and prepared to crush Napoleon, whom they declared an outlaw. To enlist popular support in France, the Emperor proclaimed that he had learned from his past mistakes and that, if victorious in the coming campaign, he would institute a liberal regime and abandon wars of conquest. But, as he was well aware, the test of arms would be the crucial one, and he prepared to renew his old strategy of defeating the converging allied armies one at a time.

Against Blücher's Prussians advancing through Belgium he was successful on June 16, but he had to turn immediately to meet a second army under Wellington in the vicinity of Brussels. On June 18, at Waterloo, the battle swayed back and forth, but the British stood firm, meeting one desperate French assault after another with murderous fire. French reinforcements under Marshal Grouchy missed their way and failed to arrive in time, but Blücher and his Prussians did, and when the blood-red sun went down the French had been routed beyond all hope of recovery.

Abdicating a second time, Napoleon surrendered to the captain of a British frigate which took him to the remote island of St. Helena off the African coast. There he remained under heavy guard as a prisoner of the British, lest the peace of Europe should again be disturbed, and there he died at the age of fifty-one on May 5, 1821, after he had finished dictating a voluminous and highly mendacious set of memoirs that served to establish him within a generation as the Promethean hero of an immortal Napoleonic Legend.

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